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* [PATCH 1/1] ima: check control characters in policy file path
@ 2021-08-14 8:27 Tianxing Zhang
2021-08-17 17:45 ` Mimi Zohar
0 siblings, 1 reply; 2+ messages in thread
From: Tianxing Zhang @ 2021-08-14 8:27 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: zohar
Cc: linux-integrity, linux-security-module, linux-kernel, Tianxing Zhang
When a policy file path contains control characters like '\r' or '\b',
invalid error messages can be printed to overwrite system messages:
$ echo -e "/\rtest 12345678" > /sys/kernel/security/ima/policy
This patch rejects policy paths with control characters.
Signed-off-by: Tianxing Zhang <anakinzhang96@gmail.com>
---
security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c | 9 +++++++++
1 file changed, 9 insertions(+)
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c
index 3d8e9d5db5aa..e6daa138de89 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c
@@ -316,6 +316,7 @@ static ssize_t ima_write_policy(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
{
char *data;
ssize_t result;
+ int i;
if (datalen >= PAGE_SIZE)
datalen = PAGE_SIZE - 1;
@@ -331,6 +332,14 @@ static ssize_t ima_write_policy(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
goto out;
}
+ for (i = 0; data[i] != '\n' && data[i] != '\0'; i++) {
+ if (iscntrl(data[i])) {
+ pr_err_once("file path with no control characters required\n");
+ result = -EINVAL;
+ goto out_free;
+ }
+ }
+
result = mutex_lock_interruptible(&ima_write_mutex);
if (result < 0)
goto out_free;
--
2.25.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 2+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH 1/1] ima: check control characters in policy file path
2021-08-14 8:27 [PATCH 1/1] ima: check control characters in policy file path Tianxing Zhang
@ 2021-08-17 17:45 ` Mimi Zohar
0 siblings, 0 replies; 2+ messages in thread
From: Mimi Zohar @ 2021-08-17 17:45 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Tianxing Zhang; +Cc: linux-integrity, linux-security-module, linux-kernel
On Sat, 2021-08-14 at 16:27 +0800, Tianxing Zhang wrote:
> When a policy file path contains control characters like '\r' or '\b',
> invalid error messages can be printed to overwrite system messages:
>
> $ echo -e "/\rtest 12345678" > /sys/kernel/security/ima/policy
>
> This patch rejects policy paths with control characters.
>
> Signed-off-by: Tianxing Zhang <anakinzhang96@gmail.com>
> ---
> security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c | 9 +++++++++
> 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+)
>
> diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c
> index 3d8e9d5db5aa..e6daa138de89 100644
> --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c
> +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c
> @@ -316,6 +316,7 @@ static ssize_t ima_write_policy(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
> {
> char *data;
> ssize_t result;
> + int i;
>
> if (datalen >= PAGE_SIZE)
> datalen = PAGE_SIZE - 1;
> @@ -331,6 +332,14 @@ static ssize_t ima_write_policy(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
> goto out;
> }
>
> + for (i = 0; data[i] != '\n' && data[i] != '\0'; i++) {
> + if (iscntrl(data[i])) {
> + pr_err_once("file path with no control characters required\n");
> + result = -EINVAL;
> + goto out_free;
> + }
> + }
> +
> result = mutex_lock_interruptible(&ima_write_mutex);
> if (result < 0)
> goto out_free;
The IMA audit messages already display pathnames via
audit_log_untrustedstring(). Shouldn't any change be limited to the
ima_policy_read() code path?
thanks,
Mimi
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 2+ messages in thread
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