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From: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
To: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>,
	LSM <linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>,
	LKLM <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>,
	SE Linux <selinux@tycho.nsa.gov>,
	"SMACK-discuss@lists.01.org" <SMACK-discuss@lists.01.org>,
	John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>,
	Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
	Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@i-love.sakura.ne.jp>,
	James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 10/23] LSM: Infrastructure management of the inode security
Date: Mon, 14 May 2018 11:04:03 -0400	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <a38fb118-8c72-e18d-e55a-48fdc40e21f4@tycho.nsa.gov> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <fd3c36e4-6e75-4eec-afdf-a493889c696f@schaufler-ca.com>

On 05/10/2018 08:53 PM, Casey Schaufler wrote:
> From: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
> Date: Thu, 10 May 2018 14:23:27 -0700
> Subject: [PATCH 10/23] LSM: Infrastructure management of the inode security
>  blob
> 
> Move management of the inode->i_security blob out
> of the individual security modules and into the security
> infrastructure. Instead of allocating the blobs from within
> the modules the modules tell the infrastructure how much
> space is required, and the space is allocated there.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
> ---
>  include/linux/lsm_hooks.h         |  3 ++
>  security/security.c               | 85 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
>  security/selinux/hooks.c          | 32 +--------------
>  security/selinux/include/objsec.h |  5 +--
>  security/smack/smack_lsm.c        | 70 +++++---------------------------
>  5 files changed, 99 insertions(+), 96 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
> index 3ba96e406827..a935ab92906d 100644
> --- a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
> +++ b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
> @@ -2017,6 +2017,7 @@ struct security_hook_list {
>  struct lsm_blob_sizes {
>  	int	lbs_cred;
>  	int	lbs_file;
> +	int	lbs_inode;
>  	int	lbs_task;
>  };
>  
> @@ -2080,10 +2081,12 @@ static inline void loadpin_add_hooks(void) { };
>  #endif
>  
>  extern int lsm_cred_alloc(struct cred *cred, gfp_t gfp);
> +extern int lsm_inode_alloc(struct inode *inode);
>  
>  #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY
>  void lsm_early_cred(struct cred *cred);
>  void lsm_early_task(struct task_struct *task);
> +void lsm_early_inode(struct inode *inode);
>  #endif
>  
>  #endif /* ! __LINUX_LSM_HOOKS_H */
> diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
> index b414186ad45f..02df9b608b7e 100644
> --- a/security/security.c
> +++ b/security/security.c
> @@ -41,6 +41,7 @@ struct security_hook_heads security_hook_heads __lsm_ro_after_init;
>  static ATOMIC_NOTIFIER_HEAD(lsm_notifier_chain);
>  
>  static struct kmem_cache *lsm_file_cache;
> +static struct kmem_cache *lsm_inode_cache;
>  
>  char *lsm_names;
>  static struct lsm_blob_sizes blob_sizes;
> @@ -98,6 +99,10 @@ int __init security_init(void)
>  		lsm_file_cache = kmem_cache_create("lsm_file_cache",
>  						   blob_sizes.lbs_file, 0,
>  						   SLAB_PANIC, NULL);
> +	if (blob_sizes.lbs_inode)
> +		lsm_inode_cache = kmem_cache_create("lsm_inode_cache",
> +						    blob_sizes.lbs_inode, 0,
> +						    SLAB_PANIC, NULL);
>  	/*
>  	 * The second call to a module specific init function
>  	 * adds hooks to the hook lists and does any other early
> @@ -108,8 +113,9 @@ int __init security_init(void)
>  #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_LSM_DEBUG
>  	pr_info("LSM: cred blob size       = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_cred);
>  	pr_info("LSM: file blob size       = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_file);
> +	pr_info("LSM: inode blob size      = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_inode);
>  	pr_info("LSM: task blob size       = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_task);
> -#endif
> +#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_LSM_DEBUG */
>  
>  	return 0;
>  }
> @@ -285,6 +291,13 @@ void __init security_add_blobs(struct lsm_blob_sizes *needed)
>  	lsm_set_size(&needed->lbs_cred, &blob_sizes.lbs_cred);
>  	lsm_set_size(&needed->lbs_file, &blob_sizes.lbs_file);
>  	lsm_set_size(&needed->lbs_task, &blob_sizes.lbs_task);
> +	/*
> +	 * The inode blob gets an rcu_head in addition to
> +	 * what the modules might need.
> +	 */
> +	if (needed->lbs_inode && blob_sizes.lbs_inode == 0)
> +		blob_sizes.lbs_inode = sizeof(struct rcu_head);
> +	lsm_set_size(&needed->lbs_inode, &blob_sizes.lbs_inode);
>  }
>  
>  /**
> @@ -348,6 +361,46 @@ void lsm_early_task(struct task_struct *task)
>  		panic("%s: Early task alloc failed.\n", __func__);
>  }
>  
> +/**
> + * lsm_inode_alloc - allocate a composite inode blob
> + * @inode: the inode that needs a blob
> + *
> + * Allocate the inode blob for all the modules
> + *
> + * Returns 0, or -ENOMEM if memory can't be allocated.
> + */
> +int lsm_inode_alloc(struct inode *inode)
> +{
> +	if (!lsm_inode_cache) {
> +		inode->i_security = NULL;
> +		return 0;
> +	}
> +
> +	inode->i_security = kmem_cache_zalloc(lsm_inode_cache, GFP_KERNEL);

Should be GFP_NOFS (and was that way in SELinux and Smack).

> +	if (inode->i_security == NULL)
> +		return -ENOMEM;
> +	return 0;
> +}
> +
> +/**
> + * lsm_early_inode - during initialization allocate a composite inode blob
> + * @inode: the inode that needs a blob
> + *
> + * Allocate the inode blob for all the modules if it's not already there
> + */
> +void lsm_early_inode(struct inode *inode)
> +{
> +	int rc;
> +
> +	if (inode == NULL)
> +		panic("%s: NULL inode.\n", __func__);
> +	if (inode->i_security != NULL)
> +		return;
> +	rc = lsm_inode_alloc(inode);
> +	if (rc)
> +		panic("%s: Early inode alloc failed.\n", __func__);
> +}
> +
>  /*
>   * Hook list operation macros.
>   *
> @@ -594,14 +647,40 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sb_parse_opts_str);
>  
>  int security_inode_alloc(struct inode *inode)
>  {
> -	inode->i_security = NULL;
> -	return call_int_hook(inode_alloc_security, 0, inode);
> +	int rc = lsm_inode_alloc(inode);
> +
> +	if (unlikely(rc))
> +		return rc;
> +	rc = call_int_hook(inode_alloc_security, 0, inode);
> +	if (unlikely(rc))
> +		security_inode_free(inode);
> +	return rc;
> +}
> +
> +static void inode_free_by_rcu(struct rcu_head *head)
> +{
> +	/*
> +	 * The rcu head is at the start of the inode blob
> +	 */
> +	kmem_cache_free(lsm_inode_cache, head);
>  }
>  
>  void security_inode_free(struct inode *inode)
>  {
>  	integrity_inode_free(inode);
>  	call_void_hook(inode_free_security, inode);
> +	/*
> +	 * The inode may still be referenced in a path walk and
> +	 * a call to security_inode_permission() can be made
> +	 * after inode_free_security() is called. Ideally, the VFS
> +	 * wouldn't do this, but fixing that is a much harder
> +	 * job. For now, simply free the i_security via RCU, and
> +	 * leave the current inode->i_security pointer intact.
> +	 * The inode will be freed after the RCU grace period too.
> +	 */
> +	if (inode->i_security)
> +		call_rcu((struct rcu_head *)inode->i_security,
> +				inode_free_by_rcu);
>  }
>  
>  int security_dentry_init_security(struct dentry *dentry, int mode,
> diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
> index baefd36b44df..493328a1c789 100644
> --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
> +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
> @@ -148,8 +148,6 @@ static int __init checkreqprot_setup(char *str)
>  }
>  __setup("checkreqprot=", checkreqprot_setup);
>  
> -static struct kmem_cache *sel_inode_cache;
> -
>  /**
>   * selinux_secmark_enabled - Check to see if SECMARK is currently enabled
>   *
> @@ -245,13 +243,9 @@ static inline u32 task_sid(const struct task_struct *task)
>  
>  static int inode_alloc_security(struct inode *inode)
>  {
> -	struct inode_security_struct *isec;
> +	struct inode_security_struct *isec = selinux_inode(inode);
>  	u32 sid = current_sid();
>  
> -	isec = kmem_cache_zalloc(sel_inode_cache, GFP_NOFS);
> -	if (!isec)
> -		return -ENOMEM;
> -
>  	spin_lock_init(&isec->lock);
>  	INIT_LIST_HEAD(&isec->list);
>  	isec->inode = inode;
> @@ -259,7 +253,6 @@ static int inode_alloc_security(struct inode *inode)
>  	isec->sclass = SECCLASS_FILE;
>  	isec->task_sid = sid;
>  	isec->initialized = LABEL_INVALID;
> -	inode->i_security = isec;
>  
>  	return 0;
>  }
> @@ -338,14 +331,6 @@ static struct inode_security_struct *backing_inode_security(struct dentry *dentr
>  	return selinux_inode(inode);
>  }
>  
> -static void inode_free_rcu(struct rcu_head *head)
> -{
> -	struct inode_security_struct *isec;
> -
> -	isec = container_of(head, struct inode_security_struct, rcu);
> -	kmem_cache_free(sel_inode_cache, isec);
> -}
> -
>  static void inode_free_security(struct inode *inode)
>  {
>  	struct inode_security_struct *isec = selinux_inode(inode);
> @@ -366,17 +351,6 @@ static void inode_free_security(struct inode *inode)
>  		list_del_init(&isec->list);
>  		spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
>  	}
> -
> -	/*
> -	 * The inode may still be referenced in a path walk and
> -	 * a call to selinux_inode_permission() can be made
> -	 * after inode_free_security() is called. Ideally, the VFS
> -	 * wouldn't do this, but fixing that is a much harder
> -	 * job. For now, simply free the i_security via RCU, and
> -	 * leave the current inode->i_security pointer intact.
> -	 * The inode will be freed after the RCU grace period too.
> -	 */
> -	call_rcu(&isec->rcu, inode_free_rcu);
>  }
>  
>  static int file_alloc_security(struct file *file)
> @@ -6794,6 +6768,7 @@ static void selinux_bpf_prog_free(struct bpf_prog_aux *aux)
>  struct lsm_blob_sizes selinux_blob_sizes = {
>  	.lbs_cred = sizeof(struct task_security_struct),
>  	.lbs_file = sizeof(struct file_security_struct),
> +	.lbs_inode = sizeof(struct inode_security_struct),
>  };
>  
>  static struct security_hook_list selinux_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
> @@ -7061,9 +7036,6 @@ static __init int selinux_init(void)
>  
>  	default_noexec = !(VM_DATA_DEFAULT_FLAGS & VM_EXEC);
>  
> -	sel_inode_cache = kmem_cache_create("selinux_inode_security",
> -					    sizeof(struct inode_security_struct),
> -					    0, SLAB_PANIC, NULL);
>  	avc_init();
>  
>  	avtab_cache_init();
> diff --git a/security/selinux/include/objsec.h b/security/selinux/include/objsec.h
> index 168a96104fa0..60d109caaeef 100644
> --- a/security/selinux/include/objsec.h
> +++ b/security/selinux/include/objsec.h
> @@ -59,10 +59,7 @@ enum label_initialized {
>  
>  struct inode_security_struct {
>  	struct inode *inode;	/* back pointer to inode object */
> -	union {
> -		struct list_head list;	/* list of inode_security_struct */
> -		struct rcu_head rcu;	/* for freeing the inode_security_struct */
> -	};
> +	struct list_head list;	/* list of inode_security_struct */
>  	u32 task_sid;		/* SID of creating task */
>  	u32 sid;		/* SID of this object */
>  	u16 sclass;		/* security class of this object */
> diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
> index b9db97470e06..cfabb9f5cc9b 100644
> --- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
> +++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
> @@ -287,24 +287,18 @@ static struct smack_known *smk_fetch(const char *name, struct inode *ip,
>  }
>  
>  /**
> - * new_inode_smack - allocate an inode security blob
> + * init_inode_smack - initialize an inode security blob
> + * @isp: the blob to initialize
>   * @skp: a pointer to the Smack label entry to use in the blob
>   *
> - * Returns the new blob or NULL if there's no memory available
>   */
> -static struct inode_smack *new_inode_smack(struct smack_known *skp)
> +static void init_inode_smack(struct inode *inode, struct smack_known *skp)
>  {
> -	struct inode_smack *isp;
> -
> -	isp = kmem_cache_zalloc(smack_inode_cache, GFP_NOFS);
> -	if (isp == NULL)
> -		return NULL;
> +	struct inode_smack *isp = smack_inode(inode);
>  
>  	isp->smk_inode = skp;
>  	isp->smk_flags = 0;
>  	mutex_init(&isp->smk_lock);
> -
> -	return isp;
>  }
>  
>  /**
> @@ -823,17 +817,13 @@ static int smack_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb,
>  	/*
>  	 * Initialize the root inode.
>  	 */
> -	isp = smack_inode(inode);
> -	if (isp == NULL) {
> -		isp = new_inode_smack(sp->smk_root);
> -		if (isp == NULL)
> -			return -ENOMEM;
> -		inode->i_security = isp;
> -	} else
> -		isp->smk_inode = sp->smk_root;
> +	lsm_early_inode(inode);
> +	init_inode_smack(inode, sp->smk_root);
>  
> -	if (transmute)
> +	if (transmute) {
> +		isp = smack_inode(inode);
>  		isp->smk_flags |= SMK_INODE_TRANSMUTE;
> +	}
>  
>  	return 0;
>  }
> @@ -962,48 +952,10 @@ static int smack_inode_alloc_security(struct inode *inode)
>  {
>  	struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_current();
>  
> -	inode->i_security = new_inode_smack(skp);
> -	if (inode->i_security == NULL)
> -		return -ENOMEM;
> +	init_inode_smack(inode, skp);
>  	return 0;
>  }
>  
> -/**
> - * smack_inode_free_rcu - Free inode_smack blob from cache
> - * @head: the rcu_head for getting inode_smack pointer
> - *
> - *  Call back function called from call_rcu() to free
> - *  the i_security blob pointer in inode
> - */
> -static void smack_inode_free_rcu(struct rcu_head *head)
> -{
> -	struct inode_smack *issp;
> -
> -	issp = container_of(head, struct inode_smack, smk_rcu);
> -	kmem_cache_free(smack_inode_cache, issp);
> -}
> -
> -/**
> - * smack_inode_free_security - free an inode blob using call_rcu()
> - * @inode: the inode with a blob
> - *
> - * Clears the blob pointer in inode using RCU
> - */
> -static void smack_inode_free_security(struct inode *inode)
> -{
> -	struct inode_smack *issp = smack_inode(inode);
> -
> -	/*
> -	 * The inode may still be referenced in a path walk and
> -	 * a call to smack_inode_permission() can be made
> -	 * after smack_inode_free_security() is called.
> -	 * To avoid race condition free the i_security via RCU
> -	 * and leave the current inode->i_security pointer intact.
> -	 * The inode will be freed after the RCU grace period too.
> -	 */
> -	call_rcu(&issp->smk_rcu, smack_inode_free_rcu);
> -}
> -
>  /**
>   * smack_inode_init_security - copy out the smack from an inode
>   * @inode: the newly created inode
> @@ -4589,6 +4541,7 @@ static int smack_dentry_create_files_as(struct dentry *dentry, int mode,
>  struct lsm_blob_sizes smack_blob_sizes = {
>  	.lbs_cred = sizeof(struct task_smack),
>  	.lbs_file = sizeof(struct smack_known *),
> +	.lbs_inode = sizeof(struct inode_smack),
>  };
>  
>  static struct security_hook_list smack_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
> @@ -4607,7 +4560,6 @@ static struct security_hook_list smack_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
>  	LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_set_creds, smack_bprm_set_creds),
>  
>  	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_alloc_security, smack_inode_alloc_security),
> -	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_free_security, smack_inode_free_security),
>  	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_init_security, smack_inode_init_security),
>  	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_link, smack_inode_link),
>  	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_unlink, smack_inode_unlink),
> 


  reply	other threads:[~2018-05-14 15:04 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 31+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2018-05-11  0:30 [PATCH 00/23] LSM: Full security module stacking Casey Schaufler
2018-05-11  0:52 ` [PATCH 01/23] procfs: add smack subdir to attrs Casey Schaufler
2018-05-11  0:52 ` [PATCH 02/23] Smack: Abstract use of cred security blob Casey Schaufler
2018-05-11  0:52 ` [PATCH 03/23] SELinux: " Casey Schaufler
2018-05-11  0:52 ` [PATCH 04/23] LSM: Infrastructure management of the cred security Casey Schaufler
2018-05-11  0:52 ` [PATCH 05/23] SELinux: Abstract use of file security blob Casey Schaufler
2018-05-11  0:53 ` [PATCH 06/23] LSM: Infrastructure management of the file security Casey Schaufler
2018-05-11  0:53 ` [PATCH 07/23] LSM: Infrastructure management of the task security Casey Schaufler
2018-05-11  0:53 ` [PATCH 08/23] SELinux: Abstract use of inode security blob Casey Schaufler
2018-05-11  0:53 ` [PATCH 09/23] Smack: " Casey Schaufler
2018-05-11  0:53 ` [PATCH 10/23] LSM: Infrastructure management of the inode security Casey Schaufler
2018-05-14 15:04   ` Stephen Smalley [this message]
2018-05-14 16:32     ` Casey Schaufler
2018-05-11  0:54 ` [PATCH 11/23] LSM: Infrastructure management of the superblock Casey Schaufler
2018-05-11  0:54 ` [PATCH 12/23] LSM: Infrastructure management of the sock security Casey Schaufler
2018-05-11  0:54 ` [PATCH 13/23] LSM: Infrastructure management of the ipc security blob Casey Schaufler
2018-05-11  0:54 ` [PATCH 14/23] LSM: Infrastructure management of the key " Casey Schaufler
2018-05-11  0:55 ` [PATCH 15/23] LSM: Mark security blob allocation failures as unlikely Casey Schaufler
2018-05-11  0:55 ` [PATCH 16/23] LSM: Sharing of security blobs Casey Schaufler
2018-05-11  0:55 ` [PATCH 17/23] LSM: Allow mount options from multiple security modules Casey Schaufler
2018-05-11  0:55 ` [PATCH 18/23] LSM: Use multiple secids in security module interfaces Casey Schaufler
2018-05-11  0:55 ` [PATCH 19/23] LSM: Use multiple secids in LSM interfaces Casey Schaufler
2018-05-11  0:55 ` [PATCH 20/23] LSM: Move common usercopy into Casey Schaufler
2018-05-14 15:12   ` Stephen Smalley
2018-05-14 16:53     ` Stephen Smalley
2018-05-14 18:55       ` Casey Schaufler
2018-05-11  0:56 ` [PATCH 21/23] LSM: Multiple concurrent major security modules Casey Schaufler
2018-05-11  0:56 ` [PATCH 22/23] LSM: Fix setting of the IMA data in inode init Casey Schaufler
2018-05-11  0:56 ` [PATCH 23/23] Netfilter: Add a selection for Smack Casey Schaufler
2018-05-11  0:58 ` [PATCH 00/23] LSM: Full security module stacking Casey Schaufler
2018-05-11 20:25 ` [PATCH 24/23] LSM: Functions for dealing with struct secids Casey Schaufler

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