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From: Eric Snowberg <eric.snowberg@oracle.com>
To: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: keyrings@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-integrity <linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org>,
	David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>,
	David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>,
	Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>,
	"David S . Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>,
	jarkko@kernel.org, jmorris@namei.org, serge@hallyn.com,
	keescook@chromium.org, gregkh@linuxfoundation.org,
	torvalds@linux-foundation.org, scott.branden@broadcom.com,
	weiyongjun1@huawei.com, nayna@linux.ibm.com, ebiggers@google.com,
	ardb@kernel.org, nramas@linux.microsoft.com, lszubowi@redhat.com,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
	James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com, pjones@redhat.com,
	"konrad.wilk@oracle.com" <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v5 01/12] integrity: Introduce a Linux keyring called machine
Date: Thu, 9 Sep 2021 11:32:01 -0600	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <AE8C24C2-8F6F-4386-B804-532BE11F7F43@oracle.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <02024a370f3180e5a6668282e5843ab58bf2a073.camel@linux.ibm.com>


> On Sep 9, 2021, at 9:19 AM, Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> wrote:
> 
> On Tue, 2021-09-07 at 12:00 -0400, Eric Snowberg wrote:
>> Many UEFI Linux distributions boot using shim.  The UEFI shim provides
>> what is called Machine Owner Keys (MOK). Shim uses both the UEFI Secure
>> Boot DB and MOK keys to validate the next step in the boot chain.  The
>> MOK facility can be used to import user generated keys.  These keys can
>> be used to sign an end-users development kernel build.  When Linux
>> boots, both UEFI Secure Boot DB and MOK keys get loaded in the Linux
>> .platform keyring.
>> 
>> Add a new Linux keyring called machine.  This keyring shall contain just
> 
> ^Define

I’ll change this in the next round.

> 
>> MOK CA keys and not the remaining keys in the platform keyring. This new
>> machine keyring will be used in follow on patches.  Unlike keys in the
>> platform keyring, keys contained in the machine keyring will be trusted
>> within the kernel if the end-user has chosen to do so.
>> 
>> Signed-off-by: Eric Snowberg <eric.snowberg@oracle.com>
>> ---
>> v1: Initial version
>> v2: Removed destory keyring code
>> v3: Unmodified from v2
>> v4: Add Kconfig, merged in "integrity: add add_to_mok_keyring" 
>> v5: Rename to machine keyring
>> ---
>> security/integrity/Kconfig                    | 11 +++++
>> security/integrity/Makefile                   |  1 +
>> security/integrity/digsig.c                   |  1 +
>> security/integrity/integrity.h                | 12 +++++-
>> .../platform_certs/machine_keyring.c          | 42 +++++++++++++++++++
>> 5 files changed, 66 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
>> create mode 100644 security/integrity/platform_certs/machine_keyring.c
>> 
>> diff --git a/security/integrity/Kconfig b/security/integrity/Kconfig
>> index 71f0177e8716..52193b86768a 100644
>> --- a/security/integrity/Kconfig
>> +++ b/security/integrity/Kconfig
>> @@ -62,6 +62,17 @@ config INTEGRITY_PLATFORM_KEYRING
>>          provided by the platform for verifying the kexec'ed kerned image
>>          and, possibly, the initramfs signature.
>> 
>> +config INTEGRITY_MACHINE_KEYRING
>> +	bool "Provide a keyring to which CA Machine Owner Keys may be added"
>> +	depends on SECONDARY_TRUSTED_KEYRING
>> +	depends on INTEGRITY_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS
>> +	depends on SYSTEM_BLACKLIST_KEYRING
>> +	help
>> +	 If set, provide a keyring to which CA Machine Owner Keys (MOK) may
>> +	 be added. This keyring shall contain just CA MOK keys.  Unlike keys
>> +	 in the platform keyring, keys contained in the .machine keyring will
>> +	 be trusted within the kernel.
> 
> No sense in creating the ".machine" keyring, unless it is possible to
> safely load CA certificates on it.  At least for the time being, this
> should also be dependent on EFI.
> 

Will also add a depends for EFI

>> +++ b/security/integrity/platform_certs/machine_keyring.c
>> @@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
>> +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
>> +/*
>> + * Machine keyring routines.
>> + *
>> + * Copyright (c) 2021, Oracle and/or its affiliates.
>> + */
>> +
>> +#include "../integrity.h"
>> +
>> +static __init int machine_keyring_init(void)
>> +{
>> +	int rc;
>> +
>> +	rc = integrity_init_keyring(INTEGRITY_KEYRING_MACHINE);
>> +	if (rc)
>> +		return rc;
>> +
>> +	pr_notice("Machine keyring initialized\n");
>> +	return 0;
>> +}
>> +device_initcall(machine_keyring_init);
>> +
>> +void __init add_to_machine_keyring(const char *source, const void *data, size_t len)
>> +{
>> +	key_perm_t perm;
>> +	int rc;
>> +
>> +	perm = (KEY_POS_ALL & ~KEY_POS_SETATTR) | KEY_USR_VIEW;
>> +	rc = integrity_load_cert(INTEGRITY_KEYRING_MACHINE, source, data, len, perm);
>> +
>> +	/*
>> +	 * Some MOKList keys may not pass the machine keyring restrictions.
>> +	 * If the restriction check does not pass and the platform keyring
>> +	 * is configured, try to add it into that keyring instead.
>> +	 */
>> +	if (rc)
> 
> In addition to the comment, also test to see if the ".platform" keyring
> is configured.

and will add this too. Thanks.



  reply	other threads:[~2021-09-09 17:33 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 31+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2021-09-07 16:00 [PATCH v5 00/12] Enroll kernel keys thru MOK Eric Snowberg
2021-09-07 16:00 ` [PATCH v5 01/12] integrity: Introduce a Linux keyring called machine Eric Snowberg
2021-09-09 13:55   ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2021-09-09 15:19   ` Mimi Zohar
2021-09-09 17:32     ` Eric Snowberg [this message]
2021-09-07 16:01 ` [PATCH v5 02/12] integrity: Do not allow machine keyring updates following init Eric Snowberg
2021-09-09 13:43   ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2021-09-07 16:01 ` [PATCH v5 03/12] KEYS: CA link restriction Eric Snowberg
2021-09-07 16:01 ` [PATCH v5 04/12] integrity: restrict INTEGRITY_KEYRING_MACHINE to restrict_link_by_ca Eric Snowberg
2021-09-09 13:49   ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2021-09-09 17:25   ` Mimi Zohar
2021-09-09 17:53     ` Eric Snowberg
2021-09-09 18:19       ` Mimi Zohar
2021-09-07 16:01 ` [PATCH v5 05/12] integrity: add new keyring handler for mok keys Eric Snowberg
2021-09-07 16:01 ` [PATCH v5 06/12] KEYS: add a reference to machine keyring Eric Snowberg
2021-09-07 16:01 ` [PATCH v5 07/12] KEYS: Introduce link restriction to include builtin, secondary and machine keys Eric Snowberg
2021-09-09 17:26   ` Mimi Zohar
2021-09-09 18:03     ` Eric Snowberg
2021-09-09 18:19       ` Mimi Zohar
2021-09-07 16:01 ` [PATCH v5 08/12] KEYS: integrity: change link restriction to trust the machine keyring Eric Snowberg
2021-09-09 17:27   ` Mimi Zohar
2021-09-07 16:01 ` [PATCH v5 09/12] KEYS: link secondary_trusted_keys to machine trusted keys Eric Snowberg
2021-09-07 16:01 ` [PATCH v5 10/12] integrity: store reference to machine keyring Eric Snowberg
2021-09-07 16:01 ` [PATCH v5 11/12] integrity: Trust MOK keys if MokListTrustedRT found Eric Snowberg
2021-09-07 16:01 ` [PATCH v5 12/12] integrity: Only use machine keyring when uefi_check_trust_mok_keys is true Eric Snowberg
2021-09-09 13:58   ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2021-09-08 16:03 ` [PATCH v5 00/12] Enroll kernel keys thru MOK Jarkko Sakkinen
2021-09-08 16:49   ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2021-09-08 22:25     ` Eric Snowberg
2021-09-09 13:02       ` Mimi Zohar
2021-09-08 17:09   ` Eric Snowberg

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