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From: Waiman Long <longman9394@gmail.com>
To: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>,
Jiri Kosina <jikos@kernel.org>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>,
Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>,
David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>,
Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>,
Casey Schaufler <casey.schaufler@intel.com>,
Asit Mallick <asit.k.mallick@intel.com>,
Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>,
Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com>,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org
Subject: Re: [Patch v3 03/13] x86/speculation: Add static key for Enhanced IBRS
Date: Fri, 26 Oct 2018 12:58:16 -0400 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <b5b6f492-8bf0-7fcc-eb4f-3016b4d46c08@gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <d62b81e9390c4e404ede02139f7a29327dfe1921.1539798901.git.tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
On 10/17/2018 01:59 PM, Tim Chen wrote:
> Add static key to indicate whether we are using Enhanced IBRS to mitigate
> Spectre v2. This will be used in later patches to disengage STIBP code
> for Spectre v2 mitigation as STIBP is not needed when Enhanced IBRS is
> in use.
>
> Signed-off-by: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
> ---
> arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h | 3 +++
> arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 4 ++++
> 2 files changed, 7 insertions(+)
>
> diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
> index fd2a8c1..d57e84e 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
> @@ -3,6 +3,7 @@
> #ifndef _ASM_X86_NOSPEC_BRANCH_H_
> #define _ASM_X86_NOSPEC_BRANCH_H_
>
> +#include <linux/static_key.h>
> #include <asm/alternative.h>
> #include <asm/alternative-asm.h>
> #include <asm/cpufeatures.h>
> @@ -228,6 +229,8 @@ enum ssb_mitigation {
> extern char __indirect_thunk_start[];
> extern char __indirect_thunk_end[];
>
> +DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(spectre_v2_enhanced_ibrs);
> +
> /*
> * On VMEXIT we must ensure that no RSB predictions learned in the guest
> * can be followed in the host, by overwriting the RSB completely. Both
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
> index b2f6b8b..2fc7b4e 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
> @@ -142,6 +142,9 @@ static const char *spectre_v2_strings[] = {
> [SPECTRE_V2_IBRS_ENHANCED] = "Mitigation: Enhanced IBRS",
> };
>
> +DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(spectre_v2_enhanced_ibrs);
> +EXPORT_SYMBOL(spectre_v2_enhanced_ibrs);
> +
> #undef pr_fmt
> #define pr_fmt(fmt) "Spectre V2 : " fmt
>
> @@ -386,6 +389,7 @@ static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void)
> /* Force it so VMEXIT will restore correctly */
> x86_spec_ctrl_base |= SPEC_CTRL_IBRS;
> wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, x86_spec_ctrl_base);
> + static_branch_enable(&spectre_v2_enhanced_ibrs);
> goto specv2_set_mode;
> }
> if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RETPOLINE))
Why you need a static key for enhanced IBRS? It is supposed to be set at
boot time and never get changed after that. It will be easier to use a
feature bit for that instead. We usually use static key when the value
can be changed at run time.
Cheers,
Longman
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2018-10-26 16:58 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 47+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2018-10-17 17:59 [Patch v3 00/13] Provide process property based options to enable Spectre v2 userspace-userspace protection Tim Chen
2018-10-17 17:59 ` [Patch v3 01/13] x86/speculation: Clean up spectre_v2_parse_cmdline Tim Chen
2018-10-18 12:43 ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-10-17 17:59 ` [Patch v3 02/13] x86/speculation: Remove unnecessary ret variable in cpu_show_common Tim Chen
2018-10-18 12:46 ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-10-17 17:59 ` [Patch v3 03/13] x86/speculation: Add static key for Enhanced IBRS Tim Chen
2018-10-18 12:50 ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-10-26 16:58 ` Waiman Long [this message]
2018-10-26 18:15 ` Tim Chen
2018-10-28 9:32 ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-10-17 17:59 ` [Patch v3 04/13] x86/speculation: Disable STIBP when enhanced IBRS is in use Tim Chen
2018-10-18 12:58 ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-10-26 17:00 ` Waiman Long
2018-10-26 18:18 ` Tim Chen
2018-10-26 18:29 ` Tim Chen
2018-10-17 17:59 ` [Patch v3 05/13] x86/smt: Create cpu_smt_enabled static key for SMT specific code Tim Chen
2018-10-18 13:03 ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-10-19 7:51 ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-10-17 17:59 ` [Patch v3 06/13] mm: Pass task instead of task->mm as argument to set_dumpable Tim Chen
2018-10-18 13:22 ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-10-19 20:02 ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-10-17 17:59 ` [Patch v3 07/13] x86/process Add arch_set_dumpable Tim Chen
2018-10-18 13:28 ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-10-18 18:46 ` Tim Chen
2018-10-19 19:12 ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-10-19 20:16 ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-10-22 23:55 ` Tim Chen
2018-10-17 17:59 ` [Patch v3 08/13] x86/speculation: Rename SSBD update functions Tim Chen
2018-10-18 13:37 ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-10-17 17:59 ` [Patch v3 09/13] x86/speculation: Reorganize SPEC_CTRL MSR update Tim Chen
2018-10-18 13:47 ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-10-26 17:21 ` Waiman Long
2018-10-26 18:25 ` Tim Chen
2018-10-17 17:59 ` [Patch v3 10/13] x86/speculation: Add per thread STIBP flag Tim Chen
2018-10-18 13:53 ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-10-17 17:59 ` [Patch v3 11/13] x86/speculation: Add Spectre v2 lite app to app protection mode Tim Chen
2018-10-18 15:12 ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-10-17 17:59 ` [Patch v3 12/13] x86/speculation: Protect non-dumpable processes against Spectre v2 attack Tim Chen
2018-10-18 15:17 ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-10-26 17:46 ` Waiman Long
2018-10-26 18:10 ` Tim Chen
2018-10-17 17:59 ` [Patch v3 13/13] x86/speculation: Create PRCTL interface to restrict indirect branch speculation Tim Chen
2018-10-17 19:12 ` Randy Dunlap
2018-10-18 15:31 ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-10-19 7:57 ` [Patch v3 00/13] Provide process property based options to enable Spectre v2 userspace-userspace protection Peter Zijlstra
2018-10-19 16:43 ` Tim Chen
2018-10-19 18:38 ` Peter Zijlstra
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