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From: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
To: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>,
linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>,
"Luis R . Rodriguez" <mcgrof@kernel.org>,
kexec@lists.infradead.org, Andres Rodriguez <andresx7@gmail.com>,
Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>,
Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v3 1/7] security: rename security_kernel_read_file() hook
Date: Sat, 26 May 2018 01:41:52 +1000 (AEST) [thread overview]
Message-ID: <alpine.LRH.2.21.1805260139030.11624@namei.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <87po1k2304.fsf@xmission.com>
On Thu, 24 May 2018, Eric W. Biederman wrote:
> Below is where I suggest you start on sorting out these security hooks.
> - Adding a security_kernel_arg to catch when you want to allow/deny the
> use of an argument to a syscall. What security_kernel_file_read and
> security_kernel_file_post_read have been abused for.
NAK. This abstraction is too semantically weak.
LSM hooks need to map to stronger semantics so we can reason about what
the hook and the policy is supposed to be mediating.
--
James Morris
<jmorris@namei.org>
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2018-05-25 15:44 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 16+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2018-05-24 11:09 [PATCH v3 0/7] kexec/firmware: support system wide policy requiring signatures Mimi Zohar
2018-05-24 11:09 ` [PATCH v3 1/7] security: rename security_kernel_read_file() hook Mimi Zohar
2018-05-24 20:49 ` Eric W. Biederman
2018-05-24 23:29 ` Mimi Zohar
2018-05-25 12:22 ` Mimi Zohar
2018-05-25 15:41 ` James Morris [this message]
2018-05-25 19:51 ` Eric W. Biederman
2018-05-29 20:32 ` James Morris
2018-05-29 21:10 ` Eric W. Biederman
2018-05-24 11:09 ` [PATCH v3 2/7] kexec: add call to LSM hook in original kexec_load syscall Mimi Zohar
2018-05-24 20:50 ` Eric W. Biederman
2018-05-24 11:09 ` [PATCH v3 3/7] ima: based on policy require signed kexec kernel images Mimi Zohar
2018-05-24 11:09 ` [PATCH v3 4/7] firmware: add call to LSM hook before firmware sysfs fallback Mimi Zohar
2018-05-24 11:09 ` [PATCH v3 5/7] ima: based on policy require signed firmware (sysfs fallback) Mimi Zohar
2018-05-24 11:09 ` [PATCH v3 6/7] ima: add build time policy Mimi Zohar
2018-05-24 11:09 ` [RFC PATCH v3 7/7] ima: based on policy prevent loading firmware (pre-allocated buffer) Mimi Zohar
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