LKML Archive on lore.kernel.org
help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
To: Waiman Long <longman9394@gmail.com>,
	Jiri Kosina <jikos@kernel.org>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
	Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
	Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>,
	Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>,
	David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>,
	Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>,
	Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>,
	Casey Schaufler <casey.schaufler@intel.com>,
	Asit Mallick <asit.k.mallick@intel.com>,
	Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>,
	Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com>,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org
Subject: Re: [Patch v3 03/13] x86/speculation: Add static key for Enhanced IBRS
Date: Fri, 26 Oct 2018 11:15:35 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <90d6723f-9cb9-e299-3e99-fa01c2518c29@linux.intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <b5b6f492-8bf0-7fcc-eb4f-3016b4d46c08@gmail.com>

On 10/26/2018 09:58 AM, Waiman Long wrote:
> On 10/17/2018 01:59 PM, Tim Chen wrote:
>> Add static key to indicate whether we are using Enhanced IBRS to mitigate
>> Spectre v2.  This will be used in later patches to disengage STIBP code
>> for Spectre v2 mitigation as STIBP is not needed when Enhanced IBRS is
>> in use.
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
>> ---
>>  arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h | 3 +++
>>  arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c           | 4 ++++
>>  2 files changed, 7 insertions(+)
>>
>> diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
>> index fd2a8c1..d57e84e 100644
>> --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
>> +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
>> @@ -3,6 +3,7 @@
>>  #ifndef _ASM_X86_NOSPEC_BRANCH_H_
>>  #define _ASM_X86_NOSPEC_BRANCH_H_
>>  
>> +#include <linux/static_key.h>
>>  #include <asm/alternative.h>
>>  #include <asm/alternative-asm.h>
>>  #include <asm/cpufeatures.h>
>> @@ -228,6 +229,8 @@ enum ssb_mitigation {
>>  extern char __indirect_thunk_start[];
>>  extern char __indirect_thunk_end[];
>>  
>> +DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(spectre_v2_enhanced_ibrs);
>> +
>>  /*
>>   * On VMEXIT we must ensure that no RSB predictions learned in the guest
>>   * can be followed in the host, by overwriting the RSB completely. Both
>> diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
>> index b2f6b8b..2fc7b4e 100644
>> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
>> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
>> @@ -142,6 +142,9 @@ static const char *spectre_v2_strings[] = {
>>  	[SPECTRE_V2_IBRS_ENHANCED]		= "Mitigation: Enhanced IBRS",
>>  };
>>  
>> +DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(spectre_v2_enhanced_ibrs);
>> +EXPORT_SYMBOL(spectre_v2_enhanced_ibrs);
>> +
>>  #undef pr_fmt
>>  #define pr_fmt(fmt)     "Spectre V2 : " fmt
>>  
>> @@ -386,6 +389,7 @@ static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void)
>>  			/* Force it so VMEXIT will restore correctly */
>>  			x86_spec_ctrl_base |= SPEC_CTRL_IBRS;
>>  			wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, x86_spec_ctrl_base);
>> +			static_branch_enable(&spectre_v2_enhanced_ibrs);
>>  			goto specv2_set_mode;
>>  		}
>>  		if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RETPOLINE))
> 
> Why you need a static key for enhanced IBRS? It is supposed to be set at
> boot time and never get changed after that. It will be easier to use a
> feature bit for that instead. We usually use static key when the value
> can be changed at run time.
>

We're close to running out of the feature bits.  So I'm trying not to
use those.

Tim


  reply	other threads:[~2018-10-26 18:15 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 47+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2018-10-17 17:59 [Patch v3 00/13] Provide process property based options to enable Spectre v2 userspace-userspace protection Tim Chen
2018-10-17 17:59 ` [Patch v3 01/13] x86/speculation: Clean up spectre_v2_parse_cmdline Tim Chen
2018-10-18 12:43   ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-10-17 17:59 ` [Patch v3 02/13] x86/speculation: Remove unnecessary ret variable in cpu_show_common Tim Chen
2018-10-18 12:46   ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-10-17 17:59 ` [Patch v3 03/13] x86/speculation: Add static key for Enhanced IBRS Tim Chen
2018-10-18 12:50   ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-10-26 16:58   ` Waiman Long
2018-10-26 18:15     ` Tim Chen [this message]
2018-10-28  9:32       ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-10-17 17:59 ` [Patch v3 04/13] x86/speculation: Disable STIBP when enhanced IBRS is in use Tim Chen
2018-10-18 12:58   ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-10-26 17:00   ` Waiman Long
2018-10-26 18:18     ` Tim Chen
2018-10-26 18:29       ` Tim Chen
2018-10-17 17:59 ` [Patch v3 05/13] x86/smt: Create cpu_smt_enabled static key for SMT specific code Tim Chen
2018-10-18 13:03   ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-10-19  7:51   ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-10-17 17:59 ` [Patch v3 06/13] mm: Pass task instead of task->mm as argument to set_dumpable Tim Chen
2018-10-18 13:22   ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-10-19 20:02   ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-10-17 17:59 ` [Patch v3 07/13] x86/process Add arch_set_dumpable Tim Chen
2018-10-18 13:28   ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-10-18 18:46     ` Tim Chen
2018-10-19 19:12       ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-10-19 20:16         ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-10-22 23:55           ` Tim Chen
2018-10-17 17:59 ` [Patch v3 08/13] x86/speculation: Rename SSBD update functions Tim Chen
2018-10-18 13:37   ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-10-17 17:59 ` [Patch v3 09/13] x86/speculation: Reorganize SPEC_CTRL MSR update Tim Chen
2018-10-18 13:47   ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-10-26 17:21   ` Waiman Long
2018-10-26 18:25     ` Tim Chen
2018-10-17 17:59 ` [Patch v3 10/13] x86/speculation: Add per thread STIBP flag Tim Chen
2018-10-18 13:53   ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-10-17 17:59 ` [Patch v3 11/13] x86/speculation: Add Spectre v2 lite app to app protection mode Tim Chen
2018-10-18 15:12   ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-10-17 17:59 ` [Patch v3 12/13] x86/speculation: Protect non-dumpable processes against Spectre v2 attack Tim Chen
2018-10-18 15:17   ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-10-26 17:46   ` Waiman Long
2018-10-26 18:10     ` Tim Chen
2018-10-17 17:59 ` [Patch v3 13/13] x86/speculation: Create PRCTL interface to restrict indirect branch speculation Tim Chen
2018-10-17 19:12   ` Randy Dunlap
2018-10-18 15:31   ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-10-19  7:57 ` [Patch v3 00/13] Provide process property based options to enable Spectre v2 userspace-userspace protection Peter Zijlstra
2018-10-19 16:43   ` Tim Chen
2018-10-19 18:38     ` Peter Zijlstra

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=90d6723f-9cb9-e299-3e99-fa01c2518c29@linux.intel.com \
    --to=tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com \
    --cc=aarcange@redhat.com \
    --cc=ak@linux.intel.com \
    --cc=arjan@linux.intel.com \
    --cc=asit.k.mallick@intel.com \
    --cc=casey.schaufler@intel.com \
    --cc=dave.hansen@intel.com \
    --cc=dwmw@amazon.co.uk \
    --cc=jcm@redhat.com \
    --cc=jikos@kernel.org \
    --cc=jpoimboe@redhat.com \
    --cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=longman9394@gmail.com \
    --cc=mingo@redhat.com \
    --cc=peterz@infradead.org \
    --cc=tglx@linutronix.de \
    --cc=thomas.lendacky@amd.com \
    --cc=x86@kernel.org \
    --subject='Re: [Patch v3 03/13] x86/speculation: Add static key for Enhanced IBRS' \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link

This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox;
as well as URLs for NNTP newsgroup(s).