From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: from smtp.codeaurora.org by pdx-caf-mail.web.codeaurora.org (Dovecot) with LMTP id GL0WOhd4GVu8LgAAmS7hNA ; Thu, 07 Jun 2018 18:23:38 +0000 Received: by smtp.codeaurora.org (Postfix, from userid 1000) id 0050F6074D; Thu, 7 Jun 2018 18:23:37 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.codeaurora.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.b="LXvoUXqc" X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on pdx-caf-mail.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-3.0 required=2.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIM_SIGNED, DKIM_VALID,DKIM_VALID_AU,MAILING_LIST_MULTI,T_DKIMWL_WL_HIGH autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [209.132.180.67]) by smtp.codeaurora.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 7367D606DD; Thu, 7 Jun 2018 18:23:37 +0000 (UTC) DMARC-Filter: OpenDMARC Filter v1.3.2 smtp.codeaurora.org 7367D606DD Authentication-Results: pdx-caf-mail.web.codeaurora.org; dmarc=fail (p=none dis=none) header.from=kernel.org Authentication-Results: pdx-caf-mail.web.codeaurora.org; spf=none smtp.mailfrom=linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S936251AbeFGSXf (ORCPT + 25 others); Thu, 7 Jun 2018 14:23:35 -0400 Received: from mail.kernel.org ([198.145.29.99]:60810 "EHLO mail.kernel.org" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S932775AbeFGSXb (ORCPT ); Thu, 7 Jun 2018 14:23:31 -0400 Received: from mail-wm0-f42.google.com (mail-wm0-f42.google.com [74.125.82.42]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 (128/128 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 1E0BE208A6 for ; Thu, 7 Jun 2018 18:23:31 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=default; t=1528395811; bh=DGas0yYUuBo/5SrdIsEdP/gAywZcnq69Xrqlg0GVx6w=; h=References:In-Reply-To:From:Date:Subject:To:Cc:From; b=LXvoUXqcKFc4wkPjVuPKCOr/TI4C4scO5Im/yFQh5NAueRmiV1wM6tNyz1N7qo/zo vANLnZcaxJuDwdnu6H6zZex+8iCgSJrwDqdX3ZF2NtNwvqLh4JbtFRuTrNBfeUyWJN +/1WJ6scCD8fqKPoUMnyWrWKJHuisAyCiHfmQajo= Received: by mail-wm0-f42.google.com with SMTP id p11-v6so21003929wmc.4 for ; Thu, 07 Jun 2018 11:23:31 -0700 (PDT) X-Gm-Message-State: APt69E0iWPopkg6gp/yj0FqoOOfh2UQUY1mdNAFR2YtBi3huUrxTeXqN Oxz5wGqEY9Na8Ee7fZGVpI1qepiao+cgjRIottYXUw== X-Google-Smtp-Source: ADUXVKJHpM882L3Q+Vlp7ccJIZHQl5pyTEVjKKBZThX7P6LpV6vD6pAXi9Ss8Cg+Obr4PB58vabINokxGjwRh5gtzrM= X-Received: by 2002:a1c:34c9:: with SMTP id b192-v6mr2481696wma.21.1528395809621; Thu, 07 Jun 2018 11:23:29 -0700 (PDT) MIME-Version: 1.0 References: <20180607143807.3611-1-yu-cheng.yu@intel.com> <20180607143807.3611-2-yu-cheng.yu@intel.com> <1528393611.4636.70.camel@2b52.sc.intel.com> In-Reply-To: <1528393611.4636.70.camel@2b52.sc.intel.com> From: Andy Lutomirski Date: Thu, 7 Jun 2018 11:23:18 -0700 X-Gmail-Original-Message-ID: Message-ID: Subject: Re: [PATCH 01/10] x86/cet: User-mode shadow stack support To: Yu-cheng Yu , Florian Weimer Cc: Andrew Lutomirski , LKML , linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, Linux-MM , linux-arch , X86 ML , "H. Peter Anvin" , Thomas Gleixner , Ingo Molnar , "H. J. Lu" , "Shanbhogue, Vedvyas" , "Ravi V. Shankar" , Dave Hansen , Jonathan Corbet , Oleg Nesterov , Arnd Bergmann , mike.kravetz@oracle.com Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8" Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org On Thu, Jun 7, 2018 at 10:50 AM Yu-cheng Yu wrote: > > On Thu, 2018-06-07 at 09:37 -0700, Andy Lutomirski wrote: > > On Thu, Jun 7, 2018 at 7:41 AM Yu-cheng Yu wrote: > > > > > > This patch adds basic shadow stack enabling/disabling routines. > > > A task's shadow stack is allocated from memory with VM_SHSTK > > > flag set and read-only protection. The shadow stack is > > > allocated to a fixed size and that can be changed by the system > > > admin. > > > > How do threads work? Can a user program mremap() its shadow stack to > > make it bigger? > > A pthread's shadow stack is allocated/freed by the kernel. This patch > has the supporting routines that handle both non-pthread and pthread. > > In [PATCH 04/10] "Handle thread shadow stack", we allocate pthread > shadow stack in copy_thread_tls(), and free it in deactivate_mm(). > > If clone of a pthread fails, shadow stack is freed in > cet_disable_free_shstk() below (I will add more comments): > > If (Current thread existing) > Disable and free shadow stack > > If (Clone of a pthread fails) > Free the pthread shadow stack > > We block mremap, mprotect, madvise, and munmap on a vma that has > VM_SHSTK (in separate patches). Why? mremap() seems like a sensible way to enlarge a shadow stack. munmap() seems like a good way to get rid of one, and mmap() seems like a nice way to create a new shadow stack if one were needed (for green threads or similar).