[TOMOYO #11 (linux-next) 00/11] TOMOYO Linux

[TOMOYO #11 (linux-next) 00/11] TOMOYO Linux

[Kentaro Takeda]

TOMOYO Linux is a pathname-based MAC extension (LSM module) for the 
Linux kernel.

This patchset is for linux-next (-next-20081017).

Differences from previous version (http://lkml.org/lkml/2008/10/9/46) 
are as follows.

*About locking:
 -reduced global locks.
 -added comments to explain what lock protects.

*About singly-linked-list:
 -moved declaration of singly-linked-list from
  security/tomoyo/common.h to include/linux/list1.h .
 -added rcu_dereference() and rcu_assign_pointer() call properly.

*Others:
 -added MAINTAINERS entry of TOMOYO SECURITY MODULE .
 -inserted a blank line between variable declaration and start of 
code.

Stephen, James, Chris, please review and respond (hopefully Ack).

Regards,
--

[TOMOYO #11 (linux-next) 01/11] Introduce new LSM hooks where vfsmount is available.

[Kentaro Takeda]

----- What is this patch for? -----

There are security_inode_*() LSM hooks for attribute-based MAC, but they are not
suitable for pathname-based MAC because they don't receive "struct vfsmount"
information.

----- How this patch was developed? -----

Two pathname-based MACs, AppArmor and TOMOYO Linux, are trying to merge
upstream. But because of "struct vfsmount" problem, they have been unable to
merge upstream.

Here are the list of approaches and the reasons of denial.

(1) Not using LSM
 http://lwn.net/Articles/277833/

 This approach was rejected because security modules should use LSM because the
 whole idea behind LSM was to have a single set of hooks for all security
 modules; if every module now adds its own set of hooks, that purpose will have
 been defeated and the kernel will turn into a big mess of security hooks.

(2) Retrieving "struct vfsmount" from "struct task_struct".
 http://lkml.org/lkml/2007/11/5/388

 Since "struct task_struct" contains list of "struct vfsmount",
 "struct vfsmount" which corresponds to "struct dentry" can be retrieved from
 the list unless "mount --bind" is used.

 This approach turned out to cause a critical problem that getting namespace_sem
 lock from security_inode_*() triggers AB-BA deadlock.

(3) Adding "struct vfsmount" parameter to VFS helper functions.
 http://lkml.org/lkml/2008/5/29/207

 This approach adds "struct vfsmount" to VFS helper functions (e.g. vfs_mkdir()
 and vfs_symlink()) and LSM hooks inside VFS helper functions. This approach is
 helpful for not only AppArmor and TOMOYO Linux 2.x but also SELinux and
 auditing purpose, for this approach allows existent LSM users to use pathnames
 in their access control and audit logs.

 This approach was rejected by Al Viro, the VFS maintainer, because he thinks
 individual filesystem should remain "struct vfsmount"-unaware and VFS helper
 functions should not receive "struct vfsmount".

 Al Viro also suggested to move existing security_inode_*() to out of VFS
 helper functions so that security_inode_*() can receive "struct vfsmount"
 without modifying VFS helper functions, but this suggestion was opposed by
 Stephen Smalley because changing the order of permission checks (i.e.
 MAC checks before DAC checks) is not acceptable.

(4) Passing "struct vfsmount" via "struct task_struct".
 http://lkml.org/lkml/2007/11/16/157

 Since we didn't understand the reason why accessing "struct vfsmount" from
 LSM hooks inside VFS helper functions is not acceptable, we thought the reason
 why VFS helper functions don't receive "struct vfsmount" is the amount of
 modifications needed to do so. Thus, we proposed to pass "struct vfsmount" via
 "struct task_struct" so that modifications remain minimal.

 This approach was rejected because this is an abuse of "struct task_struct".

(5) Remembering pathname of "struct vfsmount" via "struct task_struct".
 http://lkml.org/lkml/2008/8/19/16

 Since pathname of a "struct dentry" up to the mount point can be calculated
 without "struct vfsmount", absolute pathname of a "struct dentry" can be
 calculated if "struct task_struct" can remember absolute pathname of a
 "struct vfsmount" which corresponds to "struct dentry".
 As we now understand that Al Viro is opposing to access "struct vfsmount" from
 LSM hooks inside VFS helper functions, we gave up delivering "struct vfsmount"
 to LSM hooks inside VFS helper functions.
 Kernel 2.6.26 introduced read-only bind mount feature, and hooks for that
 feature (i.e. mnt_want_write() and mnt_drop_write()) were inserted around
 VFS helper functions call. Since mnt_want_write() receives "struct vfsmount"
 which corresponds to "struct dentry" that will be passed to subsequent VFS
 helper functions call, we associated pathname of "struct vfsmount" with
 "struct task_struct" instead of associating "struct vfsmount" itself.

 This approach was not explicitly rejected, but there seems to be performance
 problem.

(6) Introducing new LSM hooks.
 (this patch)

 We understand that adding new LSM hooks which receive "struct vfsmount" outside
 VFS helper functions is the most straightforward approach. This approach has
 less impact to existing LSM module and no impact to VFS helper functions.

(6.1) Introducing security_path_clear() hook.
 (this patch)

 To perform DAC performed in vfs_foo() before MAC, we let security_path_foo()
 save a result into our own hash table and return 0, and let security_inode_foo()
 return the saved result. Since security_inode_foo() is not always called after
 security_path_foo(), we need security_path_clear() to clear the hash table.

Signed-off-by: Kentaro Takeda <takedakn@nttdata.co.jp>
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: Toshiharu Harada <haradats@nttdata.co.jp>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Cc: Crispin Cowan <crispin@crispincowan.com>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
---

 fs/namei.c               |   46 ++++++++++++++
 fs/open.c                |    5 +
 include/linux/security.h |  151 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 net/unix/af_unix.c       |    5 +
 security/Kconfig         |    9 ++
 security/capability.c    |   63 +++++++++++++++++++
 security/security.c      |   73 ++++++++++++++++++++++
 7 files changed, 352 insertions(+)

--- linux-next.orig/fs/namei.c
+++ linux-next/fs/namei.c
@@ -1571,12 +1571,17 @@ int may_open(struct nameidata *nd, int a
 		 * Refuse to truncate files with mandatory locks held on them.
 		 */
 		error = locks_verify_locked(inode);
+		if (!error)
+			error = security_path_truncate(&nd->path, 0,
+					       ATTR_MTIME|ATTR_CTIME|ATTR_OPEN,
+						       NULL);
 		if (!error) {
 			DQUOT_INIT(inode);
 
 			error = do_truncate(dentry, 0,
 					    ATTR_MTIME|ATTR_CTIME|ATTR_OPEN,
 					    NULL);
+			security_path_clear();
 		}
 		put_write_access(inode);
 		if (error)
@@ -1601,7 +1606,12 @@ static int __open_namei_create(struct na
 
 	if (!IS_POSIXACL(dir->d_inode))
 		mode &= ~current->fs->umask;
+	error = security_path_mknod(&nd->path, path->dentry, mode, 0);
+	if (error)
+		goto out_unlock;
 	error = vfs_create(dir->d_inode, path->dentry, mode, nd);
+	security_path_clear();
+out_unlock:
 	mutex_unlock(&dir->d_inode->i_mutex);
 	dput(nd->path.dentry);
 	nd->path.dentry = path->dentry;
@@ -2014,6 +2024,9 @@ asmlinkage long sys_mknodat(int dfd, con
 	error = mnt_want_write(nd.path.mnt);
 	if (error)
 		goto out_dput;
+	error = security_path_mknod(&nd.path, dentry, mode, dev);
+	if (error)
+		goto out_drop_write;
 	switch (mode & S_IFMT) {
 		case 0: case S_IFREG:
 			error = vfs_create(nd.path.dentry->d_inode,dentry,mode,&nd);
@@ -2026,6 +2039,8 @@ asmlinkage long sys_mknodat(int dfd, con
 			error = vfs_mknod(nd.path.dentry->d_inode,dentry,mode,0);
 			break;
 	}
+	security_path_clear();
+out_drop_write:
 	mnt_drop_write(nd.path.mnt);
 out_dput:
 	dput(dentry);
@@ -2085,7 +2100,12 @@ asmlinkage long sys_mkdirat(int dfd, con
 	error = mnt_want_write(nd.path.mnt);
 	if (error)
 		goto out_dput;
+	error = security_path_mkdir(&nd.path, dentry, mode);
+	if (error)
+		goto out_drop_write;
 	error = vfs_mkdir(nd.path.dentry->d_inode, dentry, mode);
+	security_path_clear();
+out_drop_write:
 	mnt_drop_write(nd.path.mnt);
 out_dput:
 	dput(dentry);
@@ -2192,7 +2212,12 @@ static long do_rmdir(int dfd, const char
 	error = mnt_want_write(nd.path.mnt);
 	if (error)
 		goto exit3;
+	error = security_path_rmdir(&nd.path, dentry);
+	if (error)
+		goto exit4;
 	error = vfs_rmdir(nd.path.dentry->d_inode, dentry);
+	security_path_clear();
+exit4:
 	mnt_drop_write(nd.path.mnt);
 exit3:
 	dput(dentry);
@@ -2274,7 +2299,12 @@ static long do_unlinkat(int dfd, const c
 		error = mnt_want_write(nd.path.mnt);
 		if (error)
 			goto exit2;
+		error = security_path_unlink(&nd.path, dentry);
+		if (error)
+			goto exit3;
 		error = vfs_unlink(nd.path.dentry->d_inode, dentry);
+		security_path_clear();
+exit3:
 		mnt_drop_write(nd.path.mnt);
 	exit2:
 		dput(dentry);
@@ -2355,7 +2385,12 @@ asmlinkage long sys_symlinkat(const char
 	error = mnt_want_write(nd.path.mnt);
 	if (error)
 		goto out_dput;
+	error = security_path_symlink(&nd.path, dentry, from);
+	if (error)
+		goto out_drop_write;
 	error = vfs_symlink(nd.path.dentry->d_inode, dentry, from);
+	security_path_clear();
+out_drop_write:
 	mnt_drop_write(nd.path.mnt);
 out_dput:
 	dput(dentry);
@@ -2452,7 +2487,12 @@ asmlinkage long sys_linkat(int olddfd, c
 	error = mnt_want_write(nd.path.mnt);
 	if (error)
 		goto out_dput;
+	error = security_path_link(old_path.dentry, &nd.path, new_dentry);
+	if (error)
+		goto out_drop_write;
 	error = vfs_link(old_path.dentry, nd.path.dentry->d_inode, new_dentry);
+	security_path_clear();
+out_drop_write:
 	mnt_drop_write(nd.path.mnt);
 out_dput:
 	dput(new_dentry);
@@ -2684,8 +2724,14 @@ asmlinkage long sys_renameat(int olddfd,
 	error = mnt_want_write(oldnd.path.mnt);
 	if (error)
 		goto exit5;
+	error = security_path_rename(&oldnd.path, old_dentry,
+				     &newnd.path, new_dentry);
+	if (error)
+		goto exit6;
 	error = vfs_rename(old_dir->d_inode, old_dentry,
 				   new_dir->d_inode, new_dentry);
+	security_path_clear();
+exit6:
 	mnt_drop_write(oldnd.path.mnt);
 exit5:
 	dput(new_dentry);
--- linux-next.orig/fs/open.c
+++ linux-next/fs/open.c
@@ -272,6 +272,8 @@ static long do_sys_truncate(const char _
 		goto put_write_and_out;
 
 	error = locks_verify_truncate(inode, NULL, length);
+	if (!error)
+		error = security_path_truncate(&path, length, 0, NULL);
 	if (!error) {
 		DQUOT_INIT(inode);
 		error = do_truncate(path.dentry, length, 0, NULL);
@@ -329,6 +331,9 @@ static long do_sys_ftruncate(unsigned in
 
 	error = locks_verify_truncate(inode, file, length);
 	if (!error)
+		error = security_path_truncate(&file->f_path, length,
+					       ATTR_MTIME|ATTR_CTIME, file);
+	if (!error)
 		error = do_truncate(dentry, length, ATTR_MTIME|ATTR_CTIME, file);
 out_putf:
 	fput(file);
--- linux-next.orig/include/linux/security.h
+++ linux-next/include/linux/security.h
@@ -331,17 +331,37 @@ static inline void security_free_mnt_opt
  *	@dir contains the inode structure of the parent directory of the new link.
  *	@new_dentry contains the dentry structure for the new link.
  *	Return 0 if permission is granted.
+ * @path_link:
+ *	Check permission before creating a new hard link to a file.
+ *	@old_dentry contains the dentry structure for an existing link
+ *	to the file.
+ *	@new_dir contains the path structure of the parent directory of
+ *	the new link.
+ *	@new_dentry contains the dentry structure for the new link.
+ *	Return 0 if permission is granted.
  * @inode_unlink:
  *	Check the permission to remove a hard link to a file.
  *	@dir contains the inode structure of parent directory of the file.
  *	@dentry contains the dentry structure for file to be unlinked.
  *	Return 0 if permission is granted.
+ * @path_unlink:
+ *	Check the permission to remove a hard link to a file.
+ *	@dir contains the path structure of parent directory of the file.
+ *	@dentry contains the dentry structure for file to be unlinked.
+ *	Return 0 if permission is granted.
  * @inode_symlink:
  *	Check the permission to create a symbolic link to a file.
  *	@dir contains the inode structure of parent directory of the symbolic link.
  *	@dentry contains the dentry structure of the symbolic link.
  *	@old_name contains the pathname of file.
  *	Return 0 if permission is granted.
+ * @path_symlink:
+ *	Check the permission to create a symbolic link to a file.
+ *	@dir contains the path structure of parent directory of
+ *	the symbolic link.
+ *	@dentry contains the dentry structure of the symbolic link.
+ *	@old_name contains the pathname of file.
+ *	Return 0 if permission is granted.
  * @inode_mkdir:
  *	Check permissions to create a new directory in the existing directory
  *	associated with inode strcture @dir.
@@ -349,11 +369,25 @@ static inline void security_free_mnt_opt
  *	@dentry contains the dentry structure of new directory.
  *	@mode contains the mode of new directory.
  *	Return 0 if permission is granted.
+ * @path_mkdir:
+ *	Check permissions to create a new directory in the existing directory
+ *	associated with path strcture @path.
+ *	@dir containst the path structure of parent of the directory
+ *	to be created.
+ *	@dentry contains the dentry structure of new directory.
+ *	@mode contains the mode of new directory.
+ *	Return 0 if permission is granted.
  * @inode_rmdir:
  *	Check the permission to remove a directory.
  *	@dir contains the inode structure of parent of the directory to be removed.
  *	@dentry contains the dentry structure of directory to be removed.
  *	Return 0 if permission is granted.
+ * @path_rmdir:
+ *	Check the permission to remove a directory.
+ *	@dir contains the path structure of parent of the directory to be
+ *	removed.
+ *	@dentry contains the dentry structure of directory to be removed.
+ *	Return 0 if permission is granted.
  * @inode_mknod:
  *	Check permissions when creating a special file (or a socket or a fifo
  *	file created via the mknod system call).  Note that if mknod operation
@@ -364,6 +398,15 @@ static inline void security_free_mnt_opt
  *	@mode contains the mode of the new file.
  *	@dev contains the device number.
  *	Return 0 if permission is granted.
+ * @path_mknod:
+ *	Check permissions when creating a file. Note that this hook is called
+ *	even if mknod operation is being done for a regular file.
+ *	@dir contains the path structure of parent of the new file.
+ *	@dentry contains the dentry structure of the new file.
+ *	@mode contains the mode of the new file.
+ *	@dev contains the undecoded device number. Use new_decode_dev() to get
+ *	the decoded device number.
+ *	Return 0 if permission is granted.
  * @inode_rename:
  *	Check for permission to rename a file or directory.
  *	@old_dir contains the inode structure for parent of the old link.
@@ -371,6 +414,13 @@ static inline void security_free_mnt_opt
  *	@new_dir contains the inode structure for parent of the new link.
  *	@new_dentry contains the dentry structure of the new link.
  *	Return 0 if permission is granted.
+ * @path_rename:
+ *	Check for permission to rename a file or directory.
+ *	@old_dir contains the path structure for parent of the old link.
+ *	@old_dentry contains the dentry structure of the old link.
+ *	@new_dir contains the path structure for parent of the new link.
+ *	@new_dentry contains the dentry structure of the new link.
+ *	Return 0 if permission is granted.
  * @inode_readlink:
  *	Check the permission to read the symbolic link.
  *	@dentry contains the dentry structure for the file link.
@@ -399,6 +449,13 @@ static inline void security_free_mnt_opt
  *	@dentry contains the dentry structure for the file.
  *	@attr is the iattr structure containing the new file attributes.
  *	Return 0 if permission is granted.
+ * @path_truncate:
+ *	Check permission before truncating a file.
+ *	@path contains the path structure for the file.
+ *	@length is the new length of the file.
+ *	@time_attrs is the flags passed to do_truncate().
+ *	@filp is the file structure (may be NULL).
+ *	Return 0 if permission is granted.
  * @inode_getattr:
  *	Check permission before obtaining file attributes.
  *	@mnt is the vfsmount where the dentry was looked up
@@ -466,6 +523,12 @@ static inline void security_free_mnt_opt
  *	@inode contains a pointer to the inode.
  *	@secid contains a pointer to the location where result will be saved.
  *	In case of failure, @secid will be set to zero.
+ * @path_clear:
+ *	Clear error code stored by security_path_*() in case
+ *	security_inode_*() was not called when DAC returned an error.
+ *	This hook allows LSM modules which use security_path_*() defer
+ *	returning LSM's error code till security_inode_*() is called so that
+ *	DAC's error (if any) is returned to the caller instead of LSM's error.
  *
  * Security hooks for file operations
  *
@@ -1327,6 +1390,23 @@ struct security_operations {
 				   struct super_block *newsb);
 	int (*sb_parse_opts_str) (char *options, struct security_mnt_opts *opts);
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_PATH
+	int (*path_unlink) (struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry);
+	int (*path_mkdir) (struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mode);
+	int (*path_rmdir) (struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry);
+	int (*path_mknod) (struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mode,
+			   unsigned int dev);
+	int (*path_truncate) (struct path *path, loff_t length,
+			      unsigned int time_attrs, struct file *filp);
+	int (*path_symlink) (struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
+			     const char *old_name);
+	int (*path_link) (struct dentry *old_dentry, struct path *new_dir,
+			  struct dentry *new_dentry);
+	int (*path_rename) (struct path *old_dir, struct dentry *old_dentry,
+			    struct path *new_dir, struct dentry *new_dentry);
+	void (*path_clear) (void);
+#endif
+
 	int (*inode_alloc_security) (struct inode *inode);
 	void (*inode_free_security) (struct inode *inode);
 	int (*inode_init_security) (struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
@@ -2685,6 +2765,77 @@ static inline void security_skb_classify
 
 #endif	/* CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM */
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_PATH
+int security_path_unlink(struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry);
+int security_path_mkdir(struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mode);
+int security_path_rmdir(struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry);
+int security_path_mknod(struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mode,
+			unsigned int dev);
+int security_path_truncate(struct path *path, loff_t length,
+			   unsigned int time_attrs, struct file *filp);
+int security_path_symlink(struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
+			  const char *old_name);
+int security_path_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, struct path *new_dir,
+		       struct dentry *new_dentry);
+int security_path_rename(struct path *old_dir, struct dentry *old_dentry,
+			 struct path *new_dir, struct dentry *new_dentry);
+void security_path_clear(void);
+#else	/* CONFIG_SECURITY_PATH */
+static inline int security_path_unlink(struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
+{
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static inline int security_path_mkdir(struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
+				      int mode)
+{
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static inline int security_path_rmdir(struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
+{
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static inline int security_path_mknod(struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
+				      int mode, unsigned int dev)
+{
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static inline int security_path_truncate(struct path *path, loff_t length,
+					 unsigned int time_attrs,
+					 struct file *filp)
+{
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static inline int security_path_symlink(struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
+					const char *old_name)
+{
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static inline int security_path_link(struct dentry *old_dentry,
+				     struct path *new_dir,
+				     struct dentry *new_dentry)
+{
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static inline int security_path_rename(struct path *old_dir,
+				       struct dentry *old_dentry,
+				       struct path *new_dir,
+				       struct dentry *new_dentry)
+{
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static inline void security_path_clear(void)
+{
+}
+#endif	/* CONFIG_SECURITY_PATH */
+
 #ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY
 
--- linux-next.orig/net/unix/af_unix.c
+++ linux-next/net/unix/af_unix.c
@@ -828,7 +828,12 @@ static int unix_bind(struct socket *sock
 		err = mnt_want_write(nd.path.mnt);
 		if (err)
 			goto out_mknod_dput;
+		err = security_path_mknod(&nd.path, dentry, mode, 0);
+		if (err)
+			goto out_mknod_drop_write;
 		err = vfs_mknod(nd.path.dentry->d_inode, dentry, mode, 0);
+		security_path_clear();
+out_mknod_drop_write:
 		mnt_drop_write(nd.path.mnt);
 		if (err)
 			goto out_mknod_dput;
--- linux-next.orig/security/Kconfig
+++ linux-next/security/Kconfig
@@ -81,6 +81,15 @@ config SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM
 	  IPSec.
 	  If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.
 
+config SECURITY_PATH
+	bool "Security hooks for pathname based access control"
+	depends on SECURITY
+	help
+	  This enables the security hooks for pathname based access control.
+	  If enabled, a security module can use these hooks to
+	  implement pathname based access controls.
+	  If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.
+
 config SECURITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES
 	bool "File POSIX Capabilities"
 	default n
--- linux-next.orig/security/capability.c
+++ linux-next/security/capability.c
@@ -263,6 +263,58 @@ static void cap_inode_getsecid(const str
 	*secid = 0;
 }
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_PATH
+static int cap_path_mknod(struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mode,
+			  unsigned int dev)
+{
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int cap_path_mkdir(struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mode)
+{
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int cap_path_rmdir(struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
+{
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int cap_path_unlink(struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
+{
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int cap_path_symlink(struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
+			    const char *old_name)
+{
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int cap_path_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, struct path *new_dir,
+			 struct dentry *new_dentry)
+{
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int cap_path_rename(struct path *old_path, struct dentry *old_dentry,
+			   struct path *new_path, struct dentry *new_dentry)
+{
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int cap_path_truncate(struct path *path, loff_t length,
+			     unsigned int time_attrs, struct file *filp)
+{
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static void cap_path_clear(void)
+{
+}
+
+#endif
+
 static int cap_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
 {
 	return 0;
@@ -883,6 +935,17 @@ void security_fixup_ops(struct security_
 	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, inode_setsecurity);
 	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, inode_listsecurity);
 	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, inode_getsecid);
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_PATH
+	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, path_mknod);
+	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, path_mkdir);
+	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, path_rmdir);
+	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, path_unlink);
+	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, path_symlink);
+	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, path_link);
+	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, path_rename);
+	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, path_truncate);
+	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, path_clear);
+#endif
 	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, file_permission);
 	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, file_alloc_security);
 	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, file_free_security);
--- linux-next.orig/security/security.c
+++ linux-next/security/security.c
@@ -341,6 +341,79 @@ int security_inode_init_security(struct 
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inode_init_security);
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_PATH
+int security_path_mknod(struct path *path, struct dentry *dentry, int mode,
+			unsigned int dev)
+{
+	if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(path->dentry->d_inode)))
+		return 0;
+	return security_ops->path_mknod(path, dentry, mode, dev);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_path_mknod);
+
+int security_path_mkdir(struct path *path, struct dentry *dentry, int mode)
+{
+	if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(path->dentry->d_inode)))
+		return 0;
+	return security_ops->path_mkdir(path, dentry, mode);
+}
+
+int security_path_rmdir(struct path *path, struct dentry *dentry)
+{
+	if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(path->dentry->d_inode)))
+		return 0;
+	return security_ops->path_rmdir(path, dentry);
+}
+
+int security_path_unlink(struct path *path, struct dentry *dentry)
+{
+	if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(path->dentry->d_inode)))
+		return 0;
+	return security_ops->path_unlink(path, dentry);
+}
+
+int security_path_symlink(struct path *path, struct dentry *dentry,
+			  const char *old_name)
+{
+	if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(path->dentry->d_inode)))
+		return 0;
+	return security_ops->path_symlink(path, dentry, old_name);
+}
+
+int security_path_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, struct path *new_dir,
+		       struct dentry *new_dentry)
+{
+	if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(old_dentry->d_inode)))
+		return 0;
+	return security_ops->path_link(old_dentry, new_dir, new_dentry);
+}
+
+int security_path_rename(struct path *old_dir, struct dentry *old_dentry,
+			 struct path *new_dir, struct dentry *new_dentry)
+{
+	if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(old_dentry->d_inode) ||
+		     (new_dentry->d_inode && IS_PRIVATE(new_dentry->d_inode))))
+		return 0;
+	return security_ops->path_rename(old_dir, old_dentry, new_dir,
+					 new_dentry);
+}
+
+int security_path_truncate(struct path *path, loff_t length,
+			   unsigned int time_attrs, struct file *filp)
+{
+	if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(path->dentry->d_inode)))
+		return 0;
+	return security_ops->path_truncate(path, length, time_attrs, filp);
+}
+
+void security_path_clear(void)
+{
+	return security_ops->path_clear();
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_path_clear);
+
+#endif
+
 int security_inode_create(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mode)
 {
 	if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(dir)))

--

[TOMOYO #11 (linux-next) 02/11] Add in_execve flag into task_struct.

[Kentaro Takeda]

This patch allows LSM modules to determine whether current process is in an
execve operation or not so that they can behave differently while an execve
operation is in progress.

This allows TOMOYO to dispense with a readability check on a file to be
executed under the process's current credentials, and to do it instead under
the proposed credentials.

This is required with the new COW credentials because TOMOYO is no longer
allowed to mark the state temporarily in the security struct attached to the
task_struct.

Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
---
 fs/compat.c           |    3 +++
 fs/exec.c             |    3 +++
 include/linux/sched.h |    2 ++
 3 files changed, 8 insertions(+)

--- linux-next.orig/fs/compat.c
+++ linux-next/fs/compat.c
@@ -1396,6 +1396,7 @@ int compat_do_execve(char * filename,
 	retval = mutex_lock_interruptible(&current->cred_exec_mutex);
 	if (retval < 0)
 		goto out_free;
+	current->in_execve = 1;
 
 	retval = -ENOMEM;
 	bprm->cred = prepare_exec_creds();
@@ -1448,6 +1449,7 @@ int compat_do_execve(char * filename,
 		goto out;
 
 	/* execve succeeded */
+	current->in_execve = 0;
 	mutex_unlock(&current->cred_exec_mutex);
 	acct_update_integrals(current);
 	free_bprm(bprm);
@@ -1464,6 +1466,7 @@ out_file:
 	}
 
 out_unlock:
+	current->in_execve = 0;
 	mutex_unlock(&current->cred_exec_mutex);
 
 out_free:
--- linux-next.orig/fs/exec.c
+++ linux-next/fs/exec.c
@@ -1303,6 +1303,7 @@ int do_execve(char * filename,
 	retval = mutex_lock_interruptible(&current->cred_exec_mutex);
 	if (retval < 0)
 		goto out_free;
+	current->in_execve = 1;
 
 	retval = -ENOMEM;
 	bprm->cred = prepare_exec_creds();
@@ -1356,6 +1357,7 @@ int do_execve(char * filename,
 		goto out;
 
 	/* execve succeeded */
+	current->in_execve = 0;
 	mutex_unlock(&current->cred_exec_mutex);
 	acct_update_integrals(current);
 	free_bprm(bprm);
@@ -1374,6 +1376,7 @@ out_file:
 	}
 
 out_unlock:
+	current->in_execve = 0;
 	mutex_unlock(&current->cred_exec_mutex);
 
 out_free:
--- linux-next.orig/include/linux/sched.h
+++ linux-next/include/linux/sched.h
@@ -1089,6 +1089,8 @@ struct task_struct {
 	/* ??? */
 	unsigned int personality;
 	unsigned did_exec:1;
+	unsigned in_execve:1;	/* Tell the LSMs that the process is doing an
+				 * execve */
 	pid_t pid;
 	pid_t tgid;
 

--

[TOMOYO #11 (linux-next) 03/11] Singly linked list implementation.

[Kentaro Takeda]

Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Reviewed-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
---
 include/linux/list1.h |   81 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 81 insertions(+)

--- /dev/null
+++ linux-next/include/linux/list1.h
@@ -0,0 +1,81 @@
+#ifndef _LINUX_LIST1_H
+#define _LINUX_LIST1_H
+
+#include <linux/list.h>
+#include <linux/rcupdate.h>
+
+/*
+ * Singly linked list implementation.
+ *
+ * This list supports only two operations.
+ * (1) Append an entry to the tail of the list.
+ * (2) Read all entries starting from the head of the list.
+ *
+ * This list is designed for holding "write once, read many" entries.
+ * This list requires no locks for read operation.
+ * This list doesn't support "remove an entry from the list" operation.
+ */
+
+/* To reduce memory usage, this list doesn't use "->prev" pointer. */
+struct list1_head {
+	struct list1_head *next;
+};
+
+#define LIST1_HEAD_INIT(name) { &(name) }
+#define LIST1_HEAD(name) struct list1_head name = LIST1_HEAD_INIT(name)
+
+static inline void INIT_LIST1_HEAD(struct list1_head *list)
+{
+	list->next = list;
+}
+
+/* Reuse list_entry because it doesn't use "->prev" pointer. */
+#define list1_entry list_entry
+
+/* Reuse list_for_each_rcu because it doesn't use "->prev" pointer. */
+#define list1_for_each list_for_each_rcu
+/* Reuse list_for_each_entry_rcu because it doesn't use "->prev" pointer. */
+#define list1_for_each_entry list_for_each_entry_rcu
+
+/**
+ * list1_for_each_cookie - iterate over a list with cookie.
+ * @pos:        the &struct list1_head to use as a loop cursor.
+ * @cookie:     the &struct list1_head to use as a cookie.
+ * @head:       the head for your list.
+ *
+ * Same with list_for_each_rcu() except that this primitive uses @cookie
+ * so that we can continue iteration.
+ * @cookie must be NULL when iteration starts, and @cookie will become
+ * NULL when iteration finishes.
+ *
+ * Since list elements are never removed, we don't need to get a lock
+ * or a reference count.
+ */
+#define list1_for_each_cookie(pos, cookie, head)                      \
+	for (({ if (!cookie)                                          \
+				     cookie = head; }),               \
+	     pos = rcu_dereference((cookie)->next);                   \
+	     prefetch(pos->next), pos != (head) || ((cookie) = NULL); \
+	     (cookie) = pos, pos = rcu_dereference(pos->next))
+
+/**
+ * list1_add_tail - add a new entry to list1 list.
+ * @new: new entry to be added.
+ * @head: list head to add it before.
+ *
+ * Same with list_add_tail_rcu() without "->prev" pointer.
+ *
+ * Caller must hold a lock for protecting @head.
+ */
+static inline void list1_add_tail(struct list1_head *new,
+				  struct list1_head *head)
+{
+	struct list1_head *prev = head;
+
+	new->next = head;
+	while (prev->next != head)
+		prev = prev->next;
+	rcu_assign_pointer(prev->next, new);
+}
+
+#endif

--

[TOMOYO #11 (linux-next) 04/11] Introduce d_realpath().

[Kentaro Takeda]

To remove factors that make pathname based access control difficult
(e.g. symbolic links, "..", "//", chroot() etc.), a variant of d_path()
which traverses up to the root of the namespace is needed.

Three differences compared to d_path().
(1) Ignores current process's root directory.
(2) Trailing '/' is added if the pathname refers to a directory.
(3) /proc/PID/ is represented as /proc/self/ if PID equals current->tgid.

Signed-off-by: Kentaro Takeda <takedakn@nttdata.co.jp>
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: Toshiharu Harada <haradats@nttdata.co.jp>
---
 fs/dcache.c            |   79 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 include/linux/dcache.h |    1 
 2 files changed, 80 insertions(+)

--- linux-next.orig/fs/dcache.c
+++ linux-next/fs/dcache.c
@@ -33,6 +33,7 @@
 #include <linux/swap.h>
 #include <linux/bootmem.h>
 #include <linux/backing-dev.h>
+#include <linux/magic.h>
 #include "internal.h"
 
 
@@ -1972,6 +1973,84 @@ Elong:
 }
 
 /**
+ * d_realpath - Get the realpath of a dentry.
+ *
+ * @path: Pointer to "struct path".
+ * @buffer: Pointer to buffer to return value in.
+ * @buflen: Sizeof @buffer.
+ *
+ * Returns pointer to the realpath on success, an error code othersize.
+ *
+ * If @dentry is a directory, trailing '/' is appended.
+ * If /proc/PID/ is replaced by /proc/self/ if PID == current->tgid.
+ */
+char *d_realpath(struct path *path, char *buffer, int buflen)
+{
+	struct dentry *dentry = path->dentry;
+	struct vfsmount *vfsmnt = path->mnt;
+	char *end = buffer + buflen;
+	char self_pid[16];
+
+	snprintf(self_pid, sizeof(self_pid), "%u", current->tgid);
+	spin_lock(&dcache_lock);
+	spin_lock(&vfsmount_lock);
+	if (buflen < 1 || prepend(&end, &buflen, "", 1))
+		goto Elong;
+	/*
+	 * Exception: Add trailing '/' for directory.
+	 */
+	if (dentry->d_inode && S_ISDIR(dentry->d_inode->i_mode) &&
+	    prepend(&end, &buflen, "/", 1))
+		goto Elong;
+	for (;;) {
+		struct dentry *parent;
+		const char *name;
+
+		if (dentry == vfsmnt->mnt_root || IS_ROOT(dentry)) {
+			/* Global root? */
+			if (vfsmnt->mnt_parent == vfsmnt)
+				break;
+			dentry = vfsmnt->mnt_mountpoint;
+			vfsmnt = vfsmnt->mnt_parent;
+			continue;
+		}
+		parent = dentry->d_parent;
+		prefetch(parent);
+		/*
+		 * Exception: Use /proc/self/ rather than /proc/\$/
+		 * for current process.
+		 */
+		name = dentry->d_name.name;
+		if (IS_ROOT(parent) &&
+		    parent->d_sb->s_magic == PROC_SUPER_MAGIC &&
+		    !strcmp(name, self_pid)) {
+			if (prepend(&end, &buflen, "self", 4))
+				goto Elong;
+		} else {
+			if (prepend_name(&end, &buflen, &dentry->d_name))
+				goto Elong;
+		}
+		if (prepend(&end, &buflen, "/", 1))
+			goto Elong;
+		dentry = parent;
+	}
+	if (*end == '/') {
+		/* hit the slash */
+		buflen++;
+		end++;
+	}
+	if (prepend_name(&end, &buflen, &dentry->d_name))
+		goto Elong;
+ out:
+	spin_unlock(&vfsmount_lock);
+	spin_unlock(&dcache_lock);
+	return end;
+ Elong:
+	end = ERR_PTR(-ENAMETOOLONG);
+	goto out;
+}
+
+/**
  * d_path - return the path of a dentry
  * @path: path to report
  * @buf: buffer to return value in
--- linux-next.orig/include/linux/dcache.h
+++ linux-next/include/linux/dcache.h
@@ -304,6 +304,7 @@ extern char *dynamic_dname(struct dentry
 extern char *__d_path(const struct path *path, struct path *root, char *, int);
 extern char *d_path(const struct path *, char *, int);
 extern char *dentry_path(struct dentry *, char *, int);
+extern char *d_realpath(struct path *, char *, int);
 
 /* Allocation counts.. */
 

--

[TOMOYO #11 (linux-next) 05/11] Memory and pathname management functions.

[Kentaro Takeda]

TOMOYO Linux performs pathname based access control.
To remove factors that make pathname based access control difficult
(e.g. symbolic links, "..", "//" etc.), TOMOYO Linux derives realpath
of requested pathname from "struct dentry" and "struct vfsmount".

The maximum length of string data is limited to 4000 including trailing '\0'.
Since TOMOYO Linux uses '\ooo' style representation for non ASCII printable
characters, may be TOMOYO Linux should be able to support 16336 (which means
(NAME_MAX * (PATH_MAX / (NAME_MAX + 1)) * 4 + (PATH_MAX / (NAME_MAX + 1)))
including trailing '\0'), but I think 4000 is enough for practical use.

Signed-off-by: Kentaro Takeda <takedakn@nttdata.co.jp>
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: Toshiharu Harada <haradats@nttdata.co.jp>
---
 security/tomoyo/realpath.c |  540 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 security/tomoyo/realpath.h |   60 +++++
 2 files changed, 600 insertions(+)

--- /dev/null
+++ linux-next/security/tomoyo/realpath.c
@@ -0,0 +1,540 @@
+/*
+ * security/tomoyo/realpath.c
+ *
+ * Get the canonicalized absolute pathnames. The basis for TOMOYO.
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2005-2008  NTT DATA CORPORATION
+ *
+ * Version: 2.2.0-pre   2008/10/10
+ *
+ */
+
+#include <linux/types.h>
+#include <linux/mount.h>
+#include <linux/magic.h>
+#include <linux/sysctl.h>
+#include "common.h"
+#include "realpath.h"
+
+/**
+ * tmy_realpath_from_path2 - Returns realpath(3) of the given dentry but ignores chroot'ed root.
+ *
+ * @path:        Pointer to "struct path".
+ * @newname:     Pointer to buffer to return value in.
+ * @newname_len: Size of @newname.
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, negative value otherwise.
+ *
+ * If dentry is a directory, trailing '/' is appended.
+ * Characters out of 0x20 < c < 0x7F range are converted to
+ * \ooo style octal string.
+ * Character \ is converted to \\ string.
+ */
+int tmy_realpath_from_path2(struct path *path, char *newname, int newname_len)
+{
+	int error = -ENOMEM;
+	struct dentry *dentry = path->dentry;
+	char *sp;
+
+	if (!dentry || !path->mnt || !newname || newname_len <= 2048)
+		return -EINVAL;
+	if (dentry->d_op && dentry->d_op->d_dname) {
+		/* For "socket:[\$]" and "pipe:[\$]". */
+		static const int offset = 1536;
+		sp = dentry->d_op->d_dname(dentry, newname + offset,
+					   newname_len - offset);
+	} else {
+		path_get(path);
+		sp = d_realpath(path, newname, newname_len);
+		path_put(path);
+	}
+	if (IS_ERR(sp)) {
+		error = PTR_ERR(sp);
+	} else {
+		char *dp = newname;
+		newname += newname_len - 5;
+		while (dp <= newname) {
+			const unsigned char c = *(unsigned char *) sp++;
+			*dp++ = c;
+			if (c == '\\') {
+				*dp++ = '\\';
+			} else if (c > ' ' && c < 127) {
+				continue;
+			} else if (!c) {
+				error = 0;
+				break;
+			} else {
+				*dp++ = '\\';
+				*dp++ = (c >> 6) + '0';
+				*dp++ = ((c >> 3) & 7) + '0';
+				*dp++ = (c & 7) + '0';
+			}
+		}
+	}
+	if (error)
+		printk(KERN_WARNING "tmy_realpath: Pathname too long.\n");
+	return error;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tmy_realpath_from_path - Returns realpath(3) of the given pathname but ignores chroot'ed root.
+ *
+ * @path: Pointer to "struct path".
+ *
+ * Returns the realpath of the given @path on success, NULL otherwise.
+ *
+ * These functions use tmy_alloc(), so the caller must call tmy_free()
+ * if these functions didn't return NULL.
+ */
+char *tmy_realpath_from_path(struct path *path)
+{
+	char *buf = tmy_alloc(sizeof(struct tmy_page_buffer));
+
+	if (buf && tmy_realpath_from_path2(path, buf,
+					     TMY_MAX_PATHNAME_LEN - 1) == 0)
+		return buf;
+	tmy_free(buf);
+	return NULL;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tmy_realpath - Get realpath of a pathname.
+ *
+ * @pathname: The pathname to solve.
+ *
+ * Returns the realpath of @pathname on success, NULL otherwise.
+ */
+char *tmy_realpath(const char *pathname)
+{
+	struct nameidata nd;
+
+	if (pathname && path_lookup(pathname, LOOKUP_FOLLOW, &nd) == 0) {
+		char *buf = tmy_realpath_from_path(&nd.path);
+		path_put(&nd.path);
+		return buf;
+	}
+	return NULL;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tmy_realpath_nofollow - Get realpath of a pathname.
+ *
+ * @pathname: The pathname to solve.
+ *
+ * Returns the realpath of @pathname on success, NULL otherwise.
+ */
+char *tmy_realpath_nofollow(const char *pathname)
+{
+	struct nameidata nd;
+
+	if (pathname && path_lookup(pathname, 0, &nd) == 0) {
+		char *buf = tmy_realpath_from_path(&nd.path);
+		path_put(&nd.path);
+		return buf;
+	}
+	return NULL;
+}
+
+/**
+ * round_up - Round up an integer so that the returned pointers are appropriately aligned.
+ *
+ * @size: Size in bytes.
+ *
+ * Returns rounded value of @size.
+ *
+ * FIXME: Are there more requirements that is needed for assigning value
+ * atomically?
+ */
+static inline unsigned int round_up(const unsigned int size)
+{
+	if (sizeof(void *) >= sizeof(long))
+		return ((size + sizeof(void *) - 1)
+			/ sizeof(void *)) * sizeof(void *);
+	else
+		return ((size + sizeof(long) - 1)
+			/ sizeof(long)) * sizeof(long);
+}
+
+/* Memory allocated for non-string data. */
+static unsigned int allocated_memory_for_elements;
+/* Quota for holding non-string data. */
+static unsigned int quota_for_elements;
+
+/**
+ * tmy_alloc_element - Allocate permanent memory for structures.
+ *
+ * @size: Size in bytes.
+ *
+ * Returns pointer to allocated memory on success, NULL otherwise.
+ *
+ * The RAM is chunked, so NEVER try to kfree() the returned pointer.
+ */
+void *tmy_alloc_element(const unsigned int size)
+{
+	static char *buf;
+	static DEFINE_MUTEX(lock);
+	static unsigned int buf_used_len = PAGE_SIZE;
+	char *ptr = NULL;
+	const unsigned int word_aligned_size = round_up(size);
+
+	if (word_aligned_size > PAGE_SIZE)
+		return NULL;
+	/***** EXCLUSIVE SECTION START *****/
+	mutex_lock(&lock);
+	if (buf_used_len + word_aligned_size > PAGE_SIZE) {
+		if (!quota_for_elements || allocated_memory_for_elements
+		    + PAGE_SIZE <= quota_for_elements)
+			ptr = kzalloc(PAGE_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL);
+		if (!ptr) {
+			printk(KERN_WARNING "ERROR: Out of memory "
+			       "for tmy_alloc_element().\n");
+			if (!sbin_init_started)
+				panic("MAC Initialization failed.\n");
+		} else {
+			buf = ptr;
+			allocated_memory_for_elements += PAGE_SIZE;
+			buf_used_len = word_aligned_size;
+			ptr = buf;
+		}
+	} else if (word_aligned_size) {
+		int i;
+		ptr = buf + buf_used_len;
+		buf_used_len += word_aligned_size;
+		for (i = 0; i < word_aligned_size; i++) {
+			if (!ptr[i])
+				continue;
+			printk(KERN_ERR "WARNING: Reserved memory was tainted! "
+			       "The system might go wrong.\n");
+			ptr[i] = '\0';
+		}
+	}
+	mutex_unlock(&lock);
+	/***** EXCLUSIVE SECTION END *****/
+	return ptr;
+}
+
+/* Memory allocated for string data. */
+static unsigned int allocated_memory_for_savename;
+/* Quota for holding string data. */
+static unsigned int quota_for_savename;
+
+/*
+ * TOMOYO uses this hash only when appending a string into the string
+ * table. Frequency of appending strings is very low. So we don't need
+ * large (e.g. 64k) hash size. 256 will be sufficient.
+ */
+#define MAX_HASH 256
+
+/* Structure for string data. */
+struct name_entry {
+	struct list1_head list;
+	struct path_info entry;
+};
+
+/* Structure for available memory region. */
+struct free_memory_block_list {
+	struct list_head list;
+	char *ptr;             /* Pointer to a free area. */
+	int len;               /* Length of the area.     */
+};
+
+/*
+ * The list for "struct name_entry".
+ *
+ * This list is updated only inside tmy_save_name(), thus
+ * no global mutex exists.
+ */
+static struct list1_head name_list[MAX_HASH];
+
+/**
+ * tmy_save_name - Allocate permanent memory for string data.
+ *
+ * @name: The string to store into the permernent memory.
+ *
+ * Returns pointer to "struct path_info" on success, NULL otherwise.
+ *
+ * The RAM is shared, so NEVER try to modify or kfree() the returned name.
+ */
+const struct path_info *tmy_save_name(const char *name)
+{
+	static LIST_HEAD(fmb_list);
+	static DEFINE_MUTEX(lock);
+	struct name_entry *ptr;
+	unsigned int hash;
+	struct free_memory_block_list *fmb;
+	int len;
+	char *cp;
+
+	if (!name)
+		return NULL;
+	len = strlen(name) + 1;
+	if (len > TMY_MAX_PATHNAME_LEN) {
+		printk(KERN_WARNING "ERROR: Name too long "
+		       "for tmy_save_name().\n");
+		return NULL;
+	}
+	hash = full_name_hash((const unsigned char *) name, len - 1);
+	/***** EXCLUSIVE SECTION START *****/
+	mutex_lock(&lock);
+	list1_for_each_entry(ptr, &name_list[hash % MAX_HASH], list) {
+		if (hash == ptr->entry.hash && !strcmp(name, ptr->entry.name))
+			goto out;
+	}
+	list_for_each_entry(fmb, &fmb_list, list) {
+		if (len <= fmb->len)
+			goto ready;
+	}
+	if (!quota_for_savename || allocated_memory_for_savename + PAGE_SIZE
+	    <= quota_for_savename)
+		cp = kzalloc(PAGE_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL);
+	else
+		cp = NULL;
+	fmb = kzalloc(sizeof(*fmb), GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!cp || !fmb) {
+		kfree(cp);
+		kfree(fmb);
+		printk(KERN_WARNING "ERROR: Out of memory "
+		       "for tmy_save_name().\n");
+		if (!sbin_init_started)
+			panic("MAC Initialization failed.\n");
+		ptr = NULL;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	allocated_memory_for_savename += PAGE_SIZE;
+	list_add(&fmb->list, &fmb_list);
+	fmb->ptr = cp;
+	fmb->len = PAGE_SIZE;
+ready:
+	ptr = tmy_alloc_element(sizeof(*ptr));
+	if (!ptr)
+		goto out;
+	ptr->entry.name = fmb->ptr;
+	memmove(fmb->ptr, name, len);
+	tmy_fill_path_info(&ptr->entry);
+	fmb->ptr += len;
+	fmb->len -= len;
+	list1_add_tail(&ptr->list, &name_list[hash % MAX_HASH]);
+	if (fmb->len == 0) {
+		list_del(&fmb->list);
+		kfree(fmb);
+	}
+out:
+	mutex_unlock(&lock);
+	/***** EXCLUSIVE SECTION END *****/
+	return ptr ? &ptr->entry : NULL;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tmy_realpath_init - Initialize realpath related code.
+ *
+ * Returns 0.
+ */
+static int __init tmy_realpath_init(void)
+{
+	int i;
+
+	if (TMY_MAX_PATHNAME_LEN > PAGE_SIZE)
+		panic("Bad size.");
+	for (i = 0; i < MAX_HASH; i++)
+		INIT_LIST1_HEAD(&name_list[i]);
+	INIT_LIST1_HEAD(&KERNEL_DOMAIN.acl_info_list);
+	KERNEL_DOMAIN.domainname = tmy_save_name(ROOT_NAME);
+	list1_add_tail(&KERNEL_DOMAIN.list, &domain_list);
+	if (tmy_find_domain(ROOT_NAME) != &KERNEL_DOMAIN)
+		panic("Can't register KERNEL_DOMAIN");
+	return 0;
+}
+
+security_initcall(tmy_realpath_init);
+
+/* Memory allocated for temporal purpose. */
+static atomic_t dynamic_memory_size;
+
+/**
+ * tmy_alloc - Allocate memory for temporal purpose.
+ *
+ * @size: Size in bytes.
+ *
+ * Returns pointer to allocated memory on success, NULL otherwise.
+ */
+void *tmy_alloc(const size_t size)
+{
+	void *p = kzalloc(size, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (p)
+		atomic_add(ksize(p), &dynamic_memory_size);
+	return p;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tmy_free - Release memory allocated by tmy_alloc().
+ *
+ * @p: Pointer returned by tmy_alloc(). May be NULL.
+ *
+ * Returns nothing.
+ */
+void tmy_free(const void *p)
+{
+	if (p)
+		atomic_sub(ksize(p), &dynamic_memory_size);
+	kfree(p);
+}
+
+static int tmy_print_ascii(const char *sp, const char *cp,
+			   int *buflen0, char **end0)
+{
+	int error = -ENOMEM;
+	int buflen = *buflen0;
+	char *end = *end0;
+
+	while (sp <= cp) {
+		unsigned char c;
+
+		c = *(unsigned char *) cp;
+		if (c == '\\') {
+			buflen -= 2;
+			if (buflen < 0)
+				goto out;
+			*--end = '\\';
+			*--end = '\\';
+		} else if (c > ' ' && c < 127) {
+			if (--buflen < 0)
+				goto out;
+			*--end = (char) c;
+		} else {
+			buflen -= 4;
+			if (buflen < 0)
+				goto out;
+			*--end = (c & 7) + '0';
+			*--end = ((c >> 3) & 7) + '0';
+			*--end = (c >> 6) + '0';
+			*--end = '\\';
+		}
+		cp--;
+	}
+
+	*buflen0 = buflen;
+	*end0 = end;
+	error = 0;
+out:
+	return error;
+}
+
+
+/* tmy_realpath_from_path2() for "struct ctl_table". */
+static int tmy_sysctl_path(struct ctl_table *table, char *buffer, int buflen)
+{
+	int error = -ENOMEM;
+	char *end = buffer + buflen;
+
+	if (buflen < 256)
+		goto out;
+
+	*--end = '\0';
+	buflen--;
+
+	buflen -= 9; /* for "/proc/sys" prefix */
+
+	while (table) {
+		char buf[32];
+		const char *sp = table->procname;
+		const char *cp;
+
+		if (!sp) {
+			memset(buf, 0, sizeof(buf));
+			snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf) - 1, "=%d=", table->ctl_name);
+			sp = buf;
+		}
+		cp = strchr(sp, '\0') - 1;
+
+		if (tmy_print_ascii(sp, cp, &buflen, &end))
+			goto out;
+
+		if (--buflen < 0)
+			goto out;
+
+		*--end = '/';
+		table = table->parent;
+	}
+
+	/* Move the pathname to the top of the buffer. */
+	memmove(buffer, "/proc/sys", 9);
+	memmove(buffer + 9, end, strlen(end) + 1);
+	error = 0;
+out:
+	return error;
+}
+
+/**
+ * sysctlpath_from_table - return the realpath of a ctl_table.
+ * @table: pointer to "struct ctl_table".
+ *
+ * Returns realpath(3) of the @table on success.
+ * Returns NULL on failure.
+ *
+ * This function uses tmy_alloc(), so the caller must call tmy_free()
+ * if this function didn't return NULL.
+ */
+char *sysctlpath_from_table(struct ctl_table *table)
+{
+	char *buf = tmy_alloc(TMY_MAX_PATHNAME_LEN);
+
+	if (buf && tmy_sysctl_path(table, buf, TMY_MAX_PATHNAME_LEN - 1) == 0)
+		return buf;
+	tmy_free(buf);
+	return NULL;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tmy_read_memory_counter - Check for memory usage.
+ *
+ * @head: Pointer to "struct tmy_io_buffer".
+ *
+ * Returns memory usage.
+ */
+int tmy_read_memory_counter(struct tmy_io_buffer *head)
+{
+	if (!head->read_eof) {
+		const unsigned int shared = allocated_memory_for_savename;
+		const unsigned int private = allocated_memory_for_elements;
+		const unsigned int dynamic = atomic_read(&dynamic_memory_size);
+		char buffer[64];
+
+		memset(buffer, 0, sizeof(buffer));
+		if (quota_for_savename)
+			snprintf(buffer, sizeof(buffer) - 1,
+				 "   (Quota: %10u)", quota_for_savename);
+		else
+			buffer[0] = '\0';
+		tmy_io_printf(head, "Shared:  %10u%s\n", shared, buffer);
+		if (quota_for_elements)
+			snprintf(buffer, sizeof(buffer) - 1,
+				 "   (Quota: %10u)", quota_for_elements);
+		else
+			buffer[0] = '\0';
+		tmy_io_printf(head, "Private: %10u%s\n", private, buffer);
+		tmy_io_printf(head, "Dynamic: %10u\n", dynamic);
+		tmy_io_printf(head, "Total:   %10u\n",
+			      shared + private + dynamic);
+		head->read_eof = true;
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tmy_write_memory_quota - Set memory quota.
+ *
+ * @head: Pointer to "struct tmy_io_buffer".
+ *
+ * Returns 0.
+ */
+int tmy_write_memory_quota(struct tmy_io_buffer *head)
+{
+	char *data = head->write_buf;
+	unsigned int size;
+
+	if (sscanf(data, "Shared: %u", &size) == 1)
+		quota_for_savename = size;
+	else if (sscanf(data, "Private: %u", &size) == 1)
+		quota_for_elements = size;
+	return 0;
+}
--- /dev/null
+++ linux-next/security/tomoyo/realpath.h
@@ -0,0 +1,60 @@
+/*
+ * security/tomoyo/realpath.h
+ *
+ * Get the canonicalized absolute pathnames. The basis for TOMOYO.
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2005-2008  NTT DATA CORPORATION
+ *
+ * Version: 2.2.0-pre   2008/10/10
+ *
+ */
+
+#ifndef _SECURITY_TOMOYO_REALPATH_H
+#define _SECURITY_TOMOYO_REALPATH_H
+
+struct path;
+struct condition_list;
+struct path_info;
+struct tmy_io_buffer;
+
+/* Returns realpath(3) of the given pathname but ignores chroot'ed root. */
+int tmy_realpath_from_path2(struct path *path, char *newname, int newname_len);
+
+/*
+ * Returns realpath(3) of the given pathname but ignores chroot'ed root.
+ * These functions use tmy_alloc(), so the caller must call tmy_free()
+ * if these functions didn't return NULL.
+ */
+char *tmy_realpath(const char *pathname);
+/* Same with tmy_realpath() except that it doesn't follow the final symlink. */
+char *tmy_realpath_nofollow(const char *pathname);
+/* Same with tmy_realpath() except that the pathname is already solved. */
+char *tmy_realpath_from_path(struct path *path);
+/* Same with tmy_realpath() except that it uses struct ctl_table. */
+char *sysctlpath_from_table(struct ctl_table *table);
+
+/*
+ * Allocate memory for ACL entry.
+ * The RAM is chunked, so NEVER try to kfree() the returned pointer.
+ */
+void *tmy_alloc_element(const unsigned int size);
+
+/*
+ * Keep the given name on the RAM.
+ * The RAM is shared, so NEVER try to modify or kfree() the returned name.
+ */
+const struct path_info *tmy_save_name(const char *name);
+
+/* Allocate memory for temporary use (e.g. permission checks). */
+void *tmy_alloc(const size_t size);
+
+/* Free memory allocated by tmy_alloc(). */
+void tmy_free(const void *p);
+
+/* Check for memory usage. */
+int tmy_read_memory_counter(struct tmy_io_buffer *head);
+
+/* Set memory quota. */
+int tmy_write_memory_quota(struct tmy_io_buffer *head);
+
+#endif /* !defined(_SECURITY_TOMOYO_REALPATH_H) */

--

[TOMOYO #11 (linux-next) 06/11] Common functions for TOMOYO Linux.

[Kentaro Takeda]

This file contains common functions (e.g. policy I/O, pattern matching).

Signed-off-by: Kentaro Takeda <takedakn@nttdata.co.jp>
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: Toshiharu Harada <haradats@nttdata.co.jp>
---
 security/tomoyo/common.c | 2209 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 security/tomoyo/common.h |  320 ++++++
 2 files changed, 2529 insertions(+)

--- /dev/null
+++ linux-next/security/tomoyo/common.c
@@ -0,0 +1,2209 @@
+/*
+ * security/tomoyo/common.c
+ *
+ * Common functions for TOMOYO.
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2005-2008  NTT DATA CORPORATION
+ *
+ * Version: 2.2.0-pre   2008/10/10
+ *
+ */
+
+#include <linux/uaccess.h>
+#include <linux/security.h>
+#include <linux/hardirq.h>
+#include "realpath.h"
+#include "common.h"
+#include "tomoyo.h"
+
+/* Set default specified by the kernel config. */
+#define MAX_ACCEPT_ENTRY 2048
+
+/* Has /sbin/init started? */
+bool sbin_init_started;
+
+/* String table for functionality that takes 4 modes. */
+static const char *mode_4[4] = {
+	"disabled", "learning", "permissive", "enforcing"
+};
+/* String table for functionality that takes 2 modes. */
+static const char *mode_2[4] = {
+	"disabled", "enabled", "enabled", "enabled"
+};
+
+/* Table for profile. */
+static struct {
+	const char *keyword;
+	unsigned int current_value;
+	const unsigned int max_value;
+} tmy_control_array[TMY_MAX_CONTROL_INDEX] = {
+	[TMY_TOMOYO_MAC_FOR_FILE]        = { "MAC_FOR_FILE",        0, 3 },
+	[TMY_TOMOYO_MAX_ACCEPT_ENTRY]
+	= { "MAX_ACCEPT_ENTRY",    MAX_ACCEPT_ENTRY, INT_MAX },
+	[TMY_TOMOYO_VERBOSE]             = { "TOMOYO_VERBOSE",      1, 1 },
+};
+
+/* Profile table. Memory is allocated as needed. */
+static struct profile {
+	unsigned int value[TMY_MAX_CONTROL_INDEX];
+	const struct path_info *comment;
+} *profile_ptr[MAX_PROFILES];
+
+/* Permit policy management by non-root user? */
+static bool manage_by_non_root;
+
+/* Utility functions. */
+
+/* Open operation for /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/ interface. */
+static int tmy_open_control(const u8 type, struct file *file);
+/* Close /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/ interface. */
+static int tmy_close_control(struct file *file);
+/* Read operation for /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/ interface. */
+static int tmy_read_control(struct file *file, char __user *buffer,
+			    const int buffer_len);
+/* Write operation for /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/ interface. */
+static int tmy_write_control(struct file *file, const char __user *buffer,
+			     const int buffer_len);
+
+/**
+ * is_byte_range - Check whether the string isa \ooo style octal value.
+ *
+ * @str: Pointer to the string.
+ *
+ * Returns true if @str is a \ooo style octal value, false otherwise.
+ */
+static bool is_byte_range(const char *str)
+{
+	return *str >= '0' && *str++ <= '3' &&
+		*str >= '0' && *str++ <= '7' &&
+		*str >= '0' && *str <= '7';
+}
+
+/**
+ * is_decimal - Check whether the character is a decimal character.
+ *
+ * @c: The character to check.
+ *
+ * Returns true if @c is a decimal character, false otherwise.
+ */
+static bool is_decimal(const char c)
+{
+	return c >= '0' && c <= '9';
+}
+
+/**
+ * is_hexadecimal - Check whether the character is a hexadecimal character.
+ *
+ * @c: The character to check.
+ *
+ * Returns true if @c is a hexadecimal character, false otherwise.
+ */
+static bool is_hexadecimal(const char c)
+{
+	return (c >= '0' && c <= '9') ||
+		(c >= 'A' && c <= 'F') ||
+		(c >= 'a' && c <= 'f');
+}
+
+/**
+ * is_alphabet_char - Check whether the character is an alphabet.
+ *
+ * @c: The character to check.
+ *
+ * Returns true if @c is an alphabet character, false otherwise.
+ */
+static bool is_alphabet_char(const char c)
+{
+	return (c >= 'A' && c <= 'F') || (c >= 'a' && c <= 'f');
+}
+
+/**
+ * make_byte - Make byte value from three octal characters.
+ *
+ * @c1: The first character.
+ * @c2: The second character.
+ * @c3: The third character.
+ *
+ * Returns byte value.
+ */
+static u8 make_byte(const u8 c1, const u8 c2, const u8 c3)
+{
+	return ((c1 - '0') << 6) + ((c2 - '0') << 3) + (c3 - '0');
+}
+
+/**
+ * str_starts - Check whether the given string starts with the given keyword.
+ *
+ * @src:  Pointer to pointer to the string.
+ * @find: Pointer to the keyword.
+ *
+ * Returns true if @src starts with @find, false otherwise.
+ *
+ * The @src is updated to point the first character after the @find
+ * if @src starts with @find.
+ */
+static bool str_starts(char **src, const char *find)
+{
+	const int len = strlen(find);
+	char *tmp = *src;
+
+	if (strncmp(tmp, find, len))
+		return false;
+	tmp += len;
+	*src = tmp;
+	return true;
+}
+
+/**
+ * normalize_line - Format string.
+ *
+ * @buffer: The line to normalize.
+ *
+ * Leading and trailing whitespaces are removed.
+ * Multiple whitespaces are packed into single space.
+ *
+ * Returns nothing.
+ */
+static void normalize_line(unsigned char *buffer)
+{
+	unsigned char *sp = buffer;
+	unsigned char *dp = buffer;
+	bool first = true;
+
+	while (*sp && (*sp <= ' ' || *sp >= 127))
+		sp++;
+	while (*sp) {
+		if (!first)
+			*dp++ = ' ';
+		first = false;
+		while (*sp > ' ' && *sp < 127)
+			*dp++ = *sp++;
+		while (*sp && (*sp <= ' ' || *sp >= 127))
+			sp++;
+	}
+	*dp = '\0';
+}
+
+/**
+ * tmy_is_correct_path - Validate a pathname.
+ * @filename:     The pathname to check.
+ * @start_type:   Should the pathname start with '/'?
+ *                1 = must / -1 = must not / 0 = don't care
+ * @pattern_type: Can the pathname contain a wildcard?
+ *                1 = must / -1 = must not / 0 = don't care
+ * @end_type:     Should the pathname end with '/'?
+ *                1 = must / -1 = must not / 0 = don't care
+ * @function:     The name of function calling me.
+ *
+ * Check whether the given filename follows the naming rules.
+ * Returns true if @filename follows the naming rules, false otherwise.
+ */
+bool tmy_is_correct_path(const char *filename, const s8 start_type,
+			 const s8 pattern_type, const s8 end_type,
+			 const char *function)
+{
+	bool contains_pattern = false;
+	unsigned char c;
+	unsigned char d;
+	unsigned char e;
+	const char *original_filename = filename;
+
+	if (!filename)
+		goto out;
+	c = *filename;
+	if (start_type == 1) { /* Must start with '/' */
+		if (c != '/')
+			goto out;
+	} else if (start_type == -1) { /* Must not start with '/' */
+		if (c == '/')
+			goto out;
+	}
+	if (c)
+		c = *(strchr(filename, '\0') - 1);
+	if (end_type == 1) { /* Must end with '/' */
+		if (c != '/')
+			goto out;
+	} else if (end_type == -1) { /* Must not end with '/' */
+		if (c == '/')
+			goto out;
+	}
+	while ((c = *filename++) != '\0') {
+		if (c == '\\') {
+			switch ((c = *filename++)) {
+			case '\\':  /* "\\" */
+				continue;
+			case '$':   /* "\$" */
+			case '+':   /* "\+" */
+			case '?':   /* "\?" */
+			case '*':   /* "\*" */
+			case '@':   /* "\@" */
+			case 'x':   /* "\x" */
+			case 'X':   /* "\X" */
+			case 'a':   /* "\a" */
+			case 'A':   /* "\A" */
+			case '-':   /* "\-" */
+				if (pattern_type == -1)
+					break; /* Must not contain pattern */
+				contains_pattern = true;
+				continue;
+			case '0':   /* "\ooo" */
+			case '1':
+			case '2':
+			case '3':
+				d = *filename++;
+				if (d < '0' || d > '7')
+					break;
+				e = *filename++;
+				if (e < '0' || e > '7')
+					break;
+				c = make_byte(c, d, e);
+				if (c && (c <= ' ' || c >= 127))
+					continue; /* pattern is not \000 */
+			}
+			goto out;
+		} else if (c <= ' ' || c >= 127) {
+			goto out;
+		}
+	}
+	if (pattern_type == 1) { /* Must contain pattern */
+		if (!contains_pattern)
+			goto out;
+	}
+	return true;
+out:
+	printk(KERN_DEBUG "%s: Invalid pathname '%s'\n", function,
+	       original_filename);
+	return false;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tmy_is_correct_domain - Check whether the given domainname follows the naming rules.
+ * @domainname:   The domainname to check.
+ * @function:     The name of function calling me.
+ *
+ * Returns true if @domainname follows the naming rules, false otherwise.
+ */
+bool tmy_is_correct_domain(const unsigned char *domainname,
+			   const char *function)
+{
+	unsigned char c;
+	unsigned char d;
+	unsigned char e;
+	const char *org_domainname = domainname;
+
+	if (!domainname || strncmp(domainname, ROOT_NAME, ROOT_NAME_LEN))
+		goto out;
+	domainname += ROOT_NAME_LEN;
+	if (!*domainname)
+		return true;
+	do {
+		if (*domainname++ != ' ')
+			goto out;
+		if (*domainname++ != '/')
+			goto out;
+		while ((c = *domainname) != '\0' && c != ' ') {
+			domainname++;
+			if (c == '\\') {
+				c = *domainname++;
+				switch ((c)) {
+				case '\\':  /* "\\" */
+					continue;
+				case '0':   /* "\ooo" */
+				case '1':
+				case '2':
+				case '3':
+					d = *domainname++;
+					if (d < '0' || d > '7')
+						break;
+					e = *domainname++;
+					if (e < '0' || e > '7')
+						break;
+					c = make_byte(c, d, e);
+					if (c && (c <= ' ' || c >= 127))
+						/* pattern is not \000 */
+						continue;
+				}
+				goto out;
+			} else if (c < ' ' || c >= 127) {
+				goto out;
+			}
+		}
+	} while (*domainname);
+	return true;
+out:
+	printk(KERN_DEBUG "%s: Invalid domainname '%s'\n", function,
+	       org_domainname);
+	return false;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tmy_is_domain_def - Check whether the given token can be a domainname.
+ *
+ * @buffer: The token to check.
+ *
+ * Returns true if @buffer possibly be a domainname, false otherwise.
+ */
+bool tmy_is_domain_def(const unsigned char *buffer)
+{
+	return !strncmp(buffer, ROOT_NAME, ROOT_NAME_LEN);
+}
+
+/**
+ * tmy_find_domain - Find a domain by the given name.
+ *
+ * @domainname: The domainname to find.
+ *
+ * Returns pointer to "struct domain_info" if found, NULL otherwise.
+ */
+struct domain_info *tmy_find_domain(const char *domainname)
+{
+	struct domain_info *domain;
+	struct path_info name;
+
+	name.name = domainname;
+	tmy_fill_path_info(&name);
+	list1_for_each_entry(domain, &domain_list, list) {
+		if (!domain->is_deleted &&
+		    !tmy_pathcmp(&name, domain->domainname))
+			return domain;
+	}
+	return NULL;
+}
+
+/**
+ * path_depth - Evaluate the number of '/' in a string.
+ *
+ * @pathname: The string to evaluate.
+ *
+ * Returns path depth of the string.
+ *
+ * I score 2 for each of the '/' in the @pathname
+ * and score 1 if the @pathname ends with '/'.
+ */
+static int path_depth(const char *pathname)
+{
+	int i = 0;
+
+	if (pathname) {
+		char *ep = strchr(pathname, '\0');
+		if (pathname < ep--) {
+			if (*ep != '/')
+				i++;
+			while (pathname <= ep)
+				if (*ep-- == '/')
+					i += 2;
+		}
+	}
+	return i;
+}
+
+/**
+ * const_part_length - Evaluate the initial length without a pattern in a token.
+ *
+ * @filename: The string to evaluate.
+ *
+ * Returns the initial length without a pattern in @filename.
+ */
+static int const_part_length(const char *filename)
+{
+	char c;
+	int len = 0;
+
+	if (!filename)
+		return 0;
+	while ((c = *filename++) != '\0') {
+		if (c != '\\') {
+			len++;
+			continue;
+		}
+		c = *filename++;
+		switch (c) {
+		case '\\':  /* "\\" */
+			len += 2;
+			continue;
+		case '0':   /* "\ooo" */
+		case '1':
+		case '2':
+		case '3':
+			c = *filename++;
+			if (c < '0' || c > '7')
+				break;
+			c = *filename++;
+			if (c < '0' || c > '7')
+				break;
+			len += 4;
+			continue;
+		}
+		break;
+	}
+	return len;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tmy_fill_path_info - Fill in "struct path_info" members.
+ *
+ * @ptr: Pointer to "struct path_info" to fill in.
+ *
+ * The caller sets "struct path_info"->name.
+ */
+void tmy_fill_path_info(struct path_info *ptr)
+{
+	const char *name = ptr->name;
+	const int len = strlen(name);
+
+	ptr->total_len = len;
+	ptr->const_len = const_part_length(name);
+	ptr->is_dir = len && (name[len - 1] == '/');
+	ptr->is_patterned = (ptr->const_len < len);
+	ptr->hash = full_name_hash(name, len);
+	ptr->depth = path_depth(name);
+}
+
+/**
+ * file_matches_to_pattern2 - Pattern matching without '/' character
+ * and "\-" pattern.
+ *
+ * @filename:     The start of string to check.
+ * @filename_end: The end of string to check.
+ * @pattern:      The start of pattern to compare.
+ * @pattern_end:  The end of pattern to compare.
+ *
+ * Returns true if @filename matches @pattern, false otherwise.
+ */
+static bool file_matches_to_pattern2(const char *filename,
+				     const char *filename_end,
+				     const char *pattern,
+				     const char *pattern_end)
+{
+	while (filename < filename_end && pattern < pattern_end) {
+		char c;
+		if (*pattern != '\\') {
+			if (*filename++ != *pattern++)
+				return false;
+			continue;
+		}
+		c = *filename;
+		pattern++;
+		switch (*pattern) {
+			int i;
+			int j;
+		case '?':
+			if (c == '/') {
+				return false;
+			} else if (c == '\\') {
+				if (filename[1] == '\\')
+					filename++;
+				else if (is_byte_range(filename + 1))
+					filename += 3;
+				else
+					return false;
+			}
+			break;
+		case '\\':
+			if (c != '\\')
+				return false;
+			if (*++filename != '\\')
+				return false;
+			break;
+		case '+':
+			if (!is_decimal(c))
+				return false;
+			break;
+		case 'x':
+			if (!is_hexadecimal(c))
+				return false;
+			break;
+		case 'a':
+			if (!is_alphabet_char(c))
+				return false;
+			break;
+		case '0':
+		case '1':
+		case '2':
+		case '3':
+			if (c == '\\' && is_byte_range(filename + 1)
+			    && strncmp(filename + 1, pattern, 3) == 0) {
+				filename += 3;
+				pattern += 2;
+				break;
+			}
+			return false; /* Not matched. */
+		case '*':
+		case '@':
+			for (i = 0; i <= filename_end - filename; i++) {
+				if (file_matches_to_pattern2(filename + i,
+							     filename_end,
+							     pattern + 1,
+							     pattern_end))
+					return true;
+				c = filename[i];
+				if (c == '.' && *pattern == '@')
+					break;
+				if (c != '\\')
+					continue;
+				if (filename[i + 1] == '\\')
+					i++;
+				else if (is_byte_range(filename + i + 1))
+					i += 3;
+				else
+					break; /* Bad pattern. */
+			}
+			return false; /* Not matched. */
+		default:
+			j = 0;
+			c = *pattern;
+			if (c == '$') {
+				while (is_decimal(filename[j]))
+					j++;
+			} else if (c == 'X') {
+				while (is_hexadecimal(filename[j]))
+					j++;
+			} else if (c == 'A') {
+				while (is_alphabet_char(filename[j]))
+					j++;
+			}
+			for (i = 1; i <= j; i++) {
+				if (file_matches_to_pattern2(filename + i,
+							     filename_end,
+							     pattern + 1,
+							     pattern_end))
+					return true;
+			}
+			return false; /* Not matched or bad pattern. */
+		}
+		filename++;
+		pattern++;
+	}
+	while (*pattern == '\\' &&
+	       (*(pattern + 1) == '*' || *(pattern + 1) == '@'))
+		pattern += 2;
+	return filename == filename_end && pattern == pattern_end;
+}
+
+/**
+ * file_matches_to_pattern - Pattern matching without without '/' character.
+ *
+ * @filename:     The start of string to check.
+ * @filename_end: The end of string to check.
+ * @pattern:      The start of pattern to compare.
+ * @pattern_end:  The end of pattern to compare.
+ *
+ * Returns true if @filename matches @pattern, false otherwise.
+ */
+static bool file_matches_to_pattern(const char *filename,
+				    const char *filename_end,
+				    const char *pattern,
+				    const char *pattern_end)
+{
+	const char *pattern_start = pattern;
+	bool first = true;
+	bool result;
+
+	while (pattern < pattern_end - 1) {
+		/* Split at "\-" pattern. */
+		if (*pattern++ != '\\' || *pattern++ != '-')
+			continue;
+		result = file_matches_to_pattern2(filename, filename_end,
+						  pattern_start, pattern - 2);
+		if (first)
+			result = !result;
+		if (result)
+			return false;
+		first = false;
+		pattern_start = pattern;
+	}
+	result = file_matches_to_pattern2(filename, filename_end,
+					  pattern_start, pattern_end);
+	return first ? result : !result;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tmy_path_matches_pattern - Check whether the given filename matches the given pattern.
+ * @filename: The filename to check.
+ * @pattern:  The pattern to compare.
+ *
+ * Returns true if matches, false otherwise.
+ *
+ * The following patterns are available.
+ *   \\     \ itself.
+ *   \ooo   Octal representation of a byte.
+ *   \*     More than or equals to 0 character other than '/'.
+ *   \@     More than or equals to 0 character other than '/' or '.'.
+ *   \?     1 byte character other than '/'.
+ *   \$     More than or equals to 1 decimal digit.
+ *   \+     1 decimal digit.
+ *   \X     More than or equals to 1 hexadecimal digit.
+ *   \x     1 hexadecimal digit.
+ *   \A     More than or equals to 1 alphabet character.
+ *   \a     1 alphabet character.
+ *   \-     Subtraction operator.
+ */
+bool tmy_path_matches_pattern(const struct path_info *filename,
+			      const struct path_info *pattern)
+{
+	/*
+	  if (!filename || !pattern)
+	  return false;
+	*/
+	const char *f = filename->name;
+	const char *p = pattern->name;
+	const int len = pattern->const_len;
+
+	/* If @pattern doesn't contain pattern, I can use strcmp(). */
+	if (!pattern->is_patterned)
+		return !tmy_pathcmp(filename, pattern);
+	/* Dont compare if the number of '/' differs. */
+	if (filename->depth != pattern->depth)
+		return false;
+	/* Compare the initial length without patterns. */
+	if (strncmp(f, p, len))
+		return false;
+	f += len;
+	p += len;
+	/* Main loop. Compare each directory component. */
+	while (*f && *p) {
+		const char *f_delimiter = strchr(f, '/');
+		const char *p_delimiter = strchr(p, '/');
+		if (!f_delimiter)
+			f_delimiter = strchr(f, '\0');
+		if (!p_delimiter)
+			p_delimiter = strchr(p, '\0');
+		if (!file_matches_to_pattern(f, f_delimiter, p, p_delimiter))
+			return false;
+		f = f_delimiter;
+		if (*f)
+			f++;
+		p = p_delimiter;
+		if (*p)
+			p++;
+	}
+	/* Ignore trailing "\*" and "\@" in @pattern. */
+	while (*p == '\\' &&
+	       (*(p + 1) == '*' || *(p + 1) == '@'))
+		p += 2;
+	return !*f && !*p;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tmy_io_printf - Transactional printf() to "struct tmy_io_buffer" structure.
+ *
+ * @head: Pointer to "struct tmy_io_buffer".
+ * @fmt:  The printf()'s format string, followed by parameters.
+ *
+ * Returns true on success, false otherwise.
+ *
+ * The snprintf() will truncate, but tmy_io_printf() won't.
+ */
+bool tmy_io_printf(struct tmy_io_buffer *head, const char *fmt, ...)
+{
+	va_list args;
+	int len;
+	int pos = head->read_avail;
+	int size = head->readbuf_size - pos;
+
+	if (size <= 0)
+		return false;
+	va_start(args, fmt);
+	len = vsnprintf(head->read_buf + pos, size, fmt, args);
+	va_end(args);
+	if (pos + len >= head->readbuf_size)
+		return false;
+	head->read_avail += len;
+	return true;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tmy_get_exe - Get tmy_realpath() of current process.
+ *
+ * Returns the tmy_realpath() of current process on success, NULL otherwise.
+ *
+ * This function uses tmy_alloc(), so the caller must call tmy_free()
+ * if this function didn't return NULL.
+ */
+static const char *tmy_get_exe(void)
+{
+	struct mm_struct *mm = current->mm;
+	struct vm_area_struct *vma;
+	const char *cp = NULL;
+
+	if (!mm)
+		return NULL;
+	down_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
+	for (vma = mm->mmap; vma; vma = vma->vm_next) {
+		if ((vma->vm_flags & VM_EXECUTABLE) && vma->vm_file) {
+			cp = tmy_realpath_from_path(&vma->vm_file->f_path);
+			break;
+		}
+	}
+	up_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
+	return cp;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tmy_get_msg - Get warning message.
+ *
+ * @is_enforce: Is it enforcing mode?
+ *
+ * Returns "ERROR" or "WARNING".
+ */
+const char *tmy_get_msg(const bool is_enforce)
+{
+	if (is_enforce)
+		return "ERROR";
+	else
+		return "WARNING";
+}
+
+/**
+ * tmy_check_flags - Check mode for specified functionality.
+ *
+ * @domain: Pointer to "struct domain_info".
+ * @index:  The functionality to check mode.
+ *
+ * Returns the mode of specified functionality.
+ */
+unsigned int tmy_check_flags(const struct domain_info *domain, const u8 index)
+{
+	const u8 profile = domain->profile;
+
+	if (unlikely(in_interrupt())) {
+		static u8 count = 20;
+		if (count) {
+			count--;
+			printk(KERN_ERR "BUG: sleeping function called "
+			       "from invalid context.\n");
+			dump_stack();
+		}
+		return 0;
+	}
+	return sbin_init_started && index < TMY_MAX_CONTROL_INDEX
+#if MAX_PROFILES != 256
+		&& profile < MAX_PROFILES
+#endif
+		&& profile_ptr[profile] ?
+		profile_ptr[profile]->value[index] : 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tmy_verbose_mode - Check whether TOMOYO is verbose mode.
+ *
+ * @domain: Pointer to "struct domain_info".
+ *
+ * Returns true if domain policy violation warning should be printed to
+ * console.
+ */
+bool tmy_verbose_mode(const struct domain_info *domain)
+{
+	return tmy_check_flags(domain, TMY_TOMOYO_VERBOSE) != 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tmy_check_domain_quota - Check for domain's quota.
+ *
+ * @domain: Pointer to "struct domain_info".
+ *
+ * Returns true if the domain is not exceeded quota, false otherwise.
+ */
+bool tmy_check_domain_quota(struct domain_info * const domain)
+{
+	unsigned int count = 0;
+	struct acl_info *ptr;
+
+	if (!domain)
+		return true;
+	list1_for_each_entry(ptr, &domain->acl_info_list, list) {
+		if (ptr->type & ACL_DELETED)
+			continue;
+		switch (tmy_acl_type2(ptr)) {
+			struct single_path_acl_record *acl1;
+			struct double_path_acl_record *acl2;
+			u16 perm;
+		case TYPE_SINGLE_PATH_ACL:
+			acl1 = container_of(ptr, struct single_path_acl_record,
+					    head);
+			perm = acl1->perm;
+			if (perm & (1 << TMY_TYPE_EXECUTE_ACL))
+				count++;
+			if (perm &
+			    ((1 << TMY_TYPE_READ_ACL) |
+			     (1 << TMY_TYPE_WRITE_ACL)))
+				count++;
+			if (perm & (1 << TMY_TYPE_CREATE_ACL))
+				count++;
+			if (perm & (1 << TMY_TYPE_UNLINK_ACL))
+				count++;
+			if (perm & (1 << TMY_TYPE_MKDIR_ACL))
+				count++;
+			if (perm & (1 << TMY_TYPE_RMDIR_ACL))
+				count++;
+			if (perm & (1 << TMY_TYPE_MKFIFO_ACL))
+				count++;
+			if (perm & (1 << TMY_TYPE_MKSOCK_ACL))
+				count++;
+			if (perm & (1 << TMY_TYPE_MKBLOCK_ACL))
+				count++;
+			if (perm & (1 << TMY_TYPE_MKCHAR_ACL))
+				count++;
+			if (perm & (1 << TMY_TYPE_TRUNCATE_ACL))
+				count++;
+			if (perm & (1 << TMY_TYPE_SYMLINK_ACL))
+				count++;
+			if (perm & (1 << TMY_TYPE_REWRITE_ACL))
+				count++;
+			break;
+		case TYPE_DOUBLE_PATH_ACL:
+			acl2 = container_of(ptr, struct double_path_acl_record,
+					    head);
+			perm = acl2->perm;
+			if (perm & (1 << TMY_TYPE_LINK_ACL))
+				count++;
+			if (perm & (1 << TMY_TYPE_RENAME_ACL))
+				count++;
+			break;
+		}
+	}
+	if (count < tmy_check_flags(domain, TMY_TOMOYO_MAX_ACCEPT_ENTRY))
+		return true;
+	if (!domain->quota_warned) {
+		domain->quota_warned = true;
+		printk(KERN_WARNING "TOMOYO-WARNING: "
+		       "Domain '%s' has so many ACLs to hold. "
+		       "Stopped learning mode.\n", domain->domainname->name);
+	}
+	return false;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tmy_find_or_assign_new_profile - Create a new profile.
+ *
+ * @profile: Profile number to create.
+ *
+ * Returns pointer to "struct profile" on success, NULL otherwise.
+ */
+static struct profile *tmy_find_or_assign_new_profile(const unsigned int
+						      profile)
+{
+	static DEFINE_MUTEX(lock);
+	struct profile *ptr = NULL;
+
+	/***** EXCLUSIVE SECTION START *****/
+	mutex_lock(&lock);
+	if (profile < MAX_PROFILES) {
+		ptr = profile_ptr[profile];
+		if (ptr)
+			goto ok;
+		ptr = tmy_alloc_element(sizeof(*ptr));
+		if (ptr) {
+			int i;
+			for (i = 0; i < TMY_MAX_CONTROL_INDEX; i++)
+				ptr->value[i]
+					= tmy_control_array[i].current_value;
+			mb(); /* Avoid out-of-order execution. */
+			profile_ptr[profile] = ptr;
+		}
+	}
+ok:
+	mutex_unlock(&lock);
+	/***** EXCLUSIVE SECTION END *****/
+	return ptr;
+}
+
+/**
+ * write_profile - Write profile table.
+ *
+ * @head: Pointer to "struct tmy_io_buffer"
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, negative value otherwise.
+ */
+static int write_profile(struct tmy_io_buffer *head)
+{
+	char *data = head->write_buf;
+	unsigned int i;
+	unsigned int value;
+	char *cp;
+	struct profile *profile;
+	unsigned long num;
+
+	cp = strchr(data, '-');
+	if (cp)
+		*cp = '\0';
+	if (strict_strtoul(data, 10, &num))
+		return -EINVAL;
+	if (cp)
+		data = cp + 1;
+	profile = tmy_find_or_assign_new_profile(num);
+	if (!profile)
+		return -EINVAL;
+	cp = strchr(data, '=');
+	if (!cp)
+		return -EINVAL;
+	*cp = '\0';
+	tmy_update_counter(TMY_UPDATES_COUNTER_PROFILE);
+	if (!strcmp(data, "COMMENT")) {
+		profile->comment = tmy_save_name(cp + 1);
+		return 0;
+	}
+	for (i = 0; i < TMY_MAX_CONTROL_INDEX; i++) {
+		if (strcmp(data, tmy_control_array[i].keyword))
+			continue;
+		if (sscanf(cp + 1, "%u", &value) != 1) {
+			int j;
+			const char **modes;
+			switch (i) {
+			case TMY_TOMOYO_VERBOSE:
+				modes = mode_2;
+				break;
+			default:
+				modes = mode_4;
+				break;
+			}
+			for (j = 0; j < 4; j++) {
+				if (strcmp(cp + 1, modes[j]))
+					continue;
+				value = j;
+				break;
+			}
+			if (j == 4)
+				return -EINVAL;
+		} else if (value > tmy_control_array[i].max_value) {
+			value = tmy_control_array[i].max_value;
+		}
+		profile->value[i] = value;
+		return 0;
+	}
+	return -EINVAL;
+}
+
+/**
+ * read_profile - Read profile table.
+ *
+ * @head: Pointer to "struct tmy_io_buffer"
+ *
+ * Returns 0.
+ */
+static int read_profile(struct tmy_io_buffer *head)
+{
+	static const int total = TMY_MAX_CONTROL_INDEX + 1;
+	int step;
+
+	if (head->read_eof)
+		return 0;
+	for (step = head->read_step; step < MAX_PROFILES * total; step++) {
+		const u8 index = step / total;
+		u8 type = step % total;
+		const struct profile *profile = profile_ptr[index];
+		head->read_step = step;
+		if (!profile)
+			continue;
+		if (!type) { /* Print profile' comment tag. */
+			if (!tmy_io_printf(head, "%u-COMMENT=%s\n",
+					   index, profile->comment ?
+					   profile->comment->name : ""))
+				break;
+			continue;
+		}
+		type--;
+		if (type < TMY_MAX_CONTROL_INDEX) {
+			const unsigned int value = profile->value[type];
+			const char **modes = NULL;
+			const char *keyword = tmy_control_array[type].keyword;
+			switch (tmy_control_array[type].max_value) {
+			case 3:
+				modes = mode_4;
+				break;
+			case 1:
+				modes = mode_2;
+				break;
+			}
+			if (modes) {
+				if (!tmy_io_printf(head, "%u-%s=%s\n", index,
+						   keyword, modes[value]))
+					break;
+			} else {
+				if (!tmy_io_printf(head, "%u-%s=%u\n", index,
+						   keyword, value))
+					break;
+			}
+		}
+	}
+	if (step == MAX_PROFILES * total)
+		head->read_eof = true;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/* Structure for policy manager. */
+struct policy_manager_entry {
+	struct list1_head list;
+	/* A path to program or a domainname. */
+	const struct path_info *manager;
+	bool is_domain;  /* True if manager is a domainname. */
+	bool is_deleted; /* True if this entry is deleted. */
+};
+
+/*
+ * The list for "struct policy_manager_entry".
+ *
+ * This list is updated only inside update_manager_entry(), thus
+ * no global mutex exists.
+ */
+static LIST1_HEAD(policy_manager_list);
+
+/**
+ * update_manager_entry - Add a manager entry.
+ *
+ * @manager:   The path to manager or the domainnamme.
+ * @is_delete: True if it is a delete request.
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, negative value otherwise.
+ */
+static int update_manager_entry(const char *manager, const bool is_delete)
+{
+	struct policy_manager_entry *new_entry;
+	struct policy_manager_entry *ptr;
+	static DEFINE_MUTEX(lock);
+	const struct path_info *saved_manager;
+	int error = -ENOMEM;
+	bool is_domain = false;
+
+	if (tmy_is_domain_def(manager)) {
+		if (!tmy_is_correct_domain(manager, __func__))
+			return -EINVAL;
+		is_domain = true;
+	} else {
+		if (!tmy_is_correct_path(manager, 1, -1, -1, __func__))
+			return -EINVAL;
+	}
+	saved_manager = tmy_save_name(manager);
+	if (!saved_manager)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	/***** EXCLUSIVE SECTION START *****/
+	mutex_lock(&lock);
+	list1_for_each_entry(ptr, &policy_manager_list, list) {
+		if (ptr->manager != saved_manager)
+			continue;
+		ptr->is_deleted = is_delete;
+		error = 0;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if (is_delete) {
+		error = -ENOENT;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	new_entry = tmy_alloc_element(sizeof(*new_entry));
+	if (!new_entry)
+		goto out;
+	new_entry->manager = saved_manager;
+	new_entry->is_domain = is_domain;
+	list1_add_tail(&new_entry->list, &policy_manager_list);
+	error = 0;
+out:
+	mutex_unlock(&lock);
+	/***** EXCLUSIVE SECTION END *****/
+	if (!error)
+		tmy_update_counter(TMY_UPDATES_COUNTER_MANAGER);
+	return error;
+}
+
+/**
+ * write_manager_policy - Write manager policy.
+ *
+ * @head: Pointer to "struct tmy_io_buffer"
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, negative value otherwise.
+ */
+static int write_manager_policy(struct tmy_io_buffer *head)
+{
+	char *data = head->write_buf;
+	bool is_delete = str_starts(&data, KEYWORD_DELETE);
+
+	if (!strcmp(data, "manage_by_non_root")) {
+		manage_by_non_root = !is_delete;
+		return 0;
+	}
+	return update_manager_entry(data, is_delete);
+}
+
+/**
+ * read_manager_policy - Read manager policy.
+ *
+ * @head: Pointer to "struct tmy_io_buffer"
+ *
+ * Returns 0.
+ */
+static int read_manager_policy(struct tmy_io_buffer *head)
+{
+	struct list1_head *pos;
+
+	if (head->read_eof)
+		return 0;
+	list1_for_each_cookie(pos, head->read_var2, &policy_manager_list) {
+		struct policy_manager_entry *ptr;
+		ptr = list1_entry(pos, struct policy_manager_entry, list);
+		if (ptr->is_deleted)
+			continue;
+		if (!tmy_io_printf(head, "%s\n", ptr->manager->name))
+			return 0;
+	}
+	head->read_eof = true;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * is_policy_manager - Check whether the current process is a policy manager.
+ *
+ * Returns true if the current process is permitted to modify policy
+ * via /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/ interface.
+ */
+static bool is_policy_manager(void)
+{
+	struct policy_manager_entry *ptr;
+	const char *exe;
+	const struct task_struct *task = current;
+	const struct path_info *domainname = tmy_domain()->domainname;
+	bool found = false;
+
+	if (!sbin_init_started)
+		return true;
+	if (!manage_by_non_root && (task->cred->uid || task->cred->euid))
+		return false;
+	list1_for_each_entry(ptr, &policy_manager_list, list) {
+		if (!ptr->is_deleted && ptr->is_domain
+		    && !tmy_pathcmp(domainname, ptr->manager))
+			return true;
+	}
+	exe = tmy_get_exe();
+	if (!exe)
+		return false;
+	list1_for_each_entry(ptr, &policy_manager_list, list) {
+		if (!ptr->is_deleted && !ptr->is_domain
+		    && !strcmp(exe, ptr->manager->name)) {
+			found = true;
+			break;
+		}
+	}
+	if (!found) { /* Reduce error messages. */
+		static pid_t last_pid;
+		const pid_t pid = current->pid;
+		if (last_pid != pid) {
+			printk(KERN_WARNING "%s ( %s ) is not permitted to "
+			       "update policies.\n", domainname->name, exe);
+			last_pid = pid;
+		}
+	}
+	tmy_free(exe);
+	return found;
+}
+
+/**
+ * is_select_one - Parse select command.
+ *
+ * @head: Pointer to "struct tmy_io_buffer".
+ * @data: String to parse.
+ *
+ * Returns true on success, false otherwise.
+ */
+static bool is_select_one(struct tmy_io_buffer *head, const char *data)
+{
+	unsigned int pid;
+	struct domain_info *domain = NULL;
+
+	if (sscanf(data, "pid=%u", &pid) == 1) {
+		struct task_struct *p;
+		/***** CRITICAL SECTION START *****/
+		read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
+		p = find_task_by_vpid(pid);
+		if (p)
+			domain = tmy_real_domain(p);
+		read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
+		/***** CRITICAL SECTION END *****/
+	} else if (!strncmp(data, "domain=", 7)) {
+		if (tmy_is_domain_def(data + 7))
+			domain = tmy_find_domain(data + 7);
+	} else
+		return false;
+	head->read_avail = 0;
+	tmy_io_printf(head, "# select %s\n", data);
+	head->read_single_domain = true;
+	head->read_eof = !domain;
+	if (domain) {
+		struct domain_info *d;
+		head->read_var1 = NULL;
+		list1_for_each_entry(d, &domain_list, list) {
+			if (d == domain)
+				break;
+			head->read_var1 = &d->list;
+		}
+		head->read_var2 = NULL;
+		head->read_bit = 0;
+		head->read_step = 0;
+		if (domain->is_deleted)
+			tmy_io_printf(head, "# This is a deleted domain.\n");
+	}
+	head->write_var1 = domain;
+	return true;
+}
+
+/**
+ * write_domain_policy - Write domain policy.
+ *
+ * @head: Pointer to "struct tmy_io_buffer".
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, negative value otherwise.
+ */
+static int write_domain_policy(struct tmy_io_buffer *head)
+{
+	char *data = head->write_buf;
+	struct domain_info *domain = head->write_var1;
+	bool is_delete = false;
+	bool is_select = false;
+	bool is_undelete = false;
+	unsigned int profile;
+
+	if (str_starts(&data, KEYWORD_DELETE))
+		is_delete = true;
+	else if (str_starts(&data, KEYWORD_SELECT))
+		is_select = true;
+	else if (str_starts(&data, KEYWORD_UNDELETE))
+		is_undelete = true;
+	if (is_select && is_select_one(head, data))
+		return 0;
+	/* Don't allow updating policies by non manager programs. */
+	if (!is_policy_manager())
+		return -EPERM;
+	if (tmy_is_domain_def(data)) {
+		domain = NULL;
+		if (is_delete)
+			tmy_delete_domain(data);
+		else if (is_select)
+			domain = tmy_find_domain(data);
+		else if (is_undelete)
+			domain = tmy_undelete_domain(data);
+		else
+			domain = tmy_find_or_assign_new_domain(data, 0);
+		head->write_var1 = domain;
+		tmy_update_counter(TMY_UPDATES_COUNTER_DOMAIN_POLICY);
+		return 0;
+	}
+	if (!domain)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (sscanf(data, KEYWORD_USE_PROFILE "%u", &profile) == 1
+	    && profile < MAX_PROFILES) {
+		if (profile_ptr[profile] || !sbin_init_started)
+			domain->profile = (u8) profile;
+		return 0;
+	}
+	if (!strcmp(data, KEYWORD_IGNORE_GLOBAL_ALLOW_READ)) {
+		tmy_set_domain_flag(domain, is_delete,
+				    DOMAIN_FLAGS_IGNORE_GLOBAL_ALLOW_READ);
+		return 0;
+	}
+	return tmy_write_file_policy(data, domain, is_delete);
+}
+
+/**
+ * print_single_path_acl - Print a single path ACL entry.
+ *
+ * @head: Pointer to "struct tmy_io_buffer".
+ * @ptr:  Pointer to "struct single_path_acl_record".
+ *
+ * Returns true on success, false otherwise.
+ */
+static bool print_single_path_acl(struct tmy_io_buffer *head,
+				  struct single_path_acl_record *ptr)
+{
+	int pos;
+	u8 bit;
+	const char *atmark = "";
+	const char *filename;
+	const u16 perm = ptr->perm;
+
+	filename = ptr->filename->name;
+	for (bit = head->read_bit; bit < MAX_SINGLE_PATH_OPERATION; bit++) {
+		const char *msg;
+		if (!(perm & (1 << bit)))
+			continue;
+		/* Print "read/write" instead of "read" and "write". */
+		if ((bit == TMY_TYPE_READ_ACL || bit == TMY_TYPE_WRITE_ACL)
+		    && (perm & (1 << TMY_TYPE_READ_WRITE_ACL)))
+			continue;
+		msg = tmy_sp2keyword(bit);
+		pos = head->read_avail;
+		if (!tmy_io_printf(head, "allow_%s %s%s\n", msg,
+				   atmark, filename))
+			goto out;
+	}
+	head->read_bit = 0;
+	return true;
+out:
+	head->read_bit = bit;
+	head->read_avail = pos;
+	return false;
+}
+
+/**
+ * print_double_path_acl - Print a double path ACL entry.
+ *
+ * @head: Pointer to "struct tmy_io_buffer".
+ * @ptr:  Pointer to "struct double_path_acl_record".
+ *
+ * Returns true on success, false otherwise.
+ */
+static bool print_double_path_acl(struct tmy_io_buffer *head,
+				  struct double_path_acl_record *ptr)
+{
+	int pos;
+	const char *atmark1 = "";
+	const char *atmark2 = "";
+	const char *filename1;
+	const char *filename2;
+	const u8 perm = ptr->perm;
+	u8 bit;
+
+	filename1 = ptr->filename1->name;
+	filename2 = ptr->filename2->name;
+	for (bit = head->read_bit; bit < MAX_DOUBLE_PATH_OPERATION; bit++) {
+		const char *msg;
+		if (!(perm & (1 << bit)))
+			continue;
+		msg = tmy_dp2keyword(bit);
+		pos = head->read_avail;
+		if (!tmy_io_printf(head, "allow_%s %s%s %s%s\n", msg,
+				   atmark1, filename1, atmark2, filename2))
+			goto out;
+	}
+	head->read_bit = 0;
+	return true;
+out:
+	head->read_bit = bit;
+	head->read_avail = pos;
+	return false;
+}
+
+/**
+ * print_entry - Print an ACL entry.
+ *
+ * @head: Pointer to "struct tmy_io_buffer".
+ * @ptr:  Pointer to an ACL entry.
+ *
+ * Returns true on success, false otherwise.
+ */
+static bool print_entry(struct tmy_io_buffer *head, struct acl_info *ptr)
+{
+	const u8 acl_type = tmy_acl_type2(ptr);
+
+	if (acl_type & ACL_DELETED)
+		return true;
+	if (acl_type == TYPE_SINGLE_PATH_ACL) {
+		struct single_path_acl_record *acl
+			= container_of(ptr, struct single_path_acl_record,
+				       head);
+		return print_single_path_acl(head, acl);
+	}
+	if (acl_type == TYPE_DOUBLE_PATH_ACL) {
+		struct double_path_acl_record *acl
+			= container_of(ptr, struct double_path_acl_record,
+				       head);
+		return print_double_path_acl(head, acl);
+	}
+	BUG(); /* This must not happen. */
+	return false;
+}
+
+/**
+ * read_domain_policy - Read domain policy.
+ *
+ * @head: Pointer to "struct tmy_io_buffer".
+ *
+ * Returns 0.
+ */
+static int read_domain_policy(struct tmy_io_buffer *head)
+{
+	struct list1_head *dpos;
+	struct list1_head *apos;
+
+	if (head->read_eof)
+		return 0;
+	if (head->read_step == 0)
+		head->read_step = 1;
+	list1_for_each_cookie(dpos, head->read_var1, &domain_list) {
+		struct domain_info *domain;
+		const char *quota_exceeded = "";
+		const char *transition_failed = "";
+		const char *ignore_global_allow_read = "";
+		domain = list1_entry(dpos, struct domain_info, list);
+		if (head->read_step != 1)
+			goto acl_loop;
+		if (domain->is_deleted && !head->read_single_domain)
+			continue;
+		/* Print domainname and flags. */
+		if (domain->quota_warned)
+			quota_exceeded = "quota_exceeded\n";
+		if (domain->flags & DOMAIN_FLAGS_TRANSITION_FAILED)
+			transition_failed = "transition_failed\n";
+		if (domain->flags & DOMAIN_FLAGS_IGNORE_GLOBAL_ALLOW_READ)
+			ignore_global_allow_read
+				= KEYWORD_IGNORE_GLOBAL_ALLOW_READ "\n";
+		if (!tmy_io_printf(head, "%s\n" KEYWORD_USE_PROFILE "%u\n"
+				   "%s%s%s\n", domain->domainname->name,
+				   domain->profile, quota_exceeded,
+				   transition_failed, ignore_global_allow_read))
+			return 0;
+		head->read_step = 2;
+acl_loop:
+		if (head->read_step == 3)
+			goto tail_mark;
+		/* Print ACL entries in the domain. */
+		list1_for_each_cookie(apos, head->read_var2,
+				      &domain->acl_info_list) {
+			struct acl_info *ptr
+				= list1_entry(apos, struct acl_info, list);
+			if (!print_entry(head, ptr))
+				return 0;
+		}
+		head->read_step = 3;
+tail_mark:
+		if (!tmy_io_printf(head, "\n"))
+			return 0;
+		head->read_step = 1;
+		if (head->read_single_domain)
+			break;
+	}
+	head->read_eof = true;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * write_domain_profile - Assign profile for specified domain.
+ *
+ * @head: Pointer to "struct tmy_io_buffer".
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, -EINVAL otherwise.
+ *
+ * This is equivalent to doing
+ *
+ *     ( echo "select " $domainname; echo "use_profile " $profile ) |
+ *     /usr/lib/ccs/loadpolicy -d
+ */
+static int write_domain_profile(struct tmy_io_buffer *head)
+{
+	char *data = head->write_buf;
+	char *cp = strchr(data, ' ');
+	struct domain_info *domain;
+	unsigned long profile;
+
+	if (!cp)
+		return -EINVAL;
+	*cp = '\0';
+	domain = tmy_find_domain(cp + 1);
+	strict_strtoul(data, 10, &profile);
+	if (domain && profile < MAX_PROFILES
+	    && (profile_ptr[profile] || !sbin_init_started))
+		domain->profile = (u8) profile;
+	tmy_update_counter(TMY_UPDATES_COUNTER_DOMAIN_POLICY);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * read_domain_profile - Read only domainname and profile.
+ *
+ * @head: Pointer to "struct tmy_io_buffer".
+ *
+ * Returns list of profile number and domainname pairs.
+ *
+ * This is equivalent to doing
+ *
+ *     grep -A 1 '^<kernel>' /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/domain_policy |
+ *     awk ' { if ( domainname == "" ) { if ( $1 == "<kernel>" )
+ *     domainname = $0; } else if ( $1 == "use_profile" ) {
+ *     print $2 " " domainname; domainname = ""; } } ; '
+ */
+static int read_domain_profile(struct tmy_io_buffer *head)
+{
+	struct list1_head *pos;
+
+	if (head->read_eof)
+		return 0;
+	list1_for_each_cookie(pos, head->read_var1, &domain_list) {
+		struct domain_info *domain;
+		domain = list1_entry(pos, struct domain_info, list);
+		if (domain->is_deleted)
+			continue;
+		if (!tmy_io_printf(head, "%u %s\n", domain->profile,
+				   domain->domainname->name))
+			return 0;
+	}
+	head->read_eof = true;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * write_pid: Specify PID to obtain domainname.
+ *
+ * @head: Pointer to "struct tmy_io_buffer".
+ *
+ * Returns 0.
+ */
+static int write_pid(struct tmy_io_buffer *head)
+{
+	unsigned long pid;
+	strict_strtoul(head->write_buf, 10, &pid);
+	head->read_step = (int) pid;
+	head->read_eof = false;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * read_pid - Get domainname of the specified PID.
+ *
+ * @head: Pointer to "struct tmy_io_buffer".
+ *
+ * Returns the domainname which the specified PID is in on success,
+ * empty string otherwise.
+ * The PID is specified by write_pid() so that the user can obtain
+ * using read()/write() interface rather than sysctl() interface.
+ */
+static int read_pid(struct tmy_io_buffer *head)
+{
+	if (head->read_avail == 0 && !head->read_eof) {
+		const int pid = head->read_step;
+		struct task_struct *p;
+		struct domain_info *domain = NULL;
+		/***** CRITICAL SECTION START *****/
+		read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
+		p = find_task_by_vpid(pid);
+		if (p)
+			domain = tmy_real_domain(p);
+		read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
+		/***** CRITICAL SECTION END *****/
+		if (domain)
+			tmy_io_printf(head, "%d %u %s", pid, domain->profile,
+				      domain->domainname->name);
+		head->read_eof = true;
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * write_exception_policy - Write exception policy.
+ *
+ * @head: Pointer to "struct tmy_io_buffer".
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, negative value otherwise.
+ */
+static int write_exception_policy(struct tmy_io_buffer *head)
+{
+	char *data = head->write_buf;
+	bool is_delete = str_starts(&data, KEYWORD_DELETE);
+
+	if (str_starts(&data, KEYWORD_KEEP_DOMAIN))
+		return tmy_write_domain_keeper_policy(data, false, is_delete);
+	if (str_starts(&data, KEYWORD_NO_KEEP_DOMAIN))
+		return tmy_write_domain_keeper_policy(data, true, is_delete);
+	if (str_starts(&data, KEYWORD_INITIALIZE_DOMAIN))
+		return tmy_write_domain_initializer_policy(data, false,
+							   is_delete);
+	if (str_starts(&data, KEYWORD_NO_INITIALIZE_DOMAIN))
+		return tmy_write_domain_initializer_policy(data, true,
+							   is_delete);
+	if (str_starts(&data, KEYWORD_ALIAS))
+		return tmy_write_alias_policy(data, is_delete);
+	if (str_starts(&data, KEYWORD_ALLOW_READ))
+		return tmy_write_globally_readable_policy(data, is_delete);
+	if (str_starts(&data, KEYWORD_FILE_PATTERN))
+		return tmy_write_pattern_policy(data, is_delete);
+	if (str_starts(&data, KEYWORD_DENY_REWRITE))
+		return tmy_write_no_rewrite_policy(data, is_delete);
+	return -EINVAL;
+}
+
+/**
+ * read_exception_policy - Read exception policy.
+ *
+ * @head: Pointer to "struct tmy_io_buffer".
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, -EINVAL otherwise.
+ */
+static int read_exception_policy(struct tmy_io_buffer *head)
+{
+	if (!head->read_eof) {
+		switch (head->read_step) {
+		case 0:
+			head->read_var2 = NULL;
+			head->read_step = 1;
+		case 1:
+			if (!tmy_read_domain_keeper_policy(head))
+				break;
+			head->read_var2 = NULL;
+			head->read_step = 2;
+		case 2:
+			if (!tmy_read_globally_readable_policy(head))
+				break;
+			head->read_var2 = NULL;
+			head->read_step = 3;
+		case 3:
+			head->read_var2 = NULL;
+			head->read_step = 4;
+		case 4:
+			if (!tmy_read_domain_initializer_policy(head))
+				break;
+			head->read_var2 = NULL;
+			head->read_step = 5;
+		case 5:
+			if (!tmy_read_alias_policy(head))
+				break;
+			head->read_var2 = NULL;
+			head->read_step = 6;
+		case 6:
+			head->read_var2 = NULL;
+			head->read_step = 7;
+		case 7:
+			if (!tmy_read_file_pattern(head))
+				break;
+			head->read_var2 = NULL;
+			head->read_step = 8;
+		case 8:
+			if (!tmy_read_no_rewrite_policy(head))
+				break;
+			head->read_var2 = NULL;
+			head->read_step = 9;
+		case 9:
+			head->read_eof = true;
+			break;
+		default:
+			return -EINVAL;
+		}
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/* path to policy loader */
+static const char *tmy_loader = "/sbin/tomoyo-init";
+
+/**
+ * policy_loader_exists - Check whether /sbin/tomoyo-init exists.
+ *
+ * Returns true if /sbin/tomoyo-init exists, false otherwise.
+ */
+static bool policy_loader_exists(void)
+{
+	/*
+	 * Don't activate MAC if the policy loader doesn't exist.
+	 * If the initrd includes /sbin/init but real-root-dev has not
+	 * mounted on / yet, activating MAC will block the system since
+	 * policies are not loaded yet.
+	 * Thus, let do_execve() call this function everytime.
+	 */
+	struct nameidata nd;
+
+	if (path_lookup(tmy_loader, LOOKUP_FOLLOW, &nd)) {
+		printk(KERN_INFO "Not activating Mandatory Access Control now "
+		       "since %s doesn't exist.\n", tmy_loader);
+		return false;
+	}
+	path_put(&nd.path);
+	return true;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tmy_load_policy - Run external policy loader to load policy.
+ *
+ * @filename: The program about to start.
+ *
+ * This function checks whether @filename is /sbin/init , and if so
+ * invoke /sbin/tomoyo-init and wait for the termination of /sbin/tomoyo-init
+ * and then continues invocation of /sbin/init.
+ * /sbin/tomoyo-init reads policy files in /etc/tomoyo/ directory and
+ * writes to /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/ interfaces.
+ *
+ * Returns nothing.
+ */
+void tmy_load_policy(const char *filename)
+{
+	char *argv[2];
+	char *envp[3];
+
+	if (sbin_init_started)
+		return;
+	/*
+	 * Check filename is /sbin/init or /sbin/tomoyo-start.
+	 * /sbin/tomoyo-start is a dummy filename in case where /sbin/init can't
+	 * be passed.
+	 * You can create /sbin/tomoyo-start by
+	 * "ln -s /bin/true /sbin/tomoyo-start".
+	 */
+	if (strcmp(filename, "/sbin/init") &&
+	    strcmp(filename, "/sbin/tomoyo-start"))
+		return;
+	if (!policy_loader_exists())
+		return;
+
+	printk(KERN_INFO "Calling %s to load policy. Please wait.\n",
+	       tmy_loader);
+	argv[0] = (char *) tmy_loader;
+	argv[1] = NULL;
+	envp[0] = "HOME=/";
+	envp[1] = "PATH=/sbin:/bin:/usr/sbin:/usr/bin";
+	envp[2] = NULL;
+	call_usermodehelper(argv[0], argv, envp, 1);
+
+	printk(KERN_INFO "TOMOYO: 2.2.0-pre   2008/10/10\n");
+	printk(KERN_INFO "Mandatory Access Control activated.\n");
+	sbin_init_started = true;
+	{ /* Check all profiles currently assigned to domains are defined. */
+		struct domain_info *domain;
+		list1_for_each_entry(domain, &domain_list, list) {
+			const u8 profile = domain->profile;
+			if (profile_ptr[profile])
+				continue;
+			panic("Profile %u (used by '%s') not defined.\n",
+			      profile, domain->domainname->name);
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+/* Policy updates counter. */
+static atomic_t updates_counter[MAX_TMY_UPDATES_COUNTER];
+
+/**
+ * tmy_update_counter - Increment policy change counter.
+ *
+ * @index: Type of policy.
+ *
+ * Returns nothing.
+ */
+void tmy_update_counter(const unsigned char index)
+{
+	if (index < MAX_TMY_UPDATES_COUNTER)
+		atomic_inc(&updates_counter[index]);
+}
+
+/**
+ * read_updates_counter - Check for policy change counter.
+ *
+ * @head: Pointer to "struct tmy_io_buffer".
+ *
+ * Returns how many times policy has changed since the previous check.
+ */
+static int read_updates_counter(struct tmy_io_buffer *head)
+{
+	if (head->read_eof)
+		return 0;
+	tmy_io_printf(head,
+		      "/sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/domain_policy:    %10u\n"
+		      "/sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/exception_policy: %10u\n"
+		      "/sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/profile:          %10u\n"
+		      "/sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/manager:          %10u\n",
+		      atomic_xchg(&updates_counter
+				  [TMY_UPDATES_COUNTER_DOMAIN_POLICY], 0),
+		      atomic_xchg(&updates_counter
+				  [TMY_UPDATES_COUNTER_EXCEPTION_POLICY], 0),
+		      atomic_xchg(&updates_counter
+				  [TMY_UPDATES_COUNTER_PROFILE], 0),
+		      atomic_xchg(&updates_counter
+				  [TMY_UPDATES_COUNTER_MANAGER], 0));
+	head->read_eof = true;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * read_version: Get version.
+ *
+ * @head: Pointer to "struct tmy_io_buffer".
+ *
+ * Returns version information.
+ */
+static int read_version(struct tmy_io_buffer *head)
+{
+	if (!head->read_eof) {
+		tmy_io_printf(head, "2.2.0-pre");
+		head->read_eof = true;
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * read_self_domain - Get the current process's domainname.
+ *
+ * @head: Pointer to "struct tmy_io_buffer".
+ *
+ * Returns the current process's domainname.
+ */
+static int read_self_domain(struct tmy_io_buffer *head)
+{
+	if (!head->read_eof) {
+		/*
+		 * tmy_domain()->domainname != NULL
+		 * because every process belongs to a domain and
+		 * the domain's name cannot be NULL.
+		 */
+		tmy_io_printf(head, "%s", tmy_domain()->domainname->name);
+		head->read_eof = true;
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tmy_open_control - open() for /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/ interface.
+ *
+ * @type: Type of interface.
+ * @file: Pointer to "struct file".
+ *
+ * Associates policy handler and returns 0 on success, -ENOMEM otherwise.
+ */
+static int tmy_open_control(const u8 type, struct file *file)
+{
+	struct tmy_io_buffer *head = tmy_alloc(sizeof(*head));
+
+	if (!head)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	mutex_init(&head->io_sem);
+	switch (type) {
+	case TMY_DOMAINPOLICY:
+		/* /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/domain_policy */
+		head->write = write_domain_policy;
+		head->read = read_domain_policy;
+		break;
+	case TMY_EXCEPTIONPOLICY:
+		/* /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/exception_policy */
+		head->write = write_exception_policy;
+		head->read = read_exception_policy;
+		break;
+	case TMY_SELFDOMAIN:
+		/* /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/self_domain */
+		head->read = read_self_domain;
+		break;
+	case TMY_DOMAIN_STATUS:
+		/* /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/.domain_status */
+		head->write = write_domain_profile;
+		head->read = read_domain_profile;
+		break;
+	case TMY_PROCESS_STATUS:
+		/* /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/.process_status */
+		head->write = write_pid;
+		head->read = read_pid;
+		break;
+	case TMY_VERSION:
+		/* /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/version */
+		head->read = read_version;
+		head->readbuf_size = 128;
+		break;
+	case TMY_MEMINFO:
+		/* /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/meminfo */
+		head->write = tmy_write_memory_quota;
+		head->read = tmy_read_memory_counter;
+		head->readbuf_size = 512;
+		break;
+	case TMY_PROFILE:
+		/* /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/profile */
+		head->write = write_profile;
+		head->read = read_profile;
+		break;
+	case TMY_MANAGER:
+		/* /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/manager */
+		head->write = write_manager_policy;
+		head->read = read_manager_policy;
+		break;
+	case TMY_UPDATESCOUNTER:
+		/* /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/.updates_counter */
+		head->read = read_updates_counter;
+		break;
+	}
+	if (!(file->f_mode & FMODE_READ)) {
+		/*
+		 * No need to allocate read_buf since it is not opened
+		 * for reading.
+		 */
+		head->read = NULL;
+	} else {
+		if (!head->readbuf_size)
+			head->readbuf_size = 4096 * 2;
+		head->read_buf = tmy_alloc(head->readbuf_size);
+		if (!head->read_buf) {
+			tmy_free(head);
+			return -ENOMEM;
+		}
+	}
+	if (!(file->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE)) {
+		/*
+		 * No need to allocate write_buf since it is not opened
+		 * for writing.
+		 */
+		head->write = NULL;
+	} else if (head->write) {
+		head->writebuf_size = 4096 * 2;
+		head->write_buf = tmy_alloc(head->writebuf_size);
+		if (!head->write_buf) {
+			tmy_free(head->read_buf);
+			tmy_free(head);
+			return -ENOMEM;
+		}
+	}
+	file->private_data = head;
+	/*
+	 * Call the handler now if the file is
+	 * /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/self_domain
+	 * so that the user can use
+	 * cat < /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/self_domain"
+	 * to know the current process's domainname.
+	 */
+	if (type == TMY_SELFDOMAIN)
+		tmy_read_control(file, NULL, 0);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tmy_read_control - read() for /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/ interface.
+ *
+ * @file:       Pointer to "struct file".
+ * @buffer:     Poiner to buffer to write to.
+ * @buffer_len: Size of @buffer.
+ *
+ * Returns bytes read on success, negative value otherwise.
+ */
+static int tmy_read_control(struct file *file, char __user *buffer,
+			    const int buffer_len)
+{
+	int len = 0;
+	struct tmy_io_buffer *head = file->private_data;
+	char *cp;
+
+	if (!head->read)
+		return -ENOSYS;
+	if (!access_ok(VERIFY_WRITE, buffer, buffer_len))
+		return -EFAULT;
+	if (mutex_lock_interruptible(&head->io_sem))
+		return -EINTR;
+	/* Call the policy handler. */
+	len = head->read(head);
+	if (len < 0)
+		goto out;
+	/* Write to buffer. */
+	len = head->read_avail;
+	if (len > buffer_len)
+		len = buffer_len;
+	if (!len)
+		goto out;
+	/* head->read_buf changes by some functions. */
+	cp = head->read_buf;
+	if (copy_to_user(buffer, cp, len)) {
+		len = -EFAULT;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	head->read_avail -= len;
+	memmove(cp, cp + len, head->read_avail);
+out:
+	mutex_unlock(&head->io_sem);
+	return len;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tmy_write_control - write() for /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/ interface.
+ *
+ * @file:       Pointer to "struct file".
+ * @buffer:     Pointer to buffer to read from.
+ * @buffer_len: Size of @buffer.
+ *
+ * Returns @buffer_len on success, negative value otherwise.
+ */
+static int tmy_write_control(struct file *file, const char __user *buffer,
+			     const int buffer_len)
+{
+	struct tmy_io_buffer *head = file->private_data;
+	int error = buffer_len;
+	int avail_len = buffer_len;
+	char *cp0 = head->write_buf;
+
+	if (!head->write)
+		return -ENOSYS;
+	if (!access_ok(VERIFY_READ, buffer, buffer_len))
+		return -EFAULT;
+	/* Don't allow updating policies by non manager programs. */
+	if (head->write != write_pid && head->write != write_domain_policy &&
+	    !is_policy_manager())
+		return -EPERM;
+	if (mutex_lock_interruptible(&head->io_sem))
+		return -EINTR;
+	/* Read a line and dispatch it to the policy handler. */
+	while (avail_len > 0) {
+		char c;
+		if (head->write_avail >= head->writebuf_size - 1) {
+			error = -ENOMEM;
+			break;
+		} else if (get_user(c, buffer)) {
+			error = -EFAULT;
+			break;
+		}
+		buffer++;
+		avail_len--;
+		cp0[head->write_avail++] = c;
+		if (c != '\n')
+			continue;
+		cp0[head->write_avail - 1] = '\0';
+		head->write_avail = 0;
+		normalize_line(cp0);
+		head->write(head);
+	}
+	mutex_unlock(&head->io_sem);
+	return error;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tmy_close_control - close() for /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/ interface.
+ *
+ * @file: Pointer to "struct file".
+ *
+ * Releases memory and returns 0.
+ */
+static int tmy_close_control(struct file *file)
+{
+	struct tmy_io_buffer *head = file->private_data;
+
+	/* Release memory used for policy I/O. */
+	tmy_free(head->read_buf);
+	head->read_buf = NULL;
+	tmy_free(head->write_buf);
+	head->write_buf = NULL;
+	tmy_free(head);
+	head = NULL;
+	file->private_data = NULL;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tmy_alloc_acl_element - Allocate permanent memory for ACL entry.
+ *
+ * @acl_type:  Type of ACL entry.
+ *
+ * Returns pointer to the ACL entry on success, NULL otherwise.
+ */
+void *tmy_alloc_acl_element(const u8 acl_type)
+{
+	int len;
+	struct acl_info *ptr;
+
+	switch (acl_type) {
+	case TYPE_SINGLE_PATH_ACL:
+		len = sizeof(struct single_path_acl_record);
+		break;
+	case TYPE_DOUBLE_PATH_ACL:
+		len = sizeof(struct double_path_acl_record);
+		break;
+	default:
+		return NULL;
+	}
+	ptr = tmy_alloc_element(len);
+	if (!ptr)
+		return NULL;
+	ptr->type = acl_type;
+	return ptr;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tmy_open - open() for /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/ interface.
+ *
+ * @inode: Pointer to "struct inode".
+ * @file:  Pointer to "struct file".
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, negative value otherwise.
+ */
+static int tmy_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
+{
+	return tmy_open_control(((u8 *) file->f_path.dentry->d_inode->i_private)
+				- ((u8 *) NULL), file);
+}
+
+/**
+ * tmy_release - close() for /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/ interface.
+ *
+ * @inode: Pointer to "struct inode".
+ * @file:  Pointer to "struct file".
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, negative value otherwise.
+ */
+static int tmy_release(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
+{
+	return tmy_close_control(file);
+}
+
+/**
+ * tmy_read - read() for /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/ interface.
+ *
+ * @file:  Pointer to "struct file".
+ * @buf:   Pointer to buffer.
+ * @count: Size of @buf.
+ * @ppos:  Unused.
+ *
+ * Returns bytes read on success, negative value otherwise.
+ */
+static ssize_t tmy_read(struct file *file, char __user *buf, size_t count,
+			loff_t *ppos)
+{
+	return tmy_read_control(file, buf, count);
+}
+
+/**
+ * tmy_write - write() for /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/ interface.
+ *
+ * @file:  Pointer to "struct file".
+ * @buf:   Pointer to buffer.
+ * @count: Size of @buf.
+ * @ppos:  Unused.
+ *
+ * Returns @count on success, negative value otherwise.
+ */
+static ssize_t tmy_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
+			 size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+	return tmy_write_control(file, buf, count);
+}
+
+/* Operations for /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/ interface. */
+static struct file_operations tmy_operations = {
+	.open    = tmy_open,
+	.release = tmy_release,
+	.read    = tmy_read,
+	.write   = tmy_write,
+};
+
+/**
+ * create_entry - Create interface files under /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/ directory.
+ *
+ * @name:   The name of the interface file.
+ * @mode:   The permission of the interface file.
+ * @parent: The parent directory.
+ * @key:    Type of interface.
+ *
+ * Returns nothing.
+ */
+static void __init create_entry(const char *name, const mode_t mode,
+				struct dentry *parent, const u8 key)
+{
+	securityfs_create_file(name, mode, parent, ((u8 *) NULL) + key,
+			       &tmy_operations);
+}
+
+/**
+ * tmy_initerface_init - Initialize /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/ interface.
+ *
+ * Returns 0.
+ */
+static int __init tmy_initerface_init(void)
+{
+	struct dentry *tmy_dir;
+
+	tmy_dir = securityfs_create_dir("tomoyo", NULL);
+	create_entry("domain_policy",    0600, tmy_dir, TMY_DOMAINPOLICY);
+	create_entry("exception_policy", 0600, tmy_dir, TMY_EXCEPTIONPOLICY);
+	create_entry("self_domain",      0400, tmy_dir, TMY_SELFDOMAIN);
+	create_entry(".domain_status",   0600, tmy_dir, TMY_DOMAIN_STATUS);
+	create_entry(".process_status",  0600, tmy_dir, TMY_PROCESS_STATUS);
+	create_entry("meminfo",          0600, tmy_dir, TMY_MEMINFO);
+	create_entry("profile",          0600, tmy_dir, TMY_PROFILE);
+	create_entry("manager",          0600, tmy_dir, TMY_MANAGER);
+	create_entry(".updates_counter", 0400, tmy_dir, TMY_UPDATESCOUNTER);
+	create_entry("version",          0400, tmy_dir, TMY_VERSION);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+fs_initcall(tmy_initerface_init);
--- /dev/null
+++ linux-next/security/tomoyo/common.h
@@ -0,0 +1,320 @@
+/*
+ * security/tomoyo/common.h
+ *
+ * Common functions for TOMOYO.
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2005-2008  NTT DATA CORPORATION
+ *
+ * Version: 2.2.0-pre   2008/10/10
+ *
+ */
+
+#ifndef _SECURITY_TOMOYO_COMMON_H
+#define _SECURITY_TOMOYO_COMMON_H
+
+#include <linux/string.h>
+#include <linux/mm.h>
+#include <linux/file.h>
+#include <linux/kmod.h>
+#include <linux/fs.h>
+#include <linux/sched.h>
+#include <linux/namei.h>
+#include <linux/mount.h>
+#include <linux/list1.h>
+
+struct dentry;
+struct vfsmount;
+
+#define false 0
+#define true 1
+
+/* Temporary buffer for holding pathnames. */
+struct tmy_page_buffer {
+	char buffer[4096];
+};
+
+/* Structure for attribute checks in addition to pathname checks. */
+struct obj_info {
+	struct tmy_page_buffer *tmp;
+};
+
+/* Structure for holding a token. */
+struct path_info {
+	const char *name;
+	u32 hash;          /* = full_name_hash(name, strlen(name)) */
+	u16 total_len;     /* = strlen(name)                       */
+	u16 const_len;     /* = const_part_length(name)            */
+	bool is_dir;       /* = strendswith(name, "/")             */
+	bool is_patterned; /* = path_contains_pattern(name)        */
+	u16 depth;         /* = path_depth(name)                   */
+};
+
+/*
+ * This is the max length of a token.
+ *
+ * A token consists of only ASCII printable characters.
+ * Non printable characters in a token is represented in \ooo style
+ * octal string. Thus, \ itself is represented as \\.
+ */
+#define TMY_MAX_PATHNAME_LEN 4000
+
+/* Structure for holding requested pathname. */
+struct path_info_with_data {
+	/* Keep "head" first, for this pointer is passed to tmy_free(). */
+	struct path_info head;
+	char bariier1[16]; /* Safeguard for overrun. */
+	char body[TMY_MAX_PATHNAME_LEN];
+	char barrier2[16]; /* Safeguard for overrun. */
+};
+
+/* Common header for holding ACL entries. */
+struct acl_info {
+	struct list1_head list;
+	/*
+	 * Type of this ACL entry.
+	 *
+	 * MSB is is_deleted flag.
+	 */
+	u8 type;
+} __attribute__((__packed__));
+
+/* This ACL entry is deleted.           */
+#define ACL_DELETED        0x80
+
+/* Structure for domain information. */
+struct domain_info {
+	struct list1_head list;
+	struct list1_head acl_info_list;
+	/* Name of this domain. Never NULL.          */
+	const struct path_info *domainname;
+	u8 profile;        /* Profile number to use. */
+	u8 is_deleted;     /* Delete flag.
+			      0 = active.
+			      1 = deleted but undeletable.
+			      255 = deleted and no longer undeletable. */
+	bool quota_warned; /* Quota warnning flag.   */
+	/* DOMAIN_FLAGS_*. Use tmy_set_domain_flag() to modify. */
+	u8 flags;
+};
+
+/* Profile number is an integer between 0 and 255. */
+#define MAX_PROFILES 256
+
+/* Ignore "allow_read" directive in exception policy. */
+#define DOMAIN_FLAGS_IGNORE_GLOBAL_ALLOW_READ 1
+/*
+ * This domain was unable to create a new domain at tmy_find_next_domain()
+ * because the name of the domain to be created was too long or
+ * it could not allocate memory.
+ * More than one process continued execve() without domain transition.
+ */
+#define DOMAIN_FLAGS_TRANSITION_FAILED        2
+
+/*
+ * Structure for "allow_read/write", "allow_execute", "allow_read",
+ * "allow_write", "allow_create", "allow_unlink", "allow_mkdir", "allow_rmdir",
+ * "allow_mkfifo", "allow_mksock", "allow_mkblock", "allow_mkchar",
+ * "allow_truncate", "allow_symlink" and "allow_rewrite" directive.
+ */
+struct single_path_acl_record {
+	struct acl_info head; /* type = TYPE_SINGLE_PATH_ACL */
+	u16 perm;
+	/* Pointer to single pathname. */
+	const struct path_info *filename;
+};
+
+/* Structure for "allow_rename" and "allow_link" directive. */
+struct double_path_acl_record {
+	struct acl_info head; /* type = TYPE_DOUBLE_PATH_ACL */
+	u8 perm;
+	/* Pointer to single pathname. */
+	const struct path_info *filename1;
+	/* Pointer to single pathname. */
+	const struct path_info *filename2;
+};
+
+/* Keywords for ACLs. */
+#define KEYWORD_ALIAS                     "alias "
+#define KEYWORD_ALLOW_READ                "allow_read "
+#define KEYWORD_DELETE                    "delete "
+#define KEYWORD_DENY_REWRITE              "deny_rewrite "
+#define KEYWORD_FILE_PATTERN              "file_pattern "
+#define KEYWORD_INITIALIZE_DOMAIN         "initialize_domain "
+#define KEYWORD_KEEP_DOMAIN               "keep_domain "
+#define KEYWORD_NO_INITIALIZE_DOMAIN      "no_initialize_domain "
+#define KEYWORD_NO_KEEP_DOMAIN            "no_keep_domain "
+#define KEYWORD_SELECT                    "select "
+#define KEYWORD_UNDELETE                  "undelete "
+#define KEYWORD_USE_PROFILE               "use_profile "
+#define KEYWORD_IGNORE_GLOBAL_ALLOW_READ  "ignore_global_allow_read"
+/* A domain definition starts with <kernel>. */
+#define ROOT_NAME                         "<kernel>"
+#define ROOT_NAME_LEN                     (sizeof(ROOT_NAME) - 1)
+
+/* Index numbers for Access Controls. */
+#define TMY_TOMOYO_MAC_FOR_FILE                  0  /* domain_policy.conf */
+#define TMY_TOMOYO_MAX_ACCEPT_ENTRY              1
+#define TMY_TOMOYO_VERBOSE                       2
+#define TMY_MAX_CONTROL_INDEX                    3
+
+/* Index numbers for updates counter. */
+#define TMY_UPDATES_COUNTER_DOMAIN_POLICY    0
+#define TMY_UPDATES_COUNTER_EXCEPTION_POLICY 1
+#define TMY_UPDATES_COUNTER_PROFILE          2
+#define TMY_UPDATES_COUNTER_MANAGER          3
+#define MAX_TMY_UPDATES_COUNTER              4
+
+/* Structure for reading/writing policy via securityfs interfaces. */
+struct tmy_io_buffer {
+	int (*read) (struct tmy_io_buffer *);
+	int (*write) (struct tmy_io_buffer *);
+	/* Exclusive lock for this structure.   */
+	struct mutex io_sem;
+	/* The position currently reading from. */
+	struct list1_head *read_var1;
+	/* Extra variables for reading.         */
+	struct list1_head *read_var2;
+	/* The position currently writing to.   */
+	struct domain_info *write_var1;
+	/* The step for reading.                */
+	int read_step;
+	/* Buffer for reading.                  */
+	char *read_buf;
+	/* EOF flag for reading.                */
+	bool read_eof;
+	/* Read domain ACL of specified PID?    */
+	bool read_single_domain;
+	/* Extra variable for reading.          */
+	u8 read_bit;
+	/* Bytes available for reading.         */
+	int read_avail;
+	/* Size of read buffer.                 */
+	int readbuf_size;
+	/* Buffer for writing.                  */
+	char *write_buf;
+	/* Bytes available for writing.         */
+	int write_avail;
+	/* Size of write buffer.                */
+	int writebuf_size;
+};
+
+/* Check whether the domain has too many ACL entries to hold. */
+bool tmy_check_domain_quota(struct domain_info * const domain);
+/* Transactional sprintf() for policy dump. */
+bool tmy_io_printf(struct tmy_io_buffer *head, const char *fmt, ...)
+	__attribute__ ((format(printf, 2, 3)));
+/* Check whether the domainname is correct. */
+bool tmy_is_correct_domain(const unsigned char *domainname,
+			   const char *function);
+/* Check whether the token is correct. */
+bool tmy_is_correct_path(const char *filename, const s8 start_type,
+			 const s8 pattern_type, const s8 end_type,
+			 const char *function);
+/* Check whether the token can be a domainname. */
+bool tmy_is_domain_def(const unsigned char *buffer);
+/* Check whether the given filename matches the given pattern. */
+bool tmy_path_matches_pattern(const struct path_info *filename,
+			      const struct path_info *pattern);
+/* Read "alias" entry in exception policy. */
+bool tmy_read_alias_policy(struct tmy_io_buffer *head);
+/*
+ * Read "initialize_domain" and "no_initialize_domain" entry
+ * in exception policy.
+ */
+bool tmy_read_domain_initializer_policy(struct tmy_io_buffer *head);
+/* Read "keep_domain" and "no_keep_domain" entry in exception policy. */
+bool tmy_read_domain_keeper_policy(struct tmy_io_buffer *head);
+/* Read "file_pattern" entry in exception policy. */
+bool tmy_read_file_pattern(struct tmy_io_buffer *head);
+/* Read "allow_read" entry in exception policy. */
+bool tmy_read_globally_readable_policy(struct tmy_io_buffer *head);
+/* Read "deny_rewrite" entry in exception policy. */
+bool tmy_read_no_rewrite_policy(struct tmy_io_buffer *head);
+/* Write domain policy violation warning message to console? */
+bool tmy_verbose_mode(const struct domain_info *domain);
+/* Convert double path operation to operation name. */
+const char *tmy_dp2keyword(const u8 operation);
+/* Get the last component of the given domainname. */
+const char *tmy_get_last_name(const struct domain_info *domain);
+/* Get warning message. */
+const char *tmy_get_msg(const bool is_enforce);
+/* Convert single path operation to operation name. */
+const char *tmy_sp2keyword(const u8 operation);
+/* Delete a domain. */
+int tmy_delete_domain(char *data);
+/* Create "alias" entry in exception policy. */
+int tmy_write_alias_policy(char *data, const bool is_delete);
+/*
+ * Create "initialize_domain" and "no_initialize_domain" entry
+ * in exception policy.
+ */
+int tmy_write_domain_initializer_policy(char *data, const bool is_not,
+					const bool is_delete);
+/* Create "keep_domain" and "no_keep_domain" entry in exception policy. */
+int tmy_write_domain_keeper_policy(char *data, const bool is_not,
+				   const bool is_delete);
+/*
+ * Create "allow_read/write", "allow_execute", "allow_read", "allow_write",
+ * "allow_create", "allow_unlink", "allow_mkdir", "allow_rmdir",
+ * "allow_mkfifo", "allow_mksock", "allow_mkblock", "allow_mkchar",
+ * "allow_truncate", "allow_symlink", "allow_rewrite", "allow_rename" and
+ * "allow_link" entry in domain policy.
+ */
+int tmy_write_file_policy(char *data, struct domain_info *domain,
+			  const bool is_delete);
+/* Create "allow_read" entry in exception policy. */
+int tmy_write_globally_readable_policy(char *data, const bool is_delete);
+/* Create "deny_rewrite" entry in exception policy. */
+int tmy_write_no_rewrite_policy(char *data, const bool is_delete);
+/* Create "file_pattern" entry in exception policy. */
+int tmy_write_pattern_policy(char *data, const bool is_delete);
+/* Find a domain by the given name. */
+struct domain_info *tmy_find_domain(const char *domainname);
+/* Find or create a domain by the given name. */
+struct domain_info *tmy_find_or_assign_new_domain(const char *domainname,
+						  const u8 profile);
+/* Undelete a domain. */
+struct domain_info *tmy_undelete_domain(const char *domainname);
+/* Check mode for specified functionality. */
+unsigned int tmy_check_flags(const struct domain_info *domain, const u8 index);
+/* Allocate memory for structures. */
+void *tmy_alloc_acl_element(const u8 acl_type);
+/* Fill in "struct path_info" members. */
+void tmy_fill_path_info(struct path_info *ptr);
+/* Run policy loader when /sbin/init starts. */
+void tmy_load_policy(const char *filename);
+/* Change "struct domain_info"->flags. */
+void tmy_set_domain_flag(struct domain_info *domain, const bool is_delete,
+			 const u8 flags);
+/* Update the policy change counter. */
+void tmy_update_counter(const unsigned char index);
+
+/* strcmp() for "struct path_info" structure. */
+static inline bool tmy_pathcmp(const struct path_info *a,
+			       const struct path_info *b)
+{
+	return a->hash != b->hash || strcmp(a->name, b->name);
+}
+
+/* Get type of an ACL entry. */
+static inline u8 tmy_acl_type1(struct acl_info *ptr)
+{
+	return ptr->type & ~ACL_DELETED;
+}
+
+/* Get type of an ACL entry. */
+static inline u8 tmy_acl_type2(struct acl_info *ptr)
+{
+	return ptr->type;
+}
+
+/* The list for "struct domain_info". */
+extern struct list1_head domain_list;
+
+/* Has /sbin/init started? */
+extern bool sbin_init_started;
+
+/* The kernel's domain. */
+extern struct domain_info KERNEL_DOMAIN;
+
+#endif /* !defined(_SECURITY_TOMOYO_COMMON_H) */

--

[TOMOYO #11 (linux-next) 07/11] File operation restriction part.

[Kentaro Takeda]

This file controls file related operations.

Signed-off-by: Kentaro Takeda <takedakn@nttdata.co.jp>
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: Toshiharu Harada <haradats@nttdata.co.jp>
---
 security/tomoyo/file.c | 1232 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 1232 insertions(+)

--- /dev/null
+++ linux-next/security/tomoyo/file.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1232 @@
+/*
+ * security/tomoyo/file.c
+ *
+ * Implementation of the Domain-Based Mandatory Access Control.
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2005-2008  NTT DATA CORPORATION
+ *
+ * Version: 2.2.0-pre   2008/10/10
+ *
+ */
+
+#include "common.h"
+#include "tomoyo.h"
+#include "realpath.h"
+#define ACC_MODE(x) ("\000\004\002\006"[(x)&O_ACCMODE])
+
+/* Structure for "allow_read" keyword. */
+struct globally_readable_file_entry {
+	struct list1_head list;
+	const struct path_info *filename;
+	bool is_deleted;
+};
+
+/* Structure for "file_pattern" keyword. */
+struct pattern_entry {
+	struct list1_head list;
+	const struct path_info *pattern;
+	bool is_deleted;
+};
+
+/* Structure for "deny_rewrite" keyword. */
+struct no_rewrite_entry {
+	struct list1_head list;
+	const struct path_info *pattern;
+	bool is_deleted;
+};
+
+/* Keyword array for single path operations. */
+static const char *sp_keyword[MAX_SINGLE_PATH_OPERATION] = {
+	[TMY_TYPE_READ_WRITE_ACL] = "read/write",
+	[TMY_TYPE_EXECUTE_ACL]    = "execute",
+	[TMY_TYPE_READ_ACL]       = "read",
+	[TMY_TYPE_WRITE_ACL]      = "write",
+	[TMY_TYPE_CREATE_ACL]     = "create",
+	[TMY_TYPE_UNLINK_ACL]     = "unlink",
+	[TMY_TYPE_MKDIR_ACL]      = "mkdir",
+	[TMY_TYPE_RMDIR_ACL]      = "rmdir",
+	[TMY_TYPE_MKFIFO_ACL]     = "mkfifo",
+	[TMY_TYPE_MKSOCK_ACL]     = "mksock",
+	[TMY_TYPE_MKBLOCK_ACL]    = "mkblock",
+	[TMY_TYPE_MKCHAR_ACL]     = "mkchar",
+	[TMY_TYPE_TRUNCATE_ACL]   = "truncate",
+	[TMY_TYPE_SYMLINK_ACL]    = "symlink",
+	[TMY_TYPE_REWRITE_ACL]    = "rewrite",
+};
+
+/* Keyword array for double path operations. */
+static const char *dp_keyword[MAX_DOUBLE_PATH_OPERATION] = {
+	[TMY_TYPE_LINK_ACL]    = "link",
+	[TMY_TYPE_RENAME_ACL]  = "rename",
+};
+
+/**
+ * tmy_sp2keyword - Get the name of single path operation.
+ *
+ * @operation: Type of operation.
+ *
+ * Returns the name of single path operation.
+ */
+const char *tmy_sp2keyword(const u8 operation)
+{
+	return (operation < MAX_SINGLE_PATH_OPERATION)
+		? sp_keyword[operation] : NULL;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tmy_dp2keyword - Get the name of double path operation.
+ *
+ * @operation: Type of operation.
+ *
+ * Returns the name of double path operation.
+ */
+const char *tmy_dp2keyword(const u8 operation)
+{
+	return (operation < MAX_DOUBLE_PATH_OPERATION)
+		? dp_keyword[operation] : NULL;
+}
+
+/**
+ * strendswith - Check whether the token ends with the given token.
+ *
+ * @name: The token to check.
+ * @tail: The token to find.
+ *
+ * Returns true if @name ends with @tail, false otherwise.
+ */
+static bool strendswith(const char *name, const char *tail)
+{
+	int len;
+
+	if (!name || !tail)
+		return false;
+	len = strlen(name) - strlen(tail);
+	return len >= 0 && !strcmp(name + len, tail);
+}
+
+/**
+ * tmy_get_path - Get realpath.
+ *
+ * @path: Pointer to "struct path".
+ *
+ * Returns pointer to "struct path_info" on success, NULL otherwise.
+ */
+static struct path_info *tmy_get_path(struct path *path)
+{
+	int error;
+	struct path_info_with_data *buf = tmy_alloc(sizeof(*buf));
+
+	if (!buf)
+		return NULL;
+	/* Preserve one byte for appending "/". */
+	error = tmy_realpath_from_path2(path, buf->body,
+					sizeof(buf->body) - 2);
+	if (!error) {
+		buf->head.name = buf->body;
+		tmy_fill_path_info(&buf->head);
+		return &buf->head;
+	}
+	tmy_free(buf);
+	return NULL;
+}
+
+static int update_double_path_acl(const u8 type, const char *filename1,
+				  const char *filename2,
+				  struct domain_info * const domain,
+				  const bool is_delete);
+static int update_single_path_acl(const u8 type, const char *filename,
+				  struct domain_info * const domain,
+				  const bool is_delete);
+
+/**
+ * tmy_add_domain_acl - Add the given ACL to the given domain.
+ *
+ * @domain: Pointer to "struct domain_info". May be NULL.
+ * @acl:    Pointer to "struct acl_info".
+ *
+ * Returns 0.
+ */
+static int tmy_add_domain_acl(struct domain_info *domain, struct acl_info *acl)
+{
+	if (domain) {
+		/*
+		 * We need to serialize because this function is called by
+		 * update_single_path_acl() and update_double_path_acl().
+		 */
+		static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(lock);
+		/***** CRITICAL SECTION START *****/
+		spin_lock(&lock);
+		list1_add_tail(&acl->list, &domain->acl_info_list);
+		spin_unlock(&lock);
+		/***** CRITICAL SECTION END *****/
+	} else {
+		acl->type &= ~ACL_DELETED;
+	}
+	tmy_update_counter(TMY_UPDATES_COUNTER_DOMAIN_POLICY);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tmy_del_domain_acl - Delete the given ACL from the domain.
+ *
+ * @acl: Pointer to "struct acl_info". May be NULL.
+ *
+ * Returns 0.
+ */
+static int tmy_del_domain_acl(struct acl_info *acl)
+{
+	if (acl)
+		acl->type |= ACL_DELETED;
+	tmy_update_counter(TMY_UPDATES_COUNTER_DOMAIN_POLICY);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * The list for "struct globally_readable_file_entry".
+ *
+ * This list is updated only inside update_globally_readable_entry(), thus
+ * no global mutex exists.
+ */
+static LIST1_HEAD(globally_readable_list);
+
+/**
+ * update_globally_readable_entry - Update "struct globally_readable_file_entry" list.
+ *
+ * @filename:  Filename unconditionally permitted to open() for reading.
+ * @is_delete: True if it is a delete request.
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, negative value otherwise.
+ */
+static int update_globally_readable_entry(const char *filename,
+					  const bool is_delete)
+{
+	struct globally_readable_file_entry *new_entry;
+	struct globally_readable_file_entry *ptr;
+	static DEFINE_MUTEX(lock);
+	const struct path_info *saved_filename;
+	int error = -ENOMEM;
+
+	if (!tmy_is_correct_path(filename, 1, 0, -1, __func__))
+		return -EINVAL;
+	saved_filename = tmy_save_name(filename);
+	if (!saved_filename)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	/***** EXCLUSIVE SECTION START *****/
+	mutex_lock(&lock);
+	list1_for_each_entry(ptr, &globally_readable_list, list) {
+		if (ptr->filename != saved_filename)
+			continue;
+		ptr->is_deleted = is_delete;
+		error = 0;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if (is_delete) {
+		error = -ENOENT;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	new_entry = tmy_alloc_element(sizeof(*new_entry));
+	if (!new_entry)
+		goto out;
+	new_entry->filename = saved_filename;
+	list1_add_tail(&new_entry->list, &globally_readable_list);
+	error = 0;
+out:
+	mutex_unlock(&lock);
+	/***** EXCLUSIVE SECTION END *****/
+	tmy_update_counter(TMY_UPDATES_COUNTER_EXCEPTION_POLICY);
+	return error;
+}
+
+/**
+ * is_globally_readable_file - Check if the file is unconditionnaly permitted to be open()ed for reading.
+ *
+ * @filename: The filename to check.
+ *
+ * Returns true if any domain can open @filename for reading, false otherwise.
+ */
+static bool is_globally_readable_file(const struct path_info *filename)
+{
+	struct globally_readable_file_entry *ptr;
+
+	list1_for_each_entry(ptr, &globally_readable_list, list) {
+		if (!ptr->is_deleted &&
+		    tmy_path_matches_pattern(filename, ptr->filename))
+			return true;
+	}
+	return false;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tmy_write_globally_readable_policy - Write "struct globally_readable_file_entry" list.
+ *
+ * @data:      String to parse.
+ * @is_delete: True if it is a delete request.
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, negative value otherwise.
+ */
+int tmy_write_globally_readable_policy(char *data, const bool is_delete)
+{
+	return update_globally_readable_entry(data, is_delete);
+}
+
+/**
+ * tmy_read_globally_readable_policy - Read "struct globally_readable_file_entry" list.
+ *
+ * @head: Pointer to "struct tmy_io_buffer".
+ *
+ * Returns true on success, false otherwise.
+ */
+bool tmy_read_globally_readable_policy(struct tmy_io_buffer *head)
+{
+	struct list1_head *pos;
+
+	list1_for_each_cookie(pos, head->read_var2, &globally_readable_list) {
+		struct globally_readable_file_entry *ptr;
+		ptr = list1_entry(pos, struct globally_readable_file_entry,
+				  list);
+		if (ptr->is_deleted)
+			continue;
+		if (!tmy_io_printf(head, KEYWORD_ALLOW_READ "%s\n",
+				   ptr->filename->name))
+			goto out;
+	}
+	return true;
+out:
+	return false;
+}
+
+/*
+ * The list for "struct pattern_entry".
+ *
+ * This list is updated only inside update_file_pattern_entry(), thus
+ * no global mutex exists.
+ */
+static LIST1_HEAD(pattern_list);
+
+/**
+ * update_file_pattern_entry - Update "struct pattern_entry" list.
+ *
+ * @pattern:   Pathname pattern.
+ * @is_delete: True if it is a delete request.
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, negative value otherwise.
+ */
+static int update_file_pattern_entry(const char *pattern, const bool is_delete)
+{
+	struct pattern_entry *new_entry;
+	struct pattern_entry *ptr;
+	static DEFINE_MUTEX(lock);
+	const struct path_info *saved_pattern;
+	int error = -ENOMEM;
+
+	if (!tmy_is_correct_path(pattern, 0, 1, 0, __func__))
+		return -EINVAL;
+	saved_pattern = tmy_save_name(pattern);
+	if (!saved_pattern)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	/***** EXCLUSIVE SECTION START *****/
+	mutex_lock(&lock);
+	list1_for_each_entry(ptr, &pattern_list, list) {
+		if (saved_pattern != ptr->pattern)
+			continue;
+		ptr->is_deleted = is_delete;
+		error = 0;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if (is_delete) {
+		error = -ENOENT;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	new_entry = tmy_alloc_element(sizeof(*new_entry));
+	if (!new_entry)
+		goto out;
+	new_entry->pattern = saved_pattern;
+	list1_add_tail(&new_entry->list, &pattern_list);
+	error = 0;
+out:
+	mutex_unlock(&lock);
+	/***** EXCLUSIVE SECTION END *****/
+	tmy_update_counter(TMY_UPDATES_COUNTER_EXCEPTION_POLICY);
+	return error;
+}
+
+/**
+ * get_file_pattern - Get patterned pathname.
+ *
+ * @filename: The filename to find patterned pathname.
+ *
+ * Returns pointer to pathname pattern if matched, @filename otherwise.
+ */
+static const struct path_info *
+get_file_pattern(const struct path_info *filename)
+{
+	struct pattern_entry *ptr;
+	const struct path_info *pattern = NULL;
+
+	list1_for_each_entry(ptr, &pattern_list, list) {
+		if (ptr->is_deleted)
+			continue;
+		if (!tmy_path_matches_pattern(filename, ptr->pattern))
+			continue;
+		pattern = ptr->pattern;
+		if (strendswith(pattern->name, "/\\*")) {
+			/* Do nothing. Try to find the better match. */
+		} else {
+			/* This would be the better match. Use this. */
+			break;
+		}
+	}
+	if (pattern)
+		filename = pattern;
+	return filename;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tmy_write_pattern_policy - Write "struct pattern_entry" list.
+ *
+ * @data:      String to parse.
+ * @is_delete: True if it is a delete request.
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, negative value otherwise.
+ */
+int tmy_write_pattern_policy(char *data, const bool is_delete)
+{
+	return update_file_pattern_entry(data, is_delete);
+}
+
+/**
+ * tmy_read_file_pattern - Read "struct pattern_entry" list.
+ *
+ * @head: Pointer to "struct tmy_io_buffer".
+ *
+ * Returns true on success, false otherwise.
+ */
+bool tmy_read_file_pattern(struct tmy_io_buffer *head)
+{
+	struct list1_head *pos;
+
+	list1_for_each_cookie(pos, head->read_var2, &pattern_list) {
+		struct pattern_entry *ptr;
+		ptr = list1_entry(pos, struct pattern_entry, list);
+		if (ptr->is_deleted)
+			continue;
+		if (!tmy_io_printf(head, KEYWORD_FILE_PATTERN "%s\n",
+				   ptr->pattern->name))
+			goto out;
+	}
+	return true;
+out:
+	return false;
+}
+
+/*
+ * The list for "struct no_rewrite_entry".
+ *
+ * This list is updated only inside update_no_rewrite_entry(), thus
+ * no global mutex exists.
+ */
+static LIST1_HEAD(no_rewrite_list);
+
+/**
+ * update_no_rewrite_entry - Update "struct no_rewrite_entry" list.
+ *
+ * @pattern:   Pathname pattern that are not rewritable by default.
+ * @is_delete: True if it is a delete request.
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, negative value otherwise.
+ */
+static int update_no_rewrite_entry(const char *pattern, const bool is_delete)
+{
+	struct no_rewrite_entry *new_entry, *ptr;
+	static DEFINE_MUTEX(lock);
+	const struct path_info *saved_pattern;
+	int error = -ENOMEM;
+
+	if (!tmy_is_correct_path(pattern, 0, 0, 0, __func__))
+		return -EINVAL;
+	saved_pattern = tmy_save_name(pattern);
+	if (!saved_pattern)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	/***** EXCLUSIVE SECTION START *****/
+	mutex_lock(&lock);
+	list1_for_each_entry(ptr, &no_rewrite_list, list) {
+		if (ptr->pattern != saved_pattern)
+			continue;
+		ptr->is_deleted = is_delete;
+		error = 0;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if (is_delete) {
+		error = -ENOENT;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	new_entry = tmy_alloc_element(sizeof(*new_entry));
+	if (!new_entry)
+		goto out;
+	new_entry->pattern = saved_pattern;
+	list1_add_tail(&new_entry->list, &no_rewrite_list);
+	error = 0;
+out:
+	mutex_unlock(&lock);
+	/***** EXCLUSIVE SECTION END *****/
+	tmy_update_counter(TMY_UPDATES_COUNTER_EXCEPTION_POLICY);
+	return error;
+}
+
+/**
+ * is_no_rewrite_file - Check if the given pathname is not permitted to be rewrited.
+ *
+ * @filename: Filename to check.
+ *
+ * Returns true if @filename is specified by "deny_rewrite" directive,
+ * false otherwise.
+ */
+static bool is_no_rewrite_file(const struct path_info *filename)
+{
+	struct no_rewrite_entry *ptr;
+
+	list1_for_each_entry(ptr, &no_rewrite_list, list) {
+		if (ptr->is_deleted)
+			continue;
+		if (!tmy_path_matches_pattern(filename, ptr->pattern))
+			continue;
+		return true;
+	}
+	return false;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tmy_write_no_rewrite_policy - Write "struct no_rewrite_entry" list.
+ *
+ * @data:      String to parse.
+ * @is_delete: True if it is a delete request.
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, negative value otherwise.
+ */
+int tmy_write_no_rewrite_policy(char *data, const bool is_delete)
+{
+	return update_no_rewrite_entry(data, is_delete);
+}
+
+/**
+ * tmy_read_no_rewrite_policy - Read "struct no_rewrite_entry" list.
+ *
+ * @head: Pointer to "struct tmy_io_buffer".
+ *
+ * Returns true on success, false otherwise.
+ */
+bool tmy_read_no_rewrite_policy(struct tmy_io_buffer *head)
+{
+	struct list1_head *pos;
+
+	list1_for_each_cookie(pos, head->read_var2, &no_rewrite_list) {
+		struct no_rewrite_entry *ptr;
+		ptr = list1_entry(pos, struct no_rewrite_entry, list);
+		if (ptr->is_deleted)
+			continue;
+		if (!tmy_io_printf(head, KEYWORD_DENY_REWRITE "%s\n",
+				   ptr->pattern->name))
+			goto out;
+	}
+	return true;
+out:
+	return false;
+}
+
+/**
+ * update_file_acl - Update file's read/write/execute ACL.
+ *
+ * @filename:  Filename.
+ * @perm:      Permission (between 1 to 7).
+ * @domain:    Pointer to "struct domain_info".
+ * @is_delete: True if it is a delete request.
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, negative value otherwise.
+ *
+ * This is legacy support interface for older policy syntax.
+ * Current policy syntax uses "allow_read/write" instead of "6",
+ * "allow_read" instead of "4", "allow_write" instead of "2",
+ * "allow_execute" instead of "1".
+ */
+static int update_file_acl(const char *filename, u8 perm,
+			   struct domain_info * const domain,
+			   const bool is_delete)
+{
+	if (perm > 7 || !perm) {
+		printk(KERN_DEBUG "%s: Invalid permission '%d %s'\n",
+		       __func__, perm, filename);
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+	if (filename[0] != '@' && strendswith(filename, "/"))
+		/*
+		 * Only 'allow_mkdir' and 'allow_rmdir' are valid for
+		 * directory permissions.
+		 */
+		return 0;
+	if (perm & 4)
+		update_single_path_acl(TMY_TYPE_READ_ACL, filename, domain,
+				       is_delete);
+	if (perm & 2)
+		update_single_path_acl(TMY_TYPE_WRITE_ACL, filename, domain,
+				       is_delete);
+	if (perm & 1)
+		update_single_path_acl(TMY_TYPE_EXECUTE_ACL, filename, domain,
+				       is_delete);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * check_single_path_acl2 - Check permission for single path operation.
+ *
+ * @domain:          Pointer to "struct domain_info".
+ * @filename:        Filename to check.
+ * @perm:            Permission.
+ * @may_use_pattern: True if patterned ACL is permitted.
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, -EPERM otherwise.
+ */
+static int check_single_path_acl2(const struct domain_info *domain,
+				  const struct path_info *filename,
+				  const u16 perm, const bool may_use_pattern)
+{
+	struct acl_info *ptr;
+
+	list1_for_each_entry(ptr, &domain->acl_info_list, list) {
+		struct single_path_acl_record *acl;
+		if (tmy_acl_type2(ptr) != TYPE_SINGLE_PATH_ACL)
+			continue;
+		acl = container_of(ptr, struct single_path_acl_record, head);
+		if (!(acl->perm & perm))
+			continue;
+		if (may_use_pattern || !acl->filename->is_patterned) {
+			if (!tmy_path_matches_pattern(filename,
+						      acl->filename))
+				continue;
+		} else {
+			continue;
+		}
+		return 0;
+	}
+	return -EPERM;
+}
+
+/**
+ * check_file_acl - Check permission for opening files.
+ *
+ * @domain:    Pointer to "struct domain_info".
+ * @filename:  Filename to check.
+ * @operation: Mode ("read" or "write" or "read/write" or "execute").
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, -EPERM otherwise.
+ */
+static int check_file_acl(const struct domain_info *domain,
+			  const struct path_info *filename, const u8 operation)
+{
+	u16 perm = 0;
+
+	if (!tmy_check_flags(domain, TMY_TOMOYO_MAC_FOR_FILE))
+		return 0;
+	if (operation == 6)
+		perm = 1 << TMY_TYPE_READ_WRITE_ACL;
+	else if (operation == 4)
+		perm = 1 << TMY_TYPE_READ_ACL;
+	else if (operation == 2)
+		perm = 1 << TMY_TYPE_WRITE_ACL;
+	else if (operation == 1)
+		perm = 1 << TMY_TYPE_EXECUTE_ACL;
+	else
+		BUG();
+	return check_single_path_acl2(domain, filename, perm, operation != 1);
+}
+
+/**
+ * check_file_perm2 - Check permission for opening files.
+ *
+ * @domain:    Pointer to "struct domain_info".
+ * @filename:  Filename to check.
+ * @perm:      Mode ("read" or "write" or "read/write" or "execute").
+ * @operation: Operation name passed used for verbose mode.
+ * @mode:      Access control mode.
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, negative value otherwise.
+ */
+static int check_file_perm2(struct domain_info * const domain,
+			    const struct path_info *filename, const u8 perm,
+			    const char *operation, const u8 mode)
+{
+	const bool is_enforce = (mode == 3);
+	const char *msg = "<unknown>";
+	int error = 0;
+
+	if (!filename)
+		return 0;
+	error = check_file_acl(domain, filename, perm);
+	if (error && perm == 4 &&
+	    (domain->flags & DOMAIN_FLAGS_IGNORE_GLOBAL_ALLOW_READ) == 0 &&
+	    is_globally_readable_file(filename))
+		error = 0;
+	if (perm == 6)
+		msg = tmy_sp2keyword(TMY_TYPE_READ_WRITE_ACL);
+	else if (perm == 4)
+		msg = tmy_sp2keyword(TMY_TYPE_READ_ACL);
+	else if (perm == 2)
+		msg = tmy_sp2keyword(TMY_TYPE_WRITE_ACL);
+	else if (perm == 1)
+		msg = tmy_sp2keyword(TMY_TYPE_EXECUTE_ACL);
+	else
+		BUG();
+	if (!error)
+		return 0;
+	if (tmy_verbose_mode(domain))
+		printk(KERN_WARNING "TOMOYO-%s: Access '%s(%s) %s' denied "
+		       "for %s\n", tmy_get_msg(is_enforce), msg, operation,
+		       filename->name, tmy_get_last_name(domain));
+	if (is_enforce)
+		return error;
+	if (mode == 1 && tmy_check_domain_quota(domain)) {
+		/* Don't use patterns for execute permission. */
+		const struct path_info *patterned_file = (perm != 1) ?
+			get_file_pattern(filename) : filename;
+		update_file_acl(patterned_file->name, perm,
+				domain, false);
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tmy_write_file_policy - Update file related list.
+ *
+ * @data:      String to parse.
+ * @domain:    Pointer to "struct domain_info".
+ * @is_delete: True if it is a delete request.
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, negative value otherwise.
+ */
+int tmy_write_file_policy(char *data, struct domain_info *domain,
+			  const bool is_delete)
+{
+	char *filename = strchr(data, ' ');
+	char *filename2;
+	unsigned int perm;
+	u8 type;
+
+	if (!filename)
+		return -EINVAL;
+	*filename++ = '\0';
+	if (sscanf(data, "%u", &perm) == 1)
+		return update_file_acl(filename, (u8) perm, domain, is_delete);
+	if (strncmp(data, "allow_", 6))
+		goto out;
+	data += 6;
+	for (type = 0; type < MAX_SINGLE_PATH_OPERATION; type++) {
+		if (strcmp(data, sp_keyword[type]))
+			continue;
+		return update_single_path_acl(type, filename,
+					      domain, is_delete);
+	}
+	filename2 = strchr(filename, ' ');
+	if (!filename2)
+		goto out;
+	*filename2++ = '\0';
+	for (type = 0; type < MAX_DOUBLE_PATH_OPERATION; type++) {
+		if (strcmp(data, dp_keyword[type]))
+			continue;
+		return update_double_path_acl(type, filename, filename2, domain,
+					      is_delete);
+	}
+out:
+	return -EINVAL;
+}
+
+/**
+ * update_single_path_acl - Update "struct single_path_acl_record" list.
+ *
+ * @type:      Type of operation.
+ * @filename:  Filename.
+ * @domain:    Pointer to "struct domain_info".
+ * @is_delete: True if it is a delete request.
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, negative value otherwise.
+ */
+static int update_single_path_acl(const u8 type, const char *filename,
+				  struct domain_info * const domain,
+				  const bool is_delete)
+{
+	static DEFINE_MUTEX(lock);
+	static const u16 rw_mask =
+		(1 << TMY_TYPE_READ_ACL) | (1 << TMY_TYPE_WRITE_ACL);
+	const struct path_info *saved_filename;
+	struct acl_info *ptr;
+	struct single_path_acl_record *acl;
+	int error = -ENOMEM;
+	const u16 perm = 1 << type;
+
+	if (!domain)
+		return -EINVAL;
+	if (!tmy_is_correct_path(filename, 0, 0, 0, __func__))
+		return -EINVAL;
+	saved_filename = tmy_save_name(filename);
+	if (!saved_filename)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	/***** EXCLUSIVE SECTION START *****/
+	mutex_lock(&lock);
+	if (is_delete)
+		goto delete;
+	list1_for_each_entry(ptr, &domain->acl_info_list, list) {
+		if (tmy_acl_type1(ptr) != TYPE_SINGLE_PATH_ACL)
+			continue;
+		acl = container_of(ptr, struct single_path_acl_record, head);
+		if (acl->filename != saved_filename)
+			continue;
+		/* Special case. Clear all bits if marked as deleted. */
+		if (ptr->type & ACL_DELETED)
+			acl->perm = 0;
+		acl->perm |= perm;
+		if ((acl->perm & rw_mask) == rw_mask)
+			acl->perm |= 1 << TMY_TYPE_READ_WRITE_ACL;
+		else if (acl->perm & (1 << TMY_TYPE_READ_WRITE_ACL))
+			acl->perm |= rw_mask;
+		error = tmy_add_domain_acl(NULL, ptr);
+		goto out;
+	}
+	/* Not found. Append it to the tail. */
+	acl = tmy_alloc_acl_element(TYPE_SINGLE_PATH_ACL);
+	if (!acl)
+		goto out;
+	acl->perm = perm;
+	acl->filename = saved_filename;
+	error = tmy_add_domain_acl(domain, &acl->head);
+	goto out;
+delete:
+	error = -ENOENT;
+	list1_for_each_entry(ptr, &domain->acl_info_list, list) {
+		if (tmy_acl_type2(ptr) != TYPE_SINGLE_PATH_ACL)
+			continue;
+		acl = container_of(ptr, struct single_path_acl_record, head);
+		if (acl->filename != saved_filename)
+			continue;
+		acl->perm &= ~perm;
+		if ((acl->perm & rw_mask) != rw_mask)
+			acl->perm &= ~(1 << TMY_TYPE_READ_WRITE_ACL);
+		else if (!(acl->perm & (1 << TMY_TYPE_READ_WRITE_ACL)))
+			acl->perm &= ~rw_mask;
+		error = tmy_del_domain_acl(acl->perm ? NULL : ptr);
+		break;
+	}
+out:
+	mutex_unlock(&lock);
+	/***** EXCLUSIVE SECTION END *****/
+	return error;
+}
+
+/**
+ * update_double_path_acl - Update "struct double_path_acl_record" list.
+ *
+ * @type:      Type of operation.
+ * @filename1: First filename.
+ * @filename2: Second filename.
+ * @domain:    Pointer to "struct domain_info".
+ * @is_delete: True if it is a delete request.
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, negative value otherwise.
+ */
+static int update_double_path_acl(const u8 type, const char *filename1,
+				  const char *filename2,
+				  struct domain_info * const domain,
+				  const bool is_delete)
+{
+	static DEFINE_MUTEX(lock);
+	const struct path_info *saved_filename1;
+	const struct path_info *saved_filename2;
+	struct acl_info *ptr;
+	struct double_path_acl_record *acl;
+	int error = -ENOMEM;
+	const u8 perm = 1 << type;
+
+	if (!domain)
+		return -EINVAL;
+	if (!tmy_is_correct_path(filename1, 0, 0, 0, __func__) ||
+	    !tmy_is_correct_path(filename2, 0, 0, 0, __func__))
+		return -EINVAL;
+	saved_filename1 = tmy_save_name(filename1);
+	saved_filename2 = tmy_save_name(filename2);
+	if (!saved_filename1 || !saved_filename2)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	/***** EXCLUSIVE SECTION START *****/
+	mutex_lock(&lock);
+	if (is_delete)
+		goto delete;
+	list1_for_each_entry(ptr, &domain->acl_info_list, list) {
+		if (tmy_acl_type1(ptr) != TYPE_DOUBLE_PATH_ACL)
+			continue;
+		acl = container_of(ptr, struct double_path_acl_record, head);
+		if (acl->filename1 != saved_filename1 ||
+		    acl->filename2 != saved_filename2)
+			continue;
+		/* Special case. Clear all bits if marked as deleted. */
+		if (ptr->type & ACL_DELETED)
+			acl->perm = 0;
+		acl->perm |= perm;
+		error = tmy_add_domain_acl(NULL, ptr);
+		goto out;
+	}
+	/* Not found. Append it to the tail. */
+	acl = tmy_alloc_acl_element(TYPE_DOUBLE_PATH_ACL);
+	if (!acl)
+		goto out;
+	acl->perm = perm;
+	acl->filename1 = saved_filename1;
+	acl->filename2 = saved_filename2;
+	error = tmy_add_domain_acl(domain, &acl->head);
+	goto out;
+delete:
+	error = -ENOENT;
+	list1_for_each_entry(ptr, &domain->acl_info_list, list) {
+		if (tmy_acl_type2(ptr) != TYPE_DOUBLE_PATH_ACL)
+			continue;
+		acl = container_of(ptr, struct double_path_acl_record, head);
+		if (acl->filename1 != saved_filename1 ||
+		    acl->filename2 != saved_filename2)
+			continue;
+		acl->perm &= ~perm;
+		error = tmy_del_domain_acl(acl->perm ? NULL : ptr);
+		break;
+	}
+out:
+	mutex_unlock(&lock);
+	/***** EXCLUSIVE SECTION END *****/
+	return error;
+}
+
+/**
+ * check_single_path_acl - Check permission for single path operation.
+ *
+ * @domain:   Pointer to "struct domain_info".
+ * @type:     Type of operation.
+ * @filename: Filename to check.
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, negative value otherwise.
+ */
+static int check_single_path_acl(struct domain_info *domain, const u8 type,
+				 const struct path_info *filename)
+{
+	if (!tmy_check_flags(domain, TMY_TOMOYO_MAC_FOR_FILE))
+		return 0;
+	return check_single_path_acl2(domain, filename, 1 << type, 1);
+}
+
+/**
+ * check_double_path_acl - Check permission for double path operation.
+ *
+ * @domain:    Pointer to "struct domain_info".
+ * @type:      Type of operation.
+ * @filename1: First filename to check.
+ * @filename2: Second filename to check.
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, -EPERM otherwise.
+ */
+static int check_double_path_acl(const struct domain_info *domain,
+				 const u8 type,
+				 const struct path_info *filename1,
+				 const struct path_info *filename2)
+{
+	struct acl_info *ptr;
+	const u8 perm = 1 << type;
+
+	if (!tmy_check_flags(domain, TMY_TOMOYO_MAC_FOR_FILE))
+		return 0;
+	list1_for_each_entry(ptr, &domain->acl_info_list, list) {
+		struct double_path_acl_record *acl;
+		if (tmy_acl_type2(ptr) != TYPE_DOUBLE_PATH_ACL)
+			continue;
+		acl = container_of(ptr, struct double_path_acl_record, head);
+		if (!(acl->perm & perm))
+			continue;
+		if (!tmy_path_matches_pattern(filename1, acl->filename1))
+			continue;
+		if (!tmy_path_matches_pattern(filename2, acl->filename2))
+			continue;
+		return 0;
+	}
+	return -EPERM;
+}
+
+/**
+ * check_single_path_permission2 - Check permission for single path operation.
+ *
+ * @domain:    Pointer to "struct domain_info".
+ * @operation: Type of operation.
+ * @filename:  Filename to check.
+ * @mode:      Access control mode.
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, negative value otherwise.
+ */
+static int check_single_path_permission2(struct domain_info * const domain,
+					 u8 operation,
+					 const struct path_info *filename,
+					 const u8 mode)
+{
+	const char *msg;
+	int error;
+	const bool is_enforce = (mode == 3);
+
+	if (!mode)
+		return 0;
+next:
+	error = check_single_path_acl(domain, operation, filename);
+	msg = tmy_sp2keyword(operation);
+	if (!error)
+		goto ok;
+	if (tmy_verbose_mode(domain))
+		printk(KERN_WARNING "TOMOYO-%s: Access '%s %s' denied for %s\n",
+		       tmy_get_msg(is_enforce), msg, filename->name,
+		       tmy_get_last_name(domain));
+	if (mode == 1 && tmy_check_domain_quota(domain))
+		update_single_path_acl(operation,
+				       get_file_pattern(filename)->name,
+				       domain, false);
+	if (!is_enforce)
+		error = 0;
+ok:
+	/*
+	 * Since "allow_truncate" doesn't imply "allow_rewrite" permission,
+	 * we need to check "allow_rewrite" permission if the filename is
+	 * specified by "deny_rewrite" keyword.
+	 */
+	if (!error && operation == TMY_TYPE_TRUNCATE_ACL &&
+	    is_no_rewrite_file(filename)) {
+		operation = TMY_TYPE_REWRITE_ACL;
+		goto next;
+	}
+	return error;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tmy_check_file_perm - Check permission for sysctl()'s "read" and "write".
+ *
+ * @domain:    Pointer to "struct domain_info".
+ * @filename:  Filename to check.
+ * @perm:      Mode ("read" or "write" or "read/write").
+ * Returns 0 on success, negative value otherwise.
+ */
+int tmy_check_file_perm(struct domain_info *domain, const char *filename,
+			const u8 perm)
+{
+	struct path_info name;
+	const u8 mode = tmy_check_flags(domain, TMY_TOMOYO_MAC_FOR_FILE);
+
+	if (!mode)
+		return 0;
+	name.name = filename;
+	tmy_fill_path_info(&name);
+	return check_file_perm2(domain, &name, perm, "sysctl", mode);
+}
+
+/**
+ * tmy_check_exec_perm - Check permission for "execute".
+ *
+ * @domain:   Pointer to "struct domain_info".
+ * @filename: Check permission for "execute".
+ * @tmp:      Buffer for temporal use.
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, negativevalue otherwise.
+ */
+int tmy_check_exec_perm(struct domain_info *domain,
+			const struct path_info *filename,
+			struct tmy_page_buffer *tmp)
+{
+	const u8 mode = tmy_check_flags(domain, TMY_TOMOYO_MAC_FOR_FILE);
+
+	if (!mode)
+		return 0;
+	return check_file_perm2(domain, filename, 1, "do_execve", mode);
+}
+
+/**
+ * tmy_check_open_permission - Check permission for "read" and "write".
+ *
+ * @domain: Pointer to "struct domain_info".
+ * @path:   Pointer to "struct path".
+ * @flag:   Flags for open().
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, negative value otherwise.
+ */
+int tmy_check_open_permission(struct domain_info *domain,
+			      struct path *path, const int flag)
+{
+	const u8 acc_mode = ACC_MODE(flag);
+	int error = -ENOMEM;
+	struct path_info *buf;
+	const u8 mode = tmy_check_flags(domain, TMY_TOMOYO_MAC_FOR_FILE);
+	const bool is_enforce = (mode == 3);
+
+	if (!mode || !path->mnt)
+		return 0;
+	if (acc_mode == 0)
+		return 0;
+	if (path->dentry->d_inode && S_ISDIR(path->dentry->d_inode->i_mode))
+		/*
+		 * I don't check directories here because mkdir() and rmdir()
+		 * don't call me.
+		 */
+		return 0;
+	buf = tmy_get_path(path);
+	if (!buf)
+		goto out;
+	error = 0;
+	/*
+	 * If the filename is specified by "deny_rewrite" keyword,
+	 * we need to check "allow_rewrite" permission when the filename is not
+	 * opened for append mode or the filename is truncated at open time.
+	 */
+	if ((acc_mode & MAY_WRITE) &&
+	    ((flag & O_TRUNC) || !(flag & O_APPEND)) &&
+	    (is_no_rewrite_file(buf))) {
+		error = check_single_path_permission2(domain,
+						      TMY_TYPE_REWRITE_ACL,
+						      buf, mode);
+	}
+	if (!error)
+		error = check_file_perm2(domain, buf, acc_mode, "open", mode);
+	if (!error && (flag & O_TRUNC))
+		error = check_single_path_permission2(domain,
+						      TMY_TYPE_TRUNCATE_ACL,
+						      buf, mode);
+out:
+	tmy_free(buf);
+	if (!is_enforce)
+		error = 0;
+	return error;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tmy_check_1path_perm - Check permission for "create", "unlink", "mkdir", "rmdir", "mkfifo", "mksock", "mkblock", "mkchar", "truncate" and "symlink".
+ *
+ * @domain:    Pointer to "struct domain_info".
+ * @operation: Type of operation.
+ * @path:      Pointer to "struct path".
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, negative value otherwise.
+ */
+int tmy_check_1path_perm(struct domain_info *domain, const u8 operation,
+			 struct path *path)
+{
+	int error = -ENOMEM;
+	struct path_info *buf;
+	const u8 mode = tmy_check_flags(domain, TMY_TOMOYO_MAC_FOR_FILE);
+	const bool is_enforce = (mode == 3);
+
+	if (!mode || !path->mnt)
+		return 0;
+	buf = tmy_get_path(path);
+	if (!buf)
+		goto out;
+	switch (operation) {
+	case TMY_TYPE_MKDIR_ACL:
+	case TMY_TYPE_RMDIR_ACL:
+		if (!buf->is_dir) {
+			/* tmy_get_path() preserves space for appending "/." */
+			strcat((char *) buf->name, "/");
+			tmy_fill_path_info(buf);
+		}
+	}
+	error = check_single_path_permission2(domain, operation, buf, mode);
+out:
+	tmy_free(buf);
+	if (!is_enforce)
+		error = 0;
+	return error;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tmy_check_rewrite_permission - Check permission for "rewrite".
+ *
+ * @domain: Pointer to "struct domain_info".
+ * @filp: Pointer to "struct file".
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, negative value otherwise.
+ */
+int tmy_check_rewrite_permission(struct domain_info *domain, struct file *filp)
+{
+	int error = -ENOMEM;
+	const u8 mode = tmy_check_flags(domain, TMY_TOMOYO_MAC_FOR_FILE);
+	const bool is_enforce = (mode == 3);
+	struct path_info *buf;
+
+	if (!mode || !filp->f_path.mnt)
+		return 0;
+	buf = tmy_get_path(&filp->f_path);
+	if (!buf)
+		goto out;
+	if (!is_no_rewrite_file(buf)) {
+		error = 0;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	error = check_single_path_permission2(domain, TMY_TYPE_REWRITE_ACL,
+					      buf, mode);
+out:
+	tmy_free(buf);
+	if (!is_enforce)
+		error = 0;
+	return error;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tmy_check_2path_perm - Check permission for "rename" and "link".
+ *
+ * @domain:    Pointer to "struct domain_info".
+ * @operation: Type of operation.
+ * @path1:      Pointer to "struct path".
+ * @path2:      Pointer to "struct path".
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, negative value otherwise.
+ */
+int tmy_check_2path_perm(struct domain_info * const domain, const u8 operation,
+			 struct path *path1, struct path *path2)
+{
+	int error = -ENOMEM;
+	struct path_info *buf1, *buf2;
+	const u8 mode = tmy_check_flags(domain, TMY_TOMOYO_MAC_FOR_FILE);
+	const bool is_enforce = (mode == 3);
+	const char *msg;
+
+	if (!mode || !path1->mnt || !path2->mnt)
+		return 0;
+	buf1 = tmy_get_path(path1);
+	buf2 = tmy_get_path(path2);
+	if (!buf1 || !buf2)
+		goto out;
+	{
+		struct dentry *dentry = path1->dentry;
+		if (dentry->d_inode && S_ISDIR(dentry->d_inode->i_mode)) {
+			/* tmy_get_path() preserves space for appending "/." */
+			if (!buf1->is_dir) {
+				strcat((char *) buf1->name, "/");
+				tmy_fill_path_info(buf1);
+			}
+			if (!buf2->is_dir) {
+				strcat((char *) buf2->name, "/");
+				tmy_fill_path_info(buf2);
+			}
+		}
+	}
+	error = check_double_path_acl(domain, operation, buf1, buf2);
+	msg = tmy_dp2keyword(operation);
+	if (!error)
+		goto out;
+	if (tmy_verbose_mode(domain))
+		printk(KERN_WARNING "TOMOYO-%s: Access '%s %s %s' "
+		       "denied for %s\n", tmy_get_msg(is_enforce),
+		       msg, buf1->name, buf2->name, tmy_get_last_name(domain));
+	if (mode == 1 && tmy_check_domain_quota(domain))
+		update_double_path_acl(operation,
+				       get_file_pattern(buf1)->name,
+				       get_file_pattern(buf2)->name,
+				       domain, false);
+out:
+	tmy_free(buf1);
+	tmy_free(buf2);
+	if (!is_enforce)
+		error = 0;
+	return error;
+}

--

[TOMOYO #11 (linux-next) 08/11] Domain transition handler.

[Kentaro Takeda]

This file controls domain creation/deletion/transition.

Every process belongs to a domain in TOMOYO Linux.
Domain transition occurs when execve(2) is called
and the domain is expressed as 'process invocation history',
such as '<kernel> /sbin/init /etc/init.d/rc'.
Domain information is stored in task_struct->cred->security field.

Signed-off-by: Kentaro Takeda <takedakn@nttdata.co.jp>
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: Toshiharu Harada <haradats@nttdata.co.jp>
---
 security/tomoyo/domain.c |  865 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 865 insertions(+)

--- /dev/null
+++ linux-next/security/tomoyo/domain.c
@@ -0,0 +1,865 @@
+/*
+ * security/tomoyo/domain.c
+ *
+ * Implementation of the Domain-Based Mandatory Access Control.
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2005-2008  NTT DATA CORPORATION
+ *
+ * Version: 2.2.0-pre   2008/10/10
+ *
+ */
+
+#include "common.h"
+#include "tomoyo.h"
+#include "realpath.h"
+#include <linux/binfmts.h>
+
+/* Variables definitions.*/
+
+/* The initial domain. */
+struct domain_info KERNEL_DOMAIN;
+
+/*
+ * The list for "struct domain_info".
+ *
+ * The domain_list_lock mutex protects the domain_list list.
+ */
+LIST1_HEAD(domain_list);
+static DEFINE_MUTEX(domain_list_lock);
+
+/* Structure for "initialize_domain" and "no_initialize_domain" keyword. */
+struct domain_initializer_entry {
+	struct list1_head list;
+	const struct path_info *domainname;    /* This may be NULL */
+	const struct path_info *program;
+	bool is_deleted;
+	bool is_not;       /* True if this entry is "no_initialize_domain".  */
+	bool is_last_name; /* True if the domainname is tmy_get_last_name(). */
+};
+
+/* Structure for "keep_domain" and "no_keep_domain" keyword. */
+struct domain_keeper_entry {
+	struct list1_head list;
+	const struct path_info *domainname;
+	const struct path_info *program;       /* This may be NULL */
+	bool is_deleted;
+	bool is_not;       /* True if this entry is "no_keep_domain".        */
+	bool is_last_name; /* True if the domainname is tmy_get_last_name(). */
+};
+
+/* Structure for "alias" keyword. */
+struct alias_entry {
+	struct list1_head list;
+	const struct path_info *original_name;
+	const struct path_info *aliased_name;
+	bool is_deleted;
+};
+
+/**
+ * tmy_set_domain_flag - Set or clear domain's attribute flags.
+ *
+ * @domain:    Pointer to "struct domain_info".
+ * @is_delete: True if it is a delete request.
+ * @flags:     Flags to set or clear.
+ *
+ * Returns nothing.
+ */
+void tmy_set_domain_flag(struct domain_info *domain, const bool is_delete,
+			 const u8 flags)
+{
+	/* We need to serialize because this is bitfield operation. */
+	static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(lock);
+	/***** CRITICAL SECTION START *****/
+	spin_lock(&lock);
+	if (!is_delete)
+		domain->flags |= flags;
+	else
+		domain->flags &= ~flags;
+	spin_unlock(&lock);
+	/***** CRITICAL SECTION END *****/
+}
+
+/**
+ * tmy_get_last_name - Get last component of a domainname.
+ *
+ * @domain: Pointer to "struct domain_info".
+ *
+ * Returns the last component of the domainname.
+ */
+const char *tmy_get_last_name(const struct domain_info *domain)
+{
+	const char *cp0 = domain->domainname->name;
+	const char *cp1 = strrchr(cp0, ' ');
+
+	if (cp1)
+		return cp1 + 1;
+	return cp0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * The list for "struct domain_initializer_entry".
+ *
+ * This list is updated only inside update_domain_initializer_entry(), thus
+ * no global mutex exists.
+ */
+static LIST1_HEAD(domain_initializer_list);
+
+/**
+ * update_domain_initializer_entry - Update "struct domain_initializer_entry" list.
+ *
+ * @domainname: The name of domain. May be NULL.
+ * @program:    The name of program.
+ * @is_not:     True if it is "no_initialize_domain" entry.
+ * @is_delete:  True if it is a delete request.
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, negative value otherwise.
+ */
+static int update_domain_initializer_entry(const char *domainname,
+					   const char *program,
+					   const bool is_not,
+					   const bool is_delete)
+{
+	struct domain_initializer_entry *new_entry;
+	struct domain_initializer_entry *ptr;
+	static DEFINE_MUTEX(lock);
+	const struct path_info *saved_program;
+	const struct path_info *saved_domainname = NULL;
+	int error = -ENOMEM;
+	bool is_last_name = false;
+
+	if (!tmy_is_correct_path(program, 1, -1, -1, __func__))
+		return -EINVAL; /* No patterns allowed. */
+	if (domainname) {
+		if (!tmy_is_domain_def(domainname) &&
+		    tmy_is_correct_path(domainname, 1, -1, -1, __func__))
+			is_last_name = true;
+		else if (!tmy_is_correct_domain(domainname, __func__))
+			return -EINVAL;
+		saved_domainname = tmy_save_name(domainname);
+		if (!saved_domainname)
+			return -ENOMEM;
+	}
+	saved_program = tmy_save_name(program);
+	if (!saved_program)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	/***** EXCLUSIVE SECTION START *****/
+	mutex_lock(&lock);
+	list1_for_each_entry(ptr, &domain_initializer_list, list) {
+		if (ptr->is_not != is_not ||
+		    ptr->domainname != saved_domainname ||
+		    ptr->program != saved_program)
+			continue;
+		ptr->is_deleted = is_delete;
+		error = 0;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if (is_delete) {
+		error = -ENOENT;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	new_entry = tmy_alloc_element(sizeof(*new_entry));
+	if (!new_entry)
+		goto out;
+	new_entry->domainname = saved_domainname;
+	new_entry->program = saved_program;
+	new_entry->is_not = is_not;
+	new_entry->is_last_name = is_last_name;
+	list1_add_tail(&new_entry->list, &domain_initializer_list);
+	error = 0;
+out:
+	mutex_unlock(&lock);
+	/***** EXCLUSIVE SECTION END *****/
+	tmy_update_counter(TMY_UPDATES_COUNTER_EXCEPTION_POLICY);
+	return error;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tmy_read_domain_initializer_policy - Read "struct domain_initializer_entry" list.
+ *
+ * @head: Pointer to "struct tmy_io_buffer".
+ *
+ * Returns true on success, false otherwise.
+ */
+bool tmy_read_domain_initializer_policy(struct tmy_io_buffer *head)
+{
+	struct list1_head *pos;
+
+	list1_for_each_cookie(pos, head->read_var2, &domain_initializer_list) {
+		const char *no;
+		const char *from = "";
+		const char *domain = "";
+		struct domain_initializer_entry *ptr;
+		ptr = list1_entry(pos, struct domain_initializer_entry, list);
+		if (ptr->is_deleted)
+			continue;
+		no = ptr->is_not ? "no_" : "";
+		if (ptr->domainname) {
+			from = " from ";
+			domain = ptr->domainname->name;
+		}
+		if (!tmy_io_printf(head,
+				   "%s" KEYWORD_INITIALIZE_DOMAIN "%s%s%s\n",
+				   no, ptr->program->name, from, domain))
+			goto out;
+	}
+	return true;
+out:
+	return false;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tmy_write_domain_initializer_policy - Write "struct domain_initializer_entry" list.
+ *
+ * @data:      String to parse.
+ * @is_not:    True if it is "no_initialize_domain" entry.
+ * @is_delete: True if it is a delete request.
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, negative value otherwise.
+ */
+int tmy_write_domain_initializer_policy(char *data, const bool is_not,
+					const bool is_delete)
+{
+	char *cp = strstr(data, " from ");
+
+	if (cp) {
+		*cp = '\0';
+		return update_domain_initializer_entry(cp + 6, data, is_not,
+						       is_delete);
+	}
+	return update_domain_initializer_entry(NULL, data, is_not, is_delete);
+}
+
+/**
+ * is_domain_initializer - Check whether the given program causes domainname reinitialization.
+ *
+ * @domainname: The name of domain.
+ * @program:    The name of program.
+ * @last_name:  The last component of @domainname.
+ *
+ * Returns true if executing @program reinitializes domain transition,
+ * false otherwise.
+ */
+static bool is_domain_initializer(const struct path_info *domainname,
+				  const struct path_info *program,
+				  const struct path_info *last_name)
+{
+	struct domain_initializer_entry *ptr;
+	bool flag = false;
+
+	list1_for_each_entry(ptr,  &domain_initializer_list, list) {
+		if (ptr->is_deleted)
+			continue;
+		if (ptr->domainname) {
+			if (!ptr->is_last_name) {
+				if (ptr->domainname != domainname)
+					continue;
+			} else {
+				if (tmy_pathcmp(ptr->domainname, last_name))
+					continue;
+			}
+		}
+		if (tmy_pathcmp(ptr->program, program))
+			continue;
+		if (ptr->is_not)
+			return false;
+		flag = true;
+	}
+	return flag;
+}
+
+/*
+ * The list for "struct domain_keeper_entry".
+ *
+ * This list is updated only inside update_domain_keeper_entry(), thus
+ * no global mutex exists.
+ */
+static LIST1_HEAD(domain_keeper_list);
+
+/**
+ * update_domain_keeper_entry - Update "struct domain_keeper_entry" list.
+ *
+ * @domainname: The name of domain.
+ * @program:    The name of program. May be NULL.
+ * @is_not:     True if it is "no_keep_domain" entry.
+ * @is_delete:  True if it is a delete request.
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, negative value otherwise.
+ */
+static int update_domain_keeper_entry(const char *domainname,
+				      const char *program,
+				      const bool is_not, const bool is_delete)
+{
+	struct domain_keeper_entry *new_entry;
+	struct domain_keeper_entry *ptr;
+	const struct path_info *saved_domainname;
+	const struct path_info *saved_program = NULL;
+	static DEFINE_MUTEX(lock);
+	int error = -ENOMEM;
+	bool is_last_name = false;
+
+	if (!tmy_is_domain_def(domainname) &&
+	    tmy_is_correct_path(domainname, 1, -1, -1, __func__))
+		is_last_name = true;
+	else if (!tmy_is_correct_domain(domainname, __func__))
+		return -EINVAL;
+	if (program) {
+		if (!tmy_is_correct_path(program, 1, -1, -1, __func__))
+			return -EINVAL;
+		saved_program = tmy_save_name(program);
+		if (!saved_program)
+			return -ENOMEM;
+	}
+	saved_domainname = tmy_save_name(domainname);
+	if (!saved_domainname)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	/***** EXCLUSIVE SECTION START *****/
+	mutex_lock(&lock);
+	list1_for_each_entry(ptr, &domain_keeper_list, list) {
+		if (ptr->is_not != is_not ||
+		    ptr->domainname != saved_domainname ||
+		    ptr->program != saved_program)
+			continue;
+		ptr->is_deleted = is_delete;
+		error = 0;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if (is_delete) {
+		error = -ENOENT;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	new_entry = tmy_alloc_element(sizeof(*new_entry));
+	if (!new_entry)
+		goto out;
+	new_entry->domainname = saved_domainname;
+	new_entry->program = saved_program;
+	new_entry->is_not = is_not;
+	new_entry->is_last_name = is_last_name;
+	list1_add_tail(&new_entry->list, &domain_keeper_list);
+	error = 0;
+out:
+	mutex_unlock(&lock);
+	/***** EXCLUSIVE SECTION END *****/
+	tmy_update_counter(TMY_UPDATES_COUNTER_EXCEPTION_POLICY);
+	return error;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tmy_write_domain_keeper_policy - Write "struct domain_keeper_entry" list.
+ *
+ * @data:      String to parse.
+ * @is_not:    True if it is "no_keep_domain" entry.
+ * @is_delete: True if it is a delete request.
+ *
+ */
+int tmy_write_domain_keeper_policy(char *data, const bool is_not,
+				   const bool is_delete)
+{
+	char *cp = strstr(data, " from ");
+
+	if (cp) {
+		*cp = '\0';
+		return update_domain_keeper_entry(cp + 6, data,
+						  is_not, is_delete);
+	}
+	return update_domain_keeper_entry(data, NULL, is_not, is_delete);
+}
+
+/**
+ * tmy_read_domain_keeper_policy - Read "struct domain_keeper_entry" list.
+ *
+ * @head: Pointer to "struct tmy_io_buffer".
+ *
+ * Returns true on success, false otherwise.
+ */
+bool tmy_read_domain_keeper_policy(struct tmy_io_buffer *head)
+{
+	struct list1_head *pos;
+
+	list1_for_each_cookie(pos, head->read_var2, &domain_keeper_list) {
+		struct domain_keeper_entry *ptr;
+		const char *no;
+		const char *from = "";
+		const char *program = "";
+
+		ptr = list1_entry(pos, struct domain_keeper_entry, list);
+		if (ptr->is_deleted)
+			continue;
+		no = ptr->is_not ? "no_" : "";
+		if (ptr->program) {
+			from = " from ";
+			program = ptr->program->name;
+		}
+		if (!tmy_io_printf(head,
+				   "%s" KEYWORD_KEEP_DOMAIN "%s%s%s\n", no,
+				   program, from, ptr->domainname->name))
+			goto out;
+	}
+	return true;
+out:
+	return false;
+}
+
+/**
+ * is_domain_keeper - Check whether the given program causes domain transition suppression.
+ *
+ * @domainname: The name of domain.
+ * @program:    The name of program.
+ * @last_name:  The last component of @domainname.
+ *
+ * Returns true if executing @program supresses domain transition,
+ * false otherwise.
+ */
+static bool is_domain_keeper(const struct path_info *domainname,
+			     const struct path_info *program,
+			     const struct path_info *last_name)
+{
+	struct domain_keeper_entry *ptr;
+	bool flag = false;
+
+	list1_for_each_entry(ptr, &domain_keeper_list, list) {
+		if (ptr->is_deleted)
+			continue;
+		if (!ptr->is_last_name) {
+			if (ptr->domainname != domainname)
+				continue;
+		} else {
+			if (tmy_pathcmp(ptr->domainname, last_name))
+				continue;
+		}
+		if (ptr->program && tmy_pathcmp(ptr->program, program))
+			continue;
+		if (ptr->is_not)
+			return false;
+		flag = true;
+	}
+	return flag;
+}
+
+/*
+ * The list for "struct alias_entry".
+ *
+ * This list is updated only inside update_alias_entry(), thus
+ * no global mutex exists.
+ */
+static LIST1_HEAD(alias_list);
+
+/**
+ * update_alias_entry - Update "struct alias_entry" list.
+ *
+ * @original_name: The original program's real name.
+ * @aliased_name:  The symbolic program's symbolic link's name.
+ * @is_delete:     True if it is a delete request.
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, negative value otherwise.
+ */
+static int update_alias_entry(const char *original_name,
+			      const char *aliased_name,
+			      const bool is_delete)
+{
+	struct alias_entry *new_entry;
+	struct alias_entry *ptr;
+	static DEFINE_MUTEX(lock);
+	const struct path_info *saved_original_name;
+	const struct path_info *saved_aliased_name;
+	int error = -ENOMEM;
+
+	if (!tmy_is_correct_path(original_name, 1, -1, -1, __func__) ||
+	    !tmy_is_correct_path(aliased_name, 1, -1, -1, __func__))
+		return -EINVAL; /* No patterns allowed. */
+	saved_original_name = tmy_save_name(original_name);
+	saved_aliased_name = tmy_save_name(aliased_name);
+	if (!saved_original_name || !saved_aliased_name)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	/***** EXCLUSIVE SECTION START *****/
+	mutex_lock(&lock);
+	list1_for_each_entry(ptr, &alias_list, list) {
+		if (ptr->original_name != saved_original_name ||
+		    ptr->aliased_name != saved_aliased_name)
+			continue;
+		ptr->is_deleted = is_delete;
+		error = 0;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if (is_delete) {
+		error = -ENOENT;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	new_entry = tmy_alloc_element(sizeof(*new_entry));
+	if (!new_entry)
+		goto out;
+	new_entry->original_name = saved_original_name;
+	new_entry->aliased_name = saved_aliased_name;
+	list1_add_tail(&new_entry->list, &alias_list);
+	error = 0;
+out:
+	mutex_unlock(&lock);
+	/***** EXCLUSIVE SECTION END *****/
+	tmy_update_counter(TMY_UPDATES_COUNTER_EXCEPTION_POLICY);
+	return error;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tmy_read_alias_policy - Read "struct alias_entry" list.
+ *
+ * @head: Pointer to "struct tmy_io_buffer".
+ *
+ * Returns true on success, false otherwise.
+ */
+bool tmy_read_alias_policy(struct tmy_io_buffer *head)
+{
+	struct list1_head *pos;
+
+	list1_for_each_cookie(pos, head->read_var2, &alias_list) {
+		struct alias_entry *ptr;
+
+		ptr = list1_entry(pos, struct alias_entry, list);
+		if (ptr->is_deleted)
+			continue;
+		if (!tmy_io_printf(head, KEYWORD_ALIAS "%s %s\n",
+				   ptr->original_name->name,
+				   ptr->aliased_name->name))
+			goto out;
+	}
+	return true;
+out:
+	return false;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tmy_write_alias_policy - Write "struct alias_entry" list.
+ *
+ * @data:      String to parse.
+ * @is_delete: True if it is a delete request.
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, negative value otherwise.
+ */
+int tmy_write_alias_policy(char *data, const bool is_delete)
+{
+	char *cp = strchr(data, ' ');
+
+	if (!cp)
+		return -EINVAL;
+	*cp++ = '\0';
+	return update_alias_entry(data, cp, is_delete);
+}
+
+/* Domain create/delete/undelete handler. */
+
+/* #define DEBUG_DOMAIN_UNDELETE */
+
+/**
+ * tmy_delete_domain - Delete a domain.
+ *
+ * @domainname: The name of domain.
+ *
+ * Returns 0.
+ */
+int tmy_delete_domain(char *domainname)
+{
+	struct domain_info *domain;
+	struct path_info name;
+
+	name.name = domainname;
+	tmy_fill_path_info(&name);
+	/***** EXCLUSIVE SECTION START *****/
+	mutex_lock(&domain_list_lock);
+#ifdef DEBUG_DOMAIN_UNDELETE
+	printk(KERN_DEBUG "tmy_delete_domain %s\n", domainname);
+	list1_for_each_entry(domain, &domain_list, list) {
+		if (tmy_pathcmp(domain->domainname, &name))
+			continue;
+		printk(KERN_DEBUG "List: %p %u\n", domain, domain->is_deleted);
+	}
+#endif
+	/* Is there an active domain? */
+	list1_for_each_entry(domain, &domain_list, list) {
+		struct domain_info *domain2;
+		/* Never delete KERNEL_DOMAIN */
+		if (domain == &KERNEL_DOMAIN)
+			continue;
+		if (domain->is_deleted ||
+		    tmy_pathcmp(domain->domainname, &name))
+			continue;
+		/* Mark already deleted domains as non undeletable. */
+		list1_for_each_entry(domain2, &domain_list, list) {
+			if (!domain2->is_deleted ||
+			    tmy_pathcmp(domain2->domainname, &name))
+				continue;
+#ifdef DEBUG_DOMAIN_UNDELETE
+			if (domain2->is_deleted != 255)
+				printk(KERN_DEBUG
+				       "Marked %p as non undeletable\n",
+				       domain2);
+#endif
+			domain2->is_deleted = 255;
+		}
+		/* Delete and mark active domain as undeletable. */
+		domain->is_deleted = 1;
+#ifdef DEBUG_DOMAIN_UNDELETE
+		printk(KERN_DEBUG "Marked %p as undeletable\n", domain);
+#endif
+		break;
+	}
+	mutex_unlock(&domain_list_lock);
+	/***** EXCLUSIVE SECTION END *****/
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tmy_undelete_domain - Undelete a domain.
+ *
+ * @domainname: The name of domain.
+ *
+ * Returns pointer to "struct domain_info" on success, NULL otherwise.
+ */
+struct domain_info *tmy_undelete_domain(const char *domainname)
+{
+	struct domain_info *domain;
+	struct domain_info *candidate_domain = NULL;
+	struct path_info name;
+
+	name.name = domainname;
+	tmy_fill_path_info(&name);
+	/***** EXCLUSIVE SECTION START *****/
+	mutex_lock(&domain_list_lock);
+#ifdef DEBUG_DOMAIN_UNDELETE
+	printk(KERN_DEBUG "tmy_undelete_domain %s\n", domainname);
+	list1_for_each_entry(domain, &domain_list, list) {
+		if (tmy_pathcmp(domain->domainname, &name))
+			continue;
+		printk(KERN_DEBUG "List: %p %u\n", domain, domain->is_deleted);
+	}
+#endif
+	list1_for_each_entry(domain, &domain_list, list) {
+		if (tmy_pathcmp(&name, domain->domainname))
+			continue;
+		if (!domain->is_deleted) {
+			/* This domain is active. I can't undelete. */
+			candidate_domain = NULL;
+#ifdef DEBUG_DOMAIN_UNDELETE
+			printk(KERN_DEBUG "%p is active. I can't undelete.\n",
+			       domain);
+#endif
+			break;
+		}
+		/* Is this domain undeletable? */
+		if (domain->is_deleted == 1)
+			candidate_domain = domain;
+	}
+	if (candidate_domain) {
+		candidate_domain->is_deleted = 0;
+#ifdef DEBUG_DOMAIN_UNDELETE
+		printk(KERN_DEBUG "%p was undeleted.\n", candidate_domain);
+#endif
+	}
+	mutex_unlock(&domain_list_lock);
+	/***** EXCLUSIVE SECTION END *****/
+	return candidate_domain;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tmy_find_or_assign_new_domain - Create a domain.
+ *
+ * @domainname: The name of domain.
+ * @profile:    Profile number to assign if the domain was newly created.
+ *
+ * Returns pointer to "struct domain_info" on success, NULL otherwise.
+ */
+struct domain_info *tmy_find_or_assign_new_domain(const char *domainname,
+						  const u8 profile)
+{
+	struct domain_info *domain = NULL;
+	const struct path_info *saved_domainname;
+
+	/***** EXCLUSIVE SECTION START *****/
+	mutex_lock(&domain_list_lock);
+	domain = tmy_find_domain(domainname);
+	if (domain)
+		goto out;
+	if (!tmy_is_correct_domain(domainname, __func__))
+		goto out;
+	saved_domainname = tmy_save_name(domainname);
+	if (!saved_domainname)
+		goto out;
+	/* Can I reuse memory of deleted domain? */
+	list1_for_each_entry(domain, &domain_list, list) {
+		struct task_struct *p;
+		struct acl_info *ptr;
+		bool flag;
+		if (!domain->is_deleted ||
+		    domain->domainname != saved_domainname)
+			continue;
+		flag = false;
+		/***** CRITICAL SECTION START *****/
+		read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
+		for_each_process(p) {
+			if (tmy_real_domain(p) != domain)
+				continue;
+			flag = true;
+			break;
+		}
+		read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
+		/***** CRITICAL SECTION END *****/
+		if (flag)
+			continue;
+#ifdef DEBUG_DOMAIN_UNDELETE
+		printk(KERN_DEBUG "Reusing %p %s\n", domain,
+		       domain->domainname->name);
+#endif
+		list1_for_each_entry(ptr, &domain->acl_info_list, list) {
+			ptr->type |= ACL_DELETED;
+		}
+		tmy_set_domain_flag(domain, true, domain->flags);
+		domain->profile = profile;
+		domain->quota_warned = false;
+		mb(); /* Avoid out-of-order execution. */
+		domain->is_deleted = 0;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	/* No memory reusable. Create using new memory. */
+	domain = tmy_alloc_element(sizeof(*domain));
+	if (domain) {
+		INIT_LIST1_HEAD(&domain->acl_info_list);
+		domain->domainname = saved_domainname;
+		domain->profile = profile;
+		list1_add_tail(&domain->list, &domain_list);
+	}
+out:
+	mutex_unlock(&domain_list_lock);
+	/***** EXCLUSIVE SECTION END *****/
+	return domain;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tmy_find_next_domain - Find a domain.
+ *
+ * @bprm:           Pointer to "struct linux_binprm".
+ * @next_domain:    Pointer to pointer to "struct domain_info".
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, negative value otherwise.
+ */
+int tmy_find_next_domain(struct linux_binprm *bprm,
+			 struct domain_info **next_domain)
+{
+	/*
+	 * This function assumes that the size of buffer returned by
+	 * tmy_realpath() = TMY_MAX_PATHNAME_LEN.
+	 */
+	struct tmy_page_buffer *tmp = tmy_alloc(sizeof(*tmp));
+	struct domain_info *old_domain = tmy_domain();
+	struct domain_info *domain = NULL;
+	const char *old_domain_name = old_domain->domainname->name;
+	const char *original_name = bprm->filename;
+	char *new_domain_name = NULL;
+	char *real_program_name = NULL;
+	char *symlink_program_name = NULL;
+	const u8 mode = tmy_check_flags(old_domain, TMY_TOMOYO_MAC_FOR_FILE);
+	const bool is_enforce = (mode == 3);
+	int retval = -ENOMEM;
+	struct path_info r; /* real name */
+	struct path_info s; /* symlink name */
+	struct path_info l; /* last name */
+
+	if (!tmp)
+		goto out;
+
+	{
+		/*
+		 * Built-in initializers. This is needed because policies are
+		 * not loaded until starting /sbin/init.
+		 */
+		static bool first = true;
+		if (first) {
+			update_domain_initializer_entry(NULL, "/sbin/hotplug",
+							false, false);
+			update_domain_initializer_entry(NULL, "/sbin/modprobe",
+							false, false);
+			first = false;
+		}
+	}
+
+	/* Get tmy_realpath of program. */
+	retval = -ENOENT; /* I hope tmy_realpath() won't fail with -ENOMEM. */
+	real_program_name = tmy_realpath(original_name);
+	if (!real_program_name)
+		goto out;
+	/* Get tmy_realpath of symbolic link. */
+	symlink_program_name = tmy_realpath_nofollow(original_name);
+	if (!symlink_program_name)
+		goto out;
+
+	r.name = real_program_name;
+	tmy_fill_path_info(&r);
+	s.name = symlink_program_name;
+	tmy_fill_path_info(&s);
+	l.name = tmy_get_last_name(old_domain);
+	tmy_fill_path_info(&l);
+
+	/* Check 'alias' directive. */
+	if (tmy_pathcmp(&r, &s)) {
+		struct alias_entry *ptr;
+		/* Is this program allowed to be called via symbolic links? */
+		list1_for_each_entry(ptr, &alias_list, list) {
+			if (ptr->is_deleted ||
+			    tmy_pathcmp(&r, ptr->original_name) ||
+			    tmy_pathcmp(&s, ptr->aliased_name))
+				continue;
+			memset(real_program_name, 0, TMY_MAX_PATHNAME_LEN);
+			strncpy(real_program_name, ptr->aliased_name->name,
+				TMY_MAX_PATHNAME_LEN - 1);
+			tmy_fill_path_info(&r);
+			break;
+		}
+	}
+
+	/* Check execute permission. */
+	retval = tmy_check_exec_perm(old_domain, &r, tmp);
+	if (retval < 0)
+		goto out;
+
+	new_domain_name = tmp->buffer;
+	if (is_domain_initializer(old_domain->domainname, &r, &l)) {
+		/* Transit to the child of KERNEL_DOMAIN domain. */
+		snprintf(new_domain_name, TMY_MAX_PATHNAME_LEN + 1,
+			 ROOT_NAME " " "%s", real_program_name);
+	} else if (old_domain == &KERNEL_DOMAIN && !sbin_init_started) {
+		/*
+		 * Needn't to transit from kernel domain before starting
+		 * /sbin/init. But transit from kernel domain if executing
+		 * initializers because they might start before /sbin/init.
+		 */
+		domain = old_domain;
+	} else if (is_domain_keeper(old_domain->domainname, &r, &l)) {
+		/* Keep current domain. */
+		domain = old_domain;
+	} else {
+		/* Normal domain transition. */
+		snprintf(new_domain_name, TMY_MAX_PATHNAME_LEN + 1,
+			 "%s %s", old_domain_name, real_program_name);
+	}
+	if (domain || strlen(new_domain_name) >= TMY_MAX_PATHNAME_LEN)
+		goto done;
+	domain = tmy_find_domain(new_domain_name);
+	if (domain)
+		goto done;
+	if (is_enforce)
+		goto done;
+	domain = tmy_find_or_assign_new_domain(new_domain_name,
+					       old_domain->profile);
+done:
+	if (domain)
+		goto out;
+	printk(KERN_WARNING "TOMOYO-ERROR: Domain '%s' not defined.\n",
+	       new_domain_name);
+	if (is_enforce)
+		retval = -EPERM;
+	else
+		tmy_set_domain_flag(old_domain, false,
+				    DOMAIN_FLAGS_TRANSITION_FAILED);
+out:
+	tmy_free(real_program_name);
+	tmy_free(symlink_program_name);
+	*next_domain = domain ? domain : old_domain;
+	tmy_free(tmp);
+	return retval;
+}

--

[TOMOYO #11 (linux-next) 09/11] LSM adapter functions.

[Kentaro Takeda]

Signed-off-by: Kentaro Takeda <takedakn@nttdata.co.jp>
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: Toshiharu Harada <haradats@nttdata.co.jp>
---
 security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c |  376 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 security/tomoyo/tomoyo.h |  105 +++++++++++++
 2 files changed, 481 insertions(+)

--- /dev/null
+++ linux-next/security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c
@@ -0,0 +1,376 @@
+/*
+ * security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c
+ *
+ * LSM hooks for TOMOYO Linux.
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2005-2008  NTT DATA CORPORATION
+ *
+ * Version: 2.2.0-pre   2008/10/10
+ *
+ */
+
+#include <linux/security.h>
+#include "common.h"
+#include "tomoyo.h"
+#include "realpath.h"
+
+static int tmy_cred_prepare(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, gfp_t gfp)
+{
+	/*
+	 * Since "struct domain_info *" is a sharable pointer, we don't need
+	 * to duplicate.
+	 */
+	new->security = old->security;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int tmy_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
+{
+	/*
+	 * Do only if this function is called for the first time of an execve
+	 * operation.
+	 */
+	if (bprm->cred_prepared)
+		return 0;
+	/*
+	 * Load policy if /sbin/tomoyo-init exists and /sbin/init is requested
+	 * for the first time.
+	 */
+	if (!sbin_init_started)
+		tmy_load_policy(bprm->filename);
+	/*
+	 * Tell tmy_bprm_check_security() is called for the first time of an
+	 * execve operation.
+	 */
+	bprm->cred->security = NULL;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int tmy_bprm_check_security(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
+{
+	struct domain_info *domain = bprm->cred->security;
+
+	/*
+	 * Execute permission is checked against pathname passed to do_execve()
+	 * using current domain.
+	 */
+	if (!domain) {
+		struct domain_info *next_domain = NULL;
+		int retval = tmy_find_next_domain(bprm, &next_domain);
+
+		if (!retval)
+			bprm->cred->security = next_domain;
+		return retval;
+	}
+	/*
+	 * Read permission is checked against interpreters using next domain.
+	 * '1' is the result of open_to_namei_flags(O_RDONLY).
+	 */
+	return tmy_check_open_permission(domain, &bprm->file->f_path, 1);
+}
+
+static int tmy_sysctl(struct ctl_table *table, int op)
+{
+	int error;
+	char *name;
+
+	op &= MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE;
+	if (!op)
+		return 0;
+	name = sysctlpath_from_table(table);
+	if (!name)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	error = tmy_check_file_perm(tmy_domain(), name, op);
+	tmy_free(name);
+	return error;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tmy_update_result - Update error code.
+ *
+ * @error: Return code from security_path_*().
+ *
+ * To be able to return DAC's error (if any) to the caller instead of
+ * MAC's error, we don't return MAC's error at security_path_*().
+ *
+ * We remember MAC's error only if security_path_*() returned an error.
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, -ENOMEM otherwise if @error != 0.
+ * Returns previously saved error code and clears it if @error == 0.
+ */
+static int tmy_update_result(int error)
+{
+	/* Structure for holding the result of security_path_*(). */
+	struct check_result_entry {
+		struct list_head list;
+		struct task_struct *task; /* = current */
+		int error; /* != 0 */
+	};
+	static LIST_HEAD(list);
+	static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(lock);
+	struct task_struct *task = current;
+	struct check_result_entry *entry;
+	if (!error) {
+		if (!list_empty(&list)) {
+			struct check_result_entry *p;
+			entry = NULL;
+			/***** CRITICAL SECTION START *****/
+			spin_lock(&lock);
+			list_for_each_entry(p, &list, list) {
+				if (p->task != task)
+					continue;
+				list_del(&p->list);
+				entry = p;
+				break;
+			}
+			spin_unlock(&lock);
+			/***** CRITICAL SECTION END *****/
+			if (entry) {
+				error = entry->error;
+				kfree(entry);
+			}
+		}
+		return error;
+	}
+	entry = kmalloc(sizeof(*entry), GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!entry)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	entry->task = task;
+	entry->error = error;
+	/***** CRITICAL SECTION START *****/
+	spin_lock(&lock);
+	list_add(&entry->list, &list);
+	spin_unlock(&lock);
+	/***** CRITICAL SECTION END *****/
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tmy_save_result - Remember error code for security_inode_*() if any.
+ *
+ * @error: Return code from security_path_*().
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, -ENOMEM otherwise.
+ *
+ * We don't save if @error == 0.
+ */
+static int tmy_save_result(const int error)
+{
+	return error ? tmy_update_result(error) : 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tmy_load_result - Fetch error code for security_inode_*().
+ *
+ * Returns error code saved by security_path_*().
+ */
+static int tmy_load_result(void)
+{
+	return tmy_update_result(0);
+}
+
+/* Clear error code in case security_inode_*() was not called. */
+static void tmy_path_clear(void)
+{
+	tmy_load_result();
+}
+
+static int tmy_path_truncate(struct path *path, loff_t length,
+			     unsigned int time_attrs, struct file *filp)
+{
+	return tmy_save_result(tmy_check_1path_perm(tmy_domain(),
+						    TMY_TYPE_TRUNCATE_ACL,
+						    path));
+}
+
+static int tmy_path_unlink(struct path *parent, struct dentry *dentry)
+{
+	struct path path = { parent->mnt, dentry };
+	return tmy_save_result(tmy_check_1path_perm(tmy_domain(),
+						    TMY_TYPE_UNLINK_ACL,
+						    &path));
+}
+
+static int tmy_path_mkdir(struct path *parent, struct dentry *dentry, int mode)
+{
+	struct path path = { parent->mnt, dentry };
+	return tmy_save_result(tmy_check_1path_perm(tmy_domain(),
+						    TMY_TYPE_MKDIR_ACL,
+						    &path));
+}
+
+static int tmy_path_rmdir(struct path *parent, struct dentry *dentry)
+{
+	struct path path = { parent->mnt, dentry };
+	return tmy_save_result(tmy_check_1path_perm(tmy_domain(),
+						    TMY_TYPE_RMDIR_ACL,
+						    &path));
+}
+
+static int tmy_path_symlink(struct path *parent, struct dentry *dentry,
+			    const char *old_name)
+{
+	struct path path = { parent->mnt, dentry };
+	return tmy_save_result(tmy_check_1path_perm(tmy_domain(),
+						    TMY_TYPE_SYMLINK_ACL,
+						    &path));
+}
+
+static int tmy_path_mknod(struct path *parent, struct dentry *dentry, int mode,
+			  unsigned int dev)
+{
+	struct path path = { parent->mnt, dentry };
+	int type = TMY_TYPE_CREATE_ACL;
+
+	switch (mode & S_IFMT) {
+	case S_IFCHR:
+		type = TMY_TYPE_MKCHAR_ACL;
+		break;
+	case S_IFBLK:
+		type = TMY_TYPE_MKBLOCK_ACL;
+		break;
+	case S_IFIFO:
+		type = TMY_TYPE_MKFIFO_ACL;
+		break;
+	case S_IFSOCK:
+		type = TMY_TYPE_MKSOCK_ACL;
+		break;
+	}
+	return tmy_save_result(tmy_check_1path_perm(tmy_domain(),
+						    type, &path));
+}
+
+static int tmy_path_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, struct path *new_dir,
+			 struct dentry *new_dentry)
+{
+	struct path path1 = { new_dir->mnt, old_dentry };
+	struct path path2 = { new_dir->mnt, new_dentry };
+	return tmy_save_result(tmy_check_2path_perm(tmy_domain(),
+						    TMY_TYPE_LINK_ACL,
+						    &path1, &path2));
+}
+
+static int tmy_path_rename(struct path *old_parent, struct dentry *old_dentry,
+			   struct path *new_parent, struct dentry *new_dentry)
+{
+	struct path path1 = { old_parent->mnt, old_dentry };
+	struct path path2 = { new_parent->mnt, new_dentry };
+	return tmy_save_result(tmy_check_2path_perm(tmy_domain(),
+						    TMY_TYPE_RENAME_ACL,
+						    &path1, &path2));
+}
+
+static int tmy_inode_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, struct inode *inode,
+			  struct dentry *new_dentry)
+{
+	return tmy_load_result();
+}
+
+static int tmy_inode_unlink(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *dentry)
+{
+	return tmy_load_result();
+}
+
+static int tmy_inode_symlink(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *dentry,
+			     const char *name)
+{
+	return tmy_load_result();
+}
+
+static int tmy_inode_mkdir(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *dentry,
+			   int mask)
+{
+	return tmy_load_result();
+}
+
+static int tmy_inode_rmdir(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *dentry)
+{
+	return tmy_load_result();
+}
+
+static int tmy_inode_create(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mode)
+{
+	return tmy_load_result();
+}
+
+static int tmy_inode_mknod(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *dentry,
+			   int mode, dev_t dev)
+{
+	return tmy_load_result();
+}
+
+static int tmy_inode_rename(struct inode *old_inode, struct dentry *old_dentry,
+			    struct inode *new_inode, struct dentry *new_dentry)
+{
+	return tmy_load_result();
+}
+
+static int tmy_inode_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *iattr)
+{
+	return tmy_load_result();
+}
+
+static int tmy_file_fcntl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
+			  unsigned long arg)
+{
+	if (cmd == F_SETFL && ((arg ^ file->f_flags) & O_APPEND))
+		return tmy_check_rewrite_permission(tmy_domain(), file);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int tmy_dentry_open(struct file *f, const struct cred *cred)
+{
+	int flags = f->f_flags;
+
+	if ((flags + 1) & O_ACCMODE)
+		flags++;
+	flags |= f->f_flags & (O_APPEND | O_TRUNC);
+	/* Don't check read permission here if called from do_execve(). */
+	if (current->in_execve)
+		return 0;
+	return tmy_check_open_permission(tmy_domain(), &f->f_path, flags);
+}
+
+static struct security_operations tomoyo_security_ops = {
+	.name                      = "tomoyo",
+	.cred_prepare              = tmy_cred_prepare,
+	.bprm_set_creds            = tmy_bprm_set_creds,
+	.bprm_check_security       = tmy_bprm_check_security,
+	.sysctl                    = tmy_sysctl,
+	.file_fcntl                = tmy_file_fcntl,
+	.dentry_open               = tmy_dentry_open,
+	.path_truncate             = tmy_path_truncate,
+	.path_unlink               = tmy_path_unlink,
+	.path_mkdir                = tmy_path_mkdir,
+	.path_rmdir                = tmy_path_rmdir,
+	.path_symlink              = tmy_path_symlink,
+	.path_mknod                = tmy_path_mknod,
+	.path_link                 = tmy_path_link,
+	.path_rename               = tmy_path_rename,
+	.inode_create              = tmy_inode_create,
+	.inode_setattr             = tmy_inode_setattr,
+	.inode_unlink              = tmy_inode_unlink,
+	.inode_mkdir               = tmy_inode_mkdir,
+	.inode_rmdir               = tmy_inode_rmdir,
+	.inode_symlink             = tmy_inode_symlink,
+	.inode_mknod               = tmy_inode_mknod,
+	.inode_link                = tmy_inode_link,
+	.inode_rename              = tmy_inode_rename,
+	.path_clear                = tmy_path_clear,
+};
+
+static int __init tmy_init(void)
+{
+	struct cred *cred = (struct cred *) current_cred();
+
+	if (!security_module_enable(&tomoyo_security_ops))
+		return 0;
+	/* register ourselves with the security framework */
+	if (register_security(&tomoyo_security_ops))
+		panic("Failure registering TOMOYO Linux");
+	printk(KERN_INFO "TOMOYO Linux initialized\n");
+	cred->security = &KERNEL_DOMAIN;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+security_initcall(tmy_init);
--- /dev/null
+++ linux-next/security/tomoyo/tomoyo.h
@@ -0,0 +1,105 @@
+/*
+ * security/tomoyo/tomoyo.h
+ *
+ * Implementation of the Domain-Based Mandatory Access Control.
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2005-2008  NTT DATA CORPORATION
+ *
+ * Version: 2.2.0-pre   2008/10/10
+ *
+ */
+
+#ifndef _SECURITY_TOMOYO_TOMOYO_H
+#define _SECURITY_TOMOYO_TOMOYO_H
+
+struct path_info;
+struct path;
+struct inode;
+struct linux_binprm;
+struct pt_regs;
+struct tmy_page_buffer;
+
+int tmy_check_file_perm(struct domain_info *domain, const char *filename,
+			const u8 perm);
+int tmy_check_exec_perm(struct domain_info *domain,
+			const struct path_info *filename,
+			struct tmy_page_buffer *buf);
+int tmy_check_open_permission(struct domain_info *domain, struct path *path,
+			      const int flag);
+int tmy_check_1path_perm(struct domain_info *domain, const u8 operation,
+			 struct path *path);
+int tmy_check_2path_perm(struct domain_info *domain, const u8 operation,
+			 struct path *path1, struct path *path2);
+int tmy_check_rewrite_permission(struct domain_info *domain,
+				 struct file *filp);
+int tmy_find_next_domain(struct linux_binprm *bprm,
+			 struct domain_info **next_domain);
+
+/* Index numbers for Access Controls. */
+
+#define TYPE_SINGLE_PATH_ACL                 0
+#define TYPE_DOUBLE_PATH_ACL                 1
+
+/* Index numbers for File Controls. */
+
+/*
+ * TYPE_READ_WRITE_ACL is special. TYPE_READ_WRITE_ACL is automatically set
+ * if both TYPE_READ_ACL and TYPE_WRITE_ACL are set. Both TYPE_READ_ACL and
+ * TYPE_WRITE_ACL are automatically set if TYPE_READ_WRITE_ACL is set.
+ * TYPE_READ_WRITE_ACL is automatically cleared if either TYPE_READ_ACL or
+ * TYPE_WRITE_ACL is cleared. Both TYPE_READ_ACL and TYPE_WRITE_ACL are
+ * automatically cleared if TYPE_READ_WRITE_ACL is cleared.
+ */
+
+#define TMY_TYPE_READ_WRITE_ACL    0
+#define TMY_TYPE_EXECUTE_ACL       1
+#define TMY_TYPE_READ_ACL          2
+#define TMY_TYPE_WRITE_ACL         3
+#define TMY_TYPE_CREATE_ACL        4
+#define TMY_TYPE_UNLINK_ACL        5
+#define TMY_TYPE_MKDIR_ACL         6
+#define TMY_TYPE_RMDIR_ACL         7
+#define TMY_TYPE_MKFIFO_ACL        8
+#define TMY_TYPE_MKSOCK_ACL        9
+#define TMY_TYPE_MKBLOCK_ACL      10
+#define TMY_TYPE_MKCHAR_ACL       11
+#define TMY_TYPE_TRUNCATE_ACL     12
+#define TMY_TYPE_SYMLINK_ACL      13
+#define TMY_TYPE_REWRITE_ACL      14
+#define MAX_SINGLE_PATH_OPERATION 15
+
+#define TMY_TYPE_LINK_ACL         0
+#define TMY_TYPE_RENAME_ACL       1
+#define MAX_DOUBLE_PATH_OPERATION 2
+
+#define TMY_DOMAINPOLICY          0
+#define TMY_EXCEPTIONPOLICY       1
+#define TMY_DOMAIN_STATUS         2
+#define TMY_PROCESS_STATUS        3
+#define TMY_MEMINFO               4
+#define TMY_SELFDOMAIN            5
+#define TMY_VERSION               6
+#define TMY_PROFILE               7
+#define TMY_MANAGER               8
+#define TMY_UPDATESCOUNTER        9
+
+extern struct domain_info KERNEL_DOMAIN;
+
+static inline struct domain_info *tmy_domain(void)
+{
+	return current_cred()->security;
+}
+
+/* Caller holds tasklist_lock spinlock. */
+static inline struct domain_info *tmy_real_domain(struct task_struct *task)
+{
+	/***** CRITICAL SECTION START *****/
+	const struct cred *cred = get_task_cred(task);
+	struct domain_info *domain = cred->security;
+
+	put_cred(cred);
+	return domain;
+	/***** CRITICAL SECTION END *****/
+}
+
+#endif /* !defined(_SECURITY_TOMOYO_TOMOYO_H) */

--

[TOMOYO #11 (linux-next) 10/11] Kconfig and Makefile

[Kentaro Takeda]

Signed-off-by: Kentaro Takeda <takedakn@nttdata.co.jp>
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
---
 security/Kconfig         |    1 +
 security/Makefile        |    2 ++
 security/tomoyo/Kconfig  |   11 +++++++++++
 security/tomoyo/Makefile |    1 +
 4 files changed, 15 insertions(+)

--- linux-next.orig/security/Kconfig
+++ linux-next/security/Kconfig
@@ -134,6 +134,7 @@ config SECURITY_DEFAULT_MMAP_MIN_ADDR
 
 source security/selinux/Kconfig
 source security/smack/Kconfig
+source security/tomoyo/Kconfig
 
 endmenu
 
--- linux-next.orig/security/Makefile
+++ linux-next/security/Makefile
@@ -5,6 +5,7 @@
 obj-$(CONFIG_KEYS)			+= keys/
 subdir-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX)	+= selinux
 subdir-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK)		+= smack
+subdir-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_TOMOYO)        += tomoyo
 
 # always enable default capabilities
 obj-y		+= commoncap.o
@@ -17,3 +18,4 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX)		+= selin
 obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK)		+= smack/built-in.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_ROOTPLUG)		+= root_plug.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_CGROUP_DEVICE)		+= device_cgroup.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_TOMOYO)		+= tomoyo/built-in.o
--- /dev/null
+++ linux-next/security/tomoyo/Kconfig
@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
+config SECURITY_TOMOYO
+	bool "TOMOYO Linux Support"
+	depends on SECURITY
+	select SECURITYFS
+	select SECURITY_PATH
+	default n
+	help
+	  This selects TOMOYO Linux, pathname-based access control.
+	  Required userspace tools and further information may be
+          found at <http://tomoyo.sourceforge.jp/>.
+	  If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.
--- /dev/null
+++ linux-next/security/tomoyo/Makefile
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+obj-y = common.o realpath.o tomoyo.o domain.o file.o

--

[TOMOYO #11 (linux-next) 11/11] MAINTAINERS info

[Kentaro Takeda]

The archive of tomoyo-users-en mailing list is available at
http://lists.sourceforge.jp/mailman/archives/tomoyo-users-en/ .
Mailing lists for Japanese users are at
http://lists.sourceforge.jp/mailman/archives/tomoyo-users/ and
http://lists.sourceforge.jp/mailman/archives/tomoyo-dev/ .

TOMOYO Linux English portal is at
http://elinux.org/TomoyoLinux .

Signed-off-by: Kentaro Takeda <takedakn@nttdata.co.jp>
---
 MAINTAINERS |   13 +++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+)

--- linux-next.orig/MAINTAINERS
+++ linux-next/MAINTAINERS
@@ -4110,6 +4110,19 @@ L:	tlan-devel@lists.sourceforge.net (sub
 W:	http://sourceforge.net/projects/tlan/
 S:	Maintained
 
+TOMOYO SECURITY MODULE
+P:	Kentaro Takeda
+M:	takedakn@nttdata.co.jp
+P:	Tetsuo Handa
+M:	penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp
+L:	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org (kernel issues)
+L:	tomoyo-users-en@lists.sourceforge.jp (subscribers-only, for developers and users in English)
+L:	tomoyo-dev@lists.sourceforge.jp (subscribers-only, for developers in Japanese)
+L:	tomoyo-users@lists.sourceforge.jp (subscribers-only, for users in Japanese)
+W:	http://tomoyo.sourceforge.jp/
+T:	quilt http://svn.sourceforge.jp/svnroot/tomoyo/trunk/2.2.x/tomoyo-lsm/patches/
+S:	Maintained
+
 TOSHIBA ACPI EXTRAS DRIVER
 P:	John Belmonte
 M:	toshiba_acpi@memebeam.org

--

Re: [TOMOYO #11 (linux-next) 01/11] Introduce new LSM hooks where vfsmount is available.

[Shaya Potter]

Kentaro Takeda wrote:
> ----- What is this patch for? -----
> 
> There are security_inode_*() LSM hooks for attribute-based MAC, but they are not
> suitable for pathname-based MAC because they don't receive "struct vfsmount"
> information.
> 
> ----- How this patch was developed? -----
> 
> Two pathname-based MACs, AppArmor and TOMOYO Linux, are trying to merge
> upstream. But because of "struct vfsmount" problem, they have been unable to
e> merge upstream.
> 
> Here are the list of approaches and the reasons of denial.

I know I'm late to the game in this, but as I recently asked about this 
and didn't get an answer, I'll re-ask my approach.

Why can't you do this

in lookup()

- resolve rules (not for single process, but for all processes) for said 
path and tag dentry (seem to already have a hook)

in permission()

- check tag based on current security context

in rename(),....

- drop dentry tag and force a lookup next time its used (invalidate dentry)

you then don't have to jump through hoops to handle things like symbolic 
links as they are handled implicitly.

the only place I can see this approach "failing" (as in different 
semantics than your approach) is

- hard links within a single namespace and bind mounts shared between 
namespaces (in that different rules would be resolved for different path 
names for the same file).

But from a security perspective, both would seem like a very bad idea in 
general that one would ant to prevent.  or to rephrase, why would you 
want to allow that?  What's the benefit in allowing that?

Re: [TOMOYO #11 (linux-next) 01/11] Introduce new LSM hooks where vfsmount is available.

[Miklos Szeredi]

On Mon, 20 Oct 2008, Kentaro Takeda wrote:
> ----- What is this patch for? -----
> 
> There are security_inode_*() LSM hooks for attribute-based MAC, but
> they are not suitable for pathname-based MAC because they don't
> receive "struct vfsmount" information.
> 
> ----- How this patch was developed? -----
> 
> Two pathname-based MACs, AppArmor and TOMOYO Linux, are trying to
> merge upstream. But because of "struct vfsmount" problem, they have
> been unable to merge upstream.

Thanks for doing this work!

See below for comments.

> (6) Introducing new LSM hooks.
>  (this patch)
> 
>  We understand that adding new LSM hooks which receive "struct
>  vfsmount" outside VFS helper functions is the most straightforward
>  approach. This approach has less impact to existing LSM module and
>  no impact to VFS helper functions.

AppArmor will need a few additional hooks, but the ones added by this
patch look OK.  One thing I'd prefer is if there were two different
hooks for truncate and ftruncate:

   int (*path_truncate) (struct path *path, ...);

and

   int (*file_truncate) (struct file *file, ...);

security_path_truncate() is missing from do_coredump() in exec.c.  Is
this intentional?

Also seems to be missing:

 - security_path_mknod() from do_create() in ipc/mqueue.c
 - security_path_mknod() from unix_bind() in net/unix/af_unix.c
 - security_path_unlink() from sys_mq_unlink() in ipc/mqueue.c

The hooks are also not called from nfsd, I presume that's intentional?


> (6.1) Introducing security_path_clear() hook.
>  (this patch)
> 
>  To perform DAC performed in vfs_foo() before MAC, we let
>  security_path_foo() save a result into our own hash table and
>  return 0, and let security_inode_foo() return the saved
>  result. Since security_inode_foo() is not always called after
>  security_path_foo(), we need security_path_clear() to clear the
>  hash table.

This is not a good interface, IMO.  It's easy to forget (e.g. two
places in open.c), and hard to detect.

And is it necessary at all?  Saving the result in the per-task
security context and destroying it at exit should be an equivalent
solution.

Thanks,
Miklos


> Signed-off-by: Kentaro Takeda <takedakn@nttdata.co.jp>
> Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
> Signed-off-by: Toshiharu Harada <haradats@nttdata.co.jp>
> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
> Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
> Cc: Crispin Cowan <crispin@crispincowan.com>
> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
> Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
> Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
> ---
> 
>  fs/namei.c               |   46 ++++++++++++++
>  fs/open.c                |    5 +
>  include/linux/security.h |  151 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
>  net/unix/af_unix.c       |    5 +
>  security/Kconfig         |    9 ++
>  security/capability.c    |   63 +++++++++++++++++++
>  security/security.c      |   73 ++++++++++++++++++++++
>  7 files changed, 352 insertions(+)
> 
> --- linux-next.orig/fs/namei.c
> +++ linux-next/fs/namei.c
> @@ -1571,12 +1571,17 @@ int may_open(struct nameidata *nd, int a
>  		 * Refuse to truncate files with mandatory locks held on them.
>  		 */
>  		error = locks_verify_locked(inode);
> +		if (!error)
> +			error = security_path_truncate(&nd->path, 0,
> +					       ATTR_MTIME|ATTR_CTIME|ATTR_OPEN,
> +						       NULL);
>  		if (!error) {
>  			DQUOT_INIT(inode);
>  
>  			error = do_truncate(dentry, 0,
>  					    ATTR_MTIME|ATTR_CTIME|ATTR_OPEN,
>  					    NULL);
> +			security_path_clear();
>  		}
>  		put_write_access(inode);
>  		if (error)
> @@ -1601,7 +1606,12 @@ static int __open_namei_create(struct na
>  
>  	if (!IS_POSIXACL(dir->d_inode))
>  		mode &= ~current->fs->umask;
> +	error = security_path_mknod(&nd->path, path->dentry, mode, 0);
> +	if (error)
> +		goto out_unlock;
>  	error = vfs_create(dir->d_inode, path->dentry, mode, nd);
> +	security_path_clear();
> +out_unlock:
>  	mutex_unlock(&dir->d_inode->i_mutex);
>  	dput(nd->path.dentry);
>  	nd->path.dentry = path->dentry;
> @@ -2014,6 +2024,9 @@ asmlinkage long sys_mknodat(int dfd, con
>  	error = mnt_want_write(nd.path.mnt);
>  	if (error)
>  		goto out_dput;
> +	error = security_path_mknod(&nd.path, dentry, mode, dev);
> +	if (error)
> +		goto out_drop_write;
>  	switch (mode & S_IFMT) {
>  		case 0: case S_IFREG:
>  			error = vfs_create(nd.path.dentry->d_inode,dentry,mode,&nd);
> @@ -2026,6 +2039,8 @@ asmlinkage long sys_mknodat(int dfd, con
>  			error = vfs_mknod(nd.path.dentry->d_inode,dentry,mode,0);
>  			break;
>  	}
> +	security_path_clear();
> +out_drop_write:
>  	mnt_drop_write(nd.path.mnt);
>  out_dput:
>  	dput(dentry);
> @@ -2085,7 +2100,12 @@ asmlinkage long sys_mkdirat(int dfd, con
>  	error = mnt_want_write(nd.path.mnt);
>  	if (error)
>  		goto out_dput;
> +	error = security_path_mkdir(&nd.path, dentry, mode);
> +	if (error)
> +		goto out_drop_write;
>  	error = vfs_mkdir(nd.path.dentry->d_inode, dentry, mode);
> +	security_path_clear();
> +out_drop_write:
>  	mnt_drop_write(nd.path.mnt);
>  out_dput:
>  	dput(dentry);
> @@ -2192,7 +2212,12 @@ static long do_rmdir(int dfd, const char
>  	error = mnt_want_write(nd.path.mnt);
>  	if (error)
>  		goto exit3;
> +	error = security_path_rmdir(&nd.path, dentry);
> +	if (error)
> +		goto exit4;
>  	error = vfs_rmdir(nd.path.dentry->d_inode, dentry);
> +	security_path_clear();
> +exit4:
>  	mnt_drop_write(nd.path.mnt);
>  exit3:
>  	dput(dentry);
> @@ -2274,7 +2299,12 @@ static long do_unlinkat(int dfd, const c
>  		error = mnt_want_write(nd.path.mnt);
>  		if (error)
>  			goto exit2;
> +		error = security_path_unlink(&nd.path, dentry);
> +		if (error)
> +			goto exit3;
>  		error = vfs_unlink(nd.path.dentry->d_inode, dentry);
> +		security_path_clear();
> +exit3:
>  		mnt_drop_write(nd.path.mnt);
>  	exit2:
>  		dput(dentry);
> @@ -2355,7 +2385,12 @@ asmlinkage long sys_symlinkat(const char
>  	error = mnt_want_write(nd.path.mnt);
>  	if (error)
>  		goto out_dput;
> +	error = security_path_symlink(&nd.path, dentry, from);
> +	if (error)
> +		goto out_drop_write;
>  	error = vfs_symlink(nd.path.dentry->d_inode, dentry, from);
> +	security_path_clear();
> +out_drop_write:
>  	mnt_drop_write(nd.path.mnt);
>  out_dput:
>  	dput(dentry);
> @@ -2452,7 +2487,12 @@ asmlinkage long sys_linkat(int olddfd, c
>  	error = mnt_want_write(nd.path.mnt);
>  	if (error)
>  		goto out_dput;
> +	error = security_path_link(old_path.dentry, &nd.path, new_dentry);
> +	if (error)
> +		goto out_drop_write;
>  	error = vfs_link(old_path.dentry, nd.path.dentry->d_inode, new_dentry);
> +	security_path_clear();
> +out_drop_write:
>  	mnt_drop_write(nd.path.mnt);
>  out_dput:
>  	dput(new_dentry);
> @@ -2684,8 +2724,14 @@ asmlinkage long sys_renameat(int olddfd,
>  	error = mnt_want_write(oldnd.path.mnt);
>  	if (error)
>  		goto exit5;
> +	error = security_path_rename(&oldnd.path, old_dentry,
> +				     &newnd.path, new_dentry);
> +	if (error)
> +		goto exit6;
>  	error = vfs_rename(old_dir->d_inode, old_dentry,
>  				   new_dir->d_inode, new_dentry);
> +	security_path_clear();
> +exit6:
>  	mnt_drop_write(oldnd.path.mnt);
>  exit5:
>  	dput(new_dentry);
> --- linux-next.orig/fs/open.c
> +++ linux-next/fs/open.c
> @@ -272,6 +272,8 @@ static long do_sys_truncate(const char _
>  		goto put_write_and_out;
>  
>  	error = locks_verify_truncate(inode, NULL, length);
> +	if (!error)
> +		error = security_path_truncate(&path, length, 0, NULL);
>  	if (!error) {
>  		DQUOT_INIT(inode);
>  		error = do_truncate(path.dentry, length, 0, NULL);
> @@ -329,6 +331,9 @@ static long do_sys_ftruncate(unsigned in
>  
>  	error = locks_verify_truncate(inode, file, length);
>  	if (!error)
> +		error = security_path_truncate(&file->f_path, length,
> +					       ATTR_MTIME|ATTR_CTIME, file);
> +	if (!error)
>  		error = do_truncate(dentry, length, ATTR_MTIME|ATTR_CTIME, file);
>  out_putf:
>  	fput(file);
> --- linux-next.orig/include/linux/security.h
> +++ linux-next/include/linux/security.h
> @@ -331,17 +331,37 @@ static inline void security_free_mnt_opt
>   *	@dir contains the inode structure of the parent directory of the new link.
>   *	@new_dentry contains the dentry structure for the new link.
>   *	Return 0 if permission is granted.
> + * @path_link:
> + *	Check permission before creating a new hard link to a file.
> + *	@old_dentry contains the dentry structure for an existing link
> + *	to the file.
> + *	@new_dir contains the path structure of the parent directory of
> + *	the new link.
> + *	@new_dentry contains the dentry structure for the new link.
> + *	Return 0 if permission is granted.
>   * @inode_unlink:
>   *	Check the permission to remove a hard link to a file.
>   *	@dir contains the inode structure of parent directory of the file.
>   *	@dentry contains the dentry structure for file to be unlinked.
>   *	Return 0 if permission is granted.
> + * @path_unlink:
> + *	Check the permission to remove a hard link to a file.
> + *	@dir contains the path structure of parent directory of the file.
> + *	@dentry contains the dentry structure for file to be unlinked.
> + *	Return 0 if permission is granted.
>   * @inode_symlink:
>   *	Check the permission to create a symbolic link to a file.
>   *	@dir contains the inode structure of parent directory of the symbolic link.
>   *	@dentry contains the dentry structure of the symbolic link.
>   *	@old_name contains the pathname of file.
>   *	Return 0 if permission is granted.
> + * @path_symlink:
> + *	Check the permission to create a symbolic link to a file.
> + *	@dir contains the path structure of parent directory of
> + *	the symbolic link.
> + *	@dentry contains the dentry structure of the symbolic link.
> + *	@old_name contains the pathname of file.
> + *	Return 0 if permission is granted.
>   * @inode_mkdir:
>   *	Check permissions to create a new directory in the existing directory
>   *	associated with inode strcture @dir.
> @@ -349,11 +369,25 @@ static inline void security_free_mnt_opt
>   *	@dentry contains the dentry structure of new directory.
>   *	@mode contains the mode of new directory.
>   *	Return 0 if permission is granted.
> + * @path_mkdir:
> + *	Check permissions to create a new directory in the existing directory
> + *	associated with path strcture @path.
> + *	@dir containst the path structure of parent of the directory
> + *	to be created.
> + *	@dentry contains the dentry structure of new directory.
> + *	@mode contains the mode of new directory.
> + *	Return 0 if permission is granted.
>   * @inode_rmdir:
>   *	Check the permission to remove a directory.
>   *	@dir contains the inode structure of parent of the directory to be removed.
>   *	@dentry contains the dentry structure of directory to be removed.
>   *	Return 0 if permission is granted.
> + * @path_rmdir:
> + *	Check the permission to remove a directory.
> + *	@dir contains the path structure of parent of the directory to be
> + *	removed.
> + *	@dentry contains the dentry structure of directory to be removed.
> + *	Return 0 if permission is granted.
>   * @inode_mknod:
>   *	Check permissions when creating a special file (or a socket or a fifo
>   *	file created via the mknod system call).  Note that if mknod operation
> @@ -364,6 +398,15 @@ static inline void security_free_mnt_opt
>   *	@mode contains the mode of the new file.
>   *	@dev contains the device number.
>   *	Return 0 if permission is granted.
> + * @path_mknod:
> + *	Check permissions when creating a file. Note that this hook is called
> + *	even if mknod operation is being done for a regular file.
> + *	@dir contains the path structure of parent of the new file.
> + *	@dentry contains the dentry structure of the new file.
> + *	@mode contains the mode of the new file.
> + *	@dev contains the undecoded device number. Use new_decode_dev() to get
> + *	the decoded device number.
> + *	Return 0 if permission is granted.
>   * @inode_rename:
>   *	Check for permission to rename a file or directory.
>   *	@old_dir contains the inode structure for parent of the old link.
> @@ -371,6 +414,13 @@ static inline void security_free_mnt_opt
>   *	@new_dir contains the inode structure for parent of the new link.
>   *	@new_dentry contains the dentry structure of the new link.
>   *	Return 0 if permission is granted.
> + * @path_rename:
> + *	Check for permission to rename a file or directory.
> + *	@old_dir contains the path structure for parent of the old link.
> + *	@old_dentry contains the dentry structure of the old link.
> + *	@new_dir contains the path structure for parent of the new link.
> + *	@new_dentry contains the dentry structure of the new link.
> + *	Return 0 if permission is granted.
>   * @inode_readlink:
>   *	Check the permission to read the symbolic link.
>   *	@dentry contains the dentry structure for the file link.
> @@ -399,6 +449,13 @@ static inline void security_free_mnt_opt
>   *	@dentry contains the dentry structure for the file.
>   *	@attr is the iattr structure containing the new file attributes.
>   *	Return 0 if permission is granted.
> + * @path_truncate:
> + *	Check permission before truncating a file.
> + *	@path contains the path structure for the file.
> + *	@length is the new length of the file.
> + *	@time_attrs is the flags passed to do_truncate().
> + *	@filp is the file structure (may be NULL).
> + *	Return 0 if permission is granted.
>   * @inode_getattr:
>   *	Check permission before obtaining file attributes.
>   *	@mnt is the vfsmount where the dentry was looked up
> @@ -466,6 +523,12 @@ static inline void security_free_mnt_opt
>   *	@inode contains a pointer to the inode.
>   *	@secid contains a pointer to the location where result will be saved.
>   *	In case of failure, @secid will be set to zero.
> + * @path_clear:
> + *	Clear error code stored by security_path_*() in case
> + *	security_inode_*() was not called when DAC returned an error.
> + *	This hook allows LSM modules which use security_path_*() defer
> + *	returning LSM's error code till security_inode_*() is called so that
> + *	DAC's error (if any) is returned to the caller instead of LSM's error.
>   *
>   * Security hooks for file operations
>   *
> @@ -1327,6 +1390,23 @@ struct security_operations {
>  				   struct super_block *newsb);
>  	int (*sb_parse_opts_str) (char *options, struct security_mnt_opts *opts);
>  
> +#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_PATH
> +	int (*path_unlink) (struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry);
> +	int (*path_mkdir) (struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mode);
> +	int (*path_rmdir) (struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry);
> +	int (*path_mknod) (struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mode,
> +			   unsigned int dev);
> +	int (*path_truncate) (struct path *path, loff_t length,
> +			      unsigned int time_attrs, struct file *filp);
> +	int (*path_symlink) (struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
> +			     const char *old_name);
> +	int (*path_link) (struct dentry *old_dentry, struct path *new_dir,
> +			  struct dentry *new_dentry);
> +	int (*path_rename) (struct path *old_dir, struct dentry *old_dentry,
> +			    struct path *new_dir, struct dentry *new_dentry);
> +	void (*path_clear) (void);
> +#endif
> +
>  	int (*inode_alloc_security) (struct inode *inode);
>  	void (*inode_free_security) (struct inode *inode);
>  	int (*inode_init_security) (struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
> @@ -2685,6 +2765,77 @@ static inline void security_skb_classify
>  
>  #endif	/* CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM */
>  
> +#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_PATH
> +int security_path_unlink(struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry);
> +int security_path_mkdir(struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mode);
> +int security_path_rmdir(struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry);
> +int security_path_mknod(struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mode,
> +			unsigned int dev);
> +int security_path_truncate(struct path *path, loff_t length,
> +			   unsigned int time_attrs, struct file *filp);
> +int security_path_symlink(struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
> +			  const char *old_name);
> +int security_path_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, struct path *new_dir,
> +		       struct dentry *new_dentry);
> +int security_path_rename(struct path *old_dir, struct dentry *old_dentry,
> +			 struct path *new_dir, struct dentry *new_dentry);
> +void security_path_clear(void);
> +#else	/* CONFIG_SECURITY_PATH */
> +static inline int security_path_unlink(struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
> +{
> +	return 0;
> +}
> +
> +static inline int security_path_mkdir(struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
> +				      int mode)
> +{
> +	return 0;
> +}
> +
> +static inline int security_path_rmdir(struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
> +{
> +	return 0;
> +}
> +
> +static inline int security_path_mknod(struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
> +				      int mode, unsigned int dev)
> +{
> +	return 0;
> +}
> +
> +static inline int security_path_truncate(struct path *path, loff_t length,
> +					 unsigned int time_attrs,
> +					 struct file *filp)
> +{
> +	return 0;
> +}
> +
> +static inline int security_path_symlink(struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
> +					const char *old_name)
> +{
> +	return 0;
> +}
> +
> +static inline int security_path_link(struct dentry *old_dentry,
> +				     struct path *new_dir,
> +				     struct dentry *new_dentry)
> +{
> +	return 0;
> +}
> +
> +static inline int security_path_rename(struct path *old_dir,
> +				       struct dentry *old_dentry,
> +				       struct path *new_dir,
> +				       struct dentry *new_dentry)
> +{
> +	return 0;
> +}
> +
> +static inline void security_path_clear(void)
> +{
> +}
> +#endif	/* CONFIG_SECURITY_PATH */
> +
>  #ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
>  #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY
>  
> --- linux-next.orig/net/unix/af_unix.c
> +++ linux-next/net/unix/af_unix.c
> @@ -828,7 +828,12 @@ static int unix_bind(struct socket *sock
>  		err = mnt_want_write(nd.path.mnt);
>  		if (err)
>  			goto out_mknod_dput;
> +		err = security_path_mknod(&nd.path, dentry, mode, 0);
> +		if (err)
> +			goto out_mknod_drop_write;
>  		err = vfs_mknod(nd.path.dentry->d_inode, dentry, mode, 0);
> +		security_path_clear();
> +out_mknod_drop_write:
>  		mnt_drop_write(nd.path.mnt);
>  		if (err)
>  			goto out_mknod_dput;
> --- linux-next.orig/security/Kconfig
> +++ linux-next/security/Kconfig
> @@ -81,6 +81,15 @@ config SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM
>  	  IPSec.
>  	  If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.
>  
> +config SECURITY_PATH
> +	bool "Security hooks for pathname based access control"
> +	depends on SECURITY
> +	help
> +	  This enables the security hooks for pathname based access control.
> +	  If enabled, a security module can use these hooks to
> +	  implement pathname based access controls.
> +	  If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.
> +
>  config SECURITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES
>  	bool "File POSIX Capabilities"
>  	default n
> --- linux-next.orig/security/capability.c
> +++ linux-next/security/capability.c
> @@ -263,6 +263,58 @@ static void cap_inode_getsecid(const str
>  	*secid = 0;
>  }
>  
> +#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_PATH
> +static int cap_path_mknod(struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mode,
> +			  unsigned int dev)
> +{
> +	return 0;
> +}
> +
> +static int cap_path_mkdir(struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mode)
> +{
> +	return 0;
> +}
> +
> +static int cap_path_rmdir(struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
> +{
> +	return 0;
> +}
> +
> +static int cap_path_unlink(struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
> +{
> +	return 0;
> +}
> +
> +static int cap_path_symlink(struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
> +			    const char *old_name)
> +{
> +	return 0;
> +}
> +
> +static int cap_path_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, struct path *new_dir,
> +			 struct dentry *new_dentry)
> +{
> +	return 0;
> +}
> +
> +static int cap_path_rename(struct path *old_path, struct dentry *old_dentry,
> +			   struct path *new_path, struct dentry *new_dentry)
> +{
> +	return 0;
> +}
> +
> +static int cap_path_truncate(struct path *path, loff_t length,
> +			     unsigned int time_attrs, struct file *filp)
> +{
> +	return 0;
> +}
> +
> +static void cap_path_clear(void)
> +{
> +}
> +
> +#endif
> +
>  static int cap_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
>  {
>  	return 0;
> @@ -883,6 +935,17 @@ void security_fixup_ops(struct security_
>  	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, inode_setsecurity);
>  	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, inode_listsecurity);
>  	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, inode_getsecid);
> +#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_PATH
> +	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, path_mknod);
> +	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, path_mkdir);
> +	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, path_rmdir);
> +	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, path_unlink);
> +	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, path_symlink);
> +	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, path_link);
> +	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, path_rename);
> +	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, path_truncate);
> +	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, path_clear);
> +#endif
>  	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, file_permission);
>  	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, file_alloc_security);
>  	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, file_free_security);
> --- linux-next.orig/security/security.c
> +++ linux-next/security/security.c
> @@ -341,6 +341,79 @@ int security_inode_init_security(struct 
>  }
>  EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inode_init_security);
>  
> +#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_PATH
> +int security_path_mknod(struct path *path, struct dentry *dentry, int mode,
> +			unsigned int dev)
> +{
> +	if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(path->dentry->d_inode)))
> +		return 0;
> +	return security_ops->path_mknod(path, dentry, mode, dev);
> +}
> +EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_path_mknod);
> +
> +int security_path_mkdir(struct path *path, struct dentry *dentry, int mode)
> +{
> +	if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(path->dentry->d_inode)))
> +		return 0;
> +	return security_ops->path_mkdir(path, dentry, mode);
> +}
> +
> +int security_path_rmdir(struct path *path, struct dentry *dentry)
> +{
> +	if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(path->dentry->d_inode)))
> +		return 0;
> +	return security_ops->path_rmdir(path, dentry);
> +}
> +
> +int security_path_unlink(struct path *path, struct dentry *dentry)
> +{
> +	if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(path->dentry->d_inode)))
> +		return 0;
> +	return security_ops->path_unlink(path, dentry);
> +}
> +
> +int security_path_symlink(struct path *path, struct dentry *dentry,
> +			  const char *old_name)
> +{
> +	if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(path->dentry->d_inode)))
> +		return 0;
> +	return security_ops->path_symlink(path, dentry, old_name);
> +}
> +
> +int security_path_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, struct path *new_dir,
> +		       struct dentry *new_dentry)
> +{
> +	if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(old_dentry->d_inode)))
> +		return 0;
> +	return security_ops->path_link(old_dentry, new_dir, new_dentry);
> +}
> +
> +int security_path_rename(struct path *old_dir, struct dentry *old_dentry,
> +			 struct path *new_dir, struct dentry *new_dentry)
> +{
> +	if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(old_dentry->d_inode) ||
> +		     (new_dentry->d_inode && IS_PRIVATE(new_dentry->d_inode))))
> +		return 0;
> +	return security_ops->path_rename(old_dir, old_dentry, new_dir,
> +					 new_dentry);
> +}
> +
> +int security_path_truncate(struct path *path, loff_t length,
> +			   unsigned int time_attrs, struct file *filp)
> +{
> +	if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(path->dentry->d_inode)))
> +		return 0;
> +	return security_ops->path_truncate(path, length, time_attrs, filp);
> +}
> +
> +void security_path_clear(void)
> +{
> +	return security_ops->path_clear();
> +}
> +EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_path_clear);
> +
> +#endif
> +
>  int security_inode_create(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mode)
>  {
>  	if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(dir)))
> 
> --
> 
> --
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> the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org
> More majordomo info at  http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
> Please read the FAQ at  http://www.tux.org/lkml/
> 

Re: [TOMOYO #11 (linux-next) 01/11] Introduce new LSM hooks where vfsmount is available.

[crispin]

Quoting Shaya Potter <spotter@cs.columbia.edu>:
> I know I'm late to the game in this, but as I recently asked about this
> and didn't get an answer, I'll re-ask my approach.
>
> Why can't you do this
>
> in lookup()
>
> - resolve rules (not for single process, but for all processes) for
> said path and tag dentry (seem to already have a hook)
>
> in permission()

Because it doesn't work  
http://kerneltrap.org/mailarchive/linux-fsdevel/2007/6/8/319446

Quick summary: The difference between the pathname model and the label  
model is dynamism. The accessi really is determined by the pathname to  
the file that you used to access the file. If you try to compute  
access based on attributes tagged onto the file, then you have to  
re-compute those attributes every time someone renames a file.

Crispin

Re: [TOMOYO #11 (linux-next) 01/11] Introduce new LSM hooks where vfsmount is available.

[Shaya Potter]

crispin@crispincowan.com wrote:
> Quoting Shaya Potter <spotter@cs.columbia.edu>:
>> I know I'm late to the game in this, but as I recently asked about this
>> and didn't get an answer, I'll re-ask my approach.
>>
>> Why can't you do this
>>
>> in lookup()
>>
>> - resolve rules (not for single process, but for all processes) for
>> said path and tag dentry (seem to already have a hook)
>>
>> in permission()
> 
> Because it doesn't work 
> http://kerneltrap.org/mailarchive/linux-fsdevel/2007/6/8/319446
> 
> Quick summary: The difference between the pathname model and the label 
> model is dynamism. The accessi really is determined by the pathname to 
> the file that you used to access the file. If you try to compute access 
> based on attributes tagged onto the file, then you have to re-compute 
> those attributes every time someone renames a file.

ok.  simple question then so why not just recompute them every every 
rename?  are rename's that common relative to all other file operations 
where we care?

invalidate the dentry on rename, it will force it to go back through 
lookup() instead of being found in the cache and shouldn't it implicitly 
recalculate it?

I don't see why one can't maintain the dynamism with a focus just on 
lookup and permission (minus the multiple names to the same object 
issues which is a security problem waiting to happen anyways)

I could very well be missing something, I'm fully ready to eat crow.  I 
just felt it should be asked.

Re: [TOMOYO #11 (linux-next) 01/11] Introduce new LSM hooks where vfsmount is available.

[Kentaro Takeda]

Miklos Szeredi wrote:
>> (6) Introducing new LSM hooks.
>>  (this patch)
>>
>>  We understand that adding new LSM hooks which receive "struct
>>  vfsmount" outside VFS helper functions is the most straightforward
>>  approach. This approach has less impact to existing LSM module and
>>  no impact to VFS helper functions.
> 
> AppArmor will need a few additional hooks, but the ones added by this
> patch look OK.  One thing I'd prefer is if there were two different
> hooks for truncate and ftruncate:
> 
>    int (*path_truncate) (struct path *path, ...);
> 
> and
> 
>    int (*file_truncate) (struct file *file, ...);
When you submit AppArmor, you can introduce security_file_truncate() 
and replace security_path_truncate() with security_file_truncate() 
since TOMOYO can get "struct path *path" from 
"struct file *file"->f_path .

> security_path_truncate() is missing from do_coredump() in exec.c.  Is
> this intentional?
Yes.
TOMOYO checks only requests from userspace, not from kernel (e.g. 
filesystem). Since do_coredump() performs request from kernel, we 
don't insert security_path_truncate() in do_coredump() .

> Also seems to be missing:
> 
>  - security_path_mknod() from do_create() in ipc/mqueue.c
TOMOYO doesn't check IPC for now.

>  - security_path_mknod() from unix_bind() in net/unix/af_unix.c
There is security_path_mknod() call in unix_bind(). Please see below.
;-)

--- linux-next.orig/net/unix/af_unix.c
+++ linux-next/net/unix/af_unix.c
@@ -828,7 +828,12 @@ static int unix_bind(struct socket *sock
 		err = mnt_want_write(nd.path.mnt);
 		if (err)
 			goto out_mknod_dput;
+		err = security_path_mknod(&nd.path, dentry, mode, 0);
+		if (err)
+			goto out_mknod_drop_write;
 		err = vfs_mknod(nd.path.dentry->d_inode, dentry, mode, 0);
+		security_path_clear();
+out_mknod_drop_write:
 		mnt_drop_write(nd.path.mnt);
 		if (err)
 			goto out_mknod_dput;

>  - security_path_unlink() from sys_mq_unlink() in ipc/mqueue.c
Same reason as security_path_mknod() from do_create() in ipc/mqueue.c .

> The hooks are also not called from nfsd, I presume that's intentional?
Same reason as do_coredump() . Requests from nfsd are not from 
userspace.

Since AppArmor checks both reqests from userspace and kernel, 
AppArmor will need to insert security_path_*() to more locations. 
Then TOMOYO will want a mechanism for dinstinguishing requests from 
userspace and ones from kernel.

>> (6.1) Introducing security_path_clear() hook.
>>  (this patch)
>>
>>  To perform DAC performed in vfs_foo() before MAC, we let
>>  security_path_foo() save a result into our own hash table and
>>  return 0, and let security_inode_foo() return the saved
>>  result. Since security_inode_foo() is not always called after
>>  security_path_foo(), we need security_path_clear() to clear the
>>  hash table.
> 
> This is not a good interface, IMO.  It's easy to forget (e.g. two
> places in open.c), and hard to detect.
> 
> And is it necessary at all?  Saving the result in the per-task
> security context and destroying it at exit should be an equivalent
> solution.
Though current kernel has current->security, CRED patchset by David moves 
security field from current to current->cred . Since current->cred is shared by 
multiple processes, we'll not be able to implement per-task security. Please see 
http://lkml.org/lkml/2008/10/2/7 in detail.

Regards,

Re: [TOMOYO #11 (linux-next) 01/11] Introduce new LSM hooks where vfsmount is available.

[Shaya Potter]

Shaya Potter wrote:
> crispin@crispincowan.com wrote:
>> Quoting Shaya Potter <spotter@cs.columbia.edu>:
>>> I know I'm late to the game in this, but as I recently asked about this
>>> and didn't get an answer, I'll re-ask my approach.
>>>
>>> Why can't you do this
>>>
>>> in lookup()
>>>
>>> - resolve rules (not for single process, but for all processes) for
>>> said path and tag dentry (seem to already have a hook)
>>>
>>> in permission()
>>
>> Because it doesn't work 
>> http://kerneltrap.org/mailarchive/linux-fsdevel/2007/6/8/319446
>>
>> Quick summary: The difference between the pathname model and the label 
>> model is dynamism. The accessi really is determined by the pathname to 
>> the file that you used to access the file. If you try to compute 
>> access based on attributes tagged onto the file, then you have to 
>> re-compute those attributes every time someone renames a file.
> 
> ok.  simple question then so why not just recompute them every every 
> rename?  are rename's that common relative to all other file operations 
> where we care?

just want to followup as didn't get a response.  If the problem is 
rename(), what's the problem with dropping the label on rename() to 
force a reevaluation on the next pass through the lookup() code.

Re: [TOMOYO #11 (linux-next) 00/11] TOMOYO Linux

[Kentaro Takeda]

Stephen, James, Chris, Serge,
What is the status of this patchset?

I saw no objections against our patchset.
We are waiting for your review for now.
Is there something we can do?

Regards,

Re: [TOMOYO #11 (linux-next) 00/11] TOMOYO Linux

[Serge E. Hallyn]

Quoting Kentaro Takeda (takedakn@nttdata.co.jp):
> Stephen, James, Chris, Serge,
> What is the status of this patchset?
> 
> I saw no objections against our patchset.

I don't like the 'in_exec' bit in the task_struct, but adding LSM hooks
to let just TOMOYO mark whether you're in exec seems even uglier.

> We are waiting for your review for now.
> Is there something we can do?

Well I think the patchset is at a stage where it needs a test-spin in
-mm (or something).

The users' list seems quite sparse, though.  Who exactly does use this,
and why?  (I don't mean that to sound adversarial, but while I think I
know how it differs from selinux, I'm not clear on when or why its
differences would be advantageous.)

-serge

Re: [TOMOYO #11 (linux-next) 00/11] TOMOYO Linux

[Toshiharu Harada]

On 10/30/2008 4:18 AM, Serge E. Hallyn wrote:
> The users' list seems quite sparse, though.  Who exactly does use this,
> and why?  (I don't mean that to sound adversarial, but while I think I
> know how it differs from selinux, I'm not clear on when or why its
> differences would be advantageous.)
> 
> -serge

I assume you saw the English version of users' list which was
created very recently. At the moment, most of the TOMOYO Linux
project users are Japanese as it is not merged *yet*. ;-)

Well, I think I need to prove the existence of users.
Page views total since 2005-11-11: 1,272,647
Downloads total since 2005-11-11: 28,501
Please visit the following url to find number of users are increasing.
http://sourceforge.jp/project/stats/index.php?report=months&group_id=1973&language_id=1

The following wiki page is designed to be an entry for newcomers.
http://elinux.org/TomoyoLinux (7,499 page views)

The following page has been maintained by non-Japanese users.
http://cblfs.cross-lfs.org/index.php/TOMOYO (3,252 page views)

Mandriva 2008.1 and 2009.0 have TOMOYO Linux enabled kernels.
http://tomoyo.sourceforge.jp/en/1.6.x/1st-step/mandriva2008.1/
http://tomoyo.sourceforge.jp/en/1.6.x/1st-step/mandriva2009.0/

Turbolinux 11 Server and Turbolinux Client 2008, too.
http://tomoyo.sourceforge.jp/ja/1.5.x/1st-step/tl11s/
http://tomoyo.sourceforge.jp/ja/1.6.x/1st-step/tc2008/

We have been providing Ubuntu based LiveCD and CentOS based LiveCD.
(= Ubuntu/CentOS LiveCD + TOMOYO Kernel and utilities)
http://tomoyo.sourceforge.jp/wiki-e/?TomoyoLive

Reference documentations and web pages are provided in
English and Japanese.
http://tomoyo.sourceforge.jp/index.html.en

We have open forums and have had feedbacks from non-Japanese
people.
http://sourceforge.jp/forum/forum.php?forum_id=11352&language_id=1

Some Japanese security related NGO server has been protected by
TOMOYO Linux. (not play machine)
http://www.jnsa.org/result/2007/tech/secos/secureos.pdf
(sorry, there's no English version)

So, I think it's safe to say TOMOYO Linux is a *real* project and
there are users. :-)

Best regards,
Toshiharu Harada
haradats@nttdata.co.jp