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From: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
To: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Jiri Kosina <jikos@kernel.org>,
	Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
	Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
	Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>,
	Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>,
	David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>,
	Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>,
	Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>,
	Casey Schaufler <casey.schaufler@intel.com>,
	Asit Mallick <asit.k.mallick@intel.com>,
	Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>,
	Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com>,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org
Subject: Re: [Patch v3 09/13] x86/speculation: Reorganize SPEC_CTRL MSR update
Date: Thu, 18 Oct 2018 15:47:39 +0200 (CEST)	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <alpine.DEB.2.21.1810181537331.1647@nanos.tec.linutronix.de> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <23d8ffaac99be49aa163eb16dd131399141fc432.1539798901.git.tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>

On Wed, 17 Oct 2018, Tim Chen wrote:

> Reorganize the spculation control MSR update code. Currently it is limited
> to only dynamic update of the Speculative Store Bypass Disable bit.
> This patch consolidates the logic to check for AMD CPUs that may or may

# git grep 'This patch' Documentation/process/

> not use this MSR to control SSBD. This prepares us to add logic to update
> other bits in the SPEC_CTRL MSR cleanly.
> 
> Originally-by: Thomas Lendacky <Thomas.Lendacky@amd.com>
> Signed-off-by: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
> ---
>  arch/x86/kernel/process.c | 39 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------
>  1 file changed, 29 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/process.c b/arch/x86/kernel/process.c
> index 8aa4960..789f1bada 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/process.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/process.c
> @@ -397,25 +397,45 @@ static __always_inline void amd_set_ssb_virt_state(unsigned long tifn)
>  
>  static __always_inline void spec_ctrl_update_msr(unsigned long tifn)
>  {
> -	u64 msr = x86_spec_ctrl_base | ssbd_tif_to_spec_ctrl(tifn);
> +	u64 msr = x86_spec_ctrl_base;
> +
> +	/*
> +	 * If X86_FEATURE_SSBD is not set, the SSBD
> +	 * bit is not to be touched.
> +	 */
> +	if (static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SSBD))
> +		msr |= ssbd_tif_to_spec_ctrl(tifn);
>  
>  	wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, msr);
>  }
>  
> -static __always_inline void __speculation_ctrl_update(unsigned long tifn)
> +static __always_inline void __speculation_ctrl_update(unsigned long tifp,
> +						      unsigned long tifn)
>  {
> -	if (static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_VIRT_SSBD))
> -		amd_set_ssb_virt_state(tifn);
> -	else if (static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_LS_CFG_SSBD))
> -		amd_set_core_ssb_state(tifn);
> -	else
> +	bool updmsr = false;
> +
> +	/* Check for AMD cpu to see if it uses SPEC_CTRL MSR for SSBD */

Errm. This checks a TIF bit and nothing AMD. The AMD specific check only
happens when the branch is taken. Please be precise with your comments.

	/* If TIF_SSBD is different, select the proper mitigation method */

Hmm?

> +	if ((tifp ^ tifn) & _TIF_SSBD) {
> +		if (static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_VIRT_SSBD))
> +			amd_set_ssb_virt_state(tifn);
> +		else if (static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_LS_CFG_SSBD))
> +			amd_set_core_ssb_state(tifn);
> +		else if (static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SSBD))
> +			updmsr  = true;
> +	}
> +
> +	if (updmsr)
>  		spec_ctrl_update_msr(tifn);
>  }
>  
>  void speculation_ctrl_update(unsigned long tif)
>  {
> +	/*
> +	 * On this path we're forcing the update, so use ~tif as the
> +	 * previous flags.
> +	 */

	/* Forced update. Make sure all relevant TIF flags are different */

Hmm?

Thanks,

	tglx

  reply	other threads:[~2018-10-18 13:47 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 47+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2018-10-17 17:59 [Patch v3 00/13] Provide process property based options to enable Spectre v2 userspace-userspace protection Tim Chen
2018-10-17 17:59 ` [Patch v3 01/13] x86/speculation: Clean up spectre_v2_parse_cmdline Tim Chen
2018-10-18 12:43   ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-10-17 17:59 ` [Patch v3 02/13] x86/speculation: Remove unnecessary ret variable in cpu_show_common Tim Chen
2018-10-18 12:46   ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-10-17 17:59 ` [Patch v3 03/13] x86/speculation: Add static key for Enhanced IBRS Tim Chen
2018-10-18 12:50   ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-10-26 16:58   ` Waiman Long
2018-10-26 18:15     ` Tim Chen
2018-10-28  9:32       ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-10-17 17:59 ` [Patch v3 04/13] x86/speculation: Disable STIBP when enhanced IBRS is in use Tim Chen
2018-10-18 12:58   ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-10-26 17:00   ` Waiman Long
2018-10-26 18:18     ` Tim Chen
2018-10-26 18:29       ` Tim Chen
2018-10-17 17:59 ` [Patch v3 05/13] x86/smt: Create cpu_smt_enabled static key for SMT specific code Tim Chen
2018-10-18 13:03   ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-10-19  7:51   ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-10-17 17:59 ` [Patch v3 06/13] mm: Pass task instead of task->mm as argument to set_dumpable Tim Chen
2018-10-18 13:22   ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-10-19 20:02   ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-10-17 17:59 ` [Patch v3 07/13] x86/process Add arch_set_dumpable Tim Chen
2018-10-18 13:28   ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-10-18 18:46     ` Tim Chen
2018-10-19 19:12       ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-10-19 20:16         ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-10-22 23:55           ` Tim Chen
2018-10-17 17:59 ` [Patch v3 08/13] x86/speculation: Rename SSBD update functions Tim Chen
2018-10-18 13:37   ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-10-17 17:59 ` [Patch v3 09/13] x86/speculation: Reorganize SPEC_CTRL MSR update Tim Chen
2018-10-18 13:47   ` Thomas Gleixner [this message]
2018-10-26 17:21   ` Waiman Long
2018-10-26 18:25     ` Tim Chen
2018-10-17 17:59 ` [Patch v3 10/13] x86/speculation: Add per thread STIBP flag Tim Chen
2018-10-18 13:53   ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-10-17 17:59 ` [Patch v3 11/13] x86/speculation: Add Spectre v2 lite app to app protection mode Tim Chen
2018-10-18 15:12   ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-10-17 17:59 ` [Patch v3 12/13] x86/speculation: Protect non-dumpable processes against Spectre v2 attack Tim Chen
2018-10-18 15:17   ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-10-26 17:46   ` Waiman Long
2018-10-26 18:10     ` Tim Chen
2018-10-17 17:59 ` [Patch v3 13/13] x86/speculation: Create PRCTL interface to restrict indirect branch speculation Tim Chen
2018-10-17 19:12   ` Randy Dunlap
2018-10-18 15:31   ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-10-19  7:57 ` [Patch v3 00/13] Provide process property based options to enable Spectre v2 userspace-userspace protection Peter Zijlstra
2018-10-19 16:43   ` Tim Chen
2018-10-19 18:38     ` Peter Zijlstra

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