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* [PATCH 4.9 00/87] 4.9.102-stable review
@ 2018-05-21 21:10 Greg Kroah-Hartman
  2018-05-21 21:10 ` [PATCH 4.9 01/87] usbip: usbip_host: refine probe and disconnect debug msgs to be useful Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (90 more replies)
  0 siblings, 91 replies; 92+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2018-05-21 21:10 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-kernel
  Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, torvalds, akpm, linux, shuah, patches,
	ben.hutchings, lkft-triage, stable

This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 4.9.102 release.
There are 87 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response
to this one.  If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please
let me know.

Responses should be made by Tue May 22 21:03:57 UTC 2018.
Anything received after that time might be too late.

The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:
	https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v4.x/stable-review/patch-4.9.102-rc1.gz
or in the git tree and branch at:
	git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git linux-4.9.y
and the diffstat can be found below.

thanks,

greg k-h

-------------
Pseudo-Shortlog of commits:

Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
    Linux 4.9.102-rc1

Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
    x86/bugs: Rename SSBD_NO to SSB_NO

Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
    KVM: SVM: Implement VIRT_SPEC_CTRL support for SSBD

Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
    x86/speculation, KVM: Implement support for VIRT_SPEC_CTRL/LS_CFG

Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
    x86/bugs: Rework spec_ctrl base and mask logic

Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
    x86/bugs: Remove x86_spec_ctrl_set()

Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
    x86/bugs: Expose x86_spec_ctrl_base directly

Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
    x86/bugs: Unify x86_spec_ctrl_{set_guest,restore_host}

Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
    x86/speculation: Rework speculative_store_bypass_update()

Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
    x86/speculation: Add virtualized speculative store bypass disable support

Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
    x86/bugs, KVM: Extend speculation control for VIRT_SPEC_CTRL

Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
    x86/speculation: Handle HT correctly on AMD

Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
    x86/cpufeatures: Add FEATURE_ZEN

Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
    x86/cpu/AMD: Fix erratum 1076 (CPB bit)

Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
    x86/cpufeatures: Disentangle SSBD enumeration

Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
    x86/cpufeatures: Disentangle MSR_SPEC_CTRL enumeration from IBRS

Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
    x86/speculation: Use synthetic bits for IBRS/IBPB/STIBP

Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
    KVM: SVM: Move spec control call after restore of GS

Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
    x86/cpu: Make alternative_msr_write work for 32-bit code

Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
    x86/bugs: Fix the parameters alignment and missing void

Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
    x86/bugs: Make cpu_show_common() static

Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
    x86/bugs: Fix __ssb_select_mitigation() return type

Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
    Documentation/spec_ctrl: Do some minor cleanups

Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
    proc: Use underscores for SSBD in 'status'

Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
    x86/bugs: Rename _RDS to _SSBD

Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
    x86/speculation: Make "seccomp" the default mode for Speculative Store Bypass

Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
    seccomp: Move speculation migitation control to arch code

Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
    seccomp: Add filter flag to opt-out of SSB mitigation

Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
    seccomp: Use PR_SPEC_FORCE_DISABLE

Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
    prctl: Add force disable speculation

Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
    x86/bugs: Make boot modes __ro_after_init

Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
    seccomp: Enable speculation flaw mitigations

Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
    proc: Provide details on speculation flaw mitigations

Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
    nospec: Allow getting/setting on non-current task

Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
    x86/speculation: Add prctl for Speculative Store Bypass mitigation

Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
    x86/process: Allow runtime control of Speculative Store Bypass

Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
    x86/process: Optimize TIF_NOTSC switch

Kyle Huey <me@kylehuey.com>
    x86/process: Correct and optimize TIF_BLOCKSTEP switch

Kyle Huey <me@kylehuey.com>
    x86/process: Optimize TIF checks in __switch_to_xtra()

Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
    prctl: Add speculation control prctls

Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
    x86/speculation: Create spec-ctrl.h to avoid include hell

Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
    x86/KVM/VMX: Expose SPEC_CTRL Bit(2) to the guest

David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
    x86/bugs/AMD: Add support to disable RDS on Fam[15,16,17]h if requested

Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
    x86/bugs: Whitelist allowed SPEC_CTRL MSR values

Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
    x86/bugs/intel: Set proper CPU features and setup RDS

Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
    x86/bugs: Provide boot parameters for the spec_store_bypass_disable mitigation

Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
    x86/cpufeatures: Add X86_FEATURE_RDS

Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
    x86/bugs: Expose /sys/../spec_store_bypass

Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
    x86/bugs, KVM: Support the combination of guest and host IBRS

Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
    x86/bugs: Read SPEC_CTRL MSR during boot and re-use reserved bits

Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
    x86/bugs: Concentrate bug reporting into a separate function

Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
    x86/bugs: Concentrate bug detection into a separate function

Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
    x86/nospec: Simplify alternative_msr_write()

Liu Bo <bo.liu@linux.alibaba.com>
    btrfs: fix reading stale metadata blocks after degraded raid1 mounts

David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
    x86/amd: don't set X86_BUG_SYSRET_SS_ATTRS when running under Xen

Anand Jain <anand.jain@oracle.com>
    btrfs: fix crash when trying to resume balance without the resume flag

Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com>
    Btrfs: fix xattr loss after power failure

Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
    ARM: 8772/1: kprobes: Prohibit kprobes on get_user functions

Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
    ARM: 8770/1: kprobes: Prohibit probing on optimized_callback

Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
    ARM: 8769/1: kprobes: Fix to use get_kprobe_ctlblk after irq-disabed

Dexuan Cui <decui@microsoft.com>
    tick/broadcast: Use for_each_cpu() specially on UP kernels

Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
    ARM: 8771/1: kprobes: Prohibit kprobes on do_undefinstr

Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
    efi: Avoid potential crashes, fix the 'struct efi_pci_io_protocol_32' definition for mixed mode

Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
    x86/pkeys: Do not special case protection key 0

Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
    x86/pkeys: Override pkey when moving away from PROT_EXEC

Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
    s390: remove indirect branch from do_softirq_own_stack

Julian Wiedmann <jwi@linux.ibm.com>
    s390/qdio: don't release memory in qdio_setup_irq()

Hendrik Brueckner <brueckner@linux.ibm.com>
    s390/cpum_sf: ensure sample frequency of perf event attributes is non-zero

Julian Wiedmann <jwi@linux.ibm.com>
    s390/qdio: fix access to uninitialized qdio_q fields

Pavel Tatashin <pasha.tatashin@oracle.com>
    mm: don't allow deferred pages with NEED_PER_CPU_KM

Nicholas Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com>
    powerpc/powernv: Fix NVRAM sleep in invalid context when crashing

Alexander Monakov <amonakov@ispras.ru>
    i2c: designware: fix poll-after-enable regression

Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
    netfilter: nf_tables: can't fail after linking rule into active rule list

Steven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
    tracing/x86/xen: Remove zero data size trace events trace_xen_mmu_flush_tlb{_all}

Waiman Long <Waiman.Long@hpe.com>
    signals: avoid unnecessary taking of sighand->siglock

Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>
    powerpc: Don't preempt_disable() in show_cpuinfo()

Andre Przywara <andre.przywara@arm.com>
    KVM: arm/arm64: VGIC/ITS: protect kvm_read_guest() calls with SRCU lock

Kamal Dasu <kdasu.kdev@gmail.com>
    spi: bcm-qspi: Always read and set BSPI_MAST_N_BOOT_CTRL

Kamal Dasu <kdasu.kdev@gmail.com>
    spi: bcm-qspi: Avoid setting MSPI_CDRAM_PCS for spi-nor master

Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com>
    spi: pxa2xx: Allow 64-bit DMA

Wenwen Wang <wang6495@umn.edu>
    ALSA: control: fix a redundant-copy issue

Hans de Goede <hdegoede@redhat.com>
    ALSA: hda: Add Lenovo C50 All in one to the power_save blacklist

Federico Cuello <fedux@fedux.com.ar>
    ALSA: usb: mixer: volume quirk for CM102-A+/102S+

Shuah Khan (Samsung OSG) <shuah@kernel.org>
    usbip: usbip_host: fix bad unlock balance during stub_probe()

Shuah Khan (Samsung OSG) <shuah@kernel.org>
    usbip: usbip_host: fix NULL-ptr deref and use-after-free errors

Shuah Khan (Samsung OSG) <shuah@kernel.org>
    usbip: usbip_host: run rebind from exit when module is removed

Shuah Khan (Samsung OSG) <shuah@kernel.org>
    usbip: usbip_host: delete device from busid_table after rebind

Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org>
    usbip: usbip_host: refine probe and disconnect debug msgs to be useful


-------------

Diffstat:

 Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-devices-system-cpu |   1 +
 Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt                |  45 +++
 Documentation/spec_ctrl.txt                        |  94 +++++
 Makefile                                           |   4 +-
 arch/arm/include/asm/assembler.h                   |  10 +
 arch/arm/include/asm/kvm_mmu.h                     |  16 +
 arch/arm/kernel/traps.c                            |   5 +-
 arch/arm/lib/getuser.S                             |  10 +
 arch/arm/probes/kprobes/opt-arm.c                  |   4 +-
 arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_mmu.h                   |  16 +
 arch/powerpc/kernel/setup-common.c                 |  11 -
 arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/opal-nvram.c        |  14 +-
 arch/s390/kernel/irq.c                             |   5 +-
 arch/s390/kernel/perf_cpum_sf.c                    |   4 +
 arch/x86/boot/compressed/eboot.c                   |   6 +-
 arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h                 |  20 +-
 arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h                    |   2 +-
 arch/x86/include/asm/mmu_context.h                 |   2 +-
 arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h                   |  10 +
 arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h               |  43 ++-
 arch/x86/include/asm/pkeys.h                       |  18 +-
 arch/x86/include/asm/spec-ctrl.h                   |  80 +++++
 arch/x86/include/asm/thread_info.h                 |   6 +-
 arch/x86/include/asm/tlbflush.h                    |  10 +
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c                          |  38 +-
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c                         | 397 ++++++++++++++++++++-
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c                       |  77 +++-
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/cpu.h                          |   3 +
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c                        |   3 +
 arch/x86/kernel/process.c                          | 224 +++++++++---
 arch/x86/kernel/smpboot.c                          |   5 +
 arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c                               |  21 +-
 arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.h                               |  17 +-
 arch/x86/kvm/svm.c                                 |  64 ++--
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c                                 |  33 +-
 arch/x86/kvm/x86.c                                 |  13 +-
 arch/x86/mm/pkeys.c                                |  21 +-
 arch/x86/xen/enlighten.c                           |   4 +-
 arch/x86/xen/mmu.c                                 |   4 -
 drivers/base/cpu.c                                 |   8 +
 drivers/i2c/busses/i2c-designware-core.c           |   5 +-
 drivers/s390/cio/qdio_setup.c                      |  12 +-
 drivers/spi/spi-bcm-qspi.c                         |  28 +-
 drivers/spi/spi-pxa2xx.h                           |   2 +-
 drivers/usb/usbip/stub.h                           |   2 +
 drivers/usb/usbip/stub_dev.c                       |  43 ++-
 drivers/usb/usbip/stub_main.c                      | 105 +++++-
 fs/btrfs/ctree.c                                   |   6 +-
 fs/btrfs/tree-log.c                                |   7 +
 fs/btrfs/volumes.c                                 |   9 +
 fs/proc/array.c                                    |  27 +-
 include/linux/cpu.h                                |   2 +
 include/linux/efi.h                                |   8 +-
 include/linux/nospec.h                             |  10 +
 include/linux/sched.h                              |   9 +
 include/linux/seccomp.h                            |   3 +-
 include/linux/signal.h                             |  17 +
 include/trace/events/xen.h                         |  16 -
 include/uapi/linux/prctl.h                         |  12 +
 include/uapi/linux/seccomp.h                       |   4 +-
 kernel/seccomp.c                                   |  21 +-
 kernel/signal.c                                    |   7 +
 kernel/sys.c                                       |  23 ++
 kernel/time/tick-broadcast.c                       |   8 +
 mm/Kconfig                                         |   1 +
 net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c                      |  59 +--
 sound/core/control_compat.c                        |   3 +-
 sound/pci/hda/hda_intel.c                          |   2 +
 sound/usb/mixer.c                                  |   8 +
 tools/testing/selftests/seccomp/seccomp_bpf.c      |  78 +++-
 virt/kvm/arm/vgic/vgic-its.c                       |  15 +-
 71 files changed, 1611 insertions(+), 309 deletions(-)

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 92+ messages in thread

* [PATCH 4.9 01/87] usbip: usbip_host: refine probe and disconnect debug msgs to be useful
  2018-05-21 21:10 [PATCH 4.9 00/87] 4.9.102-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2018-05-21 21:10 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
  2018-05-21 21:10 ` [PATCH 4.9 02/87] usbip: usbip_host: delete device from busid_table after rebind Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (89 subsequent siblings)
  90 siblings, 0 replies; 92+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2018-05-21 21:10 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-kernel; +Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Shuah Khan

4.9-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Shuah Khan <shuahkh@osg.samsung.com>

commit 28b68acc4a88dcf91fd1dcf2577371dc9bf574cc upstream.

Refine probe and disconnect debug msgs to be useful and say what is
in progress.

Signed-off-by: Shuah Khan <shuahkh@osg.samsung.com>
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 drivers/usb/usbip/stub_dev.c |    4 ++--
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

--- a/drivers/usb/usbip/stub_dev.c
+++ b/drivers/usb/usbip/stub_dev.c
@@ -316,7 +316,7 @@ static int stub_probe(struct usb_device
 	struct bus_id_priv *busid_priv;
 	int rc;
 
-	dev_dbg(&udev->dev, "Enter\n");
+	dev_dbg(&udev->dev, "Enter probe\n");
 
 	/* check we should claim or not by busid_table */
 	busid_priv = get_busid_priv(udev_busid);
@@ -418,7 +418,7 @@ static void stub_disconnect(struct usb_d
 	struct bus_id_priv *busid_priv;
 	int rc;
 
-	dev_dbg(&udev->dev, "Enter\n");
+	dev_dbg(&udev->dev, "Enter disconnect\n");
 
 	busid_priv = get_busid_priv(udev_busid);
 	if (!busid_priv) {

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 92+ messages in thread

* [PATCH 4.9 02/87] usbip: usbip_host: delete device from busid_table after rebind
  2018-05-21 21:10 [PATCH 4.9 00/87] 4.9.102-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
  2018-05-21 21:10 ` [PATCH 4.9 01/87] usbip: usbip_host: refine probe and disconnect debug msgs to be useful Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2018-05-21 21:10 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
  2018-05-21 21:10 ` [PATCH 4.9 03/87] usbip: usbip_host: run rebind from exit when module is removed Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (88 subsequent siblings)
  90 siblings, 0 replies; 92+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2018-05-21 21:10 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-kernel; +Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Shuah Khan (Samsung OSG)

4.9-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Shuah Khan (Samsung OSG) <shuah@kernel.org>

commit 1e180f167d4e413afccbbb4a421b48b2de832549 upstream.

Device is left in the busid_table after unbind and rebind. Rebind
initiates usb bus scan and the original driver claims the device.
After rescan the device should be deleted from the busid_table as
it no longer belongs to usbip_host.

Fix it to delete the device after device_attach() succeeds.

Signed-off-by: Shuah Khan (Samsung OSG) <shuah@kernel.org>
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 drivers/usb/usbip/stub_main.c |    6 ++++++
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)

--- a/drivers/usb/usbip/stub_main.c
+++ b/drivers/usb/usbip/stub_main.c
@@ -201,6 +201,9 @@ static ssize_t rebind_store(struct devic
 	if (!bid)
 		return -ENODEV;
 
+	/* mark the device for deletion so probe ignores it during rescan */
+	bid->status = STUB_BUSID_OTHER;
+
 	/* device_attach() callers should hold parent lock for USB */
 	if (bid->udev->dev.parent)
 		device_lock(bid->udev->dev.parent);
@@ -212,6 +215,9 @@ static ssize_t rebind_store(struct devic
 		return ret;
 	}
 
+	/* delete device from busid_table */
+	del_match_busid((char *) buf);
+
 	return count;
 }
 

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 92+ messages in thread

* [PATCH 4.9 03/87] usbip: usbip_host: run rebind from exit when module is removed
  2018-05-21 21:10 [PATCH 4.9 00/87] 4.9.102-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
  2018-05-21 21:10 ` [PATCH 4.9 01/87] usbip: usbip_host: refine probe and disconnect debug msgs to be useful Greg Kroah-Hartman
  2018-05-21 21:10 ` [PATCH 4.9 02/87] usbip: usbip_host: delete device from busid_table after rebind Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2018-05-21 21:10 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
  2018-05-21 21:10 ` [PATCH 4.9 04/87] usbip: usbip_host: fix NULL-ptr deref and use-after-free errors Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (87 subsequent siblings)
  90 siblings, 0 replies; 92+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2018-05-21 21:10 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-kernel; +Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Shuah Khan (Samsung OSG)

4.9-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Shuah Khan (Samsung OSG) <shuah@kernel.org>

commit 7510df3f29d44685bab7b1918b61a8ccd57126a9 upstream.

After removing usbip_host module, devices it releases are left without
a driver. For example, when a keyboard or a mass storage device are
bound to usbip_host when it is removed, these devices are no longer
bound to any driver.

Fix it to run device_attach() from the module exit routine to restore
the devices to their original drivers. This includes cleanup changes
and moving device_attach() code to a common routine to be called from
rebind_store() and usbip_host_exit().

Signed-off-by: Shuah Khan (Samsung OSG) <shuah@kernel.org>
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 drivers/usb/usbip/stub_dev.c  |    6 ----
 drivers/usb/usbip/stub_main.c |   60 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------
 2 files changed, 52 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)

--- a/drivers/usb/usbip/stub_dev.c
+++ b/drivers/usb/usbip/stub_dev.c
@@ -462,12 +462,8 @@ static void stub_disconnect(struct usb_d
 	busid_priv->sdev = NULL;
 	stub_device_free(sdev);
 
-	if (busid_priv->status == STUB_BUSID_ALLOC) {
+	if (busid_priv->status == STUB_BUSID_ALLOC)
 		busid_priv->status = STUB_BUSID_ADDED;
-	} else {
-		busid_priv->status = STUB_BUSID_OTHER;
-		del_match_busid((char *)udev_busid);
-	}
 }
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_PM
--- a/drivers/usb/usbip/stub_main.c
+++ b/drivers/usb/usbip/stub_main.c
@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@
 #define DRIVER_DESC "USB/IP Host Driver"
 
 struct kmem_cache *stub_priv_cache;
+
 /*
  * busid_tables defines matching busids that usbip can grab. A user can change
  * dynamically what device is locally used and what device is exported to a
@@ -184,6 +185,51 @@ static ssize_t store_match_busid(struct
 static DRIVER_ATTR(match_busid, S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR, show_match_busid,
 		   store_match_busid);
 
+static int do_rebind(char *busid, struct bus_id_priv *busid_priv)
+{
+	int ret;
+
+	/* device_attach() callers should hold parent lock for USB */
+	if (busid_priv->udev->dev.parent)
+		device_lock(busid_priv->udev->dev.parent);
+	ret = device_attach(&busid_priv->udev->dev);
+	if (busid_priv->udev->dev.parent)
+		device_unlock(busid_priv->udev->dev.parent);
+	if (ret < 0) {
+		dev_err(&busid_priv->udev->dev, "rebind failed\n");
+		return ret;
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static void stub_device_rebind(void)
+{
+#if IS_MODULE(CONFIG_USBIP_HOST)
+	struct bus_id_priv *busid_priv;
+	int i;
+
+	/* update status to STUB_BUSID_OTHER so probe ignores the device */
+	spin_lock(&busid_table_lock);
+	for (i = 0; i < MAX_BUSID; i++) {
+		if (busid_table[i].name[0] &&
+		    busid_table[i].shutdown_busid) {
+			busid_priv = &(busid_table[i]);
+			busid_priv->status = STUB_BUSID_OTHER;
+		}
+	}
+	spin_unlock(&busid_table_lock);
+
+	/* now run rebind */
+	for (i = 0; i < MAX_BUSID; i++) {
+		if (busid_table[i].name[0] &&
+		    busid_table[i].shutdown_busid) {
+			busid_priv = &(busid_table[i]);
+			do_rebind(busid_table[i].name, busid_priv);
+		}
+	}
+#endif
+}
+
 static ssize_t rebind_store(struct device_driver *dev, const char *buf,
 				 size_t count)
 {
@@ -204,16 +250,9 @@ static ssize_t rebind_store(struct devic
 	/* mark the device for deletion so probe ignores it during rescan */
 	bid->status = STUB_BUSID_OTHER;
 
-	/* device_attach() callers should hold parent lock for USB */
-	if (bid->udev->dev.parent)
-		device_lock(bid->udev->dev.parent);
-	ret = device_attach(&bid->udev->dev);
-	if (bid->udev->dev.parent)
-		device_unlock(bid->udev->dev.parent);
-	if (ret < 0) {
-		dev_err(&bid->udev->dev, "rebind failed\n");
+	ret = do_rebind((char *) buf, bid);
+	if (ret < 0)
 		return ret;
-	}
 
 	/* delete device from busid_table */
 	del_match_busid((char *) buf);
@@ -339,6 +378,9 @@ static void __exit usbip_host_exit(void)
 	 */
 	usb_deregister_device_driver(&stub_driver);
 
+	/* initiate scan to attach devices */
+	stub_device_rebind();
+
 	kmem_cache_destroy(stub_priv_cache);
 }
 

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 92+ messages in thread

* [PATCH 4.9 04/87] usbip: usbip_host: fix NULL-ptr deref and use-after-free errors
  2018-05-21 21:10 [PATCH 4.9 00/87] 4.9.102-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (2 preceding siblings ...)
  2018-05-21 21:10 ` [PATCH 4.9 03/87] usbip: usbip_host: run rebind from exit when module is removed Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2018-05-21 21:10 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
  2018-05-21 21:10 ` [PATCH 4.9 05/87] usbip: usbip_host: fix bad unlock balance during stub_probe() Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (86 subsequent siblings)
  90 siblings, 0 replies; 92+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2018-05-21 21:10 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-kernel; +Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Shuah Khan (Samsung OSG)

4.9-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Shuah Khan (Samsung OSG) <shuah@kernel.org>

commit 22076557b07c12086eeb16b8ce2b0b735f7a27e7 upstream.

usbip_host updates device status without holding lock from stub probe,
disconnect and rebind code paths. When multiple requests to import a
device are received, these unprotected code paths step all over each
other and drive fails with NULL-ptr deref and use-after-free errors.

The driver uses a table lock to protect the busid array for adding and
deleting busids to the table. However, the probe, disconnect and rebind
paths get the busid table entry and update the status without holding
the busid table lock. Add a new finer grain lock to protect the busid
entry. This new lock will be held to search and update the busid entry
fields from get_busid_idx(), add_match_busid() and del_match_busid().

match_busid_show() does the same to access the busid entry fields.

get_busid_priv() changed to return the pointer to the busid entry holding
the busid lock. stub_probe(), stub_disconnect() and stub_device_rebind()
call put_busid_priv() to release the busid lock before returning. This
changes fixes the unprotected code paths eliminating the race conditions
in updating the busid entries.

Reported-by: Jakub Jirasek
Signed-off-by: Shuah Khan (Samsung OSG) <shuah@kernel.org>
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 drivers/usb/usbip/stub.h      |    2 ++
 drivers/usb/usbip/stub_dev.c  |   33 +++++++++++++++++++++++----------
 drivers/usb/usbip/stub_main.c |   40 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----
 3 files changed, 60 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)

--- a/drivers/usb/usbip/stub.h
+++ b/drivers/usb/usbip/stub.h
@@ -87,6 +87,7 @@ struct bus_id_priv {
 	struct stub_device *sdev;
 	struct usb_device *udev;
 	char shutdown_busid;
+	spinlock_t busid_lock;
 };
 
 /* stub_priv is allocated from stub_priv_cache */
@@ -97,6 +98,7 @@ extern struct usb_device_driver stub_dri
 
 /* stub_main.c */
 struct bus_id_priv *get_busid_priv(const char *busid);
+void put_busid_priv(struct bus_id_priv *bid);
 int del_match_busid(char *busid);
 void stub_device_cleanup_urbs(struct stub_device *sdev);
 
--- a/drivers/usb/usbip/stub_dev.c
+++ b/drivers/usb/usbip/stub_dev.c
@@ -314,7 +314,7 @@ static int stub_probe(struct usb_device
 	struct stub_device *sdev = NULL;
 	const char *udev_busid = dev_name(&udev->dev);
 	struct bus_id_priv *busid_priv;
-	int rc;
+	int rc = 0;
 
 	dev_dbg(&udev->dev, "Enter probe\n");
 
@@ -331,13 +331,15 @@ static int stub_probe(struct usb_device
 		 * other matched drivers by the driver core.
 		 * See driver_probe_device() in driver/base/dd.c
 		 */
-		return -ENODEV;
+		rc = -ENODEV;
+		goto call_put_busid_priv;
 	}
 
 	if (udev->descriptor.bDeviceClass == USB_CLASS_HUB) {
 		dev_dbg(&udev->dev, "%s is a usb hub device... skip!\n",
 			 udev_busid);
-		return -ENODEV;
+		rc = -ENODEV;
+		goto call_put_busid_priv;
 	}
 
 	if (!strcmp(udev->bus->bus_name, "vhci_hcd")) {
@@ -345,13 +347,16 @@ static int stub_probe(struct usb_device
 			"%s is attached on vhci_hcd... skip!\n",
 			udev_busid);
 
-		return -ENODEV;
+		rc = -ENODEV;
+		goto call_put_busid_priv;
 	}
 
 	/* ok, this is my device */
 	sdev = stub_device_alloc(udev);
-	if (!sdev)
-		return -ENOMEM;
+	if (!sdev) {
+		rc = -ENOMEM;
+		goto call_put_busid_priv;
+	}
 
 	dev_info(&udev->dev,
 		"usbip-host: register new device (bus %u dev %u)\n",
@@ -383,7 +388,9 @@ static int stub_probe(struct usb_device
 	}
 	busid_priv->status = STUB_BUSID_ALLOC;
 
-	return 0;
+	rc = 0;
+	goto call_put_busid_priv;
+
 err_files:
 	usb_hub_release_port(udev->parent, udev->portnum,
 			     (struct usb_dev_state *) udev);
@@ -393,6 +400,9 @@ err_port:
 
 	busid_priv->sdev = NULL;
 	stub_device_free(sdev);
+
+call_put_busid_priv:
+	put_busid_priv(busid_priv);
 	return rc;
 }
 
@@ -431,7 +441,7 @@ static void stub_disconnect(struct usb_d
 	/* get stub_device */
 	if (!sdev) {
 		dev_err(&udev->dev, "could not get device");
-		return;
+		goto call_put_busid_priv;
 	}
 
 	dev_set_drvdata(&udev->dev, NULL);
@@ -446,12 +456,12 @@ static void stub_disconnect(struct usb_d
 				  (struct usb_dev_state *) udev);
 	if (rc) {
 		dev_dbg(&udev->dev, "unable to release port\n");
-		return;
+		goto call_put_busid_priv;
 	}
 
 	/* If usb reset is called from event handler */
 	if (usbip_in_eh(current))
-		return;
+		goto call_put_busid_priv;
 
 	/* shutdown the current connection */
 	shutdown_busid(busid_priv);
@@ -464,6 +474,9 @@ static void stub_disconnect(struct usb_d
 
 	if (busid_priv->status == STUB_BUSID_ALLOC)
 		busid_priv->status = STUB_BUSID_ADDED;
+
+call_put_busid_priv:
+	put_busid_priv(busid_priv);
 }
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_PM
--- a/drivers/usb/usbip/stub_main.c
+++ b/drivers/usb/usbip/stub_main.c
@@ -40,6 +40,8 @@ static spinlock_t busid_table_lock;
 
 static void init_busid_table(void)
 {
+	int i;
+
 	/*
 	 * This also sets the bus_table[i].status to
 	 * STUB_BUSID_OTHER, which is 0.
@@ -47,6 +49,9 @@ static void init_busid_table(void)
 	memset(busid_table, 0, sizeof(busid_table));
 
 	spin_lock_init(&busid_table_lock);
+
+	for (i = 0; i < MAX_BUSID; i++)
+		spin_lock_init(&busid_table[i].busid_lock);
 }
 
 /*
@@ -58,15 +63,20 @@ static int get_busid_idx(const char *bus
 	int i;
 	int idx = -1;
 
-	for (i = 0; i < MAX_BUSID; i++)
+	for (i = 0; i < MAX_BUSID; i++) {
+		spin_lock(&busid_table[i].busid_lock);
 		if (busid_table[i].name[0])
 			if (!strncmp(busid_table[i].name, busid, BUSID_SIZE)) {
 				idx = i;
+				spin_unlock(&busid_table[i].busid_lock);
 				break;
 			}
+		spin_unlock(&busid_table[i].busid_lock);
+	}
 	return idx;
 }
 
+/* Returns holding busid_lock. Should call put_busid_priv() to unlock */
 struct bus_id_priv *get_busid_priv(const char *busid)
 {
 	int idx;
@@ -74,13 +84,21 @@ struct bus_id_priv *get_busid_priv(const
 
 	spin_lock(&busid_table_lock);
 	idx = get_busid_idx(busid);
-	if (idx >= 0)
+	if (idx >= 0) {
 		bid = &(busid_table[idx]);
+		/* get busid_lock before returning */
+		spin_lock(&bid->busid_lock);
+	}
 	spin_unlock(&busid_table_lock);
 
 	return bid;
 }
 
+void put_busid_priv(struct bus_id_priv *bid)
+{
+	spin_unlock(&bid->busid_lock);
+}
+
 static int add_match_busid(char *busid)
 {
 	int i;
@@ -93,15 +111,19 @@ static int add_match_busid(char *busid)
 		goto out;
 	}
 
-	for (i = 0; i < MAX_BUSID; i++)
+	for (i = 0; i < MAX_BUSID; i++) {
+		spin_lock(&busid_table[i].busid_lock);
 		if (!busid_table[i].name[0]) {
 			strlcpy(busid_table[i].name, busid, BUSID_SIZE);
 			if ((busid_table[i].status != STUB_BUSID_ALLOC) &&
 			    (busid_table[i].status != STUB_BUSID_REMOV))
 				busid_table[i].status = STUB_BUSID_ADDED;
 			ret = 0;
+			spin_unlock(&busid_table[i].busid_lock);
 			break;
 		}
+		spin_unlock(&busid_table[i].busid_lock);
+	}
 
 out:
 	spin_unlock(&busid_table_lock);
@@ -122,6 +144,8 @@ int del_match_busid(char *busid)
 	/* found */
 	ret = 0;
 
+	spin_lock(&busid_table[idx].busid_lock);
+
 	if (busid_table[idx].status == STUB_BUSID_OTHER)
 		memset(busid_table[idx].name, 0, BUSID_SIZE);
 
@@ -129,6 +153,7 @@ int del_match_busid(char *busid)
 	    (busid_table[idx].status != STUB_BUSID_ADDED))
 		busid_table[idx].status = STUB_BUSID_REMOV;
 
+	spin_unlock(&busid_table[idx].busid_lock);
 out:
 	spin_unlock(&busid_table_lock);
 
@@ -141,9 +166,12 @@ static ssize_t show_match_busid(struct d
 	char *out = buf;
 
 	spin_lock(&busid_table_lock);
-	for (i = 0; i < MAX_BUSID; i++)
+	for (i = 0; i < MAX_BUSID; i++) {
+		spin_lock(&busid_table[i].busid_lock);
 		if (busid_table[i].name[0])
 			out += sprintf(out, "%s ", busid_table[i].name);
+		spin_unlock(&busid_table[i].busid_lock);
+	}
 	spin_unlock(&busid_table_lock);
 	out += sprintf(out, "\n");
 
@@ -219,7 +247,7 @@ static void stub_device_rebind(void)
 	}
 	spin_unlock(&busid_table_lock);
 
-	/* now run rebind */
+	/* now run rebind - no need to hold locks. driver files are removed */
 	for (i = 0; i < MAX_BUSID; i++) {
 		if (busid_table[i].name[0] &&
 		    busid_table[i].shutdown_busid) {
@@ -249,6 +277,8 @@ static ssize_t rebind_store(struct devic
 
 	/* mark the device for deletion so probe ignores it during rescan */
 	bid->status = STUB_BUSID_OTHER;
+	/* release the busid lock */
+	put_busid_priv(bid);
 
 	ret = do_rebind((char *) buf, bid);
 	if (ret < 0)

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 92+ messages in thread

* [PATCH 4.9 05/87] usbip: usbip_host: fix bad unlock balance during stub_probe()
  2018-05-21 21:10 [PATCH 4.9 00/87] 4.9.102-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (3 preceding siblings ...)
  2018-05-21 21:10 ` [PATCH 4.9 04/87] usbip: usbip_host: fix NULL-ptr deref and use-after-free errors Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2018-05-21 21:10 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
  2018-05-21 21:10 ` [PATCH 4.9 06/87] ALSA: usb: mixer: volume quirk for CM102-A+/102S+ Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (85 subsequent siblings)
  90 siblings, 0 replies; 92+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2018-05-21 21:10 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-kernel; +Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Shuah Khan (Samsung OSG)

4.9-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Shuah Khan (Samsung OSG) <shuah@kernel.org>

commit c171654caa875919be3c533d3518da8be5be966e upstream.

stub_probe() calls put_busid_priv() in an error path when device isn't
found in the busid_table. Fix it by making put_busid_priv() safe to be
called with null struct bus_id_priv pointer.

This problem happens when "usbip bind" is run without loading usbip_host
driver and then running modprobe. The first failed bind attempt unbinds
the device from the original driver and when usbip_host is modprobed,
stub_probe() runs and doesn't find the device in its busid table and calls
put_busid_priv(0 with null bus_id_priv pointer.

usbip-host 3-10.2: 3-10.2 is not in match_busid table...  skip!

[  367.359679] =====================================
[  367.359681] WARNING: bad unlock balance detected!
[  367.359683] 4.17.0-rc4+ #5 Not tainted
[  367.359685] -------------------------------------
[  367.359688] modprobe/2768 is trying to release lock (
[  367.359689]
==================================================================
[  367.359696] BUG: KASAN: null-ptr-deref in print_unlock_imbalance_bug+0x99/0x110
[  367.359699] Read of size 8 at addr 0000000000000058 by task modprobe/2768

[  367.359705] CPU: 4 PID: 2768 Comm: modprobe Not tainted 4.17.0-rc4+ #5

Fixes: 22076557b07c ("usbip: usbip_host: fix NULL-ptr deref and use-after-free errors") in usb-linus
Signed-off-by: Shuah Khan (Samsung OSG) <shuah@kernel.org>
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 drivers/usb/usbip/stub_main.c |    3 ++-
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/drivers/usb/usbip/stub_main.c
+++ b/drivers/usb/usbip/stub_main.c
@@ -96,7 +96,8 @@ struct bus_id_priv *get_busid_priv(const
 
 void put_busid_priv(struct bus_id_priv *bid)
 {
-	spin_unlock(&bid->busid_lock);
+	if (bid)
+		spin_unlock(&bid->busid_lock);
 }
 
 static int add_match_busid(char *busid)

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 92+ messages in thread

* [PATCH 4.9 06/87] ALSA: usb: mixer: volume quirk for CM102-A+/102S+
  2018-05-21 21:10 [PATCH 4.9 00/87] 4.9.102-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (4 preceding siblings ...)
  2018-05-21 21:10 ` [PATCH 4.9 05/87] usbip: usbip_host: fix bad unlock balance during stub_probe() Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2018-05-21 21:10 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
  2018-05-21 21:10 ` [PATCH 4.9 07/87] ALSA: hda: Add Lenovo C50 All in one to the power_save blacklist Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (84 subsequent siblings)
  90 siblings, 0 replies; 92+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2018-05-21 21:10 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-kernel; +Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Federico Cuello, Takashi Iwai

4.9-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Federico Cuello <fedux@fedux.com.ar>

commit 21493316a3c4598f308d5a9fa31cc74639c4caff upstream.

Currently it's not possible to set volume lower than 26% (it just mutes).

Also fixes this warning:

  Warning! Unlikely big volume range (=9472), cval->res is probably wrong.
  [13] FU [PCM Playback Volume] ch = 2, val = -9473/-1/1

, and volume works fine for full range.

Signed-off-by: Federico Cuello <fedux@fedux.com.ar>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 sound/usb/mixer.c |    8 ++++++++
 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+)

--- a/sound/usb/mixer.c
+++ b/sound/usb/mixer.c
@@ -905,6 +905,14 @@ static void volume_control_quirks(struct
 		}
 		break;
 
+	case USB_ID(0x0d8c, 0x0103):
+		if (!strcmp(kctl->id.name, "PCM Playback Volume")) {
+			usb_audio_info(chip,
+				 "set volume quirk for CM102-A+/102S+\n");
+			cval->min = -256;
+		}
+		break;
+
 	case USB_ID(0x0471, 0x0101):
 	case USB_ID(0x0471, 0x0104):
 	case USB_ID(0x0471, 0x0105):

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 92+ messages in thread

* [PATCH 4.9 07/87] ALSA: hda: Add Lenovo C50 All in one to the power_save blacklist
  2018-05-21 21:10 [PATCH 4.9 00/87] 4.9.102-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (5 preceding siblings ...)
  2018-05-21 21:10 ` [PATCH 4.9 06/87] ALSA: usb: mixer: volume quirk for CM102-A+/102S+ Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2018-05-21 21:10 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
  2018-05-21 21:10 ` [PATCH 4.9 08/87] ALSA: control: fix a redundant-copy issue Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (83 subsequent siblings)
  90 siblings, 0 replies; 92+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2018-05-21 21:10 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-kernel; +Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Hans de Goede, Takashi Iwai

4.9-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Hans de Goede <hdegoede@redhat.com>

commit c8beccc19b92f5172994c0732db689c08f4f98e5 upstream.

Power-saving is causing loud plops on the Lenovo C50 All in one, add it
to the blacklist.

BugLink: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1572975
Signed-off-by: Hans de Goede <hdegoede@redhat.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 sound/pci/hda/hda_intel.c |    2 ++
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)

--- a/sound/pci/hda/hda_intel.c
+++ b/sound/pci/hda/hda_intel.c
@@ -2061,6 +2061,8 @@ static struct snd_pci_quirk power_save_b
 	SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x1849, 0x0c0c, "Asrock B85M-ITX", 0),
 	/* https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1525104 */
 	SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x1043, 0x8733, "Asus Prime X370-Pro", 0),
+	/* https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1572975 */
+	SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x17aa, 0x36a7, "Lenovo C50 All in one", 0),
 	/* https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=198611 */
 	SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x17aa, 0x2227, "Lenovo X1 Carbon 3rd Gen", 0),
 	{}

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 92+ messages in thread

* [PATCH 4.9 08/87] ALSA: control: fix a redundant-copy issue
  2018-05-21 21:10 [PATCH 4.9 00/87] 4.9.102-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (6 preceding siblings ...)
  2018-05-21 21:10 ` [PATCH 4.9 07/87] ALSA: hda: Add Lenovo C50 All in one to the power_save blacklist Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2018-05-21 21:10 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
  2018-05-21 21:10 ` [PATCH 4.9 09/87] spi: pxa2xx: Allow 64-bit DMA Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (82 subsequent siblings)
  90 siblings, 0 replies; 92+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2018-05-21 21:10 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-kernel; +Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Wenwen Wang, Takashi Iwai

4.9-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Wenwen Wang <wang6495@umn.edu>

commit 3f12888dfae2a48741c4caa9214885b3aaf350f9 upstream.

In snd_ctl_elem_add_compat(), the fields of the struct 'data' need to be
copied from the corresponding fields of the struct 'data32' in userspace.
This is achieved by invoking copy_from_user() and get_user() functions. The
problem here is that the 'type' field is copied twice. One is by
copy_from_user() and one is by get_user(). Given that the 'type' field is
not used between the two copies, the second copy is *completely* redundant
and should be removed for better performance and cleanup. Also, these two
copies can cause inconsistent data: as the struct 'data32' resides in
userspace and a malicious userspace process can race to change the 'type'
field between the two copies to cause inconsistent data. Depending on how
the data is used in the future, such an inconsistency may cause potential
security risks.

For above reasons, we should take out the second copy.

Signed-off-by: Wenwen Wang <wang6495@umn.edu>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 sound/core/control_compat.c |    3 +--
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 2 deletions(-)

--- a/sound/core/control_compat.c
+++ b/sound/core/control_compat.c
@@ -400,8 +400,7 @@ static int snd_ctl_elem_add_compat(struc
 	if (copy_from_user(&data->id, &data32->id, sizeof(data->id)) ||
 	    copy_from_user(&data->type, &data32->type, 3 * sizeof(u32)))
 		goto error;
-	if (get_user(data->owner, &data32->owner) ||
-	    get_user(data->type, &data32->type))
+	if (get_user(data->owner, &data32->owner))
 		goto error;
 	switch (data->type) {
 	case SNDRV_CTL_ELEM_TYPE_BOOLEAN:

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 92+ messages in thread

* [PATCH 4.9 09/87] spi: pxa2xx: Allow 64-bit DMA
  2018-05-21 21:10 [PATCH 4.9 00/87] 4.9.102-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (7 preceding siblings ...)
  2018-05-21 21:10 ` [PATCH 4.9 08/87] ALSA: control: fix a redundant-copy issue Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2018-05-21 21:10 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
  2018-05-21 21:10 ` [PATCH 4.9 10/87] spi: bcm-qspi: Avoid setting MSPI_CDRAM_PCS for spi-nor master Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (81 subsequent siblings)
  90 siblings, 0 replies; 92+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2018-05-21 21:10 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-kernel; +Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Andy Shevchenko, Mark Brown

4.9-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com>

commit efc4a13724b852ddaa3358402a8dec024ffbcb17 upstream.

Currently the 32-bit device address only is supported for DMA. However,
starting from Intel Sunrisepoint PCH the DMA address of the device FIFO
can be 64-bit.

Change the respective variable to be compatible with DMA engine
expectations, i.e. to phys_addr_t.

Fixes: 34cadd9c1bcb ("spi: pxa2xx: Add support for Intel Sunrisepoint")
Signed-off-by: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 drivers/spi/spi-pxa2xx.h |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/drivers/spi/spi-pxa2xx.h
+++ b/drivers/spi/spi-pxa2xx.h
@@ -38,7 +38,7 @@ struct driver_data {
 
 	/* SSP register addresses */
 	void __iomem *ioaddr;
-	u32 ssdr_physical;
+	phys_addr_t ssdr_physical;
 
 	/* SSP masks*/
 	u32 dma_cr1;

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 92+ messages in thread

* [PATCH 4.9 10/87] spi: bcm-qspi: Avoid setting MSPI_CDRAM_PCS for spi-nor master
  2018-05-21 21:10 [PATCH 4.9 00/87] 4.9.102-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (8 preceding siblings ...)
  2018-05-21 21:10 ` [PATCH 4.9 09/87] spi: pxa2xx: Allow 64-bit DMA Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2018-05-21 21:10 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
  2018-05-21 21:10 ` [PATCH 4.9 11/87] spi: bcm-qspi: Always read and set BSPI_MAST_N_BOOT_CTRL Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (80 subsequent siblings)
  90 siblings, 0 replies; 92+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2018-05-21 21:10 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-kernel; +Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Kamal Dasu, Mark Brown

4.9-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Kamal Dasu <kdasu.kdev@gmail.com>

commit 5eb9a07a4ae1008b67d8bcd47bddb3dae97456b7 upstream.

Added fix for probing of spi-nor device non-zero chip selects. Set
MSPI_CDRAM_PCS (peripheral chip select) with spi master for MSPI
controller and not for MSPI/BSPI spi-nor master controller. Ensure
setting of cs bit in chip select register on chip select change.

Fixes: fa236a7ef24048 ("spi: bcm-qspi: Add Broadcom MSPI driver")
Signed-off-by: Kamal Dasu <kdasu.kdev@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 drivers/spi/spi-bcm-qspi.c |   24 ++++++++++++++++--------
 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)

--- a/drivers/spi/spi-bcm-qspi.c
+++ b/drivers/spi/spi-bcm-qspi.c
@@ -543,16 +543,19 @@ static void bcm_qspi_disable_bspi(struct
 
 static void bcm_qspi_chip_select(struct bcm_qspi *qspi, int cs)
 {
-	u32 data = 0;
+	u32 rd = 0;
+	u32 wr = 0;
 
-	if (qspi->curr_cs == cs)
-		return;
 	if (qspi->base[CHIP_SELECT]) {
-		data = bcm_qspi_read(qspi, CHIP_SELECT, 0);
-		data = (data & ~0xff) | (1 << cs);
-		bcm_qspi_write(qspi, CHIP_SELECT, 0, data);
+		rd = bcm_qspi_read(qspi, CHIP_SELECT, 0);
+		wr = (rd & ~0xff) | (1 << cs);
+		if (rd == wr)
+			return;
+		bcm_qspi_write(qspi, CHIP_SELECT, 0, wr);
 		usleep_range(10, 20);
 	}
+
+	dev_dbg(&qspi->pdev->dev, "using cs:%d\n", cs);
 	qspi->curr_cs = cs;
 }
 
@@ -770,8 +773,13 @@ static int write_to_hw(struct bcm_qspi *
 			dev_dbg(&qspi->pdev->dev, "WR %04x\n", val);
 		}
 		mspi_cdram = MSPI_CDRAM_CONT_BIT;
-		mspi_cdram |= (~(1 << spi->chip_select) &
-			       MSPI_CDRAM_PCS);
+
+		if (has_bspi(qspi))
+			mspi_cdram &= ~1;
+		else
+			mspi_cdram |= (~(1 << spi->chip_select) &
+				       MSPI_CDRAM_PCS);
+
 		mspi_cdram |= ((tp.trans->bits_per_word <= 8) ? 0 :
 				MSPI_CDRAM_BITSE_BIT);
 

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 92+ messages in thread

* [PATCH 4.9 11/87] spi: bcm-qspi: Always read and set BSPI_MAST_N_BOOT_CTRL
  2018-05-21 21:10 [PATCH 4.9 00/87] 4.9.102-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (9 preceding siblings ...)
  2018-05-21 21:10 ` [PATCH 4.9 10/87] spi: bcm-qspi: Avoid setting MSPI_CDRAM_PCS for spi-nor master Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2018-05-21 21:10 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
  2018-05-21 21:10 ` [PATCH 4.9 12/87] KVM: arm/arm64: VGIC/ITS: protect kvm_read_guest() calls with SRCU lock Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (79 subsequent siblings)
  90 siblings, 0 replies; 92+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2018-05-21 21:10 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-kernel; +Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Kamal Dasu, Mark Brown

4.9-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Kamal Dasu <kdasu.kdev@gmail.com>

commit 602805fb618b018b7a41fbb3f93c1992b078b1ae upstream.

Always confirm the BSPI_MAST_N_BOOT_CTRL bit when enabling
or disabling BSPI transfers.

Fixes: 4e3b2d236fe00 ("spi: bcm-qspi: Add BSPI spi-nor flash controller driver")
Signed-off-by: Kamal Dasu <kdasu.kdev@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 drivers/spi/spi-bcm-qspi.c |    4 ++--
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

--- a/drivers/spi/spi-bcm-qspi.c
+++ b/drivers/spi/spi-bcm-qspi.c
@@ -514,7 +514,7 @@ static int bcm_qspi_bspi_set_mode(struct
 
 static void bcm_qspi_enable_bspi(struct bcm_qspi *qspi)
 {
-	if (!has_bspi(qspi) || (qspi->bspi_enabled))
+	if (!has_bspi(qspi))
 		return;
 
 	qspi->bspi_enabled = 1;
@@ -529,7 +529,7 @@ static void bcm_qspi_enable_bspi(struct
 
 static void bcm_qspi_disable_bspi(struct bcm_qspi *qspi)
 {
-	if (!has_bspi(qspi) || (!qspi->bspi_enabled))
+	if (!has_bspi(qspi))
 		return;
 
 	qspi->bspi_enabled = 0;

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 92+ messages in thread

* [PATCH 4.9 12/87] KVM: arm/arm64: VGIC/ITS: protect kvm_read_guest() calls with SRCU lock
  2018-05-21 21:10 [PATCH 4.9 00/87] 4.9.102-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (10 preceding siblings ...)
  2018-05-21 21:10 ` [PATCH 4.9 11/87] spi: bcm-qspi: Always read and set BSPI_MAST_N_BOOT_CTRL Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2018-05-21 21:10 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
  2018-05-21 21:10 ` [PATCH 4.9 13/87] powerpc: Dont preempt_disable() in show_cpuinfo() Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (78 subsequent siblings)
  90 siblings, 0 replies; 92+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2018-05-21 21:10 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-kernel
  Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Jan Glauber, Andre Przywara,
	Christoffer Dall, Paolo Bonzini

4.9-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Andre Przywara <andre.przywara@arm.com>

commit bf308242ab98b5d1648c3663e753556bef9bec01 upstream.

kvm_read_guest() will eventually look up in kvm_memslots(), which requires
either to hold the kvm->slots_lock or to be inside a kvm->srcu critical
section.
In contrast to x86 and s390 we don't take the SRCU lock on every guest
exit, so we have to do it individually for each kvm_read_guest() call.

Provide a wrapper which does that and use that everywhere.

Note that ending the SRCU critical section before returning from the
kvm_read_guest() wrapper is safe, because the data has been *copied*, so
we don't need to rely on valid references to the memslot anymore.

Cc: Stable <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 4.8+
Reported-by: Jan Glauber <jan.glauber@caviumnetworks.com>
Signed-off-by: Andre Przywara <andre.przywara@arm.com>
Acked-by: Christoffer Dall <christoffer.dall@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 arch/arm/include/asm/kvm_mmu.h   |   16 ++++++++++++++++
 arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_mmu.h |   16 ++++++++++++++++
 virt/kvm/arm/vgic/vgic-its.c     |   15 ++++++++-------
 3 files changed, 40 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)

--- a/arch/arm/include/asm/kvm_mmu.h
+++ b/arch/arm/include/asm/kvm_mmu.h
@@ -223,6 +223,22 @@ static inline unsigned int kvm_get_vmid_
 	return 8;
 }
 
+/*
+ * We are not in the kvm->srcu critical section most of the time, so we take
+ * the SRCU read lock here. Since we copy the data from the user page, we
+ * can immediately drop the lock again.
+ */
+static inline int kvm_read_guest_lock(struct kvm *kvm,
+				      gpa_t gpa, void *data, unsigned long len)
+{
+	int srcu_idx = srcu_read_lock(&kvm->srcu);
+	int ret = kvm_read_guest(kvm, gpa, data, len);
+
+	srcu_read_unlock(&kvm->srcu, srcu_idx);
+
+	return ret;
+}
+
 static inline void *kvm_get_hyp_vector(void)
 {
 	return kvm_ksym_ref(__kvm_hyp_vector);
--- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_mmu.h
+++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_mmu.h
@@ -313,6 +313,22 @@ static inline unsigned int kvm_get_vmid_
 	return (cpuid_feature_extract_unsigned_field(reg, ID_AA64MMFR1_VMIDBITS_SHIFT) == 2) ? 16 : 8;
 }
 
+/*
+ * We are not in the kvm->srcu critical section most of the time, so we take
+ * the SRCU read lock here. Since we copy the data from the user page, we
+ * can immediately drop the lock again.
+ */
+static inline int kvm_read_guest_lock(struct kvm *kvm,
+				      gpa_t gpa, void *data, unsigned long len)
+{
+	int srcu_idx = srcu_read_lock(&kvm->srcu);
+	int ret = kvm_read_guest(kvm, gpa, data, len);
+
+	srcu_read_unlock(&kvm->srcu, srcu_idx);
+
+	return ret;
+}
+
 #ifdef CONFIG_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR
 #include <asm/mmu.h>
 
--- a/virt/kvm/arm/vgic/vgic-its.c
+++ b/virt/kvm/arm/vgic/vgic-its.c
@@ -208,8 +208,8 @@ static int update_lpi_config(struct kvm
 	u8 prop;
 	int ret;
 
-	ret = kvm_read_guest(kvm, propbase + irq->intid - GIC_LPI_OFFSET,
-			     &prop, 1);
+	ret = kvm_read_guest_lock(kvm, propbase + irq->intid - GIC_LPI_OFFSET,
+				  &prop, 1);
 
 	if (ret)
 		return ret;
@@ -339,8 +339,9 @@ static int its_sync_lpi_pending_table(st
 		 * this very same byte in the last iteration. Reuse that.
 		 */
 		if (byte_offset != last_byte_offset) {
-			ret = kvm_read_guest(vcpu->kvm, pendbase + byte_offset,
-					     &pendmask, 1);
+			ret = kvm_read_guest_lock(vcpu->kvm,
+						  pendbase + byte_offset,
+						  &pendmask, 1);
 			if (ret) {
 				kfree(intids);
 				return ret;
@@ -628,7 +629,7 @@ static bool vgic_its_check_id(struct vgi
 		return false;
 
 	/* Each 1st level entry is represented by a 64-bit value. */
-	if (kvm_read_guest(its->dev->kvm,
+	if (kvm_read_guest_lock(its->dev->kvm,
 			   BASER_ADDRESS(baser) + index * sizeof(indirect_ptr),
 			   &indirect_ptr, sizeof(indirect_ptr)))
 		return false;
@@ -1152,8 +1153,8 @@ static void vgic_its_process_commands(st
 	cbaser = CBASER_ADDRESS(its->cbaser);
 
 	while (its->cwriter != its->creadr) {
-		int ret = kvm_read_guest(kvm, cbaser + its->creadr,
-					 cmd_buf, ITS_CMD_SIZE);
+		int ret = kvm_read_guest_lock(kvm, cbaser + its->creadr,
+					      cmd_buf, ITS_CMD_SIZE);
 		/*
 		 * If kvm_read_guest() fails, this could be due to the guest
 		 * programming a bogus value in CBASER or something else going

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 92+ messages in thread

* [PATCH 4.9 13/87] powerpc: Dont preempt_disable() in show_cpuinfo()
  2018-05-21 21:10 [PATCH 4.9 00/87] 4.9.102-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (11 preceding siblings ...)
  2018-05-21 21:10 ` [PATCH 4.9 12/87] KVM: arm/arm64: VGIC/ITS: protect kvm_read_guest() calls with SRCU lock Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2018-05-21 21:10 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
  2018-05-21 21:10 ` [PATCH 4.9 14/87] signals: avoid unnecessary taking of sighand->siglock Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (77 subsequent siblings)
  90 siblings, 0 replies; 92+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2018-05-21 21:10 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-kernel
  Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Benjamin Herrenschmidt,
	Michael Ellerman, Michal Suchanek

4.9-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>

commit 349524bc0da698ec77f2057cf4a4948eb6349265 upstream.

This causes warnings from cpufreq mutex code. This is also rather
unnecessary and ineffective. If we really want to prevent concurrent
unplug, we could take the unplug read lock but I don't see this being
critical.

Fixes: cd77b5ce208c ("powerpc/powernv/cpufreq: Fix the frequency read by /proc/cpuinfo")
Signed-off-by: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Acked-by: Michal Suchanek <msuchanek@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 arch/powerpc/kernel/setup-common.c |   11 -----------
 1 file changed, 11 deletions(-)

--- a/arch/powerpc/kernel/setup-common.c
+++ b/arch/powerpc/kernel/setup-common.c
@@ -228,14 +228,6 @@ static int show_cpuinfo(struct seq_file
 	unsigned short maj;
 	unsigned short min;
 
-	/* We only show online cpus: disable preempt (overzealous, I
-	 * knew) to prevent cpu going down. */
-	preempt_disable();
-	if (!cpu_online(cpu_id)) {
-		preempt_enable();
-		return 0;
-	}
-
 #ifdef CONFIG_SMP
 	pvr = per_cpu(cpu_pvr, cpu_id);
 #else
@@ -340,9 +332,6 @@ static int show_cpuinfo(struct seq_file
 #ifdef CONFIG_SMP
 	seq_printf(m, "\n");
 #endif
-
-	preempt_enable();
-
 	/* If this is the last cpu, print the summary */
 	if (cpumask_next(cpu_id, cpu_online_mask) >= nr_cpu_ids)
 		show_cpuinfo_summary(m);

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 92+ messages in thread

* [PATCH 4.9 14/87] signals: avoid unnecessary taking of sighand->siglock
  2018-05-21 21:10 [PATCH 4.9 00/87] 4.9.102-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (12 preceding siblings ...)
  2018-05-21 21:10 ` [PATCH 4.9 13/87] powerpc: Dont preempt_disable() in show_cpuinfo() Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2018-05-21 21:10 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
  2018-05-21 21:10 ` [PATCH 4.9 15/87] tracing/x86/xen: Remove zero data size trace events trace_xen_mmu_flush_tlb{_all} Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (76 subsequent siblings)
  90 siblings, 0 replies; 92+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2018-05-21 21:10 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-kernel
  Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Waiman Long, Oleg Nesterov,
	Ingo Molnar, Thomas Gleixner, Stas Sergeev, Scott J Norton,
	Douglas Hatch, Andrew Morton, Linus Torvalds, Mel Gorman

4.9-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Waiman Long <Waiman.Long@hpe.com>

commit c7be96af89d4b53211862d8599b2430e8900ed92 upstream.

When running certain database workload on a high-end system with many
CPUs, it was found that spinlock contention in the sigprocmask syscalls
became a significant portion of the overall CPU cycles as shown below.

  9.30%  9.30%  905387  dataserver  /proc/kcore 0x7fff8163f4d2
  [k] _raw_spin_lock_irq
            |
            ---_raw_spin_lock_irq
               |
               |--99.34%-- __set_current_blocked
               |          sigprocmask
               |          sys_rt_sigprocmask
               |          system_call_fastpath
               |          |
               |          |--50.63%-- __swapcontext
               |          |          |
               |          |          |--99.91%-- upsleepgeneric
               |          |
               |          |--49.36%-- __setcontext
               |          |          ktskRun

Looking further into the swapcontext function in glibc, it was found that
the function always call sigprocmask() without checking if there are
changes in the signal mask.

A check was added to the __set_current_blocked() function to avoid taking
the sighand->siglock spinlock if there is no change in the signal mask.
This will prevent unneeded spinlock contention when many threads are
trying to call sigprocmask().

With this patch applied, the spinlock contention in sigprocmask() was
gone.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1474979209-11867-1-git-send-email-Waiman.Long@hpe.com
Signed-off-by: Waiman Long <Waiman.Long@hpe.com>
Acked-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Stas Sergeev <stsp@list.ru>
Cc: Scott J Norton <scott.norton@hpe.com>
Cc: Douglas Hatch <doug.hatch@hpe.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 include/linux/signal.h |   17 +++++++++++++++++
 kernel/signal.c        |    7 +++++++
 2 files changed, 24 insertions(+)

--- a/include/linux/signal.h
+++ b/include/linux/signal.h
@@ -97,6 +97,23 @@ static inline int sigisemptyset(sigset_t
 	}
 }
 
+static inline int sigequalsets(const sigset_t *set1, const sigset_t *set2)
+{
+	switch (_NSIG_WORDS) {
+	case 4:
+		return	(set1->sig[3] == set2->sig[3]) &&
+			(set1->sig[2] == set2->sig[2]) &&
+			(set1->sig[1] == set2->sig[1]) &&
+			(set1->sig[0] == set2->sig[0]);
+	case 2:
+		return	(set1->sig[1] == set2->sig[1]) &&
+			(set1->sig[0] == set2->sig[0]);
+	case 1:
+		return	set1->sig[0] == set2->sig[0];
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
 #define sigmask(sig)	(1UL << ((sig) - 1))
 
 #ifndef __HAVE_ARCH_SIG_SETOPS
--- a/kernel/signal.c
+++ b/kernel/signal.c
@@ -2495,6 +2495,13 @@ void __set_current_blocked(const sigset_
 {
 	struct task_struct *tsk = current;
 
+	/*
+	 * In case the signal mask hasn't changed, there is nothing we need
+	 * to do. The current->blocked shouldn't be modified by other task.
+	 */
+	if (sigequalsets(&tsk->blocked, newset))
+		return;
+
 	spin_lock_irq(&tsk->sighand->siglock);
 	__set_task_blocked(tsk, newset);
 	spin_unlock_irq(&tsk->sighand->siglock);

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 92+ messages in thread

* [PATCH 4.9 15/87] tracing/x86/xen: Remove zero data size trace events trace_xen_mmu_flush_tlb{_all}
  2018-05-21 21:10 [PATCH 4.9 00/87] 4.9.102-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (13 preceding siblings ...)
  2018-05-21 21:10 ` [PATCH 4.9 14/87] signals: avoid unnecessary taking of sighand->siglock Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2018-05-21 21:10 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
  2018-05-21 21:10 ` [PATCH 4.9 16/87] netfilter: nf_tables: cant fail after linking rule into active rule list Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (75 subsequent siblings)
  90 siblings, 0 replies; 92+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2018-05-21 21:10 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-kernel
  Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Juergen Gross, Steven Rostedt (VMware)

4.9-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org>

commit 45dd9b0666a162f8e4be76096716670cf1741f0e upstream.

Doing an audit of trace events, I discovered two trace events in the xen
subsystem that use a hack to create zero data size trace events. This is not
what trace events are for. Trace events add memory footprint overhead, and
if all you need to do is see if a function is hit or not, simply make that
function noinline and use function tracer filtering.

Worse yet, the hack used was:

 __array(char, x, 0)

Which creates a static string of zero in length. There's assumptions about
such constructs in ftrace that this is a dynamic string that is nul
terminated. This is not the case with these tracepoints and can cause
problems in various parts of ftrace.

Nuke the trace events!

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180509144605.5a220327@gandalf.local.home

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 95a7d76897c1e ("xen/mmu: Use Xen specific TLB flush instead of the generic one.")
Reviewed-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 arch/x86/xen/mmu.c         |    4 ----
 include/trace/events/xen.h |   16 ----------------
 2 files changed, 20 deletions(-)

--- a/arch/x86/xen/mmu.c
+++ b/arch/x86/xen/mmu.c
@@ -1317,8 +1317,6 @@ void xen_flush_tlb_all(void)
 	struct mmuext_op *op;
 	struct multicall_space mcs;
 
-	trace_xen_mmu_flush_tlb_all(0);
-
 	preempt_disable();
 
 	mcs = xen_mc_entry(sizeof(*op));
@@ -1336,8 +1334,6 @@ static void xen_flush_tlb(void)
 	struct mmuext_op *op;
 	struct multicall_space mcs;
 
-	trace_xen_mmu_flush_tlb(0);
-
 	preempt_disable();
 
 	mcs = xen_mc_entry(sizeof(*op));
--- a/include/trace/events/xen.h
+++ b/include/trace/events/xen.h
@@ -377,22 +377,6 @@ DECLARE_EVENT_CLASS(xen_mmu_pgd,
 DEFINE_XEN_MMU_PGD_EVENT(xen_mmu_pgd_pin);
 DEFINE_XEN_MMU_PGD_EVENT(xen_mmu_pgd_unpin);
 
-TRACE_EVENT(xen_mmu_flush_tlb_all,
-	    TP_PROTO(int x),
-	    TP_ARGS(x),
-	    TP_STRUCT__entry(__array(char, x, 0)),
-	    TP_fast_assign((void)x),
-	    TP_printk("%s", "")
-	);
-
-TRACE_EVENT(xen_mmu_flush_tlb,
-	    TP_PROTO(int x),
-	    TP_ARGS(x),
-	    TP_STRUCT__entry(__array(char, x, 0)),
-	    TP_fast_assign((void)x),
-	    TP_printk("%s", "")
-	);
-
 TRACE_EVENT(xen_mmu_flush_tlb_single,
 	    TP_PROTO(unsigned long addr),
 	    TP_ARGS(addr),

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 92+ messages in thread

* [PATCH 4.9 16/87] netfilter: nf_tables: cant fail after linking rule into active rule list
  2018-05-21 21:10 [PATCH 4.9 00/87] 4.9.102-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (14 preceding siblings ...)
  2018-05-21 21:10 ` [PATCH 4.9 15/87] tracing/x86/xen: Remove zero data size trace events trace_xen_mmu_flush_tlb{_all} Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2018-05-21 21:10 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
  2018-05-21 21:10 ` [PATCH 4.9 17/87] i2c: designware: fix poll-after-enable regression Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (74 subsequent siblings)
  90 siblings, 0 replies; 92+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2018-05-21 21:10 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-kernel
  Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Florian Westphal, Pablo Neira Ayuso

4.9-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>

commit 569ccae68b38654f04b6842b034aa33857f605fe upstream.

rules in nftables a free'd using kfree, but protected by rcu, i.e. we
must wait for a grace period to elapse.

Normal removal patch does this, but nf_tables_newrule() doesn't obey
this rule during error handling.

It calls nft_trans_rule_add() *after* linking rule, and, if that
fails to allocate memory, it unlinks the rule and then kfree() it --
this is unsafe.

Switch order -- first add rule to transaction list, THEN link it
to public list.

Note: nft_trans_rule_add() uses GFP_KERNEL; it will not fail so this
is not a problem in practice (spotted only during code review).

Fixes: 0628b123c96d12 ("netfilter: nfnetlink: add batch support and use it from nf_tables")
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c |   59 ++++++++++++++++++++++--------------------
 1 file changed, 32 insertions(+), 27 deletions(-)

--- a/net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c
+++ b/net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c
@@ -2200,41 +2200,46 @@ static int nf_tables_newrule(struct net
 	}
 
 	if (nlh->nlmsg_flags & NLM_F_REPLACE) {
-		if (nft_is_active_next(net, old_rule)) {
-			trans = nft_trans_rule_add(&ctx, NFT_MSG_DELRULE,
-						   old_rule);
-			if (trans == NULL) {
-				err = -ENOMEM;
-				goto err2;
-			}
-			nft_deactivate_next(net, old_rule);
-			chain->use--;
-			list_add_tail_rcu(&rule->list, &old_rule->list);
-		} else {
+		if (!nft_is_active_next(net, old_rule)) {
 			err = -ENOENT;
 			goto err2;
 		}
-	} else if (nlh->nlmsg_flags & NLM_F_APPEND)
-		if (old_rule)
-			list_add_rcu(&rule->list, &old_rule->list);
-		else
-			list_add_tail_rcu(&rule->list, &chain->rules);
-	else {
-		if (old_rule)
-			list_add_tail_rcu(&rule->list, &old_rule->list);
-		else
-			list_add_rcu(&rule->list, &chain->rules);
-	}
+		trans = nft_trans_rule_add(&ctx, NFT_MSG_DELRULE,
+					   old_rule);
+		if (trans == NULL) {
+			err = -ENOMEM;
+			goto err2;
+		}
+		nft_deactivate_next(net, old_rule);
+		chain->use--;
+
+		if (nft_trans_rule_add(&ctx, NFT_MSG_NEWRULE, rule) == NULL) {
+			err = -ENOMEM;
+			goto err2;
+		}
 
-	if (nft_trans_rule_add(&ctx, NFT_MSG_NEWRULE, rule) == NULL) {
-		err = -ENOMEM;
-		goto err3;
+		list_add_tail_rcu(&rule->list, &old_rule->list);
+	} else {
+		if (nft_trans_rule_add(&ctx, NFT_MSG_NEWRULE, rule) == NULL) {
+			err = -ENOMEM;
+			goto err2;
+		}
+
+		if (nlh->nlmsg_flags & NLM_F_APPEND) {
+			if (old_rule)
+				list_add_rcu(&rule->list, &old_rule->list);
+			else
+				list_add_tail_rcu(&rule->list, &chain->rules);
+		 } else {
+			if (old_rule)
+				list_add_tail_rcu(&rule->list, &old_rule->list);
+			else
+				list_add_rcu(&rule->list, &chain->rules);
+		}
 	}
 	chain->use++;
 	return 0;
 
-err3:
-	list_del_rcu(&rule->list);
 err2:
 	nf_tables_rule_destroy(&ctx, rule);
 err1:

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 92+ messages in thread

* [PATCH 4.9 17/87] i2c: designware: fix poll-after-enable regression
  2018-05-21 21:10 [PATCH 4.9 00/87] 4.9.102-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (15 preceding siblings ...)
  2018-05-21 21:10 ` [PATCH 4.9 16/87] netfilter: nf_tables: cant fail after linking rule into active rule list Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2018-05-21 21:10 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
  2018-05-21 21:10 ` [PATCH 4.9 18/87] powerpc/powernv: Fix NVRAM sleep in invalid context when crashing Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (73 subsequent siblings)
  90 siblings, 0 replies; 92+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2018-05-21 21:10 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-kernel
  Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Alexander Monakov, Ben Gardner,
	Jarkko Nikula, Wolfram Sang

4.9-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Alexander Monakov <amonakov@ispras.ru>

commit 06cb616b1bca7080824acfedb3d4c898e7a64836 upstream.

Not all revisions of DW I2C controller implement the enable status register.
On platforms where that's the case (e.g. BG2CD and SPEAr ARM SoCs), waiting
for enable will time out as reading the unimplemented register yields zero.

It was observed that reading the IC_ENABLE_STATUS register once suffices to
avoid getting it stuck on Bay Trail hardware, so replace polling with one
dummy read of the register.

Fixes: fba4adbbf670 ("i2c: designware: must wait for enable")
Signed-off-by: Alexander Monakov <amonakov@ispras.ru>
Tested-by: Ben Gardner <gardner.ben@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Jarkko Nikula <jarkko.nikula@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Wolfram Sang <wsa@the-dreams.de>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 drivers/i2c/busses/i2c-designware-core.c |    5 ++++-
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/drivers/i2c/busses/i2c-designware-core.c
+++ b/drivers/i2c/busses/i2c-designware-core.c
@@ -507,7 +507,10 @@ static void i2c_dw_xfer_init(struct dw_i
 	i2c_dw_disable_int(dev);
 
 	/* Enable the adapter */
-	__i2c_dw_enable_and_wait(dev, true);
+	__i2c_dw_enable(dev, true);
+
+	/* Dummy read to avoid the register getting stuck on Bay Trail */
+	dw_readl(dev, DW_IC_ENABLE_STATUS);
 
 	/* Clear and enable interrupts */
 	dw_readl(dev, DW_IC_CLR_INTR);

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 92+ messages in thread

* [PATCH 4.9 18/87] powerpc/powernv: Fix NVRAM sleep in invalid context when crashing
  2018-05-21 21:10 [PATCH 4.9 00/87] 4.9.102-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (16 preceding siblings ...)
  2018-05-21 21:10 ` [PATCH 4.9 17/87] i2c: designware: fix poll-after-enable regression Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2018-05-21 21:10 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
  2018-05-21 21:10 ` [PATCH 4.9 19/87] mm: dont allow deferred pages with NEED_PER_CPU_KM Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (72 subsequent siblings)
  90 siblings, 0 replies; 92+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2018-05-21 21:10 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-kernel
  Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Nicholas Piggin, Michael Ellerman

4.9-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Nicholas Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com>

commit c1d2a31397ec51f0370f6bd17b19b39152c263cb upstream.

Similarly to opal_event_shutdown, opal_nvram_write can be called in
the crash path with irqs disabled. Special case the delay to avoid
sleeping in invalid context.

Fixes: 3b8070335f75 ("powerpc/powernv: Fix OPAL NVRAM driver OPAL_BUSY loops")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v3.2
Signed-off-by: Nicholas Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/opal-nvram.c |   14 ++++++++++++--
 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

--- a/arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/opal-nvram.c
+++ b/arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/opal-nvram.c
@@ -44,6 +44,10 @@ static ssize_t opal_nvram_read(char *buf
 	return count;
 }
 
+/*
+ * This can be called in the panic path with interrupts off, so use
+ * mdelay in that case.
+ */
 static ssize_t opal_nvram_write(char *buf, size_t count, loff_t *index)
 {
 	s64 rc = OPAL_BUSY;
@@ -58,10 +62,16 @@ static ssize_t opal_nvram_write(char *bu
 	while (rc == OPAL_BUSY || rc == OPAL_BUSY_EVENT) {
 		rc = opal_write_nvram(__pa(buf), count, off);
 		if (rc == OPAL_BUSY_EVENT) {
-			msleep(OPAL_BUSY_DELAY_MS);
+			if (in_interrupt() || irqs_disabled())
+				mdelay(OPAL_BUSY_DELAY_MS);
+			else
+				msleep(OPAL_BUSY_DELAY_MS);
 			opal_poll_events(NULL);
 		} else if (rc == OPAL_BUSY) {
-			msleep(OPAL_BUSY_DELAY_MS);
+			if (in_interrupt() || irqs_disabled())
+				mdelay(OPAL_BUSY_DELAY_MS);
+			else
+				msleep(OPAL_BUSY_DELAY_MS);
 		}
 	}
 

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 92+ messages in thread

* [PATCH 4.9 19/87] mm: dont allow deferred pages with NEED_PER_CPU_KM
  2018-05-21 21:10 [PATCH 4.9 00/87] 4.9.102-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (17 preceding siblings ...)
  2018-05-21 21:10 ` [PATCH 4.9 18/87] powerpc/powernv: Fix NVRAM sleep in invalid context when crashing Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2018-05-21 21:10 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
  2018-05-21 21:10 ` [PATCH 4.9 20/87] s390/qdio: fix access to uninitialized qdio_q fields Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (71 subsequent siblings)
  90 siblings, 0 replies; 92+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2018-05-21 21:10 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-kernel
  Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Pavel Tatashin, Michal Hocko,
	Andrew Morton, Steven Sistare, Daniel Jordan, Mel Gorman,
	Fengguang Wu, Dennis Zhou, Linus Torvalds

4.9-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Pavel Tatashin <pasha.tatashin@oracle.com>

commit ab1e8d8960b68f54af42b6484b5950bd13a4054b upstream.

It is unsafe to do virtual to physical translations before mm_init() is
called if struct page is needed in order to determine the memory section
number (see SECTION_IN_PAGE_FLAGS).  This is because only in mm_init()
we initialize struct pages for all the allocated memory when deferred
struct pages are used.

My recent fix in commit c9e97a1997 ("mm: initialize pages on demand
during boot") exposed this problem, because it greatly reduced number of
pages that are initialized before mm_init(), but the problem existed
even before my fix, as Fengguang Wu found.

Below is a more detailed explanation of the problem.

We initialize struct pages in four places:

1. Early in boot a small set of struct pages is initialized to fill the
   first section, and lower zones.

2. During mm_init() we initialize "struct pages" for all the memory that
   is allocated, i.e reserved in memblock.

3. Using on-demand logic when pages are allocated after mm_init call
   (when memblock is finished)

4. After smp_init() when the rest free deferred pages are initialized.

The problem occurs if we try to do va to phys translation of a memory
between steps 1 and 2.  Because we have not yet initialized struct pages
for all the reserved pages, it is inherently unsafe to do va to phys if
the translation itself requires access of "struct page" as in case of
this combination: CONFIG_SPARSE && !CONFIG_SPARSE_VMEMMAP

The following path exposes the problem:

  start_kernel()
   trap_init()
    setup_cpu_entry_areas()
     setup_cpu_entry_area(cpu)
      get_cpu_gdt_paddr(cpu)
       per_cpu_ptr_to_phys(addr)
        pcpu_addr_to_page(addr)
         virt_to_page(addr)
          pfn_to_page(__pa(addr) >> PAGE_SHIFT)

We disable this path by not allowing NEED_PER_CPU_KM with deferred
struct pages feature.

The problems are discussed in these threads:
  http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180418135300.inazvpxjxowogyge@wfg-t540p.sh.intel.com
  http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180419013128.iurzouiqxvcnpbvz@wfg-t540p.sh.intel.com
  http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180426202619.2768-1-pasha.tatashin@oracle.com

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180515175124.1770-1-pasha.tatashin@oracle.com
Fixes: 3a80a7fa7989 ("mm: meminit: initialise a subset of struct pages if CONFIG_DEFERRED_STRUCT_PAGE_INIT is set")
Signed-off-by: Pavel Tatashin <pasha.tatashin@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Steven Sistare <steven.sistare@oracle.com>
Cc: Daniel Jordan <daniel.m.jordan@oracle.com>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@techsingularity.net>
Cc: Fengguang Wu <fengguang.wu@intel.com>
Cc: Dennis Zhou <dennisszhou@gmail.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 mm/Kconfig |    1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)

--- a/mm/Kconfig
+++ b/mm/Kconfig
@@ -666,6 +666,7 @@ config DEFERRED_STRUCT_PAGE_INIT
 	depends on ARCH_SUPPORTS_DEFERRED_STRUCT_PAGE_INIT
 	depends on NO_BOOTMEM && MEMORY_HOTPLUG
 	depends on !FLATMEM
+	depends on !NEED_PER_CPU_KM
 	help
 	  Ordinarily all struct pages are initialised during early boot in a
 	  single thread. On very large machines this can take a considerable

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 92+ messages in thread

* [PATCH 4.9 20/87] s390/qdio: fix access to uninitialized qdio_q fields
  2018-05-21 21:10 [PATCH 4.9 00/87] 4.9.102-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (18 preceding siblings ...)
  2018-05-21 21:10 ` [PATCH 4.9 19/87] mm: dont allow deferred pages with NEED_PER_CPU_KM Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2018-05-21 21:10 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
  2018-05-21 21:10 ` [PATCH 4.9 21/87] s390/cpum_sf: ensure sample frequency of perf event attributes is non-zero Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (70 subsequent siblings)
  90 siblings, 0 replies; 92+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2018-05-21 21:10 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-kernel
  Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Julian Wiedmann, Martin Schwidefsky

4.9-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Julian Wiedmann <jwi@linux.ibm.com>

commit e521813468f786271a87e78e8644243bead48fad upstream.

Ever since CQ/QAOB support was added, calling qdio_free() straight after
qdio_alloc() results in qdio_release_memory() accessing uninitialized
memory (ie. q->u.out.use_cq and q->u.out.aobs). Followed by a
kmem_cache_free() on the random AOB addresses.

For older kernels that don't have 6e30c549f6ca, the same applies if
qdio_establish() fails in the DEV_STATE_ONLINE check.

While initializing q->u.out.use_cq would be enough to fix this
particular bug, the more future-proof change is to just zero-alloc the
whole struct.

Fixes: 104ea556ee7f ("qdio: support asynchronous delivery of storage blocks")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> #v3.2+
Signed-off-by: Julian Wiedmann <jwi@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 drivers/s390/cio/qdio_setup.c |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/drivers/s390/cio/qdio_setup.c
+++ b/drivers/s390/cio/qdio_setup.c
@@ -140,7 +140,7 @@ static int __qdio_allocate_qs(struct qdi
 	int i;
 
 	for (i = 0; i < nr_queues; i++) {
-		q = kmem_cache_alloc(qdio_q_cache, GFP_KERNEL);
+		q = kmem_cache_zalloc(qdio_q_cache, GFP_KERNEL);
 		if (!q)
 			return -ENOMEM;
 

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 92+ messages in thread

* [PATCH 4.9 21/87] s390/cpum_sf: ensure sample frequency of perf event attributes is non-zero
  2018-05-21 21:10 [PATCH 4.9 00/87] 4.9.102-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (19 preceding siblings ...)
  2018-05-21 21:10 ` [PATCH 4.9 20/87] s390/qdio: fix access to uninitialized qdio_q fields Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2018-05-21 21:10 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
  2018-05-21 21:10 ` [PATCH 4.9 22/87] s390/qdio: dont release memory in qdio_setup_irq() Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (69 subsequent siblings)
  90 siblings, 0 replies; 92+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2018-05-21 21:10 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-kernel
  Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Heiko Carstens, Hendrik Brueckner,
	Martin Schwidefsky

4.9-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Hendrik Brueckner <brueckner@linux.ibm.com>

commit 4bbaf2584b86b0772413edeac22ff448f36351b1 upstream.

Correct a trinity finding for the perf_event_open() system call with
a perf event attribute structure that uses a frequency but has the
sampling frequency set to zero.  This causes a FP divide exception during
the sample rate initialization for the hardware sampling facility.

Fixes: 8c069ff4bd606 ("s390/perf: add support for the CPU-Measurement Sampling Facility")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 3.14+
Reviewed-by: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Hendrik Brueckner <brueckner@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 arch/s390/kernel/perf_cpum_sf.c |    4 ++++
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)

--- a/arch/s390/kernel/perf_cpum_sf.c
+++ b/arch/s390/kernel/perf_cpum_sf.c
@@ -739,6 +739,10 @@ static int __hw_perf_event_init(struct p
 	 */
 	rate = 0;
 	if (attr->freq) {
+		if (!attr->sample_freq) {
+			err = -EINVAL;
+			goto out;
+		}
 		rate = freq_to_sample_rate(&si, attr->sample_freq);
 		rate = hw_limit_rate(&si, rate);
 		attr->freq = 0;

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 92+ messages in thread

* [PATCH 4.9 22/87] s390/qdio: dont release memory in qdio_setup_irq()
  2018-05-21 21:10 [PATCH 4.9 00/87] 4.9.102-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (20 preceding siblings ...)
  2018-05-21 21:10 ` [PATCH 4.9 21/87] s390/cpum_sf: ensure sample frequency of perf event attributes is non-zero Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2018-05-21 21:10 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
  2018-05-21 21:10 ` [PATCH 4.9 23/87] s390: remove indirect branch from do_softirq_own_stack Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (68 subsequent siblings)
  90 siblings, 0 replies; 92+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2018-05-21 21:10 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-kernel
  Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Julian Wiedmann, Martin Schwidefsky

4.9-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Julian Wiedmann <jwi@linux.ibm.com>

commit 2e68adcd2fb21b7188ba449f0fab3bee2910e500 upstream.

Calling qdio_release_memory() on error is just plain wrong. It frees
the main qdio_irq struct, when following code still uses it.

Also, no other error path in qdio_establish() does this. So trust
callers to clean up via qdio_free() if some step of the QDIO
initialization fails.

Fixes: 779e6e1c724d ("[S390] qdio: new qdio driver.")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> #v2.6.27+
Signed-off-by: Julian Wiedmann <jwi@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 drivers/s390/cio/qdio_setup.c |   10 ++--------
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)

--- a/drivers/s390/cio/qdio_setup.c
+++ b/drivers/s390/cio/qdio_setup.c
@@ -456,7 +456,6 @@ int qdio_setup_irq(struct qdio_initializ
 {
 	struct ciw *ciw;
 	struct qdio_irq *irq_ptr = init_data->cdev->private->qdio_data;
-	int rc;
 
 	memset(&irq_ptr->qib, 0, sizeof(irq_ptr->qib));
 	memset(&irq_ptr->siga_flag, 0, sizeof(irq_ptr->siga_flag));
@@ -493,16 +492,14 @@ int qdio_setup_irq(struct qdio_initializ
 	ciw = ccw_device_get_ciw(init_data->cdev, CIW_TYPE_EQUEUE);
 	if (!ciw) {
 		DBF_ERROR("%4x NO EQ", irq_ptr->schid.sch_no);
-		rc = -EINVAL;
-		goto out_err;
+		return -EINVAL;
 	}
 	irq_ptr->equeue = *ciw;
 
 	ciw = ccw_device_get_ciw(init_data->cdev, CIW_TYPE_AQUEUE);
 	if (!ciw) {
 		DBF_ERROR("%4x NO AQ", irq_ptr->schid.sch_no);
-		rc = -EINVAL;
-		goto out_err;
+		return -EINVAL;
 	}
 	irq_ptr->aqueue = *ciw;
 
@@ -510,9 +507,6 @@ int qdio_setup_irq(struct qdio_initializ
 	irq_ptr->orig_handler = init_data->cdev->handler;
 	init_data->cdev->handler = qdio_int_handler;
 	return 0;
-out_err:
-	qdio_release_memory(irq_ptr);
-	return rc;
 }
 
 void qdio_print_subchannel_info(struct qdio_irq *irq_ptr,

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 92+ messages in thread

* [PATCH 4.9 23/87] s390: remove indirect branch from do_softirq_own_stack
  2018-05-21 21:10 [PATCH 4.9 00/87] 4.9.102-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (21 preceding siblings ...)
  2018-05-21 21:10 ` [PATCH 4.9 22/87] s390/qdio: dont release memory in qdio_setup_irq() Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2018-05-21 21:10 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
  2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.9 24/87] x86/pkeys: Override pkey when moving away from PROT_EXEC Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (67 subsequent siblings)
  90 siblings, 0 replies; 92+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2018-05-21 21:10 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-kernel
  Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Hendrik Brueckner, Martin Schwidefsky

4.9-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>

commit 9f18fff63cfd6f559daa1eaae60640372c65f84b upstream.

The inline assembly to call __do_softirq on the irq stack uses
an indirect branch. This can be replaced with a normal relative
branch.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.16
Fixes: f19fbd5ed6 ("s390: introduce execute-trampolines for branches")
Reviewed-by: Hendrik Brueckner <brueckner@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 arch/s390/kernel/irq.c |    5 ++---
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

--- a/arch/s390/kernel/irq.c
+++ b/arch/s390/kernel/irq.c
@@ -173,10 +173,9 @@ void do_softirq_own_stack(void)
 		new -= STACK_FRAME_OVERHEAD;
 		((struct stack_frame *) new)->back_chain = old;
 		asm volatile("   la    15,0(%0)\n"
-			     "   basr  14,%2\n"
+			     "   brasl 14,__do_softirq\n"
 			     "   la    15,0(%1)\n"
-			     : : "a" (new), "a" (old),
-			         "a" (__do_softirq)
+			     : : "a" (new), "a" (old)
 			     : "0", "1", "2", "3", "4", "5", "14",
 			       "cc", "memory" );
 	} else {

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 92+ messages in thread

* [PATCH 4.9 24/87] x86/pkeys: Override pkey when moving away from PROT_EXEC
  2018-05-21 21:10 [PATCH 4.9 00/87] 4.9.102-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (22 preceding siblings ...)
  2018-05-21 21:10 ` [PATCH 4.9 23/87] s390: remove indirect branch from do_softirq_own_stack Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2018-05-21 21:11 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
  2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.9 25/87] x86/pkeys: Do not special case protection key 0 Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (66 subsequent siblings)
  90 siblings, 0 replies; 92+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2018-05-21 21:11 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-kernel
  Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Shakeel Butt, Dave Hansen,
	Andrew Morton, Dave Hansen, Linus Torvalds, Michael Ellermen,
	Peter Zijlstra, Ram Pai, Shuah Khan, Thomas Gleixner, linux-mm,
	Ingo Molnar

4.9-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>

commit 0a0b152083cfc44ec1bb599b57b7aab41327f998 upstream.

I got a bug report that the following code (roughly) was
causing a SIGSEGV:

	mprotect(ptr, size, PROT_EXEC);
	mprotect(ptr, size, PROT_NONE);
	mprotect(ptr, size, PROT_READ);
	*ptr = 100;

The problem is hit when the mprotect(PROT_EXEC)
is implicitly assigned a protection key to the VMA, and made
that key ACCESS_DENY|WRITE_DENY.  The PROT_NONE mprotect()
failed to remove the protection key, and the PROT_NONE->
PROT_READ left the PTE usable, but the pkey still in place
and left the memory inaccessible.

To fix this, we ensure that we always "override" the pkee
at mprotect() if the VMA does not have execute-only
permissions, but the VMA has the execute-only pkey.

We had a check for PROT_READ/WRITE, but it did not work
for PROT_NONE.  This entirely removes the PROT_* checks,
which ensures that PROT_NONE now works.

Reported-by: Shakeel Butt <shakeelb@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Michael Ellermen <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Ram Pai <linuxram@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 62b5f7d013f ("mm/core, x86/mm/pkeys: Add execute-only protection keys support")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180509171351.084C5A71@viggo.jf.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 arch/x86/include/asm/pkeys.h |   12 +++++++++++-
 arch/x86/mm/pkeys.c          |   21 +++++++++++----------
 2 files changed, 22 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)

--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/pkeys.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/pkeys.h
@@ -1,6 +1,8 @@
 #ifndef _ASM_X86_PKEYS_H
 #define _ASM_X86_PKEYS_H
 
+#define ARCH_DEFAULT_PKEY	0
+
 #define arch_max_pkey() (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_OSPKE) ? 16 : 1)
 
 extern int arch_set_user_pkey_access(struct task_struct *tsk, int pkey,
@@ -14,7 +16,7 @@ extern int __execute_only_pkey(struct mm
 static inline int execute_only_pkey(struct mm_struct *mm)
 {
 	if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_OSPKE))
-		return 0;
+		return ARCH_DEFAULT_PKEY;
 
 	return __execute_only_pkey(mm);
 }
@@ -55,6 +57,14 @@ bool mm_pkey_is_allocated(struct mm_stru
 		return false;
 	if (pkey >= arch_max_pkey())
 		return false;
+	/*
+	 * The exec-only pkey is set in the allocation map, but
+	 * is not available to any of the user interfaces like
+	 * mprotect_pkey().
+	 */
+	if (pkey == mm->context.execute_only_pkey)
+		return false;
+
 	return mm_pkey_allocation_map(mm) & (1U << pkey);
 }
 
--- a/arch/x86/mm/pkeys.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/pkeys.c
@@ -95,26 +95,27 @@ int __arch_override_mprotect_pkey(struct
 	 */
 	if (pkey != -1)
 		return pkey;
-	/*
-	 * Look for a protection-key-drive execute-only mapping
-	 * which is now being given permissions that are not
-	 * execute-only.  Move it back to the default pkey.
-	 */
-	if (vma_is_pkey_exec_only(vma) &&
-	    (prot & (PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE))) {
-		return 0;
-	}
+
 	/*
 	 * The mapping is execute-only.  Go try to get the
 	 * execute-only protection key.  If we fail to do that,
 	 * fall through as if we do not have execute-only
-	 * support.
+	 * support in this mm.
 	 */
 	if (prot == PROT_EXEC) {
 		pkey = execute_only_pkey(vma->vm_mm);
 		if (pkey > 0)
 			return pkey;
+	} else if (vma_is_pkey_exec_only(vma)) {
+		/*
+		 * Protections are *not* PROT_EXEC, but the mapping
+		 * is using the exec-only pkey.  This mapping was
+		 * PROT_EXEC and will no longer be.  Move back to
+		 * the default pkey.
+		 */
+		return ARCH_DEFAULT_PKEY;
 	}
+
 	/*
 	 * This is a vanilla, non-pkey mprotect (or we failed to
 	 * setup execute-only), inherit the pkey from the VMA we

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 92+ messages in thread

* [PATCH 4.9 25/87] x86/pkeys: Do not special case protection key 0
  2018-05-21 21:10 [PATCH 4.9 00/87] 4.9.102-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (23 preceding siblings ...)
  2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.9 24/87] x86/pkeys: Override pkey when moving away from PROT_EXEC Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2018-05-21 21:11 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
  2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.9 26/87] efi: Avoid potential crashes, fix the struct efi_pci_io_protocol_32 definition for mixed mode Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (65 subsequent siblings)
  90 siblings, 0 replies; 92+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2018-05-21 21:11 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-kernel
  Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Dave Hansen, Dave Hansen,
	Linus Torvalds, Michael Ellermen, Peter Zijlstra, Ram Pai,
	Shuah Khan, Thomas Gleixner, linux-mm, Ingo Molnar,
	Andrew Morton

4.9-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>

commit 2fa9d1cfaf0e02f8abef0757002bff12dfcfa4e6 upstream.

mm_pkey_is_allocated() treats pkey 0 as unallocated.  That is
inconsistent with the manpages, and also inconsistent with
mm->context.pkey_allocation_map.  Stop special casing it and only
disallow values that are actually bad (< 0).

The end-user visible effect of this is that you can now use
mprotect_pkey() to set pkey=0.

This is a bit nicer than what Ram proposed[1] because it is simpler
and removes special-casing for pkey 0.  On the other hand, it does
allow applications to pkey_free() pkey-0, but that's just a silly
thing to do, so we are not going to protect against it.

The scenario that could happen is similar to what happens if you free
any other pkey that is in use: it might get reallocated later and used
to protect some other data.  The most likely scenario is that pkey-0
comes back from pkey_alloc(), an access-disable or write-disable bit
is set in PKRU for it, and the next stack access will SIGSEGV.  It's
not horribly different from if you mprotect()'d your stack or heap to
be unreadable or unwritable, which is generally very foolish, but also
not explicitly prevented by the kernel.

1. http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1522112702-27853-1-git-send-email-linuxram@us.ibm.com

Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>p
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Michael Ellermen <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Ram Pai <linuxram@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 58ab9a088dda ("x86/pkeys: Check against max pkey to avoid overflows")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180509171358.47FD785E@viggo.jf.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 arch/x86/include/asm/mmu_context.h |    2 +-
 arch/x86/include/asm/pkeys.h       |    6 +++---
 2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/mmu_context.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/mmu_context.h
@@ -113,7 +113,7 @@ static inline int init_new_context(struc
 
 	#ifdef CONFIG_X86_INTEL_MEMORY_PROTECTION_KEYS
 	if (cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_OSPKE)) {
-		/* pkey 0 is the default and always allocated */
+		/* pkey 0 is the default and allocated implicitly */
 		mm->context.pkey_allocation_map = 0x1;
 		/* -1 means unallocated or invalid */
 		mm->context.execute_only_pkey = -1;
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/pkeys.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/pkeys.h
@@ -50,10 +50,10 @@ bool mm_pkey_is_allocated(struct mm_stru
 {
 	/*
 	 * "Allocated" pkeys are those that have been returned
-	 * from pkey_alloc().  pkey 0 is special, and never
-	 * returned from pkey_alloc().
+	 * from pkey_alloc() or pkey 0 which is allocated
+	 * implicitly when the mm is created.
 	 */
-	if (pkey <= 0)
+	if (pkey < 0)
 		return false;
 	if (pkey >= arch_max_pkey())
 		return false;

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 92+ messages in thread

* [PATCH 4.9 26/87] efi: Avoid potential crashes, fix the struct efi_pci_io_protocol_32 definition for mixed mode
  2018-05-21 21:10 [PATCH 4.9 00/87] 4.9.102-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (24 preceding siblings ...)
  2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.9 25/87] x86/pkeys: Do not special case protection key 0 Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2018-05-21 21:11 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
  2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.9 27/87] ARM: 8771/1: kprobes: Prohibit kprobes on do_undefinstr Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (64 subsequent siblings)
  90 siblings, 0 replies; 92+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2018-05-21 21:11 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-kernel
  Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Hans de Goede, Ard Biesheuvel,
	Linus Torvalds, Matt Fleming, Peter Zijlstra, Thomas Gleixner,
	linux-efi, Ingo Molnar

4.9-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>

commit 0b3225ab9407f557a8e20f23f37aa7236c10a9b1 upstream.

Mixed mode allows a kernel built for x86_64 to interact with 32-bit
EFI firmware, but requires us to define all struct definitions carefully
when it comes to pointer sizes.

'struct efi_pci_io_protocol_32' currently uses a 'void *' for the
'romimage' field, which will be interpreted as a 64-bit field
on such kernels, potentially resulting in bogus memory references
and subsequent crashes.

Tested-by: Hans de Goede <hdegoede@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180504060003.19618-13-ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 arch/x86/boot/compressed/eboot.c |    6 ++++--
 include/linux/efi.h              |    8 ++++----
 2 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)

--- a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/eboot.c
+++ b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/eboot.c
@@ -330,7 +330,8 @@ __setup_efi_pci32(efi_pci_io_protocol_32
 	if (status != EFI_SUCCESS)
 		goto free_struct;
 
-	memcpy(rom->romdata, pci->romimage, pci->romsize);
+	memcpy(rom->romdata, (void *)(unsigned long)pci->romimage,
+	       pci->romsize);
 	return status;
 
 free_struct:
@@ -436,7 +437,8 @@ __setup_efi_pci64(efi_pci_io_protocol_64
 	if (status != EFI_SUCCESS)
 		goto free_struct;
 
-	memcpy(rom->romdata, pci->romimage, pci->romsize);
+	memcpy(rom->romdata, (void *)(unsigned long)pci->romimage,
+	       pci->romsize);
 	return status;
 
 free_struct:
--- a/include/linux/efi.h
+++ b/include/linux/efi.h
@@ -380,8 +380,8 @@ typedef struct {
 	u32 attributes;
 	u32 get_bar_attributes;
 	u32 set_bar_attributes;
-	uint64_t romsize;
-	void *romimage;
+	u64 romsize;
+	u32 romimage;
 } efi_pci_io_protocol_32;
 
 typedef struct {
@@ -400,8 +400,8 @@ typedef struct {
 	u64 attributes;
 	u64 get_bar_attributes;
 	u64 set_bar_attributes;
-	uint64_t romsize;
-	void *romimage;
+	u64 romsize;
+	u64 romimage;
 } efi_pci_io_protocol_64;
 
 typedef struct {

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 92+ messages in thread

* [PATCH 4.9 27/87] ARM: 8771/1: kprobes: Prohibit kprobes on do_undefinstr
  2018-05-21 21:10 [PATCH 4.9 00/87] 4.9.102-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (25 preceding siblings ...)
  2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.9 26/87] efi: Avoid potential crashes, fix the struct efi_pci_io_protocol_32 definition for mixed mode Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2018-05-21 21:11 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
  2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.9 28/87] tick/broadcast: Use for_each_cpu() specially on UP kernels Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (63 subsequent siblings)
  90 siblings, 0 replies; 92+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2018-05-21 21:11 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-kernel; +Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Masami Hiramatsu, Russell King

4.9-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>

commit eb0146daefdde65665b7f076fbff7b49dade95b9 upstream.

Prohibit kprobes on do_undefinstr because kprobes on
arm is implemented by undefined instruction. This means
if we probe do_undefinstr(), it can cause infinit
recursive exception.

Fixes: 24ba613c9d6c ("ARM kprobes: core code")
Signed-off-by: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@armlinux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 arch/arm/kernel/traps.c |    5 ++++-
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/arch/arm/kernel/traps.c
+++ b/arch/arm/kernel/traps.c
@@ -19,6 +19,7 @@
 #include <linux/uaccess.h>
 #include <linux/hardirq.h>
 #include <linux/kdebug.h>
+#include <linux/kprobes.h>
 #include <linux/module.h>
 #include <linux/kexec.h>
 #include <linux/bug.h>
@@ -415,7 +416,8 @@ void unregister_undef_hook(struct undef_
 	raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore(&undef_lock, flags);
 }
 
-static int call_undef_hook(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned int instr)
+static nokprobe_inline
+int call_undef_hook(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned int instr)
 {
 	struct undef_hook *hook;
 	unsigned long flags;
@@ -488,6 +490,7 @@ die_sig:
 
 	arm_notify_die("Oops - undefined instruction", regs, &info, 0, 6);
 }
+NOKPROBE_SYMBOL(do_undefinstr)
 
 /*
  * Handle FIQ similarly to NMI on x86 systems.

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 92+ messages in thread

* [PATCH 4.9 28/87] tick/broadcast: Use for_each_cpu() specially on UP kernels
  2018-05-21 21:10 [PATCH 4.9 00/87] 4.9.102-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (26 preceding siblings ...)
  2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.9 27/87] ARM: 8771/1: kprobes: Prohibit kprobes on do_undefinstr Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2018-05-21 21:11 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
  2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.9 29/87] ARM: 8769/1: kprobes: Fix to use get_kprobe_ctlblk after irq-disabed Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (62 subsequent siblings)
  90 siblings, 0 replies; 92+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2018-05-21 21:11 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-kernel
  Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Dexuan Cui, Thomas Gleixner,
	Josh Poulson, Michael Kelley (EOSG),
	Peter Zijlstra, Frederic Weisbecker, Rakib Mullick, Jork Loeser,
	Andrew Morton, KY Srinivasan, Linus Torvalds, Alexey Dobriyan,
	Dmitry Vyukov

4.9-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Dexuan Cui <decui@microsoft.com>

commit 5596fe34495cf0f645f417eb928ef224df3e3cb4 upstream.

for_each_cpu() unintuitively reports CPU0 as set independent of the actual
cpumask content on UP kernels. This causes an unexpected PIT interrupt
storm on a UP kernel running in an SMP virtual machine on Hyper-V, and as
a result, the virtual machine can suffer from a strange random delay of 1~20
minutes during boot-up, and sometimes it can hang forever.

Protect if by checking whether the cpumask is empty before entering the
for_each_cpu() loop.

[ tglx: Use !IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SMP) instead of #ifdeffery ]

Signed-off-by: Dexuan Cui <decui@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Josh Poulson <jopoulso@microsoft.com>
Cc: "Michael Kelley (EOSG)" <Michael.H.Kelley@microsoft.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Rakib Mullick <rakib.mullick@gmail.com>
Cc: Jork Loeser <Jork.Loeser@microsoft.com>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: KY Srinivasan <kys@microsoft.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/KL1P15301MB000678289FE55BA365B3279ABF990@KL1P15301MB0006.APCP153.PROD.OUTLOOK.COM
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/KL1P15301MB0006FA63BC22BEB64902EAA0BF930@KL1P15301MB0006.APCP153.PROD.OUTLOOK.COM
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 kernel/time/tick-broadcast.c |    8 ++++++++
 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+)

--- a/kernel/time/tick-broadcast.c
+++ b/kernel/time/tick-broadcast.c
@@ -610,6 +610,14 @@ static void tick_handle_oneshot_broadcas
 	now = ktime_get();
 	/* Find all expired events */
 	for_each_cpu(cpu, tick_broadcast_oneshot_mask) {
+		/*
+		 * Required for !SMP because for_each_cpu() reports
+		 * unconditionally CPU0 as set on UP kernels.
+		 */
+		if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SMP) &&
+		    cpumask_empty(tick_broadcast_oneshot_mask))
+			break;
+
 		td = &per_cpu(tick_cpu_device, cpu);
 		if (td->evtdev->next_event.tv64 <= now.tv64) {
 			cpumask_set_cpu(cpu, tmpmask);

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 92+ messages in thread

* [PATCH 4.9 29/87] ARM: 8769/1: kprobes: Fix to use get_kprobe_ctlblk after irq-disabed
  2018-05-21 21:10 [PATCH 4.9 00/87] 4.9.102-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (27 preceding siblings ...)
  2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.9 28/87] tick/broadcast: Use for_each_cpu() specially on UP kernels Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2018-05-21 21:11 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
  2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.9 30/87] ARM: 8770/1: kprobes: Prohibit probing on optimized_callback Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (61 subsequent siblings)
  90 siblings, 0 replies; 92+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2018-05-21 21:11 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-kernel; +Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Masami Hiramatsu, Russell King

4.9-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>

commit 69af7e23a6870df2ea6fa79ca16493d59b3eebeb upstream.

Since get_kprobe_ctlblk() uses smp_processor_id() to access
per-cpu variable, it hits smp_processor_id sanity check as below.

[    7.006928] BUG: using smp_processor_id() in preemptible [00000000] code: swapper/0/1
[    7.007859] caller is debug_smp_processor_id+0x20/0x24
[    7.008438] CPU: 0 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 4.16.0-rc1-00192-g4eb17253e4b5 #1
[    7.008890] Hardware name: Generic DT based system
[    7.009917] [<c0313f0c>] (unwind_backtrace) from [<c030e6d8>] (show_stack+0x20/0x24)
[    7.010473] [<c030e6d8>] (show_stack) from [<c0c64694>] (dump_stack+0x84/0x98)
[    7.010990] [<c0c64694>] (dump_stack) from [<c071ca5c>] (check_preemption_disabled+0x138/0x13c)
[    7.011592] [<c071ca5c>] (check_preemption_disabled) from [<c071ca80>] (debug_smp_processor_id+0x20/0x24)
[    7.012214] [<c071ca80>] (debug_smp_processor_id) from [<c03335e0>] (optimized_callback+0x2c/0xe4)
[    7.013077] [<c03335e0>] (optimized_callback) from [<bf0021b0>] (0xbf0021b0)

To fix this issue, call get_kprobe_ctlblk() right after
irq-disabled since that disables preemption.

Fixes: 0dc016dbd820 ("ARM: kprobes: enable OPTPROBES for ARM 32")
Signed-off-by: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@armlinux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 arch/arm/probes/kprobes/opt-arm.c |    3 ++-
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/arch/arm/probes/kprobes/opt-arm.c
+++ b/arch/arm/probes/kprobes/opt-arm.c
@@ -165,13 +165,14 @@ optimized_callback(struct optimized_kpro
 {
 	unsigned long flags;
 	struct kprobe *p = &op->kp;
-	struct kprobe_ctlblk *kcb = get_kprobe_ctlblk();
+	struct kprobe_ctlblk *kcb;
 
 	/* Save skipped registers */
 	regs->ARM_pc = (unsigned long)op->kp.addr;
 	regs->ARM_ORIG_r0 = ~0UL;
 
 	local_irq_save(flags);
+	kcb = get_kprobe_ctlblk();
 
 	if (kprobe_running()) {
 		kprobes_inc_nmissed_count(&op->kp);

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 92+ messages in thread

* [PATCH 4.9 30/87] ARM: 8770/1: kprobes: Prohibit probing on optimized_callback
  2018-05-21 21:10 [PATCH 4.9 00/87] 4.9.102-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (28 preceding siblings ...)
  2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.9 29/87] ARM: 8769/1: kprobes: Fix to use get_kprobe_ctlblk after irq-disabed Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2018-05-21 21:11 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
  2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.9 31/87] ARM: 8772/1: kprobes: Prohibit kprobes on get_user functions Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (60 subsequent siblings)
  90 siblings, 0 replies; 92+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2018-05-21 21:11 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-kernel; +Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Masami Hiramatsu, Russell King

4.9-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>

commit 70948c05fdde0aac32f9667856a88725c192fa40 upstream.

Prohibit probing on optimized_callback() because
it is called from kprobes itself. If we put a kprobes
on it, that will cause a recursive call loop.
Mark it NOKPROBE_SYMBOL.

Fixes: 0dc016dbd820 ("ARM: kprobes: enable OPTPROBES for ARM 32")
Signed-off-by: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@armlinux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 arch/arm/probes/kprobes/opt-arm.c |    1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)

--- a/arch/arm/probes/kprobes/opt-arm.c
+++ b/arch/arm/probes/kprobes/opt-arm.c
@@ -192,6 +192,7 @@ optimized_callback(struct optimized_kpro
 
 	local_irq_restore(flags);
 }
+NOKPROBE_SYMBOL(optimized_callback)
 
 int arch_prepare_optimized_kprobe(struct optimized_kprobe *op, struct kprobe *orig)
 {

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 92+ messages in thread

* [PATCH 4.9 31/87] ARM: 8772/1: kprobes: Prohibit kprobes on get_user functions
  2018-05-21 21:10 [PATCH 4.9 00/87] 4.9.102-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (29 preceding siblings ...)
  2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.9 30/87] ARM: 8770/1: kprobes: Prohibit probing on optimized_callback Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2018-05-21 21:11 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
  2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.9 32/87] Btrfs: fix xattr loss after power failure Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (59 subsequent siblings)
  90 siblings, 0 replies; 92+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2018-05-21 21:11 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-kernel; +Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Masami Hiramatsu, Russell King

4.9-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>

commit 0d73c3f8e7f6ee2aab1bb350f60c180f5ae21a2c upstream.

Since do_undefinstr() uses get_user to get the undefined
instruction, it can be called before kprobes processes
recursive check. This can cause an infinit recursive
exception.
Prohibit probing on get_user functions.

Fixes: 24ba613c9d6c ("ARM kprobes: core code")
Signed-off-by: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@armlinux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 arch/arm/include/asm/assembler.h |   10 ++++++++++
 arch/arm/lib/getuser.S           |   10 ++++++++++
 2 files changed, 20 insertions(+)

--- a/arch/arm/include/asm/assembler.h
+++ b/arch/arm/include/asm/assembler.h
@@ -534,4 +534,14 @@ THUMB(	orr	\reg , \reg , #PSR_T_BIT	)
 #endif
 	.endm
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_KPROBES
+#define _ASM_NOKPROBE(entry)				\
+	.pushsection "_kprobe_blacklist", "aw" ;	\
+	.balign 4 ;					\
+	.long entry;					\
+	.popsection
+#else
+#define _ASM_NOKPROBE(entry)
+#endif
+
 #endif /* __ASM_ASSEMBLER_H__ */
--- a/arch/arm/lib/getuser.S
+++ b/arch/arm/lib/getuser.S
@@ -38,6 +38,7 @@ ENTRY(__get_user_1)
 	mov	r0, #0
 	ret	lr
 ENDPROC(__get_user_1)
+_ASM_NOKPROBE(__get_user_1)
 
 ENTRY(__get_user_2)
 	check_uaccess r0, 2, r1, r2, __get_user_bad
@@ -58,6 +59,7 @@ rb	.req	r0
 	mov	r0, #0
 	ret	lr
 ENDPROC(__get_user_2)
+_ASM_NOKPROBE(__get_user_2)
 
 ENTRY(__get_user_4)
 	check_uaccess r0, 4, r1, r2, __get_user_bad
@@ -65,6 +67,7 @@ ENTRY(__get_user_4)
 	mov	r0, #0
 	ret	lr
 ENDPROC(__get_user_4)
+_ASM_NOKPROBE(__get_user_4)
 
 ENTRY(__get_user_8)
 	check_uaccess r0, 8, r1, r2, __get_user_bad8
@@ -78,6 +81,7 @@ ENTRY(__get_user_8)
 	mov	r0, #0
 	ret	lr
 ENDPROC(__get_user_8)
+_ASM_NOKPROBE(__get_user_8)
 
 #ifdef __ARMEB__
 ENTRY(__get_user_32t_8)
@@ -91,6 +95,7 @@ ENTRY(__get_user_32t_8)
 	mov	r0, #0
 	ret	lr
 ENDPROC(__get_user_32t_8)
+_ASM_NOKPROBE(__get_user_32t_8)
 
 ENTRY(__get_user_64t_1)
 	check_uaccess r0, 1, r1, r2, __get_user_bad8
@@ -98,6 +103,7 @@ ENTRY(__get_user_64t_1)
 	mov	r0, #0
 	ret	lr
 ENDPROC(__get_user_64t_1)
+_ASM_NOKPROBE(__get_user_64t_1)
 
 ENTRY(__get_user_64t_2)
 	check_uaccess r0, 2, r1, r2, __get_user_bad8
@@ -114,6 +120,7 @@ rb	.req	r0
 	mov	r0, #0
 	ret	lr
 ENDPROC(__get_user_64t_2)
+_ASM_NOKPROBE(__get_user_64t_2)
 
 ENTRY(__get_user_64t_4)
 	check_uaccess r0, 4, r1, r2, __get_user_bad8
@@ -121,6 +128,7 @@ ENTRY(__get_user_64t_4)
 	mov	r0, #0
 	ret	lr
 ENDPROC(__get_user_64t_4)
+_ASM_NOKPROBE(__get_user_64t_4)
 #endif
 
 __get_user_bad8:
@@ -131,6 +139,8 @@ __get_user_bad:
 	ret	lr
 ENDPROC(__get_user_bad)
 ENDPROC(__get_user_bad8)
+_ASM_NOKPROBE(__get_user_bad)
+_ASM_NOKPROBE(__get_user_bad8)
 
 .pushsection __ex_table, "a"
 	.long	1b, __get_user_bad

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 92+ messages in thread

* [PATCH 4.9 32/87] Btrfs: fix xattr loss after power failure
  2018-05-21 21:10 [PATCH 4.9 00/87] 4.9.102-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (30 preceding siblings ...)
  2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.9 31/87] ARM: 8772/1: kprobes: Prohibit kprobes on get_user functions Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2018-05-21 21:11 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
  2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.9 33/87] btrfs: fix crash when trying to resume balance without the resume flag Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (58 subsequent siblings)
  90 siblings, 0 replies; 92+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2018-05-21 21:11 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-kernel; +Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Filipe Manana, David Sterba

4.9-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com>

commit 9a8fca62aacc1599fea8e813d01e1955513e4fad upstream.

If a file has xattrs, we fsync it, to ensure we clear the flags
BTRFS_INODE_NEEDS_FULL_SYNC and BTRFS_INODE_COPY_EVERYTHING from its
inode, the current transaction commits and then we fsync it (without
either of those bits being set in its inode), we end up not logging
all its xattrs. This results in deleting all xattrs when replying the
log after a power failure.

Trivial reproducer

  $ mkfs.btrfs -f /dev/sdb
  $ mount /dev/sdb /mnt

  $ touch /mnt/foobar
  $ setfattr -n user.xa -v qwerty /mnt/foobar
  $ xfs_io -c "fsync" /mnt/foobar

  $ sync

  $ xfs_io -c "pwrite -S 0xab 0 64K" /mnt/foobar
  $ xfs_io -c "fsync" /mnt/foobar
  <power failure>

  $ mount /dev/sdb /mnt
  $ getfattr --absolute-names --dump /mnt/foobar
  <empty output>
  $

So fix this by making sure all xattrs are logged if we log a file's inode
item and neither the flags BTRFS_INODE_NEEDS_FULL_SYNC nor
BTRFS_INODE_COPY_EVERYTHING were set in the inode.

Fixes: 36283bf777d9 ("Btrfs: fix fsync xattr loss in the fast fsync path")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 4.2+
Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 fs/btrfs/tree-log.c |    7 +++++++
 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+)

--- a/fs/btrfs/tree-log.c
+++ b/fs/btrfs/tree-log.c
@@ -4614,6 +4614,7 @@ static int btrfs_log_inode(struct btrfs_
 	struct extent_map_tree *em_tree = &BTRFS_I(inode)->extent_tree;
 	u64 logged_isize = 0;
 	bool need_log_inode_item = true;
+	bool xattrs_logged = false;
 
 	path = btrfs_alloc_path();
 	if (!path)
@@ -4918,6 +4919,7 @@ next_key:
 	err = btrfs_log_all_xattrs(trans, root, inode, path, dst_path);
 	if (err)
 		goto out_unlock;
+	xattrs_logged = true;
 	if (max_key.type >= BTRFS_EXTENT_DATA_KEY && !fast_search) {
 		btrfs_release_path(path);
 		btrfs_release_path(dst_path);
@@ -4930,6 +4932,11 @@ log_extents:
 	btrfs_release_path(dst_path);
 	if (need_log_inode_item) {
 		err = log_inode_item(trans, log, dst_path, inode);
+		if (!err && !xattrs_logged) {
+			err = btrfs_log_all_xattrs(trans, root, inode, path,
+						   dst_path);
+			btrfs_release_path(path);
+		}
 		if (err)
 			goto out_unlock;
 	}

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 92+ messages in thread

* [PATCH 4.9 33/87] btrfs: fix crash when trying to resume balance without the resume flag
  2018-05-21 21:10 [PATCH 4.9 00/87] 4.9.102-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (31 preceding siblings ...)
  2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.9 32/87] Btrfs: fix xattr loss after power failure Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2018-05-21 21:11 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
  2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.9 34/87] x86/amd: dont set X86_BUG_SYSRET_SS_ATTRS when running under Xen Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (57 subsequent siblings)
  90 siblings, 0 replies; 92+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2018-05-21 21:11 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-kernel; +Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Anand Jain, David Sterba

4.9-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Anand Jain <anand.jain@oracle.com>

commit 02ee654d3a04563c67bfe658a05384548b9bb105 upstream.

We set the BTRFS_BALANCE_RESUME flag in the btrfs_recover_balance()
only, which isn't called during the remount. So when resuming from
the paused balance we hit the bug:

 kernel: kernel BUG at fs/btrfs/volumes.c:3890!
 ::
 kernel:  balance_kthread+0x51/0x60 [btrfs]
 kernel:  kthread+0x111/0x130
 ::
 kernel: RIP: btrfs_balance+0x12e1/0x1570 [btrfs] RSP: ffffba7d0090bde8

Reproducer:
  On a mounted filesystem:

  btrfs balance start --full-balance /btrfs
  btrfs balance pause /btrfs
  mount -o remount,ro /dev/sdb /btrfs
  mount -o remount,rw /dev/sdb /btrfs

To fix this set the BTRFS_BALANCE_RESUME flag in
btrfs_resume_balance_async().

CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.4+
Signed-off-by: Anand Jain <anand.jain@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 fs/btrfs/volumes.c |    9 +++++++++
 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+)

--- a/fs/btrfs/volumes.c
+++ b/fs/btrfs/volumes.c
@@ -3966,6 +3966,15 @@ int btrfs_resume_balance_async(struct bt
 		return 0;
 	}
 
+	/*
+	 * A ro->rw remount sequence should continue with the paused balance
+	 * regardless of who pauses it, system or the user as of now, so set
+	 * the resume flag.
+	 */
+	spin_lock(&fs_info->balance_lock);
+	fs_info->balance_ctl->flags |= BTRFS_BALANCE_RESUME;
+	spin_unlock(&fs_info->balance_lock);
+
 	tsk = kthread_run(balance_kthread, fs_info, "btrfs-balance");
 	return PTR_ERR_OR_ZERO(tsk);
 }

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 92+ messages in thread

* [PATCH 4.9 34/87] x86/amd: dont set X86_BUG_SYSRET_SS_ATTRS when running under Xen
  2018-05-21 21:10 [PATCH 4.9 00/87] 4.9.102-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (32 preceding siblings ...)
  2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.9 33/87] btrfs: fix crash when trying to resume balance without the resume flag Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2018-05-21 21:11 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
  2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.9 35/87] btrfs: fix reading stale metadata blocks after degraded raid1 mounts Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (56 subsequent siblings)
  90 siblings, 0 replies; 92+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2018-05-21 21:11 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-kernel
  Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Juergen Gross, Boris Ostrovsky,
	Thomas Gleixner, David Woodhouse

4.9-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

commit def9331a12977770cc6132d79f8e6565871e8e38 upstream

When running as Xen pv guest X86_BUG_SYSRET_SS_ATTRS must not be set
on AMD cpus.

This bug/feature bit is kind of special as it will be used very early
when switching threads. Setting the bit and clearing it a little bit
later leaves a critical window where things can go wrong. This time
window has enlarged a little bit by using setup_clear_cpu_cap() instead
of the hypervisor's set_cpu_features callback. It seems this larger
window now makes it rather easy to hit the problem.

The proper solution is to never set the bit in case of Xen.

Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c |    5 +++--
 arch/x86/xen/enlighten.c  |    4 +---
 2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)

--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c
@@ -824,8 +824,9 @@ static void init_amd(struct cpuinfo_x86
 		if (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_3DNOW) || cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_LM))
 			set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_3DNOWPREFETCH);
 
-	/* AMD CPUs don't reset SS attributes on SYSRET */
-	set_cpu_bug(c, X86_BUG_SYSRET_SS_ATTRS);
+	/* AMD CPUs don't reset SS attributes on SYSRET, Xen does. */
+	if (!cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_XENPV))
+		set_cpu_bug(c, X86_BUG_SYSRET_SS_ATTRS);
 }
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
--- a/arch/x86/xen/enlighten.c
+++ b/arch/x86/xen/enlighten.c
@@ -1977,10 +1977,8 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(xen_hvm_need_lapic);
 
 static void xen_set_cpu_features(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
 {
-	if (xen_pv_domain()) {
-		clear_cpu_bug(c, X86_BUG_SYSRET_SS_ATTRS);
+	if (xen_pv_domain())
 		set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_XENPV);
-	}
 }
 
 static void xen_pin_vcpu(int cpu)

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 92+ messages in thread

* [PATCH 4.9 35/87] btrfs: fix reading stale metadata blocks after degraded raid1 mounts
  2018-05-21 21:10 [PATCH 4.9 00/87] 4.9.102-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (33 preceding siblings ...)
  2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.9 34/87] x86/amd: dont set X86_BUG_SYSRET_SS_ATTRS when running under Xen Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2018-05-21 21:11 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
  2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.9 36/87] x86/nospec: Simplify alternative_msr_write() Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (55 subsequent siblings)
  90 siblings, 0 replies; 92+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2018-05-21 21:11 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-kernel
  Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Liu Bo, Filipe Manana, Qu Wenruo,
	David Sterba, Nikolay Borisov

4.9-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Liu Bo <bo.liu@linux.alibaba.com>

commit 02a3307aa9c20b4f6626255b028f07f6cfa16feb upstream.

If a btree block, aka. extent buffer, is not available in the extent
buffer cache, it'll be read out from the disk instead, i.e.

btrfs_search_slot()
  read_block_for_search()  # hold parent and its lock, go to read child
    btrfs_release_path()
    read_tree_block()  # read child

Unfortunately, the parent lock got released before reading child, so
commit 5bdd3536cbbe ("Btrfs: Fix block generation verification race") had
used 0 as parent transid to read the child block.  It forces
read_tree_block() not to check if parent transid is different with the
generation id of the child that it reads out from disk.

A simple PoC is included in btrfs/124,

0. A two-disk raid1 btrfs,

1. Right after mkfs.btrfs, block A is allocated to be device tree's root.

2. Mount this filesystem and put it in use, after a while, device tree's
   root got COW but block A hasn't been allocated/overwritten yet.

3. Umount it and reload the btrfs module to remove both disks from the
   global @fs_devices list.

4. mount -odegraded dev1 and write some data, so now block A is allocated
   to be a leaf in checksum tree.  Note that only dev1 has the latest
   metadata of this filesystem.

5. Umount it and mount it again normally (with both disks), since raid1
   can pick up one disk by the writer task's pid, if btrfs_search_slot()
   needs to read block A, dev2 which does NOT have the latest metadata
   might be read for block A, then we got a stale block A.

6. As parent transid is not checked, block A is marked as uptodate and
   put into the extent buffer cache, so the future search won't bother
   to read disk again, which means it'll make changes on this stale
   one and make it dirty and flush it onto disk.

To avoid the problem, parent transid needs to be passed to
read_tree_block().

In order to get a valid parent transid, we need to hold the parent's
lock until finishing reading child.

This patch needs to be slightly adapted for stable kernels, the
&first_key parameter added to read_tree_block() is from 4.16+
(581c1760415c4). The fix is to replace 0 by 'gen'.

Fixes: 5bdd3536cbbe ("Btrfs: Fix block generation verification race")
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.4+
Signed-off-by: Liu Bo <bo.liu@linux.alibaba.com>
Reviewed-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Qu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com>
[ update changelog ]
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Nikolay Borisov <nborisov@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 fs/btrfs/ctree.c |    6 +++---
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

--- a/fs/btrfs/ctree.c
+++ b/fs/btrfs/ctree.c
@@ -2486,10 +2486,8 @@ read_block_for_search(struct btrfs_trans
 	if (p->reada != READA_NONE)
 		reada_for_search(root, p, level, slot, key->objectid);
 
-	btrfs_release_path(p);
-
 	ret = -EAGAIN;
-	tmp = read_tree_block(root, blocknr, 0);
+	tmp = read_tree_block(root, blocknr, gen);
 	if (!IS_ERR(tmp)) {
 		/*
 		 * If the read above didn't mark this buffer up to date,
@@ -2503,6 +2501,8 @@ read_block_for_search(struct btrfs_trans
 	} else {
 		ret = PTR_ERR(tmp);
 	}
+
+	btrfs_release_path(p);
 	return ret;
 }
 

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 92+ messages in thread

* [PATCH 4.9 36/87] x86/nospec: Simplify alternative_msr_write()
  2018-05-21 21:10 [PATCH 4.9 00/87] 4.9.102-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (34 preceding siblings ...)
  2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.9 35/87] btrfs: fix reading stale metadata blocks after degraded raid1 mounts Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2018-05-21 21:11 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
  2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.9 37/87] x86/bugs: Concentrate bug detection into a separate function Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (54 subsequent siblings)
  90 siblings, 0 replies; 92+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2018-05-21 21:11 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-kernel
  Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Linus Torvalds, Thomas Gleixner,
	Ingo Molnar, David Woodhouse

4.9-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

commit 1aa7a5735a41418d8e01fa7c9565eb2657e2ea3f upstream

The macro is not type safe and I did look for why that "g" constraint for
the asm doesn't work: it's because the asm is more fundamentally wrong.

It does

        movl %[val], %%eax

but "val" isn't a 32-bit value, so then gcc will pass it in a register,
and generate code like

        movl %rsi, %eax

and gas will complain about a nonsensical 'mov' instruction (it's moving a
64-bit register to a 32-bit one).

Passing it through memory will just hide the real bug - gcc still thinks
the memory location is 64-bit, but the "movl" will only load the first 32
bits and it all happens to work because x86 is little-endian.

Convert it to a type safe inline function with a little trick which hands
the feature into the ALTERNATIVE macro.

Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h |   19 ++++++++++---------
 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)

--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
@@ -241,15 +241,16 @@ static inline void vmexit_fill_RSB(void)
 #endif
 }
 
-#define alternative_msr_write(_msr, _val, _feature)		\
-	asm volatile(ALTERNATIVE("",				\
-				 "movl %[msr], %%ecx\n\t"	\
-				 "movl %[val], %%eax\n\t"	\
-				 "movl $0, %%edx\n\t"		\
-				 "wrmsr",			\
-				 _feature)			\
-		     : : [msr] "i" (_msr), [val] "i" (_val)	\
-		     : "eax", "ecx", "edx", "memory")
+static __always_inline
+void alternative_msr_write(unsigned int msr, u64 val, unsigned int feature)
+{
+	asm volatile(ALTERNATIVE("", "wrmsr", %c[feature])
+		: : "c" (msr),
+		    "a" (val),
+		    "d" (val >> 32),
+		    [feature] "i" (feature)
+		: "memory");
+}
 
 static inline void indirect_branch_prediction_barrier(void)
 {

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 92+ messages in thread

* [PATCH 4.9 37/87] x86/bugs: Concentrate bug detection into a separate function
  2018-05-21 21:10 [PATCH 4.9 00/87] 4.9.102-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (35 preceding siblings ...)
  2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.9 36/87] x86/nospec: Simplify alternative_msr_write() Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2018-05-21 21:11 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
  2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.9 38/87] x86/bugs: Concentrate bug reporting " Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (53 subsequent siblings)
  90 siblings, 0 replies; 92+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2018-05-21 21:11 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-kernel
  Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Borislav Petkov,
	Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk, Thomas Gleixner, Ingo Molnar,
	David Woodhouse

4.9-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>

commit 4a28bfe3267b68e22c663ac26185aa16c9b879ef upstream

Combine the various logic which goes through all those
x86_cpu_id matching structures in one function.

Suggested-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c |   21 +++++++++++----------
 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)

--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
@@ -879,21 +879,27 @@ static const __initconst struct x86_cpu_
 	{}
 };
 
-static bool __init cpu_vulnerable_to_meltdown(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
+static void __init cpu_set_bug_bits(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
 {
 	u64 ia32_cap = 0;
 
+	if (x86_match_cpu(cpu_no_speculation))
+		return;
+
+	setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V1);
+	setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V2);
+
 	if (x86_match_cpu(cpu_no_meltdown))
-		return false;
+		return;
 
 	if (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_ARCH_CAPABILITIES))
 		rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES, ia32_cap);
 
 	/* Rogue Data Cache Load? No! */
 	if (ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_RDCL_NO)
-		return false;
+		return;
 
-	return true;
+	setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_CPU_MELTDOWN);
 }
 
 /*
@@ -942,12 +948,7 @@ static void __init early_identify_cpu(st
 
 	setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_ALWAYS);
 
-	if (!x86_match_cpu(cpu_no_speculation)) {
-		if (cpu_vulnerable_to_meltdown(c))
-			setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_CPU_MELTDOWN);
-		setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V1);
-		setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V2);
-	}
+	cpu_set_bug_bits(c);
 
 	fpu__init_system(c);
 

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 92+ messages in thread

* [PATCH 4.9 38/87] x86/bugs: Concentrate bug reporting into a separate function
  2018-05-21 21:10 [PATCH 4.9 00/87] 4.9.102-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (36 preceding siblings ...)
  2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.9 37/87] x86/bugs: Concentrate bug detection into a separate function Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2018-05-21 21:11 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
  2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.9 39/87] x86/bugs: Read SPEC_CTRL MSR during boot and re-use reserved bits Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (52 subsequent siblings)
  90 siblings, 0 replies; 92+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2018-05-21 21:11 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-kernel
  Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Borislav Petkov,
	Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk, Thomas Gleixner, Ingo Molnar,
	David Woodhouse

4.9-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>

commit d1059518b4789cabe34bb4b714d07e6089c82ca1 upstream

Those SysFS functions have a similar preamble, as such make common
code to handle them.

Suggested-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c |   46 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------------
 1 file changed, 32 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)

--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -313,30 +313,48 @@ retpoline_auto:
 #undef pr_fmt
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_SYSFS
-ssize_t cpu_show_meltdown(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
+
+ssize_t cpu_show_common(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr,
+			char *buf, unsigned int bug)
 {
-	if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_CPU_MELTDOWN))
+	if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(bug))
 		return sprintf(buf, "Not affected\n");
-	if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_KAISER))
-		return sprintf(buf, "Mitigation: PTI\n");
+
+	switch (bug) {
+	case X86_BUG_CPU_MELTDOWN:
+		if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_KAISER))
+			return sprintf(buf, "Mitigation: PTI\n");
+
+		break;
+
+	case X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V1:
+		return sprintf(buf, "Mitigation: __user pointer sanitization\n");
+
+	case X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V2:
+		return sprintf(buf, "%s%s%s%s\n", spectre_v2_strings[spectre_v2_enabled],
+			       boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_USE_IBPB) ? ", IBPB" : "",
+			       boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_USE_IBRS_FW) ? ", IBRS_FW" : "",
+			       spectre_v2_module_string());
+
+	default:
+		break;
+	}
+
 	return sprintf(buf, "Vulnerable\n");
 }
 
+ssize_t cpu_show_meltdown(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
+{
+	return cpu_show_common(dev, attr, buf, X86_BUG_CPU_MELTDOWN);
+}
+
 ssize_t cpu_show_spectre_v1(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
 {
-	if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V1))
-		return sprintf(buf, "Not affected\n");
-	return sprintf(buf, "Mitigation: __user pointer sanitization\n");
+	return cpu_show_common(dev, attr, buf, X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V1);
 }
 
 ssize_t cpu_show_spectre_v2(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
 {
-	if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V2))
-		return sprintf(buf, "Not affected\n");
-
-	return sprintf(buf, "%s%s%s%s\n", spectre_v2_strings[spectre_v2_enabled],
-		       boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_USE_IBPB) ? ", IBPB" : "",
-		       boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_USE_IBRS_FW) ? ", IBRS_FW" : "",
-		       spectre_v2_module_string());
+	return cpu_show_common(dev, attr, buf, X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V2);
 }
 #endif

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 92+ messages in thread

* [PATCH 4.9 39/87] x86/bugs: Read SPEC_CTRL MSR during boot and re-use reserved bits
  2018-05-21 21:10 [PATCH 4.9 00/87] 4.9.102-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (37 preceding siblings ...)
  2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.9 38/87] x86/bugs: Concentrate bug reporting " Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2018-05-21 21:11 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
  2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.9 40/87] x86/bugs, KVM: Support the combination of guest and host IBRS Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (51 subsequent siblings)
  90 siblings, 0 replies; 92+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2018-05-21 21:11 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-kernel
  Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Jon Masters, Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk,
	Thomas Gleixner, Borislav Petkov, Ingo Molnar, David Woodhouse

4.9-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>

commit 1b86883ccb8d5d9506529d42dbe1a5257cb30b18 upstream

The 336996-Speculative-Execution-Side-Channel-Mitigations.pdf refers to all
the other bits as reserved. The Intel SDM glossary defines reserved as
implementation specific - aka unknown.

As such at bootup this must be taken it into account and proper masking for
the bits in use applied.

A copy of this document is available at
https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=199511

[ tglx: Made x86_spec_ctrl_base __ro_after_init ]

Suggested-by: Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h |   24 ++++++++++++++++++++----
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c           |   28 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 2 files changed, 48 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
@@ -217,6 +217,17 @@ enum spectre_v2_mitigation {
 	SPECTRE_V2_IBRS,
 };
 
+/*
+ * The Intel specification for the SPEC_CTRL MSR requires that we
+ * preserve any already set reserved bits at boot time (e.g. for
+ * future additions that this kernel is not currently aware of).
+ * We then set any additional mitigation bits that we want
+ * ourselves and always use this as the base for SPEC_CTRL.
+ * We also use this when handling guest entry/exit as below.
+ */
+extern void x86_spec_ctrl_set(u64);
+extern u64 x86_spec_ctrl_get_default(void);
+
 extern char __indirect_thunk_start[];
 extern char __indirect_thunk_end[];
 
@@ -254,8 +265,9 @@ void alternative_msr_write(unsigned int
 
 static inline void indirect_branch_prediction_barrier(void)
 {
-	alternative_msr_write(MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD, PRED_CMD_IBPB,
-			      X86_FEATURE_USE_IBPB);
+	u64 val = PRED_CMD_IBPB;
+
+	alternative_msr_write(MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD, val, X86_FEATURE_USE_IBPB);
 }
 
 /*
@@ -266,14 +278,18 @@ static inline void indirect_branch_predi
  */
 #define firmware_restrict_branch_speculation_start()			\
 do {									\
+	u64 val = x86_spec_ctrl_get_default() | SPEC_CTRL_IBRS;		\
+									\
 	preempt_disable();						\
-	alternative_msr_write(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, SPEC_CTRL_IBRS,	\
+	alternative_msr_write(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, val,			\
 			      X86_FEATURE_USE_IBRS_FW);			\
 } while (0)
 
 #define firmware_restrict_branch_speculation_end()			\
 do {									\
-	alternative_msr_write(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, 0,			\
+	u64 val = x86_spec_ctrl_get_default();				\
+									\
+	alternative_msr_write(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, val,			\
 			      X86_FEATURE_USE_IBRS_FW);			\
 	preempt_enable();						\
 } while (0)
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -27,6 +27,12 @@
 
 static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void);
 
+/*
+ * Our boot-time value of the SPEC_CTRL MSR. We read it once so that any
+ * writes to SPEC_CTRL contain whatever reserved bits have been set.
+ */
+static u64 __ro_after_init x86_spec_ctrl_base;
+
 void __init check_bugs(void)
 {
 	identify_boot_cpu();
@@ -36,6 +42,13 @@ void __init check_bugs(void)
 		print_cpu_info(&boot_cpu_data);
 	}
 
+	/*
+	 * Read the SPEC_CTRL MSR to account for reserved bits which may
+	 * have unknown values.
+	 */
+	if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBRS))
+		rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, x86_spec_ctrl_base);
+
 	/* Select the proper spectre mitigation before patching alternatives */
 	spectre_v2_select_mitigation();
 
@@ -94,6 +107,21 @@ static const char *spectre_v2_strings[]
 
 static enum spectre_v2_mitigation spectre_v2_enabled = SPECTRE_V2_NONE;
 
+void x86_spec_ctrl_set(u64 val)
+{
+	if (val & ~SPEC_CTRL_IBRS)
+		WARN_ONCE(1, "SPEC_CTRL MSR value 0x%16llx is unknown.\n", val);
+	else
+		wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, x86_spec_ctrl_base | val);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(x86_spec_ctrl_set);
+
+u64 x86_spec_ctrl_get_default(void)
+{
+	return x86_spec_ctrl_base;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(x86_spec_ctrl_get_default);
+
 #ifdef RETPOLINE
 static bool spectre_v2_bad_module;
 

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 92+ messages in thread

* [PATCH 4.9 40/87] x86/bugs, KVM: Support the combination of guest and host IBRS
  2018-05-21 21:10 [PATCH 4.9 00/87] 4.9.102-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (38 preceding siblings ...)
  2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.9 39/87] x86/bugs: Read SPEC_CTRL MSR during boot and re-use reserved bits Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2018-05-21 21:11 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
  2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.9 41/87] x86/bugs: Expose /sys/../spec_store_bypass Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (50 subsequent siblings)
  90 siblings, 0 replies; 92+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2018-05-21 21:11 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-kernel
  Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk,
	Thomas Gleixner, Borislav Petkov, Ingo Molnar, David Woodhouse

4.9-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>

commit 5cf687548705412da47c9cec342fd952d71ed3d5 upstream

A guest may modify the SPEC_CTRL MSR from the value used by the
kernel. Since the kernel doesn't use IBRS, this means a value of zero is
what is needed in the host.

But the 336996-Speculative-Execution-Side-Channel-Mitigations.pdf refers to
the other bits as reserved so the kernel should respect the boot time
SPEC_CTRL value and use that.

This allows to deal with future extensions to the SPEC_CTRL interface if
any at all.

Note: This uses wrmsrl() instead of native_wrmsl(). I does not make any
difference as paravirt will over-write the callq *0xfff.. with the wrmsrl
assembler code.

Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h |   10 ++++++++++
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c           |   18 ++++++++++++++++++
 arch/x86/kvm/svm.c                   |    6 ++----
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c                   |    6 ++----
 4 files changed, 32 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)

--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
@@ -228,6 +228,16 @@ enum spectre_v2_mitigation {
 extern void x86_spec_ctrl_set(u64);
 extern u64 x86_spec_ctrl_get_default(void);
 
+/*
+ * On VMENTER we must preserve whatever view of the SPEC_CTRL MSR
+ * the guest has, while on VMEXIT we restore the host view. This
+ * would be easier if SPEC_CTRL were architecturally maskable or
+ * shadowable for guests but this is not (currently) the case.
+ * Takes the guest view of SPEC_CTRL MSR as a parameter.
+ */
+extern void x86_spec_ctrl_set_guest(u64);
+extern void x86_spec_ctrl_restore_host(u64);
+
 extern char __indirect_thunk_start[];
 extern char __indirect_thunk_end[];
 
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -122,6 +122,24 @@ u64 x86_spec_ctrl_get_default(void)
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(x86_spec_ctrl_get_default);
 
+void x86_spec_ctrl_set_guest(u64 guest_spec_ctrl)
+{
+	if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBRS))
+		return;
+	if (x86_spec_ctrl_base != guest_spec_ctrl)
+		wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, guest_spec_ctrl);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(x86_spec_ctrl_set_guest);
+
+void x86_spec_ctrl_restore_host(u64 guest_spec_ctrl)
+{
+	if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBRS))
+		return;
+	if (x86_spec_ctrl_base != guest_spec_ctrl)
+		wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, x86_spec_ctrl_base);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(x86_spec_ctrl_restore_host);
+
 #ifdef RETPOLINE
 static bool spectre_v2_bad_module;
 
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c
@@ -4917,8 +4917,7 @@ static void svm_vcpu_run(struct kvm_vcpu
 	 * is no need to worry about the conditional branch over the wrmsr
 	 * being speculatively taken.
 	 */
-	if (svm->spec_ctrl)
-		native_wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, svm->spec_ctrl);
+	x86_spec_ctrl_set_guest(svm->spec_ctrl);
 
 	asm volatile (
 		"push %%" _ASM_BP "; \n\t"
@@ -5030,8 +5029,7 @@ static void svm_vcpu_run(struct kvm_vcpu
 	if (unlikely(!msr_write_intercepted(vcpu, MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL)))
 		svm->spec_ctrl = native_read_msr(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL);
 
-	if (svm->spec_ctrl)
-		native_wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, 0);
+	x86_spec_ctrl_restore_host(svm->spec_ctrl);
 
 	/* Eliminate branch target predictions from guest mode */
 	vmexit_fill_RSB();
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c
@@ -8916,8 +8916,7 @@ static void __noclone vmx_vcpu_run(struc
 	 * is no need to worry about the conditional branch over the wrmsr
 	 * being speculatively taken.
 	 */
-	if (vmx->spec_ctrl)
-		native_wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, vmx->spec_ctrl);
+	x86_spec_ctrl_set_guest(vmx->spec_ctrl);
 
 	vmx->__launched = vmx->loaded_vmcs->launched;
 	asm(
@@ -9055,8 +9054,7 @@ static void __noclone vmx_vcpu_run(struc
 	if (unlikely(!msr_write_intercepted(vcpu, MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL)))
 		vmx->spec_ctrl = native_read_msr(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL);
 
-	if (vmx->spec_ctrl)
-		native_wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, 0);
+	x86_spec_ctrl_restore_host(vmx->spec_ctrl);
 
 	/* Eliminate branch target predictions from guest mode */
 	vmexit_fill_RSB();

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 92+ messages in thread

* [PATCH 4.9 41/87] x86/bugs: Expose /sys/../spec_store_bypass
  2018-05-21 21:10 [PATCH 4.9 00/87] 4.9.102-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (39 preceding siblings ...)
  2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.9 40/87] x86/bugs, KVM: Support the combination of guest and host IBRS Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2018-05-21 21:11 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
  2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.9 42/87] x86/cpufeatures: Add X86_FEATURE_RDS Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (49 subsequent siblings)
  90 siblings, 0 replies; 92+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2018-05-21 21:11 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-kernel
  Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk,
	Thomas Gleixner, Borislav Petkov, Ingo Molnar, David Woodhouse

4.9-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>

commit c456442cd3a59eeb1d60293c26cbe2ff2c4e42cf upstream

Add the sysfs file for the new vulerability. It does not do much except
show the words 'Vulnerable' for recent x86 cores.

Intel cores prior to family 6 are known not to be vulnerable, and so are
some Atoms and some Xeon Phi.

It assumes that older Cyrix, Centaur, etc. cores are immune.

Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-devices-system-cpu |    1 
 arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h                 |    1 
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c                         |    5 ++++
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c                       |   23 +++++++++++++++++++++
 drivers/base/cpu.c                                 |    8 +++++++
 include/linux/cpu.h                                |    2 +
 6 files changed, 40 insertions(+)

--- a/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-devices-system-cpu
+++ b/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-devices-system-cpu
@@ -355,6 +355,7 @@ What:		/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabi
 		/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/meltdown
 		/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/spectre_v1
 		/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/spectre_v2
+		/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/spec_store_bypass
 Date:		January 2018
 Contact:	Linux kernel mailing list <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>
 Description:	Information about CPU vulnerabilities
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
@@ -335,5 +335,6 @@
 #define X86_BUG_CPU_MELTDOWN	X86_BUG(14) /* CPU is affected by meltdown attack and needs kernel page table isolation */
 #define X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V1	X86_BUG(15) /* CPU is affected by Spectre variant 1 attack with conditional branches */
 #define X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V2	X86_BUG(16) /* CPU is affected by Spectre variant 2 attack with indirect branches */
+#define X86_BUG_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS X86_BUG(17) /* CPU is affected by speculative store bypass attack */
 
 #endif /* _ASM_X86_CPUFEATURES_H */
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -403,4 +403,9 @@ ssize_t cpu_show_spectre_v2(struct devic
 {
 	return cpu_show_common(dev, attr, buf, X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V2);
 }
+
+ssize_t cpu_show_spec_store_bypass(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
+{
+	return cpu_show_common(dev, attr, buf, X86_BUG_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS);
+}
 #endif
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
@@ -879,10 +879,33 @@ static const __initconst struct x86_cpu_
 	{}
 };
 
+static const __initconst struct x86_cpu_id cpu_no_spec_store_bypass[] = {
+	{ X86_VENDOR_INTEL,	6,	INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_PINEVIEW	},
+	{ X86_VENDOR_INTEL,	6,	INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_LINCROFT	},
+	{ X86_VENDOR_INTEL,	6,	INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_PENWELL		},
+	{ X86_VENDOR_INTEL,	6,	INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_CLOVERVIEW	},
+	{ X86_VENDOR_INTEL,	6,	INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_CEDARVIEW	},
+	{ X86_VENDOR_INTEL,	6,	INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_SILVERMONT1	},
+	{ X86_VENDOR_INTEL,	6,	INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_AIRMONT		},
+	{ X86_VENDOR_INTEL,	6,	INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_SILVERMONT2	},
+	{ X86_VENDOR_INTEL,	6,	INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_MERRIFIELD	},
+	{ X86_VENDOR_INTEL,	6,	INTEL_FAM6_CORE_YONAH		},
+	{ X86_VENDOR_INTEL,	6,	INTEL_FAM6_XEON_PHI_KNL		},
+	{ X86_VENDOR_INTEL,	6,	INTEL_FAM6_XEON_PHI_KNM		},
+	{ X86_VENDOR_CENTAUR,	5,					},
+	{ X86_VENDOR_INTEL,	5,					},
+	{ X86_VENDOR_NSC,	5,					},
+	{ X86_VENDOR_ANY,	4,					},
+	{}
+};
+
 static void __init cpu_set_bug_bits(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
 {
 	u64 ia32_cap = 0;
 
+	if (!x86_match_cpu(cpu_no_spec_store_bypass))
+		setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS);
+
 	if (x86_match_cpu(cpu_no_speculation))
 		return;
 
--- a/drivers/base/cpu.c
+++ b/drivers/base/cpu.c
@@ -519,14 +519,22 @@ ssize_t __weak cpu_show_spectre_v2(struc
 	return sprintf(buf, "Not affected\n");
 }
 
+ssize_t __weak cpu_show_spec_store_bypass(struct device *dev,
+					  struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
+{
+	return sprintf(buf, "Not affected\n");
+}
+
 static DEVICE_ATTR(meltdown, 0444, cpu_show_meltdown, NULL);
 static DEVICE_ATTR(spectre_v1, 0444, cpu_show_spectre_v1, NULL);
 static DEVICE_ATTR(spectre_v2, 0444, cpu_show_spectre_v2, NULL);
+static DEVICE_ATTR(spec_store_bypass, 0444, cpu_show_spec_store_bypass, NULL);
 
 static struct attribute *cpu_root_vulnerabilities_attrs[] = {
 	&dev_attr_meltdown.attr,
 	&dev_attr_spectre_v1.attr,
 	&dev_attr_spectre_v2.attr,
+	&dev_attr_spec_store_bypass.attr,
 	NULL
 };
 
--- a/include/linux/cpu.h
+++ b/include/linux/cpu.h
@@ -50,6 +50,8 @@ extern ssize_t cpu_show_spectre_v1(struc
 				   struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf);
 extern ssize_t cpu_show_spectre_v2(struct device *dev,
 				   struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf);
+extern ssize_t cpu_show_spec_store_bypass(struct device *dev,
+					  struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf);
 
 extern __printf(4, 5)
 struct device *cpu_device_create(struct device *parent, void *drvdata,

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 92+ messages in thread

* [PATCH 4.9 42/87] x86/cpufeatures: Add X86_FEATURE_RDS
  2018-05-21 21:10 [PATCH 4.9 00/87] 4.9.102-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (40 preceding siblings ...)
  2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.9 41/87] x86/bugs: Expose /sys/../spec_store_bypass Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2018-05-21 21:11 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
  2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.9 43/87] x86/bugs: Provide boot parameters for the spec_store_bypass_disable mitigation Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (48 subsequent siblings)
  90 siblings, 0 replies; 92+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2018-05-21 21:11 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-kernel
  Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk,
	Thomas Gleixner, Ingo Molnar, David Woodhouse

4.9-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>

commit 0cc5fa00b0a88dad140b4e5c2cead9951ad36822 upstream

Add the CPU feature bit CPUID.7.0.EDX[31] which indicates whether the CPU
supports Reduced Data Speculation.

[ tglx: Split it out from a later patch ]

Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h |    1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)

--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
@@ -306,6 +306,7 @@
 #define X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL		(18*32+26) /* "" Speculation Control (IBRS + IBPB) */
 #define X86_FEATURE_INTEL_STIBP		(18*32+27) /* "" Single Thread Indirect Branch Predictors */
 #define X86_FEATURE_ARCH_CAPABILITIES	(18*32+29) /* IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES MSR (Intel) */
+#define X86_FEATURE_RDS			(18*32+31) /* Reduced Data Speculation */
 
 /*
  * BUG word(s)

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 92+ messages in thread

* [PATCH 4.9 43/87] x86/bugs: Provide boot parameters for the spec_store_bypass_disable mitigation
  2018-05-21 21:10 [PATCH 4.9 00/87] 4.9.102-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (41 preceding siblings ...)
  2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.9 42/87] x86/cpufeatures: Add X86_FEATURE_RDS Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2018-05-21 21:11 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
  2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.9 44/87] x86/bugs/intel: Set proper CPU features and setup RDS Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (47 subsequent siblings)
  90 siblings, 0 replies; 92+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2018-05-21 21:11 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-kernel
  Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk,
	Thomas Gleixner, Borislav Petkov, Ingo Molnar, David Woodhouse

4.9-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>

commit 24f7fc83b9204d20f878c57cb77d261ae825e033 upstream

Contemporary high performance processors use a common industry-wide
optimization known as "Speculative Store Bypass" in which loads from
addresses to which a recent store has occurred may (speculatively) see an
older value. Intel refers to this feature as "Memory Disambiguation" which
is part of their "Smart Memory Access" capability.

Memory Disambiguation can expose a cache side-channel attack against such
speculatively read values. An attacker can create exploit code that allows
them to read memory outside of a sandbox environment (for example,
malicious JavaScript in a web page), or to perform more complex attacks
against code running within the same privilege level, e.g. via the stack.

As a first step to mitigate against such attacks, provide two boot command
line control knobs:

 nospec_store_bypass_disable
 spec_store_bypass_disable=[off,auto,on]

By default affected x86 processors will power on with Speculative
Store Bypass enabled. Hence the provided kernel parameters are written
from the point of view of whether to enable a mitigation or not.
The parameters are as follows:

 - auto - Kernel detects whether your CPU model contains an implementation
	  of Speculative Store Bypass and picks the most appropriate
	  mitigation.

 - on   - disable Speculative Store Bypass
 - off  - enable Speculative Store Bypass

[ tglx: Reordered the checks so that the whole evaluation is not done
  	when the CPU does not support RDS ]

Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt  |   33 +++++++++++
 arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h   |    1 
 arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h |    6 ++
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c           |  103 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 4 files changed, 143 insertions(+)

--- a/Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt
+++ b/Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt
@@ -2699,6 +2699,9 @@ bytes respectively. Such letter suffixes
 			allow data leaks with this option, which is equivalent
 			to spectre_v2=off.
 
+	nospec_store_bypass_disable
+			[HW] Disable all mitigations for the Speculative Store Bypass vulnerability
+
 	noxsave		[BUGS=X86] Disables x86 extended register state save
 			and restore using xsave. The kernel will fallback to
 			enabling legacy floating-point and sse state.
@@ -3973,6 +3976,36 @@ bytes respectively. Such letter suffixes
 			Not specifying this option is equivalent to
 			spectre_v2=auto.
 
+	spec_store_bypass_disable=
+			[HW] Control Speculative Store Bypass (SSB) Disable mitigation
+			(Speculative Store Bypass vulnerability)
+
+			Certain CPUs are vulnerable to an exploit against a
+			a common industry wide performance optimization known
+			as "Speculative Store Bypass" in which recent stores
+			to the same memory location may not be observed by
+			later loads during speculative execution. The idea
+			is that such stores are unlikely and that they can
+			be detected prior to instruction retirement at the
+			end of a particular speculation execution window.
+
+			In vulnerable processors, the speculatively forwarded
+			store can be used in a cache side channel attack, for
+			example to read memory to which the attacker does not
+			directly have access (e.g. inside sandboxed code).
+
+			This parameter controls whether the Speculative Store
+			Bypass optimization is used.
+
+			on     - Unconditionally disable Speculative Store Bypass
+			off    - Unconditionally enable Speculative Store Bypass
+			auto   - Kernel detects whether the CPU model contains an
+				 implementation of Speculative Store Bypass and
+				 picks the most appropriate mitigation
+
+			Not specifying this option is equivalent to
+			spec_store_bypass_disable=auto.
+
 	spia_io_base=	[HW,MTD]
 	spia_fio_base=
 	spia_pedr=
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
@@ -204,6 +204,7 @@
 
 #define X86_FEATURE_USE_IBPB	( 7*32+21) /* "" Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier enabled */
 #define X86_FEATURE_USE_IBRS_FW	( 7*32+22) /* "" Use IBRS during runtime firmware calls */
+#define X86_FEATURE_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_DISABLE ( 7*32+23) /* "" Disable Speculative Store Bypass. */
 
 /* Virtualization flags: Linux defined, word 8 */
 #define X86_FEATURE_TPR_SHADOW  ( 8*32+ 0) /* Intel TPR Shadow */
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
@@ -238,6 +238,12 @@ extern u64 x86_spec_ctrl_get_default(voi
 extern void x86_spec_ctrl_set_guest(u64);
 extern void x86_spec_ctrl_restore_host(u64);
 
+/* The Speculative Store Bypass disable variants */
+enum ssb_mitigation {
+	SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_NONE,
+	SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_DISABLE,
+};
+
 extern char __indirect_thunk_start[];
 extern char __indirect_thunk_end[];
 
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -26,6 +26,7 @@
 #include <asm/intel-family.h>
 
 static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void);
+static void __init ssb_select_mitigation(void);
 
 /*
  * Our boot-time value of the SPEC_CTRL MSR. We read it once so that any
@@ -52,6 +53,12 @@ void __init check_bugs(void)
 	/* Select the proper spectre mitigation before patching alternatives */
 	spectre_v2_select_mitigation();
 
+	/*
+	 * Select proper mitigation for any exposure to the Speculative Store
+	 * Bypass vulnerability.
+	 */
+	ssb_select_mitigation();
+
 #ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
 	/*
 	 * Check whether we are able to run this kernel safely on SMP.
@@ -357,6 +364,99 @@ retpoline_auto:
 }
 
 #undef pr_fmt
+#define pr_fmt(fmt)	"Speculative Store Bypass: " fmt
+
+static enum ssb_mitigation ssb_mode = SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_NONE;
+
+/* The kernel command line selection */
+enum ssb_mitigation_cmd {
+	SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_CMD_NONE,
+	SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_CMD_AUTO,
+	SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_CMD_ON,
+};
+
+static const char *ssb_strings[] = {
+	[SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_NONE]	= "Vulnerable",
+	[SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_DISABLE]	= "Mitigation: Speculative Store Bypass disabled"
+};
+
+static const struct {
+	const char *option;
+	enum ssb_mitigation_cmd cmd;
+} ssb_mitigation_options[] = {
+	{ "auto",	SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_CMD_AUTO }, /* Platform decides */
+	{ "on",		SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_CMD_ON },   /* Disable Speculative Store Bypass */
+	{ "off",	SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_CMD_NONE }, /* Don't touch Speculative Store Bypass */
+};
+
+static enum ssb_mitigation_cmd __init ssb_parse_cmdline(void)
+{
+	enum ssb_mitigation_cmd cmd = SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_CMD_AUTO;
+	char arg[20];
+	int ret, i;
+
+	if (cmdline_find_option_bool(boot_command_line, "nospec_store_bypass_disable")) {
+		return SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_CMD_NONE;
+	} else {
+		ret = cmdline_find_option(boot_command_line, "spec_store_bypass_disable",
+					  arg, sizeof(arg));
+		if (ret < 0)
+			return SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_CMD_AUTO;
+
+		for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(ssb_mitigation_options); i++) {
+			if (!match_option(arg, ret, ssb_mitigation_options[i].option))
+				continue;
+
+			cmd = ssb_mitigation_options[i].cmd;
+			break;
+		}
+
+		if (i >= ARRAY_SIZE(ssb_mitigation_options)) {
+			pr_err("unknown option (%s). Switching to AUTO select\n", arg);
+			return SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_CMD_AUTO;
+		}
+	}
+
+	return cmd;
+}
+
+static enum ssb_mitigation_cmd __init __ssb_select_mitigation(void)
+{
+	enum ssb_mitigation mode = SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_NONE;
+	enum ssb_mitigation_cmd cmd;
+
+	if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RDS))
+		return mode;
+
+	cmd = ssb_parse_cmdline();
+	if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS) &&
+	    (cmd == SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_CMD_NONE ||
+	     cmd == SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_CMD_AUTO))
+		return mode;
+
+	switch (cmd) {
+	case SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_CMD_AUTO:
+	case SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_CMD_ON:
+		mode = SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_DISABLE;
+		break;
+	case SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_CMD_NONE:
+		break;
+	}
+
+	if (mode != SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_NONE)
+		setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_DISABLE);
+	return mode;
+}
+
+static void ssb_select_mitigation()
+{
+	ssb_mode = __ssb_select_mitigation();
+
+	if (boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS))
+		pr_info("%s\n", ssb_strings[ssb_mode]);
+}
+
+#undef pr_fmt
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_SYSFS
 
@@ -382,6 +482,9 @@ ssize_t cpu_show_common(struct device *d
 			       boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_USE_IBRS_FW) ? ", IBRS_FW" : "",
 			       spectre_v2_module_string());
 
+	case X86_BUG_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS:
+		return sprintf(buf, "%s\n", ssb_strings[ssb_mode]);
+
 	default:
 		break;
 	}

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 92+ messages in thread

* [PATCH 4.9 44/87] x86/bugs/intel: Set proper CPU features and setup RDS
  2018-05-21 21:10 [PATCH 4.9 00/87] 4.9.102-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (42 preceding siblings ...)
  2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.9 43/87] x86/bugs: Provide boot parameters for the spec_store_bypass_disable mitigation Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2018-05-21 21:11 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
  2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.9 45/87] x86/bugs: Whitelist allowed SPEC_CTRL MSR values Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (46 subsequent siblings)
  90 siblings, 0 replies; 92+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2018-05-21 21:11 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-kernel
  Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk,
	Thomas Gleixner, Borislav Petkov, Ingo Molnar, David Woodhouse

4.9-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>

commit 772439717dbf703b39990be58d8d4e3e4ad0598a upstream

Intel CPUs expose methods to:

 - Detect whether RDS capability is available via CPUID.7.0.EDX[31],

 - The SPEC_CTRL MSR(0x48), bit 2 set to enable RDS.

 - MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES, Bit(4) no need to enable RRS.

With that in mind if spec_store_bypass_disable=[auto,on] is selected set at
boot-time the SPEC_CTRL MSR to enable RDS if the platform requires it.

Note that this does not fix the KVM case where the SPEC_CTRL is exposed to
guests which can muck with it, see patch titled :
 KVM/SVM/VMX/x86/spectre_v2: Support the combination of guest and host IBRS.

And for the firmware (IBRS to be set), see patch titled:
 x86/spectre_v2: Read SPEC_CTRL MSR during boot and re-use reserved bits

[ tglx: Distangled it from the intel implementation and kept the call order ]

Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h |    6 ++++++
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c       |   30 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c     |   10 ++++++----
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/cpu.h        |    3 +++
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c      |    1 +
 5 files changed, 44 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)

--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
@@ -40,6 +40,7 @@
 #define MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL		0x00000048 /* Speculation Control */
 #define SPEC_CTRL_IBRS			(1 << 0)   /* Indirect Branch Restricted Speculation */
 #define SPEC_CTRL_STIBP			(1 << 1)   /* Single Thread Indirect Branch Predictors */
+#define SPEC_CTRL_RDS			(1 << 2)   /* Reduced Data Speculation */
 
 #define MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD		0x00000049 /* Prediction Command */
 #define PRED_CMD_IBPB			(1 << 0)   /* Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier */
@@ -61,6 +62,11 @@
 #define MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES	0x0000010a
 #define ARCH_CAP_RDCL_NO		(1 << 0)   /* Not susceptible to Meltdown */
 #define ARCH_CAP_IBRS_ALL		(1 << 1)   /* Enhanced IBRS support */
+#define ARCH_CAP_RDS_NO			(1 << 4)   /*
+						    * Not susceptible to Speculative Store Bypass
+						    * attack, so no Reduced Data Speculation control
+						    * required.
+						    */
 
 #define MSR_IA32_BBL_CR_CTL		0x00000119
 #define MSR_IA32_BBL_CR_CTL3		0x0000011e
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -116,7 +116,7 @@ static enum spectre_v2_mitigation spectr
 
 void x86_spec_ctrl_set(u64 val)
 {
-	if (val & ~SPEC_CTRL_IBRS)
+	if (val & ~(SPEC_CTRL_IBRS | SPEC_CTRL_RDS))
 		WARN_ONCE(1, "SPEC_CTRL MSR value 0x%16llx is unknown.\n", val);
 	else
 		wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, x86_spec_ctrl_base | val);
@@ -443,8 +443,28 @@ static enum ssb_mitigation_cmd __init __
 		break;
 	}
 
-	if (mode != SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_NONE)
+	/*
+	 * We have three CPU feature flags that are in play here:
+	 *  - X86_BUG_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS - CPU is susceptible.
+	 *  - X86_FEATURE_RDS - CPU is able to turn off speculative store bypass
+	 *  - X86_FEATURE_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_DISABLE - engage the mitigation
+	 */
+	if (mode != SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_NONE) {
 		setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_DISABLE);
+		/*
+		 * Intel uses the SPEC CTRL MSR Bit(2) for this, while AMD uses
+		 * a completely different MSR and bit dependent on family.
+		 */
+		switch (boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor) {
+		case X86_VENDOR_INTEL:
+			x86_spec_ctrl_base |= SPEC_CTRL_RDS;
+			x86_spec_ctrl_set(SPEC_CTRL_RDS);
+			break;
+		case X86_VENDOR_AMD:
+			break;
+		}
+	}
+
 	return mode;
 }
 
@@ -458,6 +478,12 @@ static void ssb_select_mitigation()
 
 #undef pr_fmt
 
+void x86_spec_ctrl_setup_ap(void)
+{
+	if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBRS))
+		x86_spec_ctrl_set(x86_spec_ctrl_base & (SPEC_CTRL_IBRS | SPEC_CTRL_RDS));
+}
+
 #ifdef CONFIG_SYSFS
 
 ssize_t cpu_show_common(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr,
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
@@ -903,7 +903,11 @@ static void __init cpu_set_bug_bits(stru
 {
 	u64 ia32_cap = 0;
 
-	if (!x86_match_cpu(cpu_no_spec_store_bypass))
+	if (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_ARCH_CAPABILITIES))
+		rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES, ia32_cap);
+
+	if (!x86_match_cpu(cpu_no_spec_store_bypass) &&
+	   !(ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_RDS_NO))
 		setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS);
 
 	if (x86_match_cpu(cpu_no_speculation))
@@ -915,9 +919,6 @@ static void __init cpu_set_bug_bits(stru
 	if (x86_match_cpu(cpu_no_meltdown))
 		return;
 
-	if (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_ARCH_CAPABILITIES))
-		rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES, ia32_cap);
-
 	/* Rogue Data Cache Load? No! */
 	if (ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_RDCL_NO)
 		return;
@@ -1339,6 +1340,7 @@ void identify_secondary_cpu(struct cpuin
 #endif
 	mtrr_ap_init();
 	validate_apic_and_package_id(c);
+	x86_spec_ctrl_setup_ap();
 }
 
 struct msr_range {
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/cpu.h
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/cpu.h
@@ -46,4 +46,7 @@ extern const struct cpu_dev *const __x86
 
 extern void get_cpu_cap(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c);
 extern void cpu_detect_cache_sizes(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c);
+
+extern void x86_spec_ctrl_setup_ap(void);
+
 #endif /* ARCH_X86_CPU_H */
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c
@@ -154,6 +154,7 @@ static void early_init_intel(struct cpui
 		setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_STIBP);
 		setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL);
 		setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_INTEL_STIBP);
+		setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RDS);
 	}
 
 	/*

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 92+ messages in thread

* [PATCH 4.9 45/87] x86/bugs: Whitelist allowed SPEC_CTRL MSR values
  2018-05-21 21:10 [PATCH 4.9 00/87] 4.9.102-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (43 preceding siblings ...)
  2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.9 44/87] x86/bugs/intel: Set proper CPU features and setup RDS Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2018-05-21 21:11 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
  2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.9 46/87] x86/bugs/AMD: Add support to disable RDS on Fam[15,16,17]h if requested Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (45 subsequent siblings)
  90 siblings, 0 replies; 92+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2018-05-21 21:11 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-kernel
  Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk,
	Thomas Gleixner, Ingo Molnar, David Woodhouse

4.9-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>

commit 1115a859f33276fe8afb31c60cf9d8e657872558 upstream

Intel and AMD SPEC_CTRL (0x48) MSR semantics may differ in the
future (or in fact use different MSRs for the same functionality).

As such a run-time mechanism is required to whitelist the appropriate MSR
values.

[ tglx: Made the variable __ro_after_init ]

Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c |   11 +++++++++--
 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -34,6 +34,12 @@ static void __init ssb_select_mitigation
  */
 static u64 __ro_after_init x86_spec_ctrl_base;
 
+/*
+ * The vendor and possibly platform specific bits which can be modified in
+ * x86_spec_ctrl_base.
+ */
+static u64 __ro_after_init x86_spec_ctrl_mask = ~SPEC_CTRL_IBRS;
+
 void __init check_bugs(void)
 {
 	identify_boot_cpu();
@@ -116,7 +122,7 @@ static enum spectre_v2_mitigation spectr
 
 void x86_spec_ctrl_set(u64 val)
 {
-	if (val & ~(SPEC_CTRL_IBRS | SPEC_CTRL_RDS))
+	if (val & x86_spec_ctrl_mask)
 		WARN_ONCE(1, "SPEC_CTRL MSR value 0x%16llx is unknown.\n", val);
 	else
 		wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, x86_spec_ctrl_base | val);
@@ -458,6 +464,7 @@ static enum ssb_mitigation_cmd __init __
 		switch (boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor) {
 		case X86_VENDOR_INTEL:
 			x86_spec_ctrl_base |= SPEC_CTRL_RDS;
+			x86_spec_ctrl_mask &= ~SPEC_CTRL_RDS;
 			x86_spec_ctrl_set(SPEC_CTRL_RDS);
 			break;
 		case X86_VENDOR_AMD:
@@ -481,7 +488,7 @@ static void ssb_select_mitigation()
 void x86_spec_ctrl_setup_ap(void)
 {
 	if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBRS))
-		x86_spec_ctrl_set(x86_spec_ctrl_base & (SPEC_CTRL_IBRS | SPEC_CTRL_RDS));
+		x86_spec_ctrl_set(x86_spec_ctrl_base & ~x86_spec_ctrl_mask);
 }
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_SYSFS

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 92+ messages in thread

* [PATCH 4.9 46/87] x86/bugs/AMD: Add support to disable RDS on Fam[15,16,17]h if requested
  2018-05-21 21:10 [PATCH 4.9 00/87] 4.9.102-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (44 preceding siblings ...)
  2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.9 45/87] x86/bugs: Whitelist allowed SPEC_CTRL MSR values Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2018-05-21 21:11 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
  2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.9 47/87] x86/KVM/VMX: Expose SPEC_CTRL Bit(2) to the guest Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (44 subsequent siblings)
  90 siblings, 0 replies; 92+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2018-05-21 21:11 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-kernel
  Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Borislav Petkov,
	Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk, Thomas Gleixner, Ingo Molnar,
	David Woodhouse

4.9-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>

commit 764f3c21588a059cd783c6ba0734d4db2d72822d upstream

AMD does not need the Speculative Store Bypass mitigation to be enabled.

The parameters for this are already available and can be done via MSR
C001_1020. Each family uses a different bit in that MSR for this.

[ tglx: Expose the bit mask via a variable and move the actual MSR fiddling
  	into the bugs code as that's the right thing to do and also required
	to prepare for dynamic enable/disable ]

Suggested-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h   |    1 +
 arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h |    4 ++++
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c            |   26 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c           |   27 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c         |    4 ++++
 5 files changed, 61 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
@@ -205,6 +205,7 @@
 #define X86_FEATURE_USE_IBPB	( 7*32+21) /* "" Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier enabled */
 #define X86_FEATURE_USE_IBRS_FW	( 7*32+22) /* "" Use IBRS during runtime firmware calls */
 #define X86_FEATURE_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_DISABLE ( 7*32+23) /* "" Disable Speculative Store Bypass. */
+#define X86_FEATURE_AMD_RDS	(7*32+24)  /* "" AMD RDS implementation */
 
 /* Virtualization flags: Linux defined, word 8 */
 #define X86_FEATURE_TPR_SHADOW  ( 8*32+ 0) /* Intel TPR Shadow */
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
@@ -244,6 +244,10 @@ enum ssb_mitigation {
 	SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_DISABLE,
 };
 
+/* AMD specific Speculative Store Bypass MSR data */
+extern u64 x86_amd_ls_cfg_base;
+extern u64 x86_amd_ls_cfg_rds_mask;
+
 extern char __indirect_thunk_start[];
 extern char __indirect_thunk_end[];
 
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c
@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@
 #include <asm/processor.h>
 #include <asm/apic.h>
 #include <asm/cpu.h>
+#include <asm/nospec-branch.h>
 #include <asm/smp.h>
 #include <asm/pci-direct.h>
 #include <asm/delay.h>
@@ -542,6 +543,26 @@ static void bsp_init_amd(struct cpuinfo_
 		rdmsrl(MSR_FAM10H_NODE_ID, value);
 		nodes_per_socket = ((value >> 3) & 7) + 1;
 	}
+
+	if (c->x86 >= 0x15 && c->x86 <= 0x17) {
+		unsigned int bit;
+
+		switch (c->x86) {
+		case 0x15: bit = 54; break;
+		case 0x16: bit = 33; break;
+		case 0x17: bit = 10; break;
+		default: return;
+		}
+		/*
+		 * Try to cache the base value so further operations can
+		 * avoid RMW. If that faults, do not enable RDS.
+		 */
+		if (!rdmsrl_safe(MSR_AMD64_LS_CFG, &x86_amd_ls_cfg_base)) {
+			setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RDS);
+			setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_AMD_RDS);
+			x86_amd_ls_cfg_rds_mask = 1ULL << bit;
+		}
+	}
 }
 
 static void early_init_amd(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
@@ -827,6 +848,11 @@ static void init_amd(struct cpuinfo_x86
 	/* AMD CPUs don't reset SS attributes on SYSRET, Xen does. */
 	if (!cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_XENPV))
 		set_cpu_bug(c, X86_BUG_SYSRET_SS_ATTRS);
+
+	if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_AMD_RDS)) {
+		set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_RDS);
+		set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_AMD_RDS);
+	}
 }
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -40,6 +40,13 @@ static u64 __ro_after_init x86_spec_ctrl
  */
 static u64 __ro_after_init x86_spec_ctrl_mask = ~SPEC_CTRL_IBRS;
 
+/*
+ * AMD specific MSR info for Speculative Store Bypass control.
+ * x86_amd_ls_cfg_rds_mask is initialized in identify_boot_cpu().
+ */
+u64 __ro_after_init x86_amd_ls_cfg_base;
+u64 __ro_after_init x86_amd_ls_cfg_rds_mask;
+
 void __init check_bugs(void)
 {
 	identify_boot_cpu();
@@ -51,7 +58,8 @@ void __init check_bugs(void)
 
 	/*
 	 * Read the SPEC_CTRL MSR to account for reserved bits which may
-	 * have unknown values.
+	 * have unknown values. AMD64_LS_CFG MSR is cached in the early AMD
+	 * init code as it is not enumerated and depends on the family.
 	 */
 	if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBRS))
 		rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, x86_spec_ctrl_base);
@@ -153,6 +161,14 @@ void x86_spec_ctrl_restore_host(u64 gues
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(x86_spec_ctrl_restore_host);
 
+static void x86_amd_rds_enable(void)
+{
+	u64 msrval = x86_amd_ls_cfg_base | x86_amd_ls_cfg_rds_mask;
+
+	if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_AMD_RDS))
+		wrmsrl(MSR_AMD64_LS_CFG, msrval);
+}
+
 #ifdef RETPOLINE
 static bool spectre_v2_bad_module;
 
@@ -442,6 +458,11 @@ static enum ssb_mitigation_cmd __init __
 
 	switch (cmd) {
 	case SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_CMD_AUTO:
+		/*
+		 * AMD platforms by default don't need SSB mitigation.
+		 */
+		if (boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor == X86_VENDOR_AMD)
+			break;
 	case SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_CMD_ON:
 		mode = SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_DISABLE;
 		break;
@@ -468,6 +489,7 @@ static enum ssb_mitigation_cmd __init __
 			x86_spec_ctrl_set(SPEC_CTRL_RDS);
 			break;
 		case X86_VENDOR_AMD:
+			x86_amd_rds_enable();
 			break;
 		}
 	}
@@ -489,6 +511,9 @@ void x86_spec_ctrl_setup_ap(void)
 {
 	if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBRS))
 		x86_spec_ctrl_set(x86_spec_ctrl_base & ~x86_spec_ctrl_mask);
+
+	if (ssb_mode == SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_DISABLE)
+		x86_amd_rds_enable();
 }
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_SYSFS
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
@@ -895,6 +895,10 @@ static const __initconst struct x86_cpu_
 	{ X86_VENDOR_CENTAUR,	5,					},
 	{ X86_VENDOR_INTEL,	5,					},
 	{ X86_VENDOR_NSC,	5,					},
+	{ X86_VENDOR_AMD,	0x12,					},
+	{ X86_VENDOR_AMD,	0x11,					},
+	{ X86_VENDOR_AMD,	0x10,					},
+	{ X86_VENDOR_AMD,	0xf,					},
 	{ X86_VENDOR_ANY,	4,					},
 	{}
 };

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 92+ messages in thread

* [PATCH 4.9 47/87] x86/KVM/VMX: Expose SPEC_CTRL Bit(2) to the guest
  2018-05-21 21:10 [PATCH 4.9 00/87] 4.9.102-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (45 preceding siblings ...)
  2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.9 46/87] x86/bugs/AMD: Add support to disable RDS on Fam[15,16,17]h if requested Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2018-05-21 21:11 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
  2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.9 48/87] x86/speculation: Create spec-ctrl.h to avoid include hell Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (43 subsequent siblings)
  90 siblings, 0 replies; 92+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2018-05-21 21:11 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-kernel
  Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk,
	Thomas Gleixner, Ingo Molnar, David Woodhouse

4.9-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>

commit da39556f66f5cfe8f9c989206974f1cb16ca5d7c upstream

Expose the CPUID.7.EDX[31] bit to the guest, and also guard against various
combinations of SPEC_CTRL MSR values.

The handling of the MSR (to take into account the host value of SPEC_CTRL
Bit(2)) is taken care of in patch:

  KVM/SVM/VMX/x86/spectre_v2: Support the combination of guest and host IBRS

Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>

[dwmw2: Handle 4.9 guest CPUID differences, rename
        guest_cpu_has_ibrs() → guest_cpu_has_spec_ctrl()]
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c |    2 +-
 arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.h |    4 ++--
 arch/x86/kvm/svm.c   |    4 ++--
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c   |    6 +++---
 4 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)

--- a/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c
@@ -382,7 +382,7 @@ static inline int __do_cpuid_ent(struct
 
 	/* cpuid 7.0.edx*/
 	const u32 kvm_cpuid_7_0_edx_x86_features =
-		F(SPEC_CTRL) | F(ARCH_CAPABILITIES);
+		F(SPEC_CTRL) | F(RDS) | F(ARCH_CAPABILITIES);
 
 	/* all calls to cpuid_count() should be made on the same cpu */
 	get_cpu();
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.h
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.h
@@ -171,7 +171,7 @@ static inline bool guest_cpuid_has_ibpb(
 	return best && (best->edx & bit(X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL));
 }
 
-static inline bool guest_cpuid_has_ibrs(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+static inline bool guest_cpuid_has_spec_ctrl(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 {
 	struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *best;
 
@@ -179,7 +179,7 @@ static inline bool guest_cpuid_has_ibrs(
 	if (best && (best->ebx & bit(X86_FEATURE_IBRS)))
 		return true;
 	best = kvm_find_cpuid_entry(vcpu, 7, 0);
-	return best && (best->edx & bit(X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL));
+	return best && (best->edx & (bit(X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL) | bit(X86_FEATURE_RDS)));
 }
 
 static inline bool guest_cpuid_has_arch_capabilities(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c
@@ -3545,7 +3545,7 @@ static int svm_get_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *
 		break;
 	case MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL:
 		if (!msr_info->host_initiated &&
-		    !guest_cpuid_has_ibrs(vcpu))
+		    !guest_cpuid_has_spec_ctrl(vcpu))
 			return 1;
 
 		msr_info->data = svm->spec_ctrl;
@@ -3643,7 +3643,7 @@ static int svm_set_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *
 		break;
 	case MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL:
 		if (!msr->host_initiated &&
-		    !guest_cpuid_has_ibrs(vcpu))
+		    !guest_cpuid_has_spec_ctrl(vcpu))
 			return 1;
 
 		/* The STIBP bit doesn't fault even if it's not advertised */
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c
@@ -3020,7 +3020,7 @@ static int vmx_get_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *
 		break;
 	case MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL:
 		if (!msr_info->host_initiated &&
-		    !guest_cpuid_has_ibrs(vcpu))
+		    !guest_cpuid_has_spec_ctrl(vcpu))
 			return 1;
 
 		msr_info->data = to_vmx(vcpu)->spec_ctrl;
@@ -3137,11 +3137,11 @@ static int vmx_set_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *
 		break;
 	case MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL:
 		if (!msr_info->host_initiated &&
-		    !guest_cpuid_has_ibrs(vcpu))
+		    !guest_cpuid_has_spec_ctrl(vcpu))
 			return 1;
 
 		/* The STIBP bit doesn't fault even if it's not advertised */
-		if (data & ~(SPEC_CTRL_IBRS | SPEC_CTRL_STIBP))
+		if (data & ~(SPEC_CTRL_IBRS | SPEC_CTRL_STIBP | SPEC_CTRL_RDS))
 			return 1;
 
 		vmx->spec_ctrl = data;

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 92+ messages in thread

* [PATCH 4.9 48/87] x86/speculation: Create spec-ctrl.h to avoid include hell
  2018-05-21 21:10 [PATCH 4.9 00/87] 4.9.102-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (46 preceding siblings ...)
  2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.9 47/87] x86/KVM/VMX: Expose SPEC_CTRL Bit(2) to the guest Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2018-05-21 21:11 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
  2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.9 49/87] prctl: Add speculation control prctls Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (42 subsequent siblings)
  90 siblings, 0 replies; 92+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2018-05-21 21:11 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-kernel
  Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Thomas Gleixner,
	Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk, Ingo Molnar, David Woodhouse

4.9-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>

commit 28a2775217b17208811fa43a9e96bd1fdf417b86 upstream

Having everything in nospec-branch.h creates a hell of dependencies when
adding the prctl based switching mechanism. Move everything which is not
required in nospec-branch.h to spec-ctrl.h and fix up the includes in the
relevant files.

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h |   14 --------------
 arch/x86/include/asm/spec-ctrl.h     |   21 +++++++++++++++++++++
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c            |    2 +-
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c           |    2 +-
 arch/x86/kvm/svm.c                   |    2 +-
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c                   |    2 +-
 6 files changed, 25 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-)
 create mode 100644 arch/x86/include/asm/spec-ctrl.h

--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
@@ -228,26 +228,12 @@ enum spectre_v2_mitigation {
 extern void x86_spec_ctrl_set(u64);
 extern u64 x86_spec_ctrl_get_default(void);
 
-/*
- * On VMENTER we must preserve whatever view of the SPEC_CTRL MSR
- * the guest has, while on VMEXIT we restore the host view. This
- * would be easier if SPEC_CTRL were architecturally maskable or
- * shadowable for guests but this is not (currently) the case.
- * Takes the guest view of SPEC_CTRL MSR as a parameter.
- */
-extern void x86_spec_ctrl_set_guest(u64);
-extern void x86_spec_ctrl_restore_host(u64);
-
 /* The Speculative Store Bypass disable variants */
 enum ssb_mitigation {
 	SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_NONE,
 	SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_DISABLE,
 };
 
-/* AMD specific Speculative Store Bypass MSR data */
-extern u64 x86_amd_ls_cfg_base;
-extern u64 x86_amd_ls_cfg_rds_mask;
-
 extern char __indirect_thunk_start[];
 extern char __indirect_thunk_end[];
 
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/spec-ctrl.h
@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
+#ifndef _ASM_X86_SPECCTRL_H_
+#define _ASM_X86_SPECCTRL_H_
+
+#include <asm/nospec-branch.h>
+
+/*
+ * On VMENTER we must preserve whatever view of the SPEC_CTRL MSR
+ * the guest has, while on VMEXIT we restore the host view. This
+ * would be easier if SPEC_CTRL were architecturally maskable or
+ * shadowable for guests but this is not (currently) the case.
+ * Takes the guest view of SPEC_CTRL MSR as a parameter.
+ */
+extern void x86_spec_ctrl_set_guest(u64);
+extern void x86_spec_ctrl_restore_host(u64);
+
+/* AMD specific Speculative Store Bypass MSR data */
+extern u64 x86_amd_ls_cfg_base;
+extern u64 x86_amd_ls_cfg_rds_mask;
+
+#endif
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@
 #include <asm/processor.h>
 #include <asm/apic.h>
 #include <asm/cpu.h>
-#include <asm/nospec-branch.h>
+#include <asm/spec-ctrl.h>
 #include <asm/smp.h>
 #include <asm/pci-direct.h>
 #include <asm/delay.h>
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@
 #include <linux/cpu.h>
 #include <linux/module.h>
 
-#include <asm/nospec-branch.h>
+#include <asm/spec-ctrl.h>
 #include <asm/cmdline.h>
 #include <asm/bugs.h>
 #include <asm/processor.h>
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c
@@ -45,7 +45,7 @@
 #include <asm/kvm_para.h>
 #include <asm/irq_remapping.h>
 #include <asm/microcode.h>
-#include <asm/nospec-branch.h>
+#include <asm/spec-ctrl.h>
 
 #include <asm/virtext.h>
 #include "trace.h"
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c
@@ -50,7 +50,7 @@
 #include <asm/apic.h>
 #include <asm/irq_remapping.h>
 #include <asm/microcode.h>
-#include <asm/nospec-branch.h>
+#include <asm/spec-ctrl.h>
 
 #include "trace.h"
 #include "pmu.h"

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 92+ messages in thread

* [PATCH 4.9 49/87] prctl: Add speculation control prctls
  2018-05-21 21:10 [PATCH 4.9 00/87] 4.9.102-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (47 preceding siblings ...)
  2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.9 48/87] x86/speculation: Create spec-ctrl.h to avoid include hell Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2018-05-21 21:11 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
  2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.9 50/87] x86/process: Optimize TIF checks in __switch_to_xtra() Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (41 subsequent siblings)
  90 siblings, 0 replies; 92+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2018-05-21 21:11 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-kernel
  Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Thomas Gleixner, Ingo Molnar,
	Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk, David Woodhouse

4.9-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>

commit b617cfc858161140d69cc0b5cc211996b557a1c7 upstream

Add two new prctls to control aspects of speculation related vulnerabilites
and their mitigations to provide finer grained control over performance
impacting mitigations.

PR_GET_SPECULATION_CTRL returns the state of the speculation misfeature
which is selected with arg2 of prctl(2). The return value uses bit 0-2 with
the following meaning:

Bit  Define           Description
0    PR_SPEC_PRCTL    Mitigation can be controlled per task by
                      PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL
1    PR_SPEC_ENABLE   The speculation feature is enabled, mitigation is
                      disabled
2    PR_SPEC_DISABLE  The speculation feature is disabled, mitigation is
                      enabled

If all bits are 0 the CPU is not affected by the speculation misfeature.

If PR_SPEC_PRCTL is set, then the per task control of the mitigation is
available. If not set, prctl(PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL) for the speculation
misfeature will fail.

PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL allows to control the speculation misfeature, which
is selected by arg2 of prctl(2) per task. arg3 is used to hand in the
control value, i.e. either PR_SPEC_ENABLE or PR_SPEC_DISABLE.

The common return values are:

EINVAL  prctl is not implemented by the architecture or the unused prctl()
        arguments are not 0
ENODEV  arg2 is selecting a not supported speculation misfeature

PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL has these additional return values:

ERANGE  arg3 is incorrect, i.e. it's not either PR_SPEC_ENABLE or PR_SPEC_DISABLE
ENXIO   prctl control of the selected speculation misfeature is disabled

The first supported controlable speculation misfeature is
PR_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS. Add the define so this can be shared between
architectures.

Based on an initial patch from Tim Chen and mostly rewritten.

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 Documentation/spec_ctrl.txt |   86 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 include/linux/nospec.h      |    5 ++
 include/uapi/linux/prctl.h  |   11 +++++
 kernel/sys.c                |   22 +++++++++++
 4 files changed, 124 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 Documentation/spec_ctrl.txt

--- /dev/null
+++ b/Documentation/spec_ctrl.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,86 @@
+===================
+Speculation Control
+===================
+
+Quite some CPUs have speculation related misfeatures which are in fact
+vulnerabilites causing data leaks in various forms even accross privilege
+domains.
+
+The kernel provides mitigation for such vulnerabilities in various
+forms. Some of these mitigations are compile time configurable and some on
+the kernel command line.
+
+There is also a class of mitigations which are very expensive, but they can
+be restricted to a certain set of processes or tasks in controlled
+environments. The mechanism to control these mitigations is via
+:manpage:`prctl(2)`.
+
+There are two prctl options which are related to this:
+
+ * PR_GET_SPECULATION_CTRL
+
+ * PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL
+
+PR_GET_SPECULATION_CTRL
+-----------------------
+
+PR_GET_SPECULATION_CTRL returns the state of the speculation misfeature
+which is selected with arg2 of prctl(2). The return value uses bits 0-2 with
+the following meaning:
+
+==== ================ ===================================================
+Bit  Define           Description
+==== ================ ===================================================
+0    PR_SPEC_PRCTL    Mitigation can be controlled per task by
+                      PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL
+1    PR_SPEC_ENABLE   The speculation feature is enabled, mitigation is
+                      disabled
+2    PR_SPEC_DISABLE  The speculation feature is disabled, mitigation is
+                      enabled
+==== ================ ===================================================
+
+If all bits are 0 the CPU is not affected by the speculation misfeature.
+
+If PR_SPEC_PRCTL is set, then the per task control of the mitigation is
+available. If not set, prctl(PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL) for the speculation
+misfeature will fail.
+
+PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL
+-----------------------
+PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL allows to control the speculation misfeature, which
+is selected by arg2 of :manpage:`prctl(2)` per task. arg3 is used to hand
+in the control value, i.e. either PR_SPEC_ENABLE or PR_SPEC_DISABLE.
+
+Common error codes
+------------------
+======= =================================================================
+Value   Meaning
+======= =================================================================
+EINVAL  The prctl is not implemented by the architecture or unused
+        prctl(2) arguments are not 0
+
+ENODEV  arg2 is selecting a not supported speculation misfeature
+======= =================================================================
+
+PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL error codes
+-----------------------------------
+======= =================================================================
+Value   Meaning
+======= =================================================================
+0       Success
+
+ERANGE  arg3 is incorrect, i.e. it's neither PR_SPEC_ENABLE nor
+        PR_SPEC_DISABLE
+
+ENXIO   Control of the selected speculation misfeature is not possible.
+        See PR_GET_SPECULATION_CTRL.
+======= =================================================================
+
+Speculation misfeature controls
+-------------------------------
+- PR_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS: Speculative Store Bypass
+
+  Invocations:
+   * prctl(PR_GET_SPECULATION_CTRL, PR_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS, 0, 0, 0);
+   * prctl(PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL, PR_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS, PR_SPEC_ENABLE, 0, 0);
+   * prctl(PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL, PR_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS, PR_SPEC_DISABLE, 0, 0);
--- a/include/linux/nospec.h
+++ b/include/linux/nospec.h
@@ -55,4 +55,9 @@ static inline unsigned long array_index_
 									\
 	(typeof(_i)) (_i & _mask);					\
 })
+
+/* Speculation control prctl */
+int arch_prctl_spec_ctrl_get(unsigned long which);
+int arch_prctl_spec_ctrl_set(unsigned long which, unsigned long ctrl);
+
 #endif /* _LINUX_NOSPEC_H */
--- a/include/uapi/linux/prctl.h
+++ b/include/uapi/linux/prctl.h
@@ -197,4 +197,15 @@ struct prctl_mm_map {
 # define PR_CAP_AMBIENT_LOWER		3
 # define PR_CAP_AMBIENT_CLEAR_ALL	4
 
+/* Per task speculation control */
+#define PR_GET_SPECULATION_CTRL		52
+#define PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL		53
+/* Speculation control variants */
+# define PR_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS		0
+/* Return and control values for PR_SET/GET_SPECULATION_CTRL */
+# define PR_SPEC_NOT_AFFECTED		0
+# define PR_SPEC_PRCTL			(1UL << 0)
+# define PR_SPEC_ENABLE			(1UL << 1)
+# define PR_SPEC_DISABLE		(1UL << 2)
+
 #endif /* _LINUX_PRCTL_H */
--- a/kernel/sys.c
+++ b/kernel/sys.c
@@ -53,6 +53,8 @@
 #include <linux/uidgid.h>
 #include <linux/cred.h>
 
+#include <linux/nospec.h>
+
 #include <linux/kmsg_dump.h>
 /* Move somewhere else to avoid recompiling? */
 #include <generated/utsrelease.h>
@@ -2072,6 +2074,16 @@ static int prctl_get_tid_address(struct
 }
 #endif
 
+int __weak arch_prctl_spec_ctrl_get(unsigned long which)
+{
+	return -EINVAL;
+}
+
+int __weak arch_prctl_spec_ctrl_set(unsigned long which, unsigned long ctrl)
+{
+	return -EINVAL;
+}
+
 SYSCALL_DEFINE5(prctl, int, option, unsigned long, arg2, unsigned long, arg3,
 		unsigned long, arg4, unsigned long, arg5)
 {
@@ -2270,6 +2282,16 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(prctl, int, option, unsi
 	case PR_GET_FP_MODE:
 		error = GET_FP_MODE(me);
 		break;
+	case PR_GET_SPECULATION_CTRL:
+		if (arg3 || arg4 || arg5)
+			return -EINVAL;
+		error = arch_prctl_spec_ctrl_get(arg2);
+		break;
+	case PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL:
+		if (arg4 || arg5)
+			return -EINVAL;
+		error = arch_prctl_spec_ctrl_set(arg2, arg3);
+		break;
 	default:
 		error = -EINVAL;
 		break;

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 92+ messages in thread

* [PATCH 4.9 50/87] x86/process: Optimize TIF checks in __switch_to_xtra()
  2018-05-21 21:10 [PATCH 4.9 00/87] 4.9.102-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (48 preceding siblings ...)
  2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.9 49/87] prctl: Add speculation control prctls Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2018-05-21 21:11 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
  2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.9 51/87] x86/process: Correct and optimize TIF_BLOCKSTEP switch Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (40 subsequent siblings)
  90 siblings, 0 replies; 92+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2018-05-21 21:11 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-kernel
  Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Kyle Huey, Peter Zijlstra,
	Andy Lutomirski, Thomas Gleixner, David Woodhouse

4.9-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Kyle Huey <me@kylehuey.com>

commit af8b3cd3934ec60f4c2a420d19a9d416554f140b upstream

Help the compiler to avoid reevaluating the thread flags for each checked
bit by reordering the bit checks and providing an explicit xor for
evaluation.

With default defconfigs for each arch,

x86_64: arch/x86/kernel/process.o
text       data     bss     dec     hex
3056       8577      16   11649    2d81	Before
3024	   8577      16	  11617	   2d61	After

i386: arch/x86/kernel/process.o
text       data     bss     dec     hex
2957	   8673	      8	  11638	   2d76	Before
2925	   8673       8	  11606	   2d56	After

Originally-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Kyle Huey <khuey@kylehuey.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170214081104.9244-2-khuey@kylehuey.com
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>

[dwmw2: backported to make TIF_RDS handling simpler.
        No deferred TR reload.]
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 arch/x86/kernel/process.c |   54 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------------------
 1 file changed, 31 insertions(+), 23 deletions(-)

--- a/arch/x86/kernel/process.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/process.c
@@ -192,48 +192,56 @@ int set_tsc_mode(unsigned int val)
 	return 0;
 }
 
+static inline void switch_to_bitmap(struct tss_struct *tss,
+				    struct thread_struct *prev,
+				    struct thread_struct *next,
+				    unsigned long tifp, unsigned long tifn)
+{
+	if (tifn & _TIF_IO_BITMAP) {
+		/*
+		 * Copy the relevant range of the IO bitmap.
+		 * Normally this is 128 bytes or less:
+		 */
+		memcpy(tss->io_bitmap, next->io_bitmap_ptr,
+		       max(prev->io_bitmap_max, next->io_bitmap_max));
+	} else if (tifp & _TIF_IO_BITMAP) {
+		/*
+		 * Clear any possible leftover bits:
+		 */
+		memset(tss->io_bitmap, 0xff, prev->io_bitmap_max);
+	}
+}
+
 void __switch_to_xtra(struct task_struct *prev_p, struct task_struct *next_p,
 		      struct tss_struct *tss)
 {
 	struct thread_struct *prev, *next;
+	unsigned long tifp, tifn;
 
 	prev = &prev_p->thread;
 	next = &next_p->thread;
 
-	if (test_tsk_thread_flag(prev_p, TIF_BLOCKSTEP) ^
-	    test_tsk_thread_flag(next_p, TIF_BLOCKSTEP)) {
+	tifn = READ_ONCE(task_thread_info(next_p)->flags);
+	tifp = READ_ONCE(task_thread_info(prev_p)->flags);
+	switch_to_bitmap(tss, prev, next, tifp, tifn);
+
+	propagate_user_return_notify(prev_p, next_p);
+
+	if ((tifp ^ tifn) & _TIF_BLOCKSTEP) {
 		unsigned long debugctl = get_debugctlmsr();
 
 		debugctl &= ~DEBUGCTLMSR_BTF;
-		if (test_tsk_thread_flag(next_p, TIF_BLOCKSTEP))
+		if (tifn & _TIF_BLOCKSTEP)
 			debugctl |= DEBUGCTLMSR_BTF;
-
 		update_debugctlmsr(debugctl);
 	}
 
-	if (test_tsk_thread_flag(prev_p, TIF_NOTSC) ^
-	    test_tsk_thread_flag(next_p, TIF_NOTSC)) {
-		/* prev and next are different */
-		if (test_tsk_thread_flag(next_p, TIF_NOTSC))
+	if ((tifp ^ tifn) & _TIF_NOTSC) {
+		if (tifn & _TIF_NOTSC)
 			hard_disable_TSC();
 		else
 			hard_enable_TSC();
 	}
-
-	if (test_tsk_thread_flag(next_p, TIF_IO_BITMAP)) {
-		/*
-		 * Copy the relevant range of the IO bitmap.
-		 * Normally this is 128 bytes or less:
-		 */
-		memcpy(tss->io_bitmap, next->io_bitmap_ptr,
-		       max(prev->io_bitmap_max, next->io_bitmap_max));
-	} else if (test_tsk_thread_flag(prev_p, TIF_IO_BITMAP)) {
-		/*
-		 * Clear any possible leftover bits:
-		 */
-		memset(tss->io_bitmap, 0xff, prev->io_bitmap_max);
-	}
-	propagate_user_return_notify(prev_p, next_p);
 }
 
 /*

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 92+ messages in thread

* [PATCH 4.9 51/87] x86/process: Correct and optimize TIF_BLOCKSTEP switch
  2018-05-21 21:10 [PATCH 4.9 00/87] 4.9.102-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (49 preceding siblings ...)
  2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.9 50/87] x86/process: Optimize TIF checks in __switch_to_xtra() Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2018-05-21 21:11 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
  2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.9 52/87] x86/process: Optimize TIF_NOTSC switch Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (39 subsequent siblings)
  90 siblings, 0 replies; 92+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2018-05-21 21:11 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-kernel
  Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Kyle Huey, Peter Zijlstra,
	Andy Lutomirski, Thomas Gleixner, David Woodhouse

4.9-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Kyle Huey <me@kylehuey.com>

commit b9894a2f5bd18b1691cb6872c9afe32b148d0132 upstream

The debug control MSR is "highly magical" as the blockstep bit can be
cleared by hardware under not well documented circumstances.

So a task switch relying on the bit set by the previous task (according to
the previous tasks thread flags) can trip over this and not update the flag
for the next task.

To fix this its required to handle DEBUGCTLMSR_BTF when either the previous
or the next or both tasks have the TIF_BLOCKSTEP flag set.

While at it avoid branching within the TIF_BLOCKSTEP case and evaluating
boot_cpu_data twice in kernels without CONFIG_X86_DEBUGCTLMSR.

x86_64: arch/x86/kernel/process.o
text	data	bss	dec	 hex
3024    8577    16      11617    2d61	Before
3008	8577	16	11601	 2d51	After

i386: No change

[ tglx: Made the shift value explicit, use a local variable to make the
code readable and massaged changelog]

Originally-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Kyle Huey <khuey@kylehuey.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170214081104.9244-3-khuey@kylehuey.com
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>

Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h |    1 +
 arch/x86/kernel/process.c        |   12 +++++++-----
 2 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)

--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
@@ -141,6 +141,7 @@
 
 /* DEBUGCTLMSR bits (others vary by model): */
 #define DEBUGCTLMSR_LBR			(1UL <<  0) /* last branch recording */
+#define DEBUGCTLMSR_BTF_SHIFT		1
 #define DEBUGCTLMSR_BTF			(1UL <<  1) /* single-step on branches */
 #define DEBUGCTLMSR_TR			(1UL <<  6)
 #define DEBUGCTLMSR_BTS			(1UL <<  7)
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/process.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/process.c
@@ -227,13 +227,15 @@ void __switch_to_xtra(struct task_struct
 
 	propagate_user_return_notify(prev_p, next_p);
 
-	if ((tifp ^ tifn) & _TIF_BLOCKSTEP) {
-		unsigned long debugctl = get_debugctlmsr();
+	if ((tifp & _TIF_BLOCKSTEP || tifn & _TIF_BLOCKSTEP) &&
+	    arch_has_block_step()) {
+		unsigned long debugctl, msk;
 
+		rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_DEBUGCTLMSR, debugctl);
 		debugctl &= ~DEBUGCTLMSR_BTF;
-		if (tifn & _TIF_BLOCKSTEP)
-			debugctl |= DEBUGCTLMSR_BTF;
-		update_debugctlmsr(debugctl);
+		msk = tifn & _TIF_BLOCKSTEP;
+		debugctl |= (msk >> TIF_BLOCKSTEP) << DEBUGCTLMSR_BTF_SHIFT;
+		wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_DEBUGCTLMSR, debugctl);
 	}
 
 	if ((tifp ^ tifn) & _TIF_NOTSC) {

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 92+ messages in thread

* [PATCH 4.9 52/87] x86/process: Optimize TIF_NOTSC switch
  2018-05-21 21:10 [PATCH 4.9 00/87] 4.9.102-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (50 preceding siblings ...)
  2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.9 51/87] x86/process: Correct and optimize TIF_BLOCKSTEP switch Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2018-05-21 21:11 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
  2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.9 53/87] x86/process: Allow runtime control of Speculative Store Bypass Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (38 subsequent siblings)
  90 siblings, 0 replies; 92+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2018-05-21 21:11 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-kernel
  Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Thomas Gleixner, Peter Zijlstra,
	Andy Lutomirski, David Woodhouse

4.9-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>

commit 5a920155e388ec22a22e0532fb695b9215c9b34d upstream

Provide and use a toggle helper instead of doing it with a branch.

x86_64: arch/x86/kernel/process.o
text	   data	    bss	    dec	    hex
3008	   8577	     16	  11601	   2d51 Before
2976       8577      16	  11569	   2d31 After

i386: arch/x86/kernel/process.o
text	   data	    bss	    dec	    hex
2925	   8673	      8	  11606	   2d56 Before
2893	   8673       8	  11574	   2d36 After

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170214081104.9244-4-khuey@kylehuey.com
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 arch/x86/include/asm/tlbflush.h |   10 ++++++++++
 arch/x86/kernel/process.c       |   22 ++++------------------
 2 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-)

--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/tlbflush.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/tlbflush.h
@@ -111,6 +111,16 @@ static inline void cr4_clear_bits(unsign
 	}
 }
 
+static inline void cr4_toggle_bits(unsigned long mask)
+{
+	unsigned long cr4;
+
+	cr4 = this_cpu_read(cpu_tlbstate.cr4);
+	cr4 ^= mask;
+	this_cpu_write(cpu_tlbstate.cr4, cr4);
+	__write_cr4(cr4);
+}
+
 /* Read the CR4 shadow. */
 static inline unsigned long cr4_read_shadow(void)
 {
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/process.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/process.c
@@ -134,11 +134,6 @@ void flush_thread(void)
 	fpu__clear(&tsk->thread.fpu);
 }
 
-static void hard_disable_TSC(void)
-{
-	cr4_set_bits(X86_CR4_TSD);
-}
-
 void disable_TSC(void)
 {
 	preempt_disable();
@@ -147,15 +142,10 @@ void disable_TSC(void)
 		 * Must flip the CPU state synchronously with
 		 * TIF_NOTSC in the current running context.
 		 */
-		hard_disable_TSC();
+		cr4_set_bits(X86_CR4_TSD);
 	preempt_enable();
 }
 
-static void hard_enable_TSC(void)
-{
-	cr4_clear_bits(X86_CR4_TSD);
-}
-
 static void enable_TSC(void)
 {
 	preempt_disable();
@@ -164,7 +154,7 @@ static void enable_TSC(void)
 		 * Must flip the CPU state synchronously with
 		 * TIF_NOTSC in the current running context.
 		 */
-		hard_enable_TSC();
+		cr4_clear_bits(X86_CR4_TSD);
 	preempt_enable();
 }
 
@@ -238,12 +228,8 @@ void __switch_to_xtra(struct task_struct
 		wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_DEBUGCTLMSR, debugctl);
 	}
 
-	if ((tifp ^ tifn) & _TIF_NOTSC) {
-		if (tifn & _TIF_NOTSC)
-			hard_disable_TSC();
-		else
-			hard_enable_TSC();
-	}
+	if ((tifp ^ tifn) & _TIF_NOTSC)
+		cr4_toggle_bits(X86_CR4_TSD);
 }
 
 /*

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 92+ messages in thread

* [PATCH 4.9 53/87] x86/process: Allow runtime control of Speculative Store Bypass
  2018-05-21 21:10 [PATCH 4.9 00/87] 4.9.102-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (51 preceding siblings ...)
  2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.9 52/87] x86/process: Optimize TIF_NOTSC switch Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2018-05-21 21:11 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
  2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.9 54/87] x86/speculation: Add prctl for Speculative Store Bypass mitigation Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (37 subsequent siblings)
  90 siblings, 0 replies; 92+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2018-05-21 21:11 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-kernel
  Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Thomas Gleixner, Ingo Molnar,
	Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk, David Woodhouse

4.9-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>

commit 885f82bfbc6fefb6664ea27965c3ab9ac4194b8c upstream

The Speculative Store Bypass vulnerability can be mitigated with the
Reduced Data Speculation (RDS) feature. To allow finer grained control of
this eventually expensive mitigation a per task mitigation control is
required.

Add a new TIF_RDS flag and put it into the group of TIF flags which are
evaluated for mismatch in switch_to(). If these bits differ in the previous
and the next task, then the slow path function __switch_to_xtra() is
invoked. Implement the TIF_RDS dependent mitigation control in the slow
path.

If the prctl for controlling Speculative Store Bypass is disabled or no
task uses the prctl then there is no overhead in the switch_to() fast
path.

Update the KVM related speculation control functions to take TID_RDS into
account as well.

Based on a patch from Tim Chen. Completely rewritten.

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h   |    3 ++-
 arch/x86/include/asm/spec-ctrl.h   |   17 +++++++++++++++++
 arch/x86/include/asm/thread_info.h |    6 ++++--
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c         |   26 +++++++++++++++++++++-----
 arch/x86/kernel/process.c          |   22 ++++++++++++++++++++++
 5 files changed, 66 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)

--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
@@ -40,7 +40,8 @@
 #define MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL		0x00000048 /* Speculation Control */
 #define SPEC_CTRL_IBRS			(1 << 0)   /* Indirect Branch Restricted Speculation */
 #define SPEC_CTRL_STIBP			(1 << 1)   /* Single Thread Indirect Branch Predictors */
-#define SPEC_CTRL_RDS			(1 << 2)   /* Reduced Data Speculation */
+#define SPEC_CTRL_RDS_SHIFT		2	   /* Reduced Data Speculation bit */
+#define SPEC_CTRL_RDS			(1 << SPEC_CTRL_RDS_SHIFT)   /* Reduced Data Speculation */
 
 #define MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD		0x00000049 /* Prediction Command */
 #define PRED_CMD_IBPB			(1 << 0)   /* Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier */
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/spec-ctrl.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/spec-ctrl.h
@@ -2,6 +2,7 @@
 #ifndef _ASM_X86_SPECCTRL_H_
 #define _ASM_X86_SPECCTRL_H_
 
+#include <linux/thread_info.h>
 #include <asm/nospec-branch.h>
 
 /*
@@ -18,4 +19,20 @@ extern void x86_spec_ctrl_restore_host(u
 extern u64 x86_amd_ls_cfg_base;
 extern u64 x86_amd_ls_cfg_rds_mask;
 
+/* The Intel SPEC CTRL MSR base value cache */
+extern u64 x86_spec_ctrl_base;
+
+static inline u64 rds_tif_to_spec_ctrl(u64 tifn)
+{
+	BUILD_BUG_ON(TIF_RDS < SPEC_CTRL_RDS_SHIFT);
+	return (tifn & _TIF_RDS) >> (TIF_RDS - SPEC_CTRL_RDS_SHIFT);
+}
+
+static inline u64 rds_tif_to_amd_ls_cfg(u64 tifn)
+{
+	return (tifn & _TIF_RDS) ? x86_amd_ls_cfg_rds_mask : 0ULL;
+}
+
+extern void speculative_store_bypass_update(void);
+
 #endif
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/thread_info.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/thread_info.h
@@ -83,6 +83,7 @@ struct thread_info {
 #define TIF_SIGPENDING		2	/* signal pending */
 #define TIF_NEED_RESCHED	3	/* rescheduling necessary */
 #define TIF_SINGLESTEP		4	/* reenable singlestep on user return*/
+#define TIF_RDS			5	/* Reduced data speculation */
 #define TIF_SYSCALL_EMU		6	/* syscall emulation active */
 #define TIF_SYSCALL_AUDIT	7	/* syscall auditing active */
 #define TIF_SECCOMP		8	/* secure computing */
@@ -104,8 +105,9 @@ struct thread_info {
 #define _TIF_SYSCALL_TRACE	(1 << TIF_SYSCALL_TRACE)
 #define _TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME	(1 << TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME)
 #define _TIF_SIGPENDING		(1 << TIF_SIGPENDING)
-#define _TIF_SINGLESTEP		(1 << TIF_SINGLESTEP)
 #define _TIF_NEED_RESCHED	(1 << TIF_NEED_RESCHED)
+#define _TIF_SINGLESTEP		(1 << TIF_SINGLESTEP)
+#define _TIF_RDS		(1 << TIF_RDS)
 #define _TIF_SYSCALL_EMU	(1 << TIF_SYSCALL_EMU)
 #define _TIF_SYSCALL_AUDIT	(1 << TIF_SYSCALL_AUDIT)
 #define _TIF_SECCOMP		(1 << TIF_SECCOMP)
@@ -139,7 +141,7 @@ struct thread_info {
 
 /* flags to check in __switch_to() */
 #define _TIF_WORK_CTXSW							\
-	(_TIF_IO_BITMAP|_TIF_NOTSC|_TIF_BLOCKSTEP)
+	(_TIF_IO_BITMAP|_TIF_NOTSC|_TIF_BLOCKSTEP|_TIF_RDS)
 
 #define _TIF_WORK_CTXSW_PREV (_TIF_WORK_CTXSW|_TIF_USER_RETURN_NOTIFY)
 #define _TIF_WORK_CTXSW_NEXT (_TIF_WORK_CTXSW)
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ static void __init ssb_select_mitigation
  * Our boot-time value of the SPEC_CTRL MSR. We read it once so that any
  * writes to SPEC_CTRL contain whatever reserved bits have been set.
  */
-static u64 __ro_after_init x86_spec_ctrl_base;
+u64 __ro_after_init x86_spec_ctrl_base;
 
 /*
  * The vendor and possibly platform specific bits which can be modified in
@@ -139,25 +139,41 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(x86_spec_ctrl_set);
 
 u64 x86_spec_ctrl_get_default(void)
 {
-	return x86_spec_ctrl_base;
+	u64 msrval = x86_spec_ctrl_base;
+
+	if (boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor == X86_VENDOR_INTEL)
+		msrval |= rds_tif_to_spec_ctrl(current_thread_info()->flags);
+	return msrval;
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(x86_spec_ctrl_get_default);
 
 void x86_spec_ctrl_set_guest(u64 guest_spec_ctrl)
 {
+	u64 host = x86_spec_ctrl_base;
+
 	if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBRS))
 		return;
-	if (x86_spec_ctrl_base != guest_spec_ctrl)
+
+	if (boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor == X86_VENDOR_INTEL)
+		host |= rds_tif_to_spec_ctrl(current_thread_info()->flags);
+
+	if (host != guest_spec_ctrl)
 		wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, guest_spec_ctrl);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(x86_spec_ctrl_set_guest);
 
 void x86_spec_ctrl_restore_host(u64 guest_spec_ctrl)
 {
+	u64 host = x86_spec_ctrl_base;
+
 	if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBRS))
 		return;
-	if (x86_spec_ctrl_base != guest_spec_ctrl)
-		wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, x86_spec_ctrl_base);
+
+	if (boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor == X86_VENDOR_INTEL)
+		host |= rds_tif_to_spec_ctrl(current_thread_info()->flags);
+
+	if (host != guest_spec_ctrl)
+		wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, host);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(x86_spec_ctrl_restore_host);
 
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/process.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/process.c
@@ -33,6 +33,7 @@
 #include <asm/mce.h>
 #include <asm/vm86.h>
 #include <asm/switch_to.h>
+#include <asm/spec-ctrl.h>
 
 /*
  * per-CPU TSS segments. Threads are completely 'soft' on Linux,
@@ -202,6 +203,24 @@ static inline void switch_to_bitmap(stru
 	}
 }
 
+static __always_inline void __speculative_store_bypass_update(unsigned long tifn)
+{
+	u64 msr;
+
+	if (static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_AMD_RDS)) {
+		msr = x86_amd_ls_cfg_base | rds_tif_to_amd_ls_cfg(tifn);
+		wrmsrl(MSR_AMD64_LS_CFG, msr);
+	} else {
+		msr = x86_spec_ctrl_base | rds_tif_to_spec_ctrl(tifn);
+		wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, msr);
+	}
+}
+
+void speculative_store_bypass_update(void)
+{
+	__speculative_store_bypass_update(current_thread_info()->flags);
+}
+
 void __switch_to_xtra(struct task_struct *prev_p, struct task_struct *next_p,
 		      struct tss_struct *tss)
 {
@@ -230,6 +249,9 @@ void __switch_to_xtra(struct task_struct
 
 	if ((tifp ^ tifn) & _TIF_NOTSC)
 		cr4_toggle_bits(X86_CR4_TSD);
+
+	if ((tifp ^ tifn) & _TIF_RDS)
+		__speculative_store_bypass_update(tifn);
 }
 
 /*

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 92+ messages in thread

* [PATCH 4.9 54/87] x86/speculation: Add prctl for Speculative Store Bypass mitigation
  2018-05-21 21:10 [PATCH 4.9 00/87] 4.9.102-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (52 preceding siblings ...)
  2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.9 53/87] x86/process: Allow runtime control of Speculative Store Bypass Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2018-05-21 21:11 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
  2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.9 55/87] nospec: Allow getting/setting on non-current task Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (36 subsequent siblings)
  90 siblings, 0 replies; 92+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2018-05-21 21:11 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-kernel
  Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Thomas Gleixner,
	Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk, David Woodhouse

4.9-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>

commit a73ec77ee17ec556fe7f165d00314cb7c047b1ac upstream

Add prctl based control for Speculative Store Bypass mitigation and make it
the default mitigation for Intel and AMD.

Andi Kleen provided the following rationale (slightly redacted):

 There are multiple levels of impact of Speculative Store Bypass:

 1) JITed sandbox.
    It cannot invoke system calls, but can do PRIME+PROBE and may have call
    interfaces to other code

 2) Native code process.
    No protection inside the process at this level.

 3) Kernel.

 4) Between processes.

 The prctl tries to protect against case (1) doing attacks.

 If the untrusted code can do random system calls then control is already
 lost in a much worse way. So there needs to be system call protection in
 some way (using a JIT not allowing them or seccomp). Or rather if the
 process can subvert its environment somehow to do the prctl it can already
 execute arbitrary code, which is much worse than SSB.

 To put it differently, the point of the prctl is to not allow JITed code
 to read data it shouldn't read from its JITed sandbox. If it already has
 escaped its sandbox then it can already read everything it wants in its
 address space, and do much worse.

 The ability to control Speculative Store Bypass allows to enable the
 protection selectively without affecting overall system performance.

Based on an initial patch from Tim Chen. Completely rewritten.

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>

Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt  |    6 ++
 arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h |    1 
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c           |   83 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----
 3 files changed, 79 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)

--- a/Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt
+++ b/Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt
@@ -4001,7 +4001,11 @@ bytes respectively. Such letter suffixes
 			off    - Unconditionally enable Speculative Store Bypass
 			auto   - Kernel detects whether the CPU model contains an
 				 implementation of Speculative Store Bypass and
-				 picks the most appropriate mitigation
+				 picks the most appropriate mitigation.
+			prctl  - Control Speculative Store Bypass per thread
+				 via prctl. Speculative Store Bypass is enabled
+				 for a process by default. The state of the control
+				 is inherited on fork.
 
 			Not specifying this option is equivalent to
 			spec_store_bypass_disable=auto.
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
@@ -232,6 +232,7 @@ extern u64 x86_spec_ctrl_get_default(voi
 enum ssb_mitigation {
 	SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_NONE,
 	SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_DISABLE,
+	SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_PRCTL,
 };
 
 extern char __indirect_thunk_start[];
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -11,6 +11,8 @@
 #include <linux/utsname.h>
 #include <linux/cpu.h>
 #include <linux/module.h>
+#include <linux/nospec.h>
+#include <linux/prctl.h>
 
 #include <asm/spec-ctrl.h>
 #include <asm/cmdline.h>
@@ -411,20 +413,23 @@ enum ssb_mitigation_cmd {
 	SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_CMD_NONE,
 	SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_CMD_AUTO,
 	SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_CMD_ON,
+	SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_CMD_PRCTL,
 };
 
 static const char *ssb_strings[] = {
 	[SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_NONE]	= "Vulnerable",
-	[SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_DISABLE]	= "Mitigation: Speculative Store Bypass disabled"
+	[SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_DISABLE]	= "Mitigation: Speculative Store Bypass disabled",
+	[SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_PRCTL]	= "Mitigation: Speculative Store Bypass disabled via prctl"
 };
 
 static const struct {
 	const char *option;
 	enum ssb_mitigation_cmd cmd;
 } ssb_mitigation_options[] = {
-	{ "auto",	SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_CMD_AUTO }, /* Platform decides */
-	{ "on",		SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_CMD_ON },   /* Disable Speculative Store Bypass */
-	{ "off",	SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_CMD_NONE }, /* Don't touch Speculative Store Bypass */
+	{ "auto",	SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_CMD_AUTO },  /* Platform decides */
+	{ "on",		SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_CMD_ON },    /* Disable Speculative Store Bypass */
+	{ "off",	SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_CMD_NONE },  /* Don't touch Speculative Store Bypass */
+	{ "prctl",	SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_CMD_PRCTL }, /* Disable Speculative Store Bypass via prctl */
 };
 
 static enum ssb_mitigation_cmd __init ssb_parse_cmdline(void)
@@ -474,14 +479,15 @@ static enum ssb_mitigation_cmd __init __
 
 	switch (cmd) {
 	case SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_CMD_AUTO:
-		/*
-		 * AMD platforms by default don't need SSB mitigation.
-		 */
-		if (boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor == X86_VENDOR_AMD)
-			break;
+		/* Choose prctl as the default mode */
+		mode = SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_PRCTL;
+		break;
 	case SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_CMD_ON:
 		mode = SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_DISABLE;
 		break;
+	case SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_CMD_PRCTL:
+		mode = SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_PRCTL;
+		break;
 	case SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_CMD_NONE:
 		break;
 	}
@@ -492,7 +498,7 @@ static enum ssb_mitigation_cmd __init __
 	 *  - X86_FEATURE_RDS - CPU is able to turn off speculative store bypass
 	 *  - X86_FEATURE_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_DISABLE - engage the mitigation
 	 */
-	if (mode != SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_NONE) {
+	if (mode == SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_DISABLE) {
 		setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_DISABLE);
 		/*
 		 * Intel uses the SPEC CTRL MSR Bit(2) for this, while AMD uses
@@ -523,6 +529,63 @@ static void ssb_select_mitigation()
 
 #undef pr_fmt
 
+static int ssb_prctl_set(unsigned long ctrl)
+{
+	bool rds = !!test_tsk_thread_flag(current, TIF_RDS);
+
+	if (ssb_mode != SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_PRCTL)
+		return -ENXIO;
+
+	if (ctrl == PR_SPEC_ENABLE)
+		clear_tsk_thread_flag(current, TIF_RDS);
+	else
+		set_tsk_thread_flag(current, TIF_RDS);
+
+	if (rds != !!test_tsk_thread_flag(current, TIF_RDS))
+		speculative_store_bypass_update();
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int ssb_prctl_get(void)
+{
+	switch (ssb_mode) {
+	case SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_DISABLE:
+		return PR_SPEC_DISABLE;
+	case SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_PRCTL:
+		if (test_tsk_thread_flag(current, TIF_RDS))
+			return PR_SPEC_PRCTL | PR_SPEC_DISABLE;
+		return PR_SPEC_PRCTL | PR_SPEC_ENABLE;
+	default:
+		if (boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS))
+			return PR_SPEC_ENABLE;
+		return PR_SPEC_NOT_AFFECTED;
+	}
+}
+
+int arch_prctl_spec_ctrl_set(unsigned long which, unsigned long ctrl)
+{
+	if (ctrl != PR_SPEC_ENABLE && ctrl != PR_SPEC_DISABLE)
+		return -ERANGE;
+
+	switch (which) {
+	case PR_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS:
+		return ssb_prctl_set(ctrl);
+	default:
+		return -ENODEV;
+	}
+}
+
+int arch_prctl_spec_ctrl_get(unsigned long which)
+{
+	switch (which) {
+	case PR_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS:
+		return ssb_prctl_get();
+	default:
+		return -ENODEV;
+	}
+}
+
 void x86_spec_ctrl_setup_ap(void)
 {
 	if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBRS))

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 92+ messages in thread

* [PATCH 4.9 55/87] nospec: Allow getting/setting on non-current task
  2018-05-21 21:10 [PATCH 4.9 00/87] 4.9.102-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (53 preceding siblings ...)
  2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.9 54/87] x86/speculation: Add prctl for Speculative Store Bypass mitigation Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2018-05-21 21:11 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
  2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.9 56/87] proc: Provide details on speculation flaw mitigations Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (35 subsequent siblings)
  90 siblings, 0 replies; 92+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2018-05-21 21:11 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-kernel
  Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Kees Cook, Thomas Gleixner, David Woodhouse

4.9-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>

commit 7bbf1373e228840bb0295a2ca26d548ef37f448e upstream

Adjust arch_prctl_get/set_spec_ctrl() to operate on tasks other than
current.

This is needed both for /proc/$pid/status queries and for seccomp (since
thread-syncing can trigger seccomp in non-current threads).

Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c |   27 ++++++++++++++++-----------
 include/linux/nospec.h     |    7 +++++--
 kernel/sys.c               |    9 +++++----
 3 files changed, 26 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-)

--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -529,31 +529,35 @@ static void ssb_select_mitigation()
 
 #undef pr_fmt
 
-static int ssb_prctl_set(unsigned long ctrl)
+static int ssb_prctl_set(struct task_struct *task, unsigned long ctrl)
 {
-	bool rds = !!test_tsk_thread_flag(current, TIF_RDS);
+	bool rds = !!test_tsk_thread_flag(task, TIF_RDS);
 
 	if (ssb_mode != SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_PRCTL)
 		return -ENXIO;
 
 	if (ctrl == PR_SPEC_ENABLE)
-		clear_tsk_thread_flag(current, TIF_RDS);
+		clear_tsk_thread_flag(task, TIF_RDS);
 	else
-		set_tsk_thread_flag(current, TIF_RDS);
+		set_tsk_thread_flag(task, TIF_RDS);
 
-	if (rds != !!test_tsk_thread_flag(current, TIF_RDS))
+	/*
+	 * If being set on non-current task, delay setting the CPU
+	 * mitigation until it is next scheduled.
+	 */
+	if (task == current && rds != !!test_tsk_thread_flag(task, TIF_RDS))
 		speculative_store_bypass_update();
 
 	return 0;
 }
 
-static int ssb_prctl_get(void)
+static int ssb_prctl_get(struct task_struct *task)
 {
 	switch (ssb_mode) {
 	case SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_DISABLE:
 		return PR_SPEC_DISABLE;
 	case SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_PRCTL:
-		if (test_tsk_thread_flag(current, TIF_RDS))
+		if (test_tsk_thread_flag(task, TIF_RDS))
 			return PR_SPEC_PRCTL | PR_SPEC_DISABLE;
 		return PR_SPEC_PRCTL | PR_SPEC_ENABLE;
 	default:
@@ -563,24 +567,25 @@ static int ssb_prctl_get(void)
 	}
 }
 
-int arch_prctl_spec_ctrl_set(unsigned long which, unsigned long ctrl)
+int arch_prctl_spec_ctrl_set(struct task_struct *task, unsigned long which,
+			     unsigned long ctrl)
 {
 	if (ctrl != PR_SPEC_ENABLE && ctrl != PR_SPEC_DISABLE)
 		return -ERANGE;
 
 	switch (which) {
 	case PR_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS:
-		return ssb_prctl_set(ctrl);
+		return ssb_prctl_set(task, ctrl);
 	default:
 		return -ENODEV;
 	}
 }
 
-int arch_prctl_spec_ctrl_get(unsigned long which)
+int arch_prctl_spec_ctrl_get(struct task_struct *task, unsigned long which)
 {
 	switch (which) {
 	case PR_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS:
-		return ssb_prctl_get();
+		return ssb_prctl_get(task);
 	default:
 		return -ENODEV;
 	}
--- a/include/linux/nospec.h
+++ b/include/linux/nospec.h
@@ -7,6 +7,8 @@
 #define _LINUX_NOSPEC_H
 #include <asm/barrier.h>
 
+struct task_struct;
+
 /**
  * array_index_mask_nospec() - generate a ~0 mask when index < size, 0 otherwise
  * @index: array element index
@@ -57,7 +59,8 @@ static inline unsigned long array_index_
 })
 
 /* Speculation control prctl */
-int arch_prctl_spec_ctrl_get(unsigned long which);
-int arch_prctl_spec_ctrl_set(unsigned long which, unsigned long ctrl);
+int arch_prctl_spec_ctrl_get(struct task_struct *task, unsigned long which);
+int arch_prctl_spec_ctrl_set(struct task_struct *task, unsigned long which,
+			     unsigned long ctrl);
 
 #endif /* _LINUX_NOSPEC_H */
--- a/kernel/sys.c
+++ b/kernel/sys.c
@@ -2074,12 +2074,13 @@ static int prctl_get_tid_address(struct
 }
 #endif
 
-int __weak arch_prctl_spec_ctrl_get(unsigned long which)
+int __weak arch_prctl_spec_ctrl_get(struct task_struct *t, unsigned long which)
 {
 	return -EINVAL;
 }
 
-int __weak arch_prctl_spec_ctrl_set(unsigned long which, unsigned long ctrl)
+int __weak arch_prctl_spec_ctrl_set(struct task_struct *t, unsigned long which,
+				    unsigned long ctrl)
 {
 	return -EINVAL;
 }
@@ -2285,12 +2286,12 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(prctl, int, option, unsi
 	case PR_GET_SPECULATION_CTRL:
 		if (arg3 || arg4 || arg5)
 			return -EINVAL;
-		error = arch_prctl_spec_ctrl_get(arg2);
+		error = arch_prctl_spec_ctrl_get(me, arg2);
 		break;
 	case PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL:
 		if (arg4 || arg5)
 			return -EINVAL;
-		error = arch_prctl_spec_ctrl_set(arg2, arg3);
+		error = arch_prctl_spec_ctrl_set(me, arg2, arg3);
 		break;
 	default:
 		error = -EINVAL;

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 92+ messages in thread

* [PATCH 4.9 56/87] proc: Provide details on speculation flaw mitigations
  2018-05-21 21:10 [PATCH 4.9 00/87] 4.9.102-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (54 preceding siblings ...)
  2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.9 55/87] nospec: Allow getting/setting on non-current task Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2018-05-21 21:11 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
  2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.9 57/87] seccomp: Enable " Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (34 subsequent siblings)
  90 siblings, 0 replies; 92+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2018-05-21 21:11 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-kernel
  Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Kees Cook, Thomas Gleixner, David Woodhouse

4.9-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>

commit fae1fa0fc6cca8beee3ab8ed71d54f9a78fa3f64 upstream

As done with seccomp and no_new_privs, also show speculation flaw
mitigation state in /proc/$pid/status.

Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 fs/proc/array.c |   24 +++++++++++++++++++++++-
 1 file changed, 23 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/fs/proc/array.c
+++ b/fs/proc/array.c
@@ -80,6 +80,7 @@
 #include <linux/delayacct.h>
 #include <linux/seq_file.h>
 #include <linux/pid_namespace.h>
+#include <linux/prctl.h>
 #include <linux/ptrace.h>
 #include <linux/tracehook.h>
 #include <linux/string_helpers.h>
@@ -345,8 +346,29 @@ static inline void task_seccomp(struct s
 {
 #ifdef CONFIG_SECCOMP
 	seq_put_decimal_ull(m, "Seccomp:\t", p->seccomp.mode);
-	seq_putc(m, '\n');
 #endif
+	seq_printf(m, "\nSpeculation Store Bypass:\t");
+	switch (arch_prctl_spec_ctrl_get(p, PR_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS)) {
+	case -EINVAL:
+		seq_printf(m, "unknown");
+		break;
+	case PR_SPEC_NOT_AFFECTED:
+		seq_printf(m, "not vulnerable");
+		break;
+	case PR_SPEC_PRCTL | PR_SPEC_DISABLE:
+		seq_printf(m, "thread mitigated");
+		break;
+	case PR_SPEC_PRCTL | PR_SPEC_ENABLE:
+		seq_printf(m, "thread vulnerable");
+		break;
+	case PR_SPEC_DISABLE:
+		seq_printf(m, "globally mitigated");
+		break;
+	default:
+		seq_printf(m, "vulnerable");
+		break;
+	}
+	seq_putc(m, '\n');
 }
 
 static inline void task_context_switch_counts(struct seq_file *m,

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 92+ messages in thread

* [PATCH 4.9 57/87] seccomp: Enable speculation flaw mitigations
  2018-05-21 21:10 [PATCH 4.9 00/87] 4.9.102-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (55 preceding siblings ...)
  2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.9 56/87] proc: Provide details on speculation flaw mitigations Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2018-05-21 21:11 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
  2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.9 58/87] x86/bugs: Make boot modes __ro_after_init Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (33 subsequent siblings)
  90 siblings, 0 replies; 92+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2018-05-21 21:11 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-kernel
  Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Kees Cook, Thomas Gleixner, David Woodhouse

4.9-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>

commit 5c3070890d06ff82eecb808d02d2ca39169533ef upstream

When speculation flaw mitigations are opt-in (via prctl), using seccomp
will automatically opt-in to these protections, since using seccomp
indicates at least some level of sandboxing is desired.

Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 kernel/seccomp.c |   17 +++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 17 insertions(+)

--- a/kernel/seccomp.c
+++ b/kernel/seccomp.c
@@ -16,6 +16,8 @@
 #include <linux/atomic.h>
 #include <linux/audit.h>
 #include <linux/compat.h>
+#include <linux/nospec.h>
+#include <linux/prctl.h>
 #include <linux/sched.h>
 #include <linux/seccomp.h>
 #include <linux/slab.h>
@@ -214,6 +216,19 @@ static inline bool seccomp_may_assign_mo
 	return true;
 }
 
+/*
+ * If a given speculation mitigation is opt-in (prctl()-controlled),
+ * select it, by disabling speculation (enabling mitigation).
+ */
+static inline void spec_mitigate(struct task_struct *task,
+				 unsigned long which)
+{
+	int state = arch_prctl_spec_ctrl_get(task, which);
+
+	if (state > 0 && (state & PR_SPEC_PRCTL))
+		arch_prctl_spec_ctrl_set(task, which, PR_SPEC_DISABLE);
+}
+
 static inline void seccomp_assign_mode(struct task_struct *task,
 				       unsigned long seccomp_mode)
 {
@@ -225,6 +240,8 @@ static inline void seccomp_assign_mode(s
 	 * filter) is set.
 	 */
 	smp_mb__before_atomic();
+	/* Assume seccomp processes want speculation flaw mitigation. */
+	spec_mitigate(task, PR_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS);
 	set_tsk_thread_flag(task, TIF_SECCOMP);
 }
 

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 92+ messages in thread

* [PATCH 4.9 58/87] x86/bugs: Make boot modes __ro_after_init
  2018-05-21 21:10 [PATCH 4.9 00/87] 4.9.102-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (56 preceding siblings ...)
  2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.9 57/87] seccomp: Enable " Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2018-05-21 21:11 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
  2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.9 59/87] prctl: Add force disable speculation Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (32 subsequent siblings)
  90 siblings, 0 replies; 92+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2018-05-21 21:11 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-kernel
  Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Kees Cook, Thomas Gleixner, David Woodhouse

4.9-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>

commit f9544b2b076ca90d887c5ae5d74fab4c21bb7c13 upstream

There's no reason for these to be changed after boot.

Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c |    5 +++--
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -128,7 +128,8 @@ static const char *spectre_v2_strings[]
 #undef pr_fmt
 #define pr_fmt(fmt)     "Spectre V2 : " fmt
 
-static enum spectre_v2_mitigation spectre_v2_enabled = SPECTRE_V2_NONE;
+static enum spectre_v2_mitigation spectre_v2_enabled __ro_after_init =
+	SPECTRE_V2_NONE;
 
 void x86_spec_ctrl_set(u64 val)
 {
@@ -406,7 +407,7 @@ retpoline_auto:
 #undef pr_fmt
 #define pr_fmt(fmt)	"Speculative Store Bypass: " fmt
 
-static enum ssb_mitigation ssb_mode = SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_NONE;
+static enum ssb_mitigation ssb_mode __ro_after_init = SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_NONE;
 
 /* The kernel command line selection */
 enum ssb_mitigation_cmd {

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 92+ messages in thread

* [PATCH 4.9 59/87] prctl: Add force disable speculation
  2018-05-21 21:10 [PATCH 4.9 00/87] 4.9.102-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (57 preceding siblings ...)
  2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.9 58/87] x86/bugs: Make boot modes __ro_after_init Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2018-05-21 21:11 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
  2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.9 60/87] seccomp: Use PR_SPEC_FORCE_DISABLE Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (31 subsequent siblings)
  90 siblings, 0 replies; 92+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2018-05-21 21:11 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-kernel; +Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Thomas Gleixner, David Woodhouse

4.9-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>

commit 356e4bfff2c5489e016fdb925adbf12a1e3950ee upstream

For certain use cases it is desired to enforce mitigations so they cannot
be undone afterwards. That's important for loader stubs which want to
prevent a child from disabling the mitigation again. Will also be used for
seccomp(). The extra state preserving of the prctl state for SSB is a
preparatory step for EBPF dymanic speculation control.

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 Documentation/spec_ctrl.txt |   34 +++++++++++++++++++++-------------
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c  |   35 +++++++++++++++++++++++++----------
 fs/proc/array.c             |    3 +++
 include/linux/sched.h       |    9 +++++++++
 include/uapi/linux/prctl.h  |    1 +
 5 files changed, 59 insertions(+), 23 deletions(-)

--- a/Documentation/spec_ctrl.txt
+++ b/Documentation/spec_ctrl.txt
@@ -25,19 +25,21 @@ PR_GET_SPECULATION_CTRL
 -----------------------
 
 PR_GET_SPECULATION_CTRL returns the state of the speculation misfeature
-which is selected with arg2 of prctl(2). The return value uses bits 0-2 with
+which is selected with arg2 of prctl(2). The return value uses bits 0-3 with
 the following meaning:
 
-==== ================ ===================================================
-Bit  Define           Description
-==== ================ ===================================================
-0    PR_SPEC_PRCTL    Mitigation can be controlled per task by
-                      PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL
-1    PR_SPEC_ENABLE   The speculation feature is enabled, mitigation is
-                      disabled
-2    PR_SPEC_DISABLE  The speculation feature is disabled, mitigation is
-                      enabled
-==== ================ ===================================================
+==== ===================== ===================================================
+Bit  Define                Description
+==== ===================== ===================================================
+0    PR_SPEC_PRCTL         Mitigation can be controlled per task by
+                           PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL
+1    PR_SPEC_ENABLE        The speculation feature is enabled, mitigation is
+                           disabled
+2    PR_SPEC_DISABLE       The speculation feature is disabled, mitigation is
+                           enabled
+3    PR_SPEC_FORCE_DISABLE Same as PR_SPEC_DISABLE, but cannot be undone. A
+                           subsequent prctl(..., PR_SPEC_ENABLE) will fail.
+==== ===================== ===================================================
 
 If all bits are 0 the CPU is not affected by the speculation misfeature.
 
@@ -47,9 +49,11 @@ misfeature will fail.
 
 PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL
 -----------------------
+
 PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL allows to control the speculation misfeature, which
 is selected by arg2 of :manpage:`prctl(2)` per task. arg3 is used to hand
-in the control value, i.e. either PR_SPEC_ENABLE or PR_SPEC_DISABLE.
+in the control value, i.e. either PR_SPEC_ENABLE or PR_SPEC_DISABLE or
+PR_SPEC_FORCE_DISABLE.
 
 Common error codes
 ------------------
@@ -70,10 +74,13 @@ Value   Meaning
 0       Success
 
 ERANGE  arg3 is incorrect, i.e. it's neither PR_SPEC_ENABLE nor
-        PR_SPEC_DISABLE
+        PR_SPEC_DISABLE nor PR_SPEC_FORCE_DISABLE
 
 ENXIO   Control of the selected speculation misfeature is not possible.
         See PR_GET_SPECULATION_CTRL.
+
+EPERM   Speculation was disabled with PR_SPEC_FORCE_DISABLE and caller
+        tried to enable it again.
 ======= =================================================================
 
 Speculation misfeature controls
@@ -84,3 +91,4 @@ Speculation misfeature controls
    * prctl(PR_GET_SPECULATION_CTRL, PR_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS, 0, 0, 0);
    * prctl(PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL, PR_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS, PR_SPEC_ENABLE, 0, 0);
    * prctl(PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL, PR_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS, PR_SPEC_DISABLE, 0, 0);
+   * prctl(PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL, PR_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS, PR_SPEC_FORCE_DISABLE, 0, 0);
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -532,21 +532,37 @@ static void ssb_select_mitigation()
 
 static int ssb_prctl_set(struct task_struct *task, unsigned long ctrl)
 {
-	bool rds = !!test_tsk_thread_flag(task, TIF_RDS);
+	bool update;
 
 	if (ssb_mode != SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_PRCTL)
 		return -ENXIO;
 
-	if (ctrl == PR_SPEC_ENABLE)
-		clear_tsk_thread_flag(task, TIF_RDS);
-	else
-		set_tsk_thread_flag(task, TIF_RDS);
+	switch (ctrl) {
+	case PR_SPEC_ENABLE:
+		/* If speculation is force disabled, enable is not allowed */
+		if (task_spec_ssb_force_disable(task))
+			return -EPERM;
+		task_clear_spec_ssb_disable(task);
+		update = test_and_clear_tsk_thread_flag(task, TIF_RDS);
+		break;
+	case PR_SPEC_DISABLE:
+		task_set_spec_ssb_disable(task);
+		update = !test_and_set_tsk_thread_flag(task, TIF_RDS);
+		break;
+	case PR_SPEC_FORCE_DISABLE:
+		task_set_spec_ssb_disable(task);
+		task_set_spec_ssb_force_disable(task);
+		update = !test_and_set_tsk_thread_flag(task, TIF_RDS);
+		break;
+	default:
+		return -ERANGE;
+	}
 
 	/*
 	 * If being set on non-current task, delay setting the CPU
 	 * mitigation until it is next scheduled.
 	 */
-	if (task == current && rds != !!test_tsk_thread_flag(task, TIF_RDS))
+	if (task == current && update)
 		speculative_store_bypass_update();
 
 	return 0;
@@ -558,7 +574,9 @@ static int ssb_prctl_get(struct task_str
 	case SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_DISABLE:
 		return PR_SPEC_DISABLE;
 	case SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_PRCTL:
-		if (test_tsk_thread_flag(task, TIF_RDS))
+		if (task_spec_ssb_force_disable(task))
+			return PR_SPEC_PRCTL | PR_SPEC_FORCE_DISABLE;
+		if (task_spec_ssb_disable(task))
 			return PR_SPEC_PRCTL | PR_SPEC_DISABLE;
 		return PR_SPEC_PRCTL | PR_SPEC_ENABLE;
 	default:
@@ -571,9 +589,6 @@ static int ssb_prctl_get(struct task_str
 int arch_prctl_spec_ctrl_set(struct task_struct *task, unsigned long which,
 			     unsigned long ctrl)
 {
-	if (ctrl != PR_SPEC_ENABLE && ctrl != PR_SPEC_DISABLE)
-		return -ERANGE;
-
 	switch (which) {
 	case PR_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS:
 		return ssb_prctl_set(task, ctrl);
--- a/fs/proc/array.c
+++ b/fs/proc/array.c
@@ -355,6 +355,9 @@ static inline void task_seccomp(struct s
 	case PR_SPEC_NOT_AFFECTED:
 		seq_printf(m, "not vulnerable");
 		break;
+	case PR_SPEC_PRCTL | PR_SPEC_FORCE_DISABLE:
+		seq_printf(m, "thread force mitigated");
+		break;
 	case PR_SPEC_PRCTL | PR_SPEC_DISABLE:
 		seq_printf(m, "thread mitigated");
 		break;
--- a/include/linux/sched.h
+++ b/include/linux/sched.h
@@ -2354,6 +2354,8 @@ static inline void memalloc_noio_restore
 #define PFA_SPREAD_PAGE  1      /* Spread page cache over cpuset */
 #define PFA_SPREAD_SLAB  2      /* Spread some slab caches over cpuset */
 #define PFA_LMK_WAITING  3      /* Lowmemorykiller is waiting */
+#define PFA_SPEC_SSB_DISABLE		4	/* Speculative Store Bypass disabled */
+#define PFA_SPEC_SSB_FORCE_DISABLE	5	/* Speculative Store Bypass force disabled*/
 
 
 #define TASK_PFA_TEST(name, func)					\
@@ -2380,6 +2382,13 @@ TASK_PFA_CLEAR(SPREAD_SLAB, spread_slab)
 TASK_PFA_TEST(LMK_WAITING, lmk_waiting)
 TASK_PFA_SET(LMK_WAITING, lmk_waiting)
 
+TASK_PFA_TEST(SPEC_SSB_DISABLE, spec_ssb_disable)
+TASK_PFA_SET(SPEC_SSB_DISABLE, spec_ssb_disable)
+TASK_PFA_CLEAR(SPEC_SSB_DISABLE, spec_ssb_disable)
+
+TASK_PFA_TEST(SPEC_SSB_FORCE_DISABLE, spec_ssb_force_disable)
+TASK_PFA_SET(SPEC_SSB_FORCE_DISABLE, spec_ssb_force_disable)
+
 /*
  * task->jobctl flags
  */
--- a/include/uapi/linux/prctl.h
+++ b/include/uapi/linux/prctl.h
@@ -207,5 +207,6 @@ struct prctl_mm_map {
 # define PR_SPEC_PRCTL			(1UL << 0)
 # define PR_SPEC_ENABLE			(1UL << 1)
 # define PR_SPEC_DISABLE		(1UL << 2)
+# define PR_SPEC_FORCE_DISABLE		(1UL << 3)
 
 #endif /* _LINUX_PRCTL_H */

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 92+ messages in thread

* [PATCH 4.9 60/87] seccomp: Use PR_SPEC_FORCE_DISABLE
  2018-05-21 21:10 [PATCH 4.9 00/87] 4.9.102-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (58 preceding siblings ...)
  2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.9 59/87] prctl: Add force disable speculation Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2018-05-21 21:11 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
  2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.9 61/87] seccomp: Add filter flag to opt-out of SSB mitigation Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (30 subsequent siblings)
  90 siblings, 0 replies; 92+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2018-05-21 21:11 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-kernel; +Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Thomas Gleixner, David Woodhouse

4.9-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>

commit b849a812f7eb92e96d1c8239b06581b2cfd8b275 upstream

Use PR_SPEC_FORCE_DISABLE in seccomp() because seccomp does not allow to
widen restrictions.

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 kernel/seccomp.c |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/kernel/seccomp.c
+++ b/kernel/seccomp.c
@@ -226,7 +226,7 @@ static inline void spec_mitigate(struct
 	int state = arch_prctl_spec_ctrl_get(task, which);
 
 	if (state > 0 && (state & PR_SPEC_PRCTL))
-		arch_prctl_spec_ctrl_set(task, which, PR_SPEC_DISABLE);
+		arch_prctl_spec_ctrl_set(task, which, PR_SPEC_FORCE_DISABLE);
 }
 
 static inline void seccomp_assign_mode(struct task_struct *task,

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 92+ messages in thread

* [PATCH 4.9 61/87] seccomp: Add filter flag to opt-out of SSB mitigation
  2018-05-21 21:10 [PATCH 4.9 00/87] 4.9.102-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (59 preceding siblings ...)
  2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.9 60/87] seccomp: Use PR_SPEC_FORCE_DISABLE Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2018-05-21 21:11 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
  2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.9 62/87] seccomp: Move speculation migitation control to arch code Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (29 subsequent siblings)
  90 siblings, 0 replies; 92+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2018-05-21 21:11 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-kernel
  Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Kees Cook, Thomas Gleixner, David Woodhouse

4.9-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>

commit 00a02d0c502a06d15e07b857f8ff921e3e402675 upstream

If a seccomp user is not interested in Speculative Store Bypass mitigation
by default, it can set the new SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_SPEC_ALLOW flag when
adding filters.

Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 include/linux/seccomp.h                       |    3 -
 include/uapi/linux/seccomp.h                  |    4 +
 kernel/seccomp.c                              |   19 +++---
 tools/testing/selftests/seccomp/seccomp_bpf.c |   78 +++++++++++++++++++++++++-
 4 files changed, 93 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)

--- a/include/linux/seccomp.h
+++ b/include/linux/seccomp.h
@@ -3,7 +3,8 @@
 
 #include <uapi/linux/seccomp.h>
 
-#define SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_MASK	(SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_TSYNC)
+#define SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_MASK	(SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_TSYNC	| \
+					 SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_SPEC_ALLOW)
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_SECCOMP
 
--- a/include/uapi/linux/seccomp.h
+++ b/include/uapi/linux/seccomp.h
@@ -15,7 +15,9 @@
 #define SECCOMP_SET_MODE_FILTER	1
 
 /* Valid flags for SECCOMP_SET_MODE_FILTER */
-#define SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_TSYNC	1
+#define SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_TSYNC	(1UL << 0)
+/* In v4.14+ SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_LOG is (1UL << 1) */
+#define SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_SPEC_ALLOW	(1UL << 2)
 
 /*
  * All BPF programs must return a 32-bit value.
--- a/kernel/seccomp.c
+++ b/kernel/seccomp.c
@@ -230,7 +230,8 @@ static inline void spec_mitigate(struct
 }
 
 static inline void seccomp_assign_mode(struct task_struct *task,
-				       unsigned long seccomp_mode)
+				       unsigned long seccomp_mode,
+				       unsigned long flags)
 {
 	assert_spin_locked(&task->sighand->siglock);
 
@@ -240,8 +241,9 @@ static inline void seccomp_assign_mode(s
 	 * filter) is set.
 	 */
 	smp_mb__before_atomic();
-	/* Assume seccomp processes want speculation flaw mitigation. */
-	spec_mitigate(task, PR_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS);
+	/* Assume default seccomp processes want spec flaw mitigation. */
+	if ((flags & SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_SPEC_ALLOW) == 0)
+		spec_mitigate(task, PR_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS);
 	set_tsk_thread_flag(task, TIF_SECCOMP);
 }
 
@@ -309,7 +311,7 @@ static inline pid_t seccomp_can_sync_thr
  * without dropping the locks.
  *
  */
-static inline void seccomp_sync_threads(void)
+static inline void seccomp_sync_threads(unsigned long flags)
 {
 	struct task_struct *thread, *caller;
 
@@ -350,7 +352,8 @@ static inline void seccomp_sync_threads(
 		 * allow one thread to transition the other.
 		 */
 		if (thread->seccomp.mode == SECCOMP_MODE_DISABLED)
-			seccomp_assign_mode(thread, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER);
+			seccomp_assign_mode(thread, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER,
+					    flags);
 	}
 }
 
@@ -469,7 +472,7 @@ static long seccomp_attach_filter(unsign
 
 	/* Now that the new filter is in place, synchronize to all threads. */
 	if (flags & SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_TSYNC)
-		seccomp_sync_threads();
+		seccomp_sync_threads(flags);
 
 	return 0;
 }
@@ -729,7 +732,7 @@ static long seccomp_set_mode_strict(void
 #ifdef TIF_NOTSC
 	disable_TSC();
 #endif
-	seccomp_assign_mode(current, seccomp_mode);
+	seccomp_assign_mode(current, seccomp_mode, 0);
 	ret = 0;
 
 out:
@@ -787,7 +790,7 @@ static long seccomp_set_mode_filter(unsi
 	/* Do not free the successfully attached filter. */
 	prepared = NULL;
 
-	seccomp_assign_mode(current, seccomp_mode);
+	seccomp_assign_mode(current, seccomp_mode, flags);
 out:
 	spin_unlock_irq(&current->sighand->siglock);
 	if (flags & SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_TSYNC)
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/seccomp/seccomp_bpf.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/seccomp/seccomp_bpf.c
@@ -1692,7 +1692,11 @@ TEST_F_SIGNAL(TRACE_syscall, kill_after_
 #endif
 
 #ifndef SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_TSYNC
-#define SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_TSYNC 1
+#define SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_TSYNC (1UL << 0)
+#endif
+
+#ifndef SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_SPEC_ALLOW
+#define SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_SPEC_ALLOW (1UL << 2)
 #endif
 
 #ifndef seccomp
@@ -1791,6 +1795,78 @@ TEST(seccomp_syscall_mode_lock)
 	}
 }
 
+/*
+ * Test detection of known and unknown filter flags. Userspace needs to be able
+ * to check if a filter flag is supported by the current kernel and a good way
+ * of doing that is by attempting to enter filter mode, with the flag bit in
+ * question set, and a NULL pointer for the _args_ parameter. EFAULT indicates
+ * that the flag is valid and EINVAL indicates that the flag is invalid.
+ */
+TEST(detect_seccomp_filter_flags)
+{
+	unsigned int flags[] = { SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_TSYNC,
+				 SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_SPEC_ALLOW };
+	unsigned int flag, all_flags;
+	int i;
+	long ret;
+
+	/* Test detection of known-good filter flags */
+	for (i = 0, all_flags = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(flags); i++) {
+		int bits = 0;
+
+		flag = flags[i];
+		/* Make sure the flag is a single bit! */
+		while (flag) {
+			if (flag & 0x1)
+				bits ++;
+			flag >>= 1;
+		}
+		ASSERT_EQ(1, bits);
+		flag = flags[i];
+
+		ret = seccomp(SECCOMP_SET_MODE_FILTER, flag, NULL);
+		ASSERT_NE(ENOSYS, errno) {
+			TH_LOG("Kernel does not support seccomp syscall!");
+		}
+		EXPECT_EQ(-1, ret);
+		EXPECT_EQ(EFAULT, errno) {
+			TH_LOG("Failed to detect that a known-good filter flag (0x%X) is supported!",
+			       flag);
+		}
+
+		all_flags |= flag;
+	}
+
+	/* Test detection of all known-good filter flags */
+	ret = seccomp(SECCOMP_SET_MODE_FILTER, all_flags, NULL);
+	EXPECT_EQ(-1, ret);
+	EXPECT_EQ(EFAULT, errno) {
+		TH_LOG("Failed to detect that all known-good filter flags (0x%X) are supported!",
+		       all_flags);
+	}
+
+	/* Test detection of an unknown filter flag */
+	flag = -1;
+	ret = seccomp(SECCOMP_SET_MODE_FILTER, flag, NULL);
+	EXPECT_EQ(-1, ret);
+	EXPECT_EQ(EINVAL, errno) {
+		TH_LOG("Failed to detect that an unknown filter flag (0x%X) is unsupported!",
+		       flag);
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Test detection of an unknown filter flag that may simply need to be
+	 * added to this test
+	 */
+	flag = flags[ARRAY_SIZE(flags) - 1] << 1;
+	ret = seccomp(SECCOMP_SET_MODE_FILTER, flag, NULL);
+	EXPECT_EQ(-1, ret);
+	EXPECT_EQ(EINVAL, errno) {
+		TH_LOG("Failed to detect that an unknown filter flag (0x%X) is unsupported! Does a new flag need to be added to this test?",
+		       flag);
+	}
+}
+
 TEST(TSYNC_first)
 {
 	struct sock_filter filter[] = {

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 92+ messages in thread

* [PATCH 4.9 62/87] seccomp: Move speculation migitation control to arch code
  2018-05-21 21:10 [PATCH 4.9 00/87] 4.9.102-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (60 preceding siblings ...)
  2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.9 61/87] seccomp: Add filter flag to opt-out of SSB mitigation Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2018-05-21 21:11 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
  2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.9 63/87] x86/speculation: Make "seccomp" the default mode for Speculative Store Bypass Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (28 subsequent siblings)
  90 siblings, 0 replies; 92+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2018-05-21 21:11 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-kernel; +Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Thomas Gleixner, David Woodhouse

4.9-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>

commit 8bf37d8c067bb7eb8e7c381bdadf9bd89182b6bc upstream

The migitation control is simpler to implement in architecture code as it
avoids the extra function call to check the mode. Aside of that having an
explicit seccomp enabled mode in the architecture mitigations would require
even more workarounds.

Move it into architecture code and provide a weak function in the seccomp
code. Remove the 'which' argument as this allows the architecture to decide
which mitigations are relevant for seccomp.

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c |   29 ++++++++++++++++++-----------
 include/linux/nospec.h     |    2 ++
 kernel/seccomp.c           |   15 ++-------------
 3 files changed, 22 insertions(+), 24 deletions(-)

--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -568,6 +568,24 @@ static int ssb_prctl_set(struct task_str
 	return 0;
 }
 
+int arch_prctl_spec_ctrl_set(struct task_struct *task, unsigned long which,
+			     unsigned long ctrl)
+{
+	switch (which) {
+	case PR_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS:
+		return ssb_prctl_set(task, ctrl);
+	default:
+		return -ENODEV;
+	}
+}
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECCOMP
+void arch_seccomp_spec_mitigate(struct task_struct *task)
+{
+	ssb_prctl_set(task, PR_SPEC_FORCE_DISABLE);
+}
+#endif
+
 static int ssb_prctl_get(struct task_struct *task)
 {
 	switch (ssb_mode) {
@@ -586,17 +604,6 @@ static int ssb_prctl_get(struct task_str
 	}
 }
 
-int arch_prctl_spec_ctrl_set(struct task_struct *task, unsigned long which,
-			     unsigned long ctrl)
-{
-	switch (which) {
-	case PR_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS:
-		return ssb_prctl_set(task, ctrl);
-	default:
-		return -ENODEV;
-	}
-}
-
 int arch_prctl_spec_ctrl_get(struct task_struct *task, unsigned long which)
 {
 	switch (which) {
--- a/include/linux/nospec.h
+++ b/include/linux/nospec.h
@@ -62,5 +62,7 @@ static inline unsigned long array_index_
 int arch_prctl_spec_ctrl_get(struct task_struct *task, unsigned long which);
 int arch_prctl_spec_ctrl_set(struct task_struct *task, unsigned long which,
 			     unsigned long ctrl);
+/* Speculation control for seccomp enforced mitigation */
+void arch_seccomp_spec_mitigate(struct task_struct *task);
 
 #endif /* _LINUX_NOSPEC_H */
--- a/kernel/seccomp.c
+++ b/kernel/seccomp.c
@@ -216,18 +216,7 @@ static inline bool seccomp_may_assign_mo
 	return true;
 }
 
-/*
- * If a given speculation mitigation is opt-in (prctl()-controlled),
- * select it, by disabling speculation (enabling mitigation).
- */
-static inline void spec_mitigate(struct task_struct *task,
-				 unsigned long which)
-{
-	int state = arch_prctl_spec_ctrl_get(task, which);
-
-	if (state > 0 && (state & PR_SPEC_PRCTL))
-		arch_prctl_spec_ctrl_set(task, which, PR_SPEC_FORCE_DISABLE);
-}
+void __weak arch_seccomp_spec_mitigate(struct task_struct *task) { }
 
 static inline void seccomp_assign_mode(struct task_struct *task,
 				       unsigned long seccomp_mode,
@@ -243,7 +232,7 @@ static inline void seccomp_assign_mode(s
 	smp_mb__before_atomic();
 	/* Assume default seccomp processes want spec flaw mitigation. */
 	if ((flags & SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_SPEC_ALLOW) == 0)
-		spec_mitigate(task, PR_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS);
+		arch_seccomp_spec_mitigate(task);
 	set_tsk_thread_flag(task, TIF_SECCOMP);
 }
 

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 92+ messages in thread

* [PATCH 4.9 63/87] x86/speculation: Make "seccomp" the default mode for Speculative Store Bypass
  2018-05-21 21:10 [PATCH 4.9 00/87] 4.9.102-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (61 preceding siblings ...)
  2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.9 62/87] seccomp: Move speculation migitation control to arch code Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2018-05-21 21:11 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
  2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.9 64/87] x86/bugs: Rename _RDS to _SSBD Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (27 subsequent siblings)
  90 siblings, 0 replies; 92+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2018-05-21 21:11 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-kernel
  Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Kees Cook, Thomas Gleixner, David Woodhouse

4.9-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>

commit f21b53b20c754021935ea43364dbf53778eeba32 upstream

Unless explicitly opted out of, anything running under seccomp will have
SSB mitigations enabled. Choosing the "prctl" mode will disable this.

[ tglx: Adjusted it to the new arch_seccomp_spec_mitigate() mechanism ]

Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt  |   26 +++++++++++++++++---------
 arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h |    1 +
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c           |   32 +++++++++++++++++++++++---------
 3 files changed, 41 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-)

--- a/Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt
+++ b/Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt
@@ -3997,19 +3997,27 @@ bytes respectively. Such letter suffixes
 			This parameter controls whether the Speculative Store
 			Bypass optimization is used.
 
-			on     - Unconditionally disable Speculative Store Bypass
-			off    - Unconditionally enable Speculative Store Bypass
-			auto   - Kernel detects whether the CPU model contains an
-				 implementation of Speculative Store Bypass and
-				 picks the most appropriate mitigation.
-			prctl  - Control Speculative Store Bypass per thread
-				 via prctl. Speculative Store Bypass is enabled
-				 for a process by default. The state of the control
-				 is inherited on fork.
+			on      - Unconditionally disable Speculative Store Bypass
+			off     - Unconditionally enable Speculative Store Bypass
+			auto    - Kernel detects whether the CPU model contains an
+				  implementation of Speculative Store Bypass and
+				  picks the most appropriate mitigation. If the
+				  CPU is not vulnerable, "off" is selected. If the
+				  CPU is vulnerable the default mitigation is
+				  architecture and Kconfig dependent. See below.
+			prctl   - Control Speculative Store Bypass per thread
+				  via prctl. Speculative Store Bypass is enabled
+				  for a process by default. The state of the control
+				  is inherited on fork.
+			seccomp - Same as "prctl" above, but all seccomp threads
+				  will disable SSB unless they explicitly opt out.
 
 			Not specifying this option is equivalent to
 			spec_store_bypass_disable=auto.
 
+			Default mitigations:
+			X86:	If CONFIG_SECCOMP=y "seccomp", otherwise "prctl"
+
 	spia_io_base=	[HW,MTD]
 	spia_fio_base=
 	spia_pedr=
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
@@ -233,6 +233,7 @@ enum ssb_mitigation {
 	SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_NONE,
 	SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_DISABLE,
 	SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_PRCTL,
+	SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_SECCOMP,
 };
 
 extern char __indirect_thunk_start[];
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -415,22 +415,25 @@ enum ssb_mitigation_cmd {
 	SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_CMD_AUTO,
 	SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_CMD_ON,
 	SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_CMD_PRCTL,
+	SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_CMD_SECCOMP,
 };
 
 static const char *ssb_strings[] = {
 	[SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_NONE]	= "Vulnerable",
 	[SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_DISABLE]	= "Mitigation: Speculative Store Bypass disabled",
-	[SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_PRCTL]	= "Mitigation: Speculative Store Bypass disabled via prctl"
+	[SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_PRCTL]	= "Mitigation: Speculative Store Bypass disabled via prctl",
+	[SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_SECCOMP]	= "Mitigation: Speculative Store Bypass disabled via prctl and seccomp",
 };
 
 static const struct {
 	const char *option;
 	enum ssb_mitigation_cmd cmd;
 } ssb_mitigation_options[] = {
-	{ "auto",	SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_CMD_AUTO },  /* Platform decides */
-	{ "on",		SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_CMD_ON },    /* Disable Speculative Store Bypass */
-	{ "off",	SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_CMD_NONE },  /* Don't touch Speculative Store Bypass */
-	{ "prctl",	SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_CMD_PRCTL }, /* Disable Speculative Store Bypass via prctl */
+	{ "auto",	SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_CMD_AUTO },    /* Platform decides */
+	{ "on",		SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_CMD_ON },      /* Disable Speculative Store Bypass */
+	{ "off",	SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_CMD_NONE },    /* Don't touch Speculative Store Bypass */
+	{ "prctl",	SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_CMD_PRCTL },   /* Disable Speculative Store Bypass via prctl */
+	{ "seccomp",	SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_CMD_SECCOMP }, /* Disable Speculative Store Bypass via prctl and seccomp */
 };
 
 static enum ssb_mitigation_cmd __init ssb_parse_cmdline(void)
@@ -480,8 +483,15 @@ static enum ssb_mitigation_cmd __init __
 
 	switch (cmd) {
 	case SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_CMD_AUTO:
-		/* Choose prctl as the default mode */
-		mode = SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_PRCTL;
+	case SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_CMD_SECCOMP:
+		/*
+		 * Choose prctl+seccomp as the default mode if seccomp is
+		 * enabled.
+		 */
+		if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECCOMP))
+			mode = SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_SECCOMP;
+		else
+			mode = SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_PRCTL;
 		break;
 	case SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_CMD_ON:
 		mode = SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_DISABLE;
@@ -529,12 +539,14 @@ static void ssb_select_mitigation()
 }
 
 #undef pr_fmt
+#define pr_fmt(fmt)     "Speculation prctl: " fmt
 
 static int ssb_prctl_set(struct task_struct *task, unsigned long ctrl)
 {
 	bool update;
 
-	if (ssb_mode != SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_PRCTL)
+	if (ssb_mode != SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_PRCTL &&
+	    ssb_mode != SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_SECCOMP)
 		return -ENXIO;
 
 	switch (ctrl) {
@@ -582,7 +594,8 @@ int arch_prctl_spec_ctrl_set(struct task
 #ifdef CONFIG_SECCOMP
 void arch_seccomp_spec_mitigate(struct task_struct *task)
 {
-	ssb_prctl_set(task, PR_SPEC_FORCE_DISABLE);
+	if (ssb_mode == SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_SECCOMP)
+		ssb_prctl_set(task, PR_SPEC_FORCE_DISABLE);
 }
 #endif
 
@@ -591,6 +604,7 @@ static int ssb_prctl_get(struct task_str
 	switch (ssb_mode) {
 	case SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_DISABLE:
 		return PR_SPEC_DISABLE;
+	case SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_SECCOMP:
 	case SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_PRCTL:
 		if (task_spec_ssb_force_disable(task))
 			return PR_SPEC_PRCTL | PR_SPEC_FORCE_DISABLE;

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 92+ messages in thread

* [PATCH 4.9 64/87] x86/bugs: Rename _RDS to _SSBD
  2018-05-21 21:10 [PATCH 4.9 00/87] 4.9.102-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (62 preceding siblings ...)
  2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.9 63/87] x86/speculation: Make "seccomp" the default mode for Speculative Store Bypass Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2018-05-21 21:11 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
  2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.9 65/87] proc: Use underscores for SSBD in status Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (26 subsequent siblings)
  90 siblings, 0 replies; 92+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2018-05-21 21:11 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-kernel
  Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk,
	Thomas Gleixner, David Woodhouse

4.9-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>

commit 9f65fb29374ee37856dbad847b4e121aab72b510 upstream

Intel collateral will reference the SSB mitigation bit in IA32_SPEC_CTL[2]
as SSBD (Speculative Store Bypass Disable).

Hence changing it.

It is unclear yet what the MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES (0x10a) Bit(4) name
is going to be. Following the rename it would be SSBD_NO but that rolls out
to Speculative Store Bypass Disable No.

Also fixed the missing space in X86_FEATURE_AMD_SSBD.

[ tglx: Fixup x86_amd_rds_enable() and rds_tif_to_amd_ls_cfg() as well ]

Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>

Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h |    4 ++--
 arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h   |   10 +++++-----
 arch/x86/include/asm/spec-ctrl.h   |   12 ++++++------
 arch/x86/include/asm/thread_info.h |    6 +++---
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c          |   14 +++++++-------
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c         |   36 ++++++++++++++++++------------------
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c       |    2 +-
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c        |    2 +-
 arch/x86/kernel/process.c          |    8 ++++----
 arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c               |    2 +-
 arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.h               |    2 +-
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c                 |    2 +-
 12 files changed, 50 insertions(+), 50 deletions(-)

--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
@@ -205,7 +205,7 @@
 #define X86_FEATURE_USE_IBPB	( 7*32+21) /* "" Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier enabled */
 #define X86_FEATURE_USE_IBRS_FW	( 7*32+22) /* "" Use IBRS during runtime firmware calls */
 #define X86_FEATURE_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_DISABLE ( 7*32+23) /* "" Disable Speculative Store Bypass. */
-#define X86_FEATURE_AMD_RDS	(7*32+24)  /* "" AMD RDS implementation */
+#define X86_FEATURE_AMD_SSBD	(7*32+24)  /* "" AMD SSBD implementation */
 
 /* Virtualization flags: Linux defined, word 8 */
 #define X86_FEATURE_TPR_SHADOW  ( 8*32+ 0) /* Intel TPR Shadow */
@@ -308,7 +308,7 @@
 #define X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL		(18*32+26) /* "" Speculation Control (IBRS + IBPB) */
 #define X86_FEATURE_INTEL_STIBP		(18*32+27) /* "" Single Thread Indirect Branch Predictors */
 #define X86_FEATURE_ARCH_CAPABILITIES	(18*32+29) /* IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES MSR (Intel) */
-#define X86_FEATURE_RDS			(18*32+31) /* Reduced Data Speculation */
+#define X86_FEATURE_SSBD		(18*32+31) /* Speculative Store Bypass Disable */
 
 /*
  * BUG word(s)
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
@@ -40,8 +40,8 @@
 #define MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL		0x00000048 /* Speculation Control */
 #define SPEC_CTRL_IBRS			(1 << 0)   /* Indirect Branch Restricted Speculation */
 #define SPEC_CTRL_STIBP			(1 << 1)   /* Single Thread Indirect Branch Predictors */
-#define SPEC_CTRL_RDS_SHIFT		2	   /* Reduced Data Speculation bit */
-#define SPEC_CTRL_RDS			(1 << SPEC_CTRL_RDS_SHIFT)   /* Reduced Data Speculation */
+#define SPEC_CTRL_SSBD_SHIFT		2	   /* Speculative Store Bypass Disable bit */
+#define SPEC_CTRL_SSBD			(1 << SPEC_CTRL_SSBD_SHIFT)   /* Speculative Store Bypass Disable */
 
 #define MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD		0x00000049 /* Prediction Command */
 #define PRED_CMD_IBPB			(1 << 0)   /* Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier */
@@ -63,10 +63,10 @@
 #define MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES	0x0000010a
 #define ARCH_CAP_RDCL_NO		(1 << 0)   /* Not susceptible to Meltdown */
 #define ARCH_CAP_IBRS_ALL		(1 << 1)   /* Enhanced IBRS support */
-#define ARCH_CAP_RDS_NO			(1 << 4)   /*
+#define ARCH_CAP_SSBD_NO		(1 << 4)   /*
 						    * Not susceptible to Speculative Store Bypass
-						    * attack, so no Reduced Data Speculation control
-						    * required.
+						    * attack, so no Speculative Store Bypass
+						    * control required.
 						    */
 
 #define MSR_IA32_BBL_CR_CTL		0x00000119
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/spec-ctrl.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/spec-ctrl.h
@@ -17,20 +17,20 @@ extern void x86_spec_ctrl_restore_host(u
 
 /* AMD specific Speculative Store Bypass MSR data */
 extern u64 x86_amd_ls_cfg_base;
-extern u64 x86_amd_ls_cfg_rds_mask;
+extern u64 x86_amd_ls_cfg_ssbd_mask;
 
 /* The Intel SPEC CTRL MSR base value cache */
 extern u64 x86_spec_ctrl_base;
 
-static inline u64 rds_tif_to_spec_ctrl(u64 tifn)
+static inline u64 ssbd_tif_to_spec_ctrl(u64 tifn)
 {
-	BUILD_BUG_ON(TIF_RDS < SPEC_CTRL_RDS_SHIFT);
-	return (tifn & _TIF_RDS) >> (TIF_RDS - SPEC_CTRL_RDS_SHIFT);
+	BUILD_BUG_ON(TIF_SSBD < SPEC_CTRL_SSBD_SHIFT);
+	return (tifn & _TIF_SSBD) >> (TIF_SSBD - SPEC_CTRL_SSBD_SHIFT);
 }
 
-static inline u64 rds_tif_to_amd_ls_cfg(u64 tifn)
+static inline u64 ssbd_tif_to_amd_ls_cfg(u64 tifn)
 {
-	return (tifn & _TIF_RDS) ? x86_amd_ls_cfg_rds_mask : 0ULL;
+	return (tifn & _TIF_SSBD) ? x86_amd_ls_cfg_ssbd_mask : 0ULL;
 }
 
 extern void speculative_store_bypass_update(void);
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/thread_info.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/thread_info.h
@@ -83,7 +83,7 @@ struct thread_info {
 #define TIF_SIGPENDING		2	/* signal pending */
 #define TIF_NEED_RESCHED	3	/* rescheduling necessary */
 #define TIF_SINGLESTEP		4	/* reenable singlestep on user return*/
-#define TIF_RDS			5	/* Reduced data speculation */
+#define TIF_SSBD		5	/* Reduced data speculation */
 #define TIF_SYSCALL_EMU		6	/* syscall emulation active */
 #define TIF_SYSCALL_AUDIT	7	/* syscall auditing active */
 #define TIF_SECCOMP		8	/* secure computing */
@@ -107,7 +107,7 @@ struct thread_info {
 #define _TIF_SIGPENDING		(1 << TIF_SIGPENDING)
 #define _TIF_NEED_RESCHED	(1 << TIF_NEED_RESCHED)
 #define _TIF_SINGLESTEP		(1 << TIF_SINGLESTEP)
-#define _TIF_RDS		(1 << TIF_RDS)
+#define _TIF_SSBD		(1 << TIF_SSBD)
 #define _TIF_SYSCALL_EMU	(1 << TIF_SYSCALL_EMU)
 #define _TIF_SYSCALL_AUDIT	(1 << TIF_SYSCALL_AUDIT)
 #define _TIF_SECCOMP		(1 << TIF_SECCOMP)
@@ -141,7 +141,7 @@ struct thread_info {
 
 /* flags to check in __switch_to() */
 #define _TIF_WORK_CTXSW							\
-	(_TIF_IO_BITMAP|_TIF_NOTSC|_TIF_BLOCKSTEP|_TIF_RDS)
+	(_TIF_IO_BITMAP|_TIF_NOTSC|_TIF_BLOCKSTEP|_TIF_SSBD)
 
 #define _TIF_WORK_CTXSW_PREV (_TIF_WORK_CTXSW|_TIF_USER_RETURN_NOTIFY)
 #define _TIF_WORK_CTXSW_NEXT (_TIF_WORK_CTXSW)
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c
@@ -555,12 +555,12 @@ static void bsp_init_amd(struct cpuinfo_
 		}
 		/*
 		 * Try to cache the base value so further operations can
-		 * avoid RMW. If that faults, do not enable RDS.
+		 * avoid RMW. If that faults, do not enable SSBD.
 		 */
 		if (!rdmsrl_safe(MSR_AMD64_LS_CFG, &x86_amd_ls_cfg_base)) {
-			setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RDS);
-			setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_AMD_RDS);
-			x86_amd_ls_cfg_rds_mask = 1ULL << bit;
+			setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_SSBD);
+			setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_AMD_SSBD);
+			x86_amd_ls_cfg_ssbd_mask = 1ULL << bit;
 		}
 	}
 }
@@ -849,9 +849,9 @@ static void init_amd(struct cpuinfo_x86
 	if (!cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_XENPV))
 		set_cpu_bug(c, X86_BUG_SYSRET_SS_ATTRS);
 
-	if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_AMD_RDS)) {
-		set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_RDS);
-		set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_AMD_RDS);
+	if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_AMD_SSBD)) {
+		set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_SSBD);
+		set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_AMD_SSBD);
 	}
 }
 
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -44,10 +44,10 @@ static u64 __ro_after_init x86_spec_ctrl
 
 /*
  * AMD specific MSR info for Speculative Store Bypass control.
- * x86_amd_ls_cfg_rds_mask is initialized in identify_boot_cpu().
+ * x86_amd_ls_cfg_ssbd_mask is initialized in identify_boot_cpu().
  */
 u64 __ro_after_init x86_amd_ls_cfg_base;
-u64 __ro_after_init x86_amd_ls_cfg_rds_mask;
+u64 __ro_after_init x86_amd_ls_cfg_ssbd_mask;
 
 void __init check_bugs(void)
 {
@@ -145,7 +145,7 @@ u64 x86_spec_ctrl_get_default(void)
 	u64 msrval = x86_spec_ctrl_base;
 
 	if (boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor == X86_VENDOR_INTEL)
-		msrval |= rds_tif_to_spec_ctrl(current_thread_info()->flags);
+		msrval |= ssbd_tif_to_spec_ctrl(current_thread_info()->flags);
 	return msrval;
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(x86_spec_ctrl_get_default);
@@ -158,7 +158,7 @@ void x86_spec_ctrl_set_guest(u64 guest_s
 		return;
 
 	if (boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor == X86_VENDOR_INTEL)
-		host |= rds_tif_to_spec_ctrl(current_thread_info()->flags);
+		host |= ssbd_tif_to_spec_ctrl(current_thread_info()->flags);
 
 	if (host != guest_spec_ctrl)
 		wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, guest_spec_ctrl);
@@ -173,18 +173,18 @@ void x86_spec_ctrl_restore_host(u64 gues
 		return;
 
 	if (boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor == X86_VENDOR_INTEL)
-		host |= rds_tif_to_spec_ctrl(current_thread_info()->flags);
+		host |= ssbd_tif_to_spec_ctrl(current_thread_info()->flags);
 
 	if (host != guest_spec_ctrl)
 		wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, host);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(x86_spec_ctrl_restore_host);
 
-static void x86_amd_rds_enable(void)
+static void x86_amd_ssb_disable(void)
 {
-	u64 msrval = x86_amd_ls_cfg_base | x86_amd_ls_cfg_rds_mask;
+	u64 msrval = x86_amd_ls_cfg_base | x86_amd_ls_cfg_ssbd_mask;
 
-	if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_AMD_RDS))
+	if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_AMD_SSBD))
 		wrmsrl(MSR_AMD64_LS_CFG, msrval);
 }
 
@@ -472,7 +472,7 @@ static enum ssb_mitigation_cmd __init __
 	enum ssb_mitigation mode = SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_NONE;
 	enum ssb_mitigation_cmd cmd;
 
-	if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RDS))
+	if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SSBD))
 		return mode;
 
 	cmd = ssb_parse_cmdline();
@@ -506,7 +506,7 @@ static enum ssb_mitigation_cmd __init __
 	/*
 	 * We have three CPU feature flags that are in play here:
 	 *  - X86_BUG_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS - CPU is susceptible.
-	 *  - X86_FEATURE_RDS - CPU is able to turn off speculative store bypass
+	 *  - X86_FEATURE_SSBD - CPU is able to turn off speculative store bypass
 	 *  - X86_FEATURE_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_DISABLE - engage the mitigation
 	 */
 	if (mode == SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_DISABLE) {
@@ -517,12 +517,12 @@ static enum ssb_mitigation_cmd __init __
 		 */
 		switch (boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor) {
 		case X86_VENDOR_INTEL:
-			x86_spec_ctrl_base |= SPEC_CTRL_RDS;
-			x86_spec_ctrl_mask &= ~SPEC_CTRL_RDS;
-			x86_spec_ctrl_set(SPEC_CTRL_RDS);
+			x86_spec_ctrl_base |= SPEC_CTRL_SSBD;
+			x86_spec_ctrl_mask &= ~SPEC_CTRL_SSBD;
+			x86_spec_ctrl_set(SPEC_CTRL_SSBD);
 			break;
 		case X86_VENDOR_AMD:
-			x86_amd_rds_enable();
+			x86_amd_ssb_disable();
 			break;
 		}
 	}
@@ -555,16 +555,16 @@ static int ssb_prctl_set(struct task_str
 		if (task_spec_ssb_force_disable(task))
 			return -EPERM;
 		task_clear_spec_ssb_disable(task);
-		update = test_and_clear_tsk_thread_flag(task, TIF_RDS);
+		update = test_and_clear_tsk_thread_flag(task, TIF_SSBD);
 		break;
 	case PR_SPEC_DISABLE:
 		task_set_spec_ssb_disable(task);
-		update = !test_and_set_tsk_thread_flag(task, TIF_RDS);
+		update = !test_and_set_tsk_thread_flag(task, TIF_SSBD);
 		break;
 	case PR_SPEC_FORCE_DISABLE:
 		task_set_spec_ssb_disable(task);
 		task_set_spec_ssb_force_disable(task);
-		update = !test_and_set_tsk_thread_flag(task, TIF_RDS);
+		update = !test_and_set_tsk_thread_flag(task, TIF_SSBD);
 		break;
 	default:
 		return -ERANGE;
@@ -634,7 +634,7 @@ void x86_spec_ctrl_setup_ap(void)
 		x86_spec_ctrl_set(x86_spec_ctrl_base & ~x86_spec_ctrl_mask);
 
 	if (ssb_mode == SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_DISABLE)
-		x86_amd_rds_enable();
+		x86_amd_ssb_disable();
 }
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_SYSFS
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
@@ -911,7 +911,7 @@ static void __init cpu_set_bug_bits(stru
 		rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES, ia32_cap);
 
 	if (!x86_match_cpu(cpu_no_spec_store_bypass) &&
-	   !(ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_RDS_NO))
+	   !(ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_SSBD_NO))
 		setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS);
 
 	if (x86_match_cpu(cpu_no_speculation))
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c
@@ -154,7 +154,7 @@ static void early_init_intel(struct cpui
 		setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_STIBP);
 		setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL);
 		setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_INTEL_STIBP);
-		setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RDS);
+		setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_SSBD);
 	}
 
 	/*
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/process.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/process.c
@@ -207,11 +207,11 @@ static __always_inline void __speculativ
 {
 	u64 msr;
 
-	if (static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_AMD_RDS)) {
-		msr = x86_amd_ls_cfg_base | rds_tif_to_amd_ls_cfg(tifn);
+	if (static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_AMD_SSBD)) {
+		msr = x86_amd_ls_cfg_base | ssbd_tif_to_amd_ls_cfg(tifn);
 		wrmsrl(MSR_AMD64_LS_CFG, msr);
 	} else {
-		msr = x86_spec_ctrl_base | rds_tif_to_spec_ctrl(tifn);
+		msr = x86_spec_ctrl_base | ssbd_tif_to_spec_ctrl(tifn);
 		wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, msr);
 	}
 }
@@ -250,7 +250,7 @@ void __switch_to_xtra(struct task_struct
 	if ((tifp ^ tifn) & _TIF_NOTSC)
 		cr4_toggle_bits(X86_CR4_TSD);
 
-	if ((tifp ^ tifn) & _TIF_RDS)
+	if ((tifp ^ tifn) & _TIF_SSBD)
 		__speculative_store_bypass_update(tifn);
 }
 
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c
@@ -382,7 +382,7 @@ static inline int __do_cpuid_ent(struct
 
 	/* cpuid 7.0.edx*/
 	const u32 kvm_cpuid_7_0_edx_x86_features =
-		F(SPEC_CTRL) | F(RDS) | F(ARCH_CAPABILITIES);
+		F(SPEC_CTRL) | F(SSBD) | F(ARCH_CAPABILITIES);
 
 	/* all calls to cpuid_count() should be made on the same cpu */
 	get_cpu();
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.h
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.h
@@ -179,7 +179,7 @@ static inline bool guest_cpuid_has_spec_
 	if (best && (best->ebx & bit(X86_FEATURE_IBRS)))
 		return true;
 	best = kvm_find_cpuid_entry(vcpu, 7, 0);
-	return best && (best->edx & (bit(X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL) | bit(X86_FEATURE_RDS)));
+	return best && (best->edx & (bit(X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL) | bit(X86_FEATURE_SSBD)));
 }
 
 static inline bool guest_cpuid_has_arch_capabilities(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c
@@ -3141,7 +3141,7 @@ static int vmx_set_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *
 			return 1;
 
 		/* The STIBP bit doesn't fault even if it's not advertised */
-		if (data & ~(SPEC_CTRL_IBRS | SPEC_CTRL_STIBP | SPEC_CTRL_RDS))
+		if (data & ~(SPEC_CTRL_IBRS | SPEC_CTRL_STIBP | SPEC_CTRL_SSBD))
 			return 1;
 
 		vmx->spec_ctrl = data;

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 92+ messages in thread

* [PATCH 4.9 65/87] proc: Use underscores for SSBD in status
  2018-05-21 21:10 [PATCH 4.9 00/87] 4.9.102-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (63 preceding siblings ...)
  2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.9 64/87] x86/bugs: Rename _RDS to _SSBD Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2018-05-21 21:11 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
  2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.9 66/87] Documentation/spec_ctrl: Do some minor cleanups Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (25 subsequent siblings)
  90 siblings, 0 replies; 92+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2018-05-21 21:11 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-kernel
  Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk,
	Thomas Gleixner, David Woodhouse

4.9-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>

commit e96f46ee8587607a828f783daa6eb5b44d25004d upstream

The style for the 'status' file is CamelCase or this. _.

Fixes: fae1fa0fc ("proc: Provide details on speculation flaw mitigations")
Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 fs/proc/array.c |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/fs/proc/array.c
+++ b/fs/proc/array.c
@@ -347,7 +347,7 @@ static inline void task_seccomp(struct s
 #ifdef CONFIG_SECCOMP
 	seq_put_decimal_ull(m, "Seccomp:\t", p->seccomp.mode);
 #endif
-	seq_printf(m, "\nSpeculation Store Bypass:\t");
+	seq_printf(m, "\nSpeculation_Store_Bypass:\t");
 	switch (arch_prctl_spec_ctrl_get(p, PR_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS)) {
 	case -EINVAL:
 		seq_printf(m, "unknown");

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 92+ messages in thread

* [PATCH 4.9 66/87] Documentation/spec_ctrl: Do some minor cleanups
  2018-05-21 21:10 [PATCH 4.9 00/87] 4.9.102-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (64 preceding siblings ...)
  2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.9 65/87] proc: Use underscores for SSBD in status Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2018-05-21 21:11 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
  2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.9 67/87] x86/bugs: Fix __ssb_select_mitigation() return type Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (24 subsequent siblings)
  90 siblings, 0 replies; 92+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2018-05-21 21:11 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-kernel
  Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Borislav Petkov, Thomas Gleixner,
	David Woodhouse

4.9-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>

commit dd0792699c4058e63c0715d9a7c2d40226fcdddc upstream

Fix some typos, improve formulations, end sentences with a fullstop.

Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 Documentation/spec_ctrl.txt |   24 ++++++++++++------------
 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)

--- a/Documentation/spec_ctrl.txt
+++ b/Documentation/spec_ctrl.txt
@@ -2,13 +2,13 @@
 Speculation Control
 ===================
 
-Quite some CPUs have speculation related misfeatures which are in fact
-vulnerabilites causing data leaks in various forms even accross privilege
-domains.
+Quite some CPUs have speculation-related misfeatures which are in
+fact vulnerabilities causing data leaks in various forms even across
+privilege domains.
 
 The kernel provides mitigation for such vulnerabilities in various
-forms. Some of these mitigations are compile time configurable and some on
-the kernel command line.
+forms. Some of these mitigations are compile-time configurable and some
+can be supplied on the kernel command line.
 
 There is also a class of mitigations which are very expensive, but they can
 be restricted to a certain set of processes or tasks in controlled
@@ -32,18 +32,18 @@ the following meaning:
 Bit  Define                Description
 ==== ===================== ===================================================
 0    PR_SPEC_PRCTL         Mitigation can be controlled per task by
-                           PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL
+                           PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL.
 1    PR_SPEC_ENABLE        The speculation feature is enabled, mitigation is
-                           disabled
+                           disabled.
 2    PR_SPEC_DISABLE       The speculation feature is disabled, mitigation is
-                           enabled
+                           enabled.
 3    PR_SPEC_FORCE_DISABLE Same as PR_SPEC_DISABLE, but cannot be undone. A
                            subsequent prctl(..., PR_SPEC_ENABLE) will fail.
 ==== ===================== ===================================================
 
 If all bits are 0 the CPU is not affected by the speculation misfeature.
 
-If PR_SPEC_PRCTL is set, then the per task control of the mitigation is
+If PR_SPEC_PRCTL is set, then the per-task control of the mitigation is
 available. If not set, prctl(PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL) for the speculation
 misfeature will fail.
 
@@ -61,9 +61,9 @@ Common error codes
 Value   Meaning
 ======= =================================================================
 EINVAL  The prctl is not implemented by the architecture or unused
-        prctl(2) arguments are not 0
+        prctl(2) arguments are not 0.
 
-ENODEV  arg2 is selecting a not supported speculation misfeature
+ENODEV  arg2 is selecting a not supported speculation misfeature.
 ======= =================================================================
 
 PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL error codes
@@ -74,7 +74,7 @@ Value   Meaning
 0       Success
 
 ERANGE  arg3 is incorrect, i.e. it's neither PR_SPEC_ENABLE nor
-        PR_SPEC_DISABLE nor PR_SPEC_FORCE_DISABLE
+        PR_SPEC_DISABLE nor PR_SPEC_FORCE_DISABLE.
 
 ENXIO   Control of the selected speculation misfeature is not possible.
         See PR_GET_SPECULATION_CTRL.

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 92+ messages in thread

* [PATCH 4.9 67/87] x86/bugs: Fix __ssb_select_mitigation() return type
  2018-05-21 21:10 [PATCH 4.9 00/87] 4.9.102-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (65 preceding siblings ...)
  2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.9 66/87] Documentation/spec_ctrl: Do some minor cleanups Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2018-05-21 21:11 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
  2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.9 68/87] x86/bugs: Make cpu_show_common() static Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (23 subsequent siblings)
  90 siblings, 0 replies; 92+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2018-05-21 21:11 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-kernel
  Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Jiri Kosina, Thomas Gleixner,
	David Woodhouse

4.9-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>

commit d66d8ff3d21667b41eddbe86b35ab411e40d8c5f upstream

__ssb_select_mitigation() returns one of the members of enum ssb_mitigation,
not ssb_mitigation_cmd; fix the prototype to reflect that.

Fixes: 24f7fc83b9204 ("x86/bugs: Provide boot parameters for the spec_store_bypass_disable mitigation")
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -467,7 +467,7 @@ static enum ssb_mitigation_cmd __init ss
 	return cmd;
 }
 
-static enum ssb_mitigation_cmd __init __ssb_select_mitigation(void)
+static enum ssb_mitigation __init __ssb_select_mitigation(void)
 {
 	enum ssb_mitigation mode = SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_NONE;
 	enum ssb_mitigation_cmd cmd;

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 92+ messages in thread

* [PATCH 4.9 68/87] x86/bugs: Make cpu_show_common() static
  2018-05-21 21:10 [PATCH 4.9 00/87] 4.9.102-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (66 preceding siblings ...)
  2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.9 67/87] x86/bugs: Fix __ssb_select_mitigation() return type Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2018-05-21 21:11 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
  2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.9 69/87] x86/bugs: Fix the parameters alignment and missing void Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (22 subsequent siblings)
  90 siblings, 0 replies; 92+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2018-05-21 21:11 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-kernel
  Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Jiri Kosina, Thomas Gleixner,
	David Woodhouse

4.9-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>

commit 7bb4d366cba992904bffa4820d24e70a3de93e76 upstream

cpu_show_common() is not used outside of arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c, so
make it static.

Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -639,7 +639,7 @@ void x86_spec_ctrl_setup_ap(void)
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_SYSFS
 
-ssize_t cpu_show_common(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr,
+static ssize_t cpu_show_common(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr,
 			char *buf, unsigned int bug)
 {
 	if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(bug))

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 92+ messages in thread

* [PATCH 4.9 69/87] x86/bugs: Fix the parameters alignment and missing void
  2018-05-21 21:10 [PATCH 4.9 00/87] 4.9.102-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (67 preceding siblings ...)
  2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.9 68/87] x86/bugs: Make cpu_show_common() static Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2018-05-21 21:11 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
  2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.9 70/87] x86/cpu: Make alternative_msr_write work for 32-bit code Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (21 subsequent siblings)
  90 siblings, 0 replies; 92+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2018-05-21 21:11 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-kernel
  Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk,
	Thomas Gleixner, David Woodhouse

4.9-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>

commit ffed645e3be0e32f8e9ab068d257aee8d0fe8eec upstream

Fixes: 7bb4d366c ("x86/bugs: Make cpu_show_common() static")
Fixes: 24f7fc83b ("x86/bugs: Provide boot parameters for the spec_store_bypass_disable mitigation")
Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c |    4 ++--
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -530,7 +530,7 @@ static enum ssb_mitigation __init __ssb_
 	return mode;
 }
 
-static void ssb_select_mitigation()
+static void ssb_select_mitigation(void)
 {
 	ssb_mode = __ssb_select_mitigation();
 
@@ -640,7 +640,7 @@ void x86_spec_ctrl_setup_ap(void)
 #ifdef CONFIG_SYSFS
 
 static ssize_t cpu_show_common(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr,
-			char *buf, unsigned int bug)
+			       char *buf, unsigned int bug)
 {
 	if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(bug))
 		return sprintf(buf, "Not affected\n");

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 92+ messages in thread

* [PATCH 4.9 70/87] x86/cpu: Make alternative_msr_write work for 32-bit code
  2018-05-21 21:10 [PATCH 4.9 00/87] 4.9.102-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (68 preceding siblings ...)
  2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.9 69/87] x86/bugs: Fix the parameters alignment and missing void Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2018-05-21 21:11 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
  2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.9 71/87] KVM: SVM: Move spec control call after restore of GS Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (20 subsequent siblings)
  90 siblings, 0 replies; 92+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2018-05-21 21:11 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-kernel
  Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Jim Mattson, Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk,
	Thomas Gleixner, Linus Torvalds, David Woodhouse

4.9-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>

commit 5f2b745f5e1304f438f9b2cd03ebc8120b6e0d3b upstream

Cast val and (val >> 32) to (u32), so that they fit in a
general-purpose register in both 32-bit and 64-bit code.

[ tglx: Made it u32 instead of uintptr_t ]

Fixes: c65732e4f721 ("x86/cpu: Restore CPUID_8000_0008_EBX reload")
Signed-off-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Acked-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h |    4 ++--
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
@@ -265,8 +265,8 @@ void alternative_msr_write(unsigned int
 {
 	asm volatile(ALTERNATIVE("", "wrmsr", %c[feature])
 		: : "c" (msr),
-		    "a" (val),
-		    "d" (val >> 32),
+		    "a" ((u32)val),
+		    "d" ((u32)(val >> 32)),
 		    [feature] "i" (feature)
 		: "memory");
 }

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 92+ messages in thread

* [PATCH 4.9 71/87] KVM: SVM: Move spec control call after restore of GS
  2018-05-21 21:10 [PATCH 4.9 00/87] 4.9.102-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (69 preceding siblings ...)
  2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.9 70/87] x86/cpu: Make alternative_msr_write work for 32-bit code Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2018-05-21 21:11 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
  2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.9 72/87] x86/speculation: Use synthetic bits for IBRS/IBPB/STIBP Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (19 subsequent siblings)
  90 siblings, 0 replies; 92+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2018-05-21 21:11 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-kernel
  Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Thomas Gleixner, Borislav Petkov,
	Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk, Paolo Bonzini, David Woodhouse

4.9-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>

commit 15e6c22fd8e5a42c5ed6d487b7c9fe44c2517765 upstream

svm_vcpu_run() invokes x86_spec_ctrl_restore_host() after VMEXIT, but
before the host GS is restored. x86_spec_ctrl_restore_host() uses 'current'
to determine the host SSBD state of the thread. 'current' is GS based, but
host GS is not yet restored and the access causes a triple fault.

Move the call after the host GS restore.

Fixes: 885f82bfbc6f x86/process: Allow runtime control of Speculative Store Bypass
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 arch/x86/kvm/svm.c |   24 ++++++++++++------------
 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)

--- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c
@@ -5011,6 +5011,18 @@ static void svm_vcpu_run(struct kvm_vcpu
 #endif
 		);
 
+	/* Eliminate branch target predictions from guest mode */
+	vmexit_fill_RSB();
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
+	wrmsrl(MSR_GS_BASE, svm->host.gs_base);
+#else
+	loadsegment(fs, svm->host.fs);
+#ifndef CONFIG_X86_32_LAZY_GS
+	loadsegment(gs, svm->host.gs);
+#endif
+#endif
+
 	/*
 	 * We do not use IBRS in the kernel. If this vCPU has used the
 	 * SPEC_CTRL MSR it may have left it on; save the value and
@@ -5031,18 +5043,6 @@ static void svm_vcpu_run(struct kvm_vcpu
 
 	x86_spec_ctrl_restore_host(svm->spec_ctrl);
 
-	/* Eliminate branch target predictions from guest mode */
-	vmexit_fill_RSB();
-
-#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
-	wrmsrl(MSR_GS_BASE, svm->host.gs_base);
-#else
-	loadsegment(fs, svm->host.fs);
-#ifndef CONFIG_X86_32_LAZY_GS
-	loadsegment(gs, svm->host.gs);
-#endif
-#endif
-
 	reload_tss(vcpu);
 
 	local_irq_disable();

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 92+ messages in thread

* [PATCH 4.9 72/87] x86/speculation: Use synthetic bits for IBRS/IBPB/STIBP
  2018-05-21 21:10 [PATCH 4.9 00/87] 4.9.102-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (70 preceding siblings ...)
  2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.9 71/87] KVM: SVM: Move spec control call after restore of GS Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2018-05-21 21:11 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
  2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.9 73/87] x86/cpufeatures: Disentangle MSR_SPEC_CTRL enumeration from IBRS Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (18 subsequent siblings)
  90 siblings, 0 replies; 92+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2018-05-21 21:11 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-kernel
  Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Borislav Petkov, Thomas Gleixner,
	Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk, Jörg Otte, Linus Torvalds,
	Kirill A. Shutemov, David Woodhouse

4.9-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>

commit e7c587da125291db39ddf1f49b18e5970adbac17 upstream

Intel and AMD have different CPUID bits hence for those use synthetic bits
which get set on the respective vendor's in init_speculation_control(). So
that debacles like what the commit message of

  c65732e4f721 ("x86/cpu: Restore CPUID_8000_0008_EBX reload")

talks about don't happen anymore.

Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Tested-by: Jörg Otte <jrg.otte@gmail.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180504161815.GG9257@pd.tnic
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h |   12 ++++++++----
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c       |   14 ++++++++++----
 arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c               |   10 +++++-----
 arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.h               |    4 ++--
 4 files changed, 25 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)

--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
@@ -205,7 +205,10 @@
 #define X86_FEATURE_USE_IBPB	( 7*32+21) /* "" Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier enabled */
 #define X86_FEATURE_USE_IBRS_FW	( 7*32+22) /* "" Use IBRS during runtime firmware calls */
 #define X86_FEATURE_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_DISABLE ( 7*32+23) /* "" Disable Speculative Store Bypass. */
-#define X86_FEATURE_AMD_SSBD	(7*32+24)  /* "" AMD SSBD implementation */
+#define X86_FEATURE_AMD_SSBD	( 7*32+24) /* "" AMD SSBD implementation */
+#define X86_FEATURE_IBRS	( 7*32+25) /* Indirect Branch Restricted Speculation */
+#define X86_FEATURE_IBPB	( 7*32+26) /* Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier */
+#define X86_FEATURE_STIBP	( 7*32+27) /* Single Thread Indirect Branch Predictors */
 
 /* Virtualization flags: Linux defined, word 8 */
 #define X86_FEATURE_TPR_SHADOW  ( 8*32+ 0) /* Intel TPR Shadow */
@@ -263,9 +266,9 @@
 /* AMD-defined CPU features, CPUID level 0x80000008 (ebx), word 13 */
 #define X86_FEATURE_CLZERO	(13*32+0) /* CLZERO instruction */
 #define X86_FEATURE_IRPERF	(13*32+1) /* Instructions Retired Count */
-#define X86_FEATURE_IBPB	(13*32+12) /* Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier */
-#define X86_FEATURE_IBRS	(13*32+14) /* Indirect Branch Restricted Speculation */
-#define X86_FEATURE_STIBP	(13*32+15) /* Single Thread Indirect Branch Predictors */
+#define X86_FEATURE_AMD_IBPB	(13*32+12) /* Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier */
+#define X86_FEATURE_AMD_IBRS	(13*32+14) /* Indirect Branch Restricted Speculation */
+#define X86_FEATURE_AMD_STIBP	(13*32+15) /* Single Thread Indirect Branch Predictors */
 
 /* Thermal and Power Management Leaf, CPUID level 0x00000006 (eax), word 14 */
 #define X86_FEATURE_DTHERM	(14*32+ 0) /* Digital Thermal Sensor */
@@ -301,6 +304,7 @@
 #define X86_FEATURE_SUCCOR	(17*32+1) /* Uncorrectable error containment and recovery */
 #define X86_FEATURE_SMCA	(17*32+3) /* Scalable MCA */
 
+
 /* Intel-defined CPU features, CPUID level 0x00000007:0 (EDX), word 18 */
 #define X86_FEATURE_AVX512_4VNNIW	(18*32+ 2) /* AVX-512 Neural Network Instructions */
 #define X86_FEATURE_AVX512_4FMAPS	(18*32+ 3) /* AVX-512 Multiply Accumulation Single precision */
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
@@ -725,17 +725,23 @@ static void init_speculation_control(str
 	 * and they also have a different bit for STIBP support. Also,
 	 * a hypervisor might have set the individual AMD bits even on
 	 * Intel CPUs, for finer-grained selection of what's available.
-	 *
-	 * We use the AMD bits in 0x8000_0008 EBX as the generic hardware
-	 * features, which are visible in /proc/cpuinfo and used by the
-	 * kernel. So set those accordingly from the Intel bits.
 	 */
 	if (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL)) {
 		set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_IBRS);
 		set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_IBPB);
 	}
+
 	if (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_INTEL_STIBP))
 		set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_STIBP);
+
+	if (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_AMD_IBRS))
+		set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_IBRS);
+
+	if (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_AMD_IBPB))
+		set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_IBPB);
+
+	if (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_AMD_STIBP))
+		set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_STIBP);
 }
 
 void get_cpu_cap(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c
@@ -357,7 +357,7 @@ static inline int __do_cpuid_ent(struct
 
 	/* cpuid 0x80000008.ebx */
 	const u32 kvm_cpuid_8000_0008_ebx_x86_features =
-		F(IBPB) | F(IBRS);
+		F(AMD_IBPB) | F(AMD_IBRS);
 
 	/* cpuid 0xC0000001.edx */
 	const u32 kvm_cpuid_C000_0001_edx_x86_features =
@@ -619,10 +619,10 @@ static inline int __do_cpuid_ent(struct
 		entry->eax = g_phys_as | (virt_as << 8);
 		entry->edx = 0;
 		/* IBRS and IBPB aren't necessarily present in hardware cpuid */
-		if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBPB))
-			entry->ebx |= F(IBPB);
-		if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBRS))
-			entry->ebx |= F(IBRS);
+		if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_AMD_IBPB))
+			entry->ebx |= F(AMD_IBPB);
+		if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_AMD_IBRS))
+			entry->ebx |= F(AMD_IBRS);
 		entry->ebx &= kvm_cpuid_8000_0008_ebx_x86_features;
 		cpuid_mask(&entry->ebx, CPUID_8000_0008_EBX);
 		break;
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.h
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.h
@@ -165,7 +165,7 @@ static inline bool guest_cpuid_has_ibpb(
 	struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *best;
 
 	best = kvm_find_cpuid_entry(vcpu, 0x80000008, 0);
-	if (best && (best->ebx & bit(X86_FEATURE_IBPB)))
+	if (best && (best->ebx & bit(X86_FEATURE_AMD_IBPB)))
 		return true;
 	best = kvm_find_cpuid_entry(vcpu, 7, 0);
 	return best && (best->edx & bit(X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL));
@@ -176,7 +176,7 @@ static inline bool guest_cpuid_has_spec_
 	struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *best;
 
 	best = kvm_find_cpuid_entry(vcpu, 0x80000008, 0);
-	if (best && (best->ebx & bit(X86_FEATURE_IBRS)))
+	if (best && (best->ebx & bit(X86_FEATURE_AMD_IBRS)))
 		return true;
 	best = kvm_find_cpuid_entry(vcpu, 7, 0);
 	return best && (best->edx & (bit(X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL) | bit(X86_FEATURE_SSBD)));

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 92+ messages in thread

* [PATCH 4.9 73/87] x86/cpufeatures: Disentangle MSR_SPEC_CTRL enumeration from IBRS
  2018-05-21 21:10 [PATCH 4.9 00/87] 4.9.102-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (71 preceding siblings ...)
  2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.9 72/87] x86/speculation: Use synthetic bits for IBRS/IBPB/STIBP Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2018-05-21 21:11 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
  2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.9 74/87] x86/cpufeatures: Disentangle SSBD enumeration Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (17 subsequent siblings)
  90 siblings, 0 replies; 92+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2018-05-21 21:11 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-kernel
  Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Thomas Gleixner, Borislav Petkov,
	Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk, David Woodhouse

4.9-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>

commit 7eb8956a7fec3c1f0abc2a5517dada99ccc8a961 upstream

The availability of the SPEC_CTRL MSR is enumerated by a CPUID bit on
Intel and implied by IBRS or STIBP support on AMD. That's just confusing
and in case an AMD CPU has IBRS not supported because the underlying
problem has been fixed but has another bit valid in the SPEC_CTRL MSR,
the thing falls apart.

Add a synthetic feature bit X86_FEATURE_MSR_SPEC_CTRL to denote the
availability on both Intel and AMD.

While at it replace the boot_cpu_has() checks with static_cpu_has() where
possible. This prevents late microcode loading from exposing SPEC_CTRL, but
late loading is already very limited as it does not reevaluate the
mitigation options and other bits and pieces. Having static_cpu_has() is
the simplest and least fragile solution.

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h |    2 ++
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c         |   18 +++++++++++-------
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c       |    9 +++++++--
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c        |    1 +
 4 files changed, 21 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)

--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
@@ -197,6 +197,8 @@
 #define X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE	( 7*32+12) /* "" Generic Retpoline mitigation for Spectre variant 2 */
 #define X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_AMD ( 7*32+13) /* "" AMD Retpoline mitigation for Spectre variant 2 */
 
+#define X86_FEATURE_MSR_SPEC_CTRL ( 7*32+16) /* "" MSR SPEC_CTRL is implemented */
+
 #define X86_FEATURE_RSB_CTXSW	( 7*32+19) /* "" Fill RSB on context switches */
 
 /* Because the ALTERNATIVE scheme is for members of the X86_FEATURE club... */
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -63,7 +63,7 @@ void __init check_bugs(void)
 	 * have unknown values. AMD64_LS_CFG MSR is cached in the early AMD
 	 * init code as it is not enumerated and depends on the family.
 	 */
-	if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBRS))
+	if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_MSR_SPEC_CTRL))
 		rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, x86_spec_ctrl_base);
 
 	/* Select the proper spectre mitigation before patching alternatives */
@@ -144,7 +144,7 @@ u64 x86_spec_ctrl_get_default(void)
 {
 	u64 msrval = x86_spec_ctrl_base;
 
-	if (boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor == X86_VENDOR_INTEL)
+	if (static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL))
 		msrval |= ssbd_tif_to_spec_ctrl(current_thread_info()->flags);
 	return msrval;
 }
@@ -154,10 +154,12 @@ void x86_spec_ctrl_set_guest(u64 guest_s
 {
 	u64 host = x86_spec_ctrl_base;
 
-	if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBRS))
+	/* Is MSR_SPEC_CTRL implemented ? */
+	if (!static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_MSR_SPEC_CTRL))
 		return;
 
-	if (boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor == X86_VENDOR_INTEL)
+	/* Intel controls SSB in MSR_SPEC_CTRL */
+	if (static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL))
 		host |= ssbd_tif_to_spec_ctrl(current_thread_info()->flags);
 
 	if (host != guest_spec_ctrl)
@@ -169,10 +171,12 @@ void x86_spec_ctrl_restore_host(u64 gues
 {
 	u64 host = x86_spec_ctrl_base;
 
-	if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBRS))
+	/* Is MSR_SPEC_CTRL implemented ? */
+	if (!static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_MSR_SPEC_CTRL))
 		return;
 
-	if (boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor == X86_VENDOR_INTEL)
+	/* Intel controls SSB in MSR_SPEC_CTRL */
+	if (static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL))
 		host |= ssbd_tif_to_spec_ctrl(current_thread_info()->flags);
 
 	if (host != guest_spec_ctrl)
@@ -630,7 +634,7 @@ int arch_prctl_spec_ctrl_get(struct task
 
 void x86_spec_ctrl_setup_ap(void)
 {
-	if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBRS))
+	if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_MSR_SPEC_CTRL))
 		x86_spec_ctrl_set(x86_spec_ctrl_base & ~x86_spec_ctrl_mask);
 
 	if (ssb_mode == SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_DISABLE)
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
@@ -729,19 +729,24 @@ static void init_speculation_control(str
 	if (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL)) {
 		set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_IBRS);
 		set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_IBPB);
+		set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_MSR_SPEC_CTRL);
 	}
 
 	if (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_INTEL_STIBP))
 		set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_STIBP);
 
-	if (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_AMD_IBRS))
+	if (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_AMD_IBRS)) {
 		set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_IBRS);
+		set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_MSR_SPEC_CTRL);
+	}
 
 	if (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_AMD_IBPB))
 		set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_IBPB);
 
-	if (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_AMD_STIBP))
+	if (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_AMD_STIBP)) {
 		set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_STIBP);
+		set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_MSR_SPEC_CTRL);
+	}
 }
 
 void get_cpu_cap(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c
@@ -153,6 +153,7 @@ static void early_init_intel(struct cpui
 		setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_IBPB);
 		setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_STIBP);
 		setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL);
+		setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_MSR_SPEC_CTRL);
 		setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_INTEL_STIBP);
 		setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_SSBD);
 	}

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 92+ messages in thread

* [PATCH 4.9 74/87] x86/cpufeatures: Disentangle SSBD enumeration
  2018-05-21 21:10 [PATCH 4.9 00/87] 4.9.102-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (72 preceding siblings ...)
  2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.9 73/87] x86/cpufeatures: Disentangle MSR_SPEC_CTRL enumeration from IBRS Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2018-05-21 21:11 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
  2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.9 75/87] x86/cpu/AMD: Fix erratum 1076 (CPB bit) Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (16 subsequent siblings)
  90 siblings, 0 replies; 92+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2018-05-21 21:11 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-kernel
  Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Thomas Gleixner, Borislav Petkov,
	Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk, David Woodhouse

4.9-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>

commit 52817587e706686fcdb27f14c1b000c92f266c96 upstream

The SSBD enumeration is similarly to the other bits magically shared
between Intel and AMD though the mechanisms are different.

Make X86_FEATURE_SSBD synthetic and set it depending on the vendor specific
features or family dependent setup.

Change the Intel bit to X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL_SSBD to denote that SSBD is
controlled via MSR_SPEC_CTRL and fix up the usage sites.

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h |    5 +++--
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c          |    7 +------
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c         |   10 +++++-----
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c       |    3 +++
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c        |    1 +
 arch/x86/kernel/process.c          |    2 +-
 6 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)

--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
@@ -198,6 +198,7 @@
 #define X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_AMD ( 7*32+13) /* "" AMD Retpoline mitigation for Spectre variant 2 */
 
 #define X86_FEATURE_MSR_SPEC_CTRL ( 7*32+16) /* "" MSR SPEC_CTRL is implemented */
+#define X86_FEATURE_SSBD	( 7*32+17) /* Speculative Store Bypass Disable */
 
 #define X86_FEATURE_RSB_CTXSW	( 7*32+19) /* "" Fill RSB on context switches */
 
@@ -207,7 +208,7 @@
 #define X86_FEATURE_USE_IBPB	( 7*32+21) /* "" Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier enabled */
 #define X86_FEATURE_USE_IBRS_FW	( 7*32+22) /* "" Use IBRS during runtime firmware calls */
 #define X86_FEATURE_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_DISABLE ( 7*32+23) /* "" Disable Speculative Store Bypass. */
-#define X86_FEATURE_AMD_SSBD	( 7*32+24) /* "" AMD SSBD implementation */
+#define X86_FEATURE_LS_CFG_SSBD	( 7*32+24) /* "" AMD SSBD implementation */
 #define X86_FEATURE_IBRS	( 7*32+25) /* Indirect Branch Restricted Speculation */
 #define X86_FEATURE_IBPB	( 7*32+26) /* Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier */
 #define X86_FEATURE_STIBP	( 7*32+27) /* Single Thread Indirect Branch Predictors */
@@ -314,7 +315,7 @@
 #define X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL		(18*32+26) /* "" Speculation Control (IBRS + IBPB) */
 #define X86_FEATURE_INTEL_STIBP		(18*32+27) /* "" Single Thread Indirect Branch Predictors */
 #define X86_FEATURE_ARCH_CAPABILITIES	(18*32+29) /* IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES MSR (Intel) */
-#define X86_FEATURE_SSBD		(18*32+31) /* Speculative Store Bypass Disable */
+#define X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL_SSBD	(18*32+31) /* "" Speculative Store Bypass Disable */
 
 /*
  * BUG word(s)
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c
@@ -558,8 +558,8 @@ static void bsp_init_amd(struct cpuinfo_
 		 * avoid RMW. If that faults, do not enable SSBD.
 		 */
 		if (!rdmsrl_safe(MSR_AMD64_LS_CFG, &x86_amd_ls_cfg_base)) {
+			setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_LS_CFG_SSBD);
 			setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_SSBD);
-			setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_AMD_SSBD);
 			x86_amd_ls_cfg_ssbd_mask = 1ULL << bit;
 		}
 	}
@@ -848,11 +848,6 @@ static void init_amd(struct cpuinfo_x86
 	/* AMD CPUs don't reset SS attributes on SYSRET, Xen does. */
 	if (!cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_XENPV))
 		set_cpu_bug(c, X86_BUG_SYSRET_SS_ATTRS);
-
-	if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_AMD_SSBD)) {
-		set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_SSBD);
-		set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_AMD_SSBD);
-	}
 }
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -158,8 +158,8 @@ void x86_spec_ctrl_set_guest(u64 guest_s
 	if (!static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_MSR_SPEC_CTRL))
 		return;
 
-	/* Intel controls SSB in MSR_SPEC_CTRL */
-	if (static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL))
+	/* SSBD controlled in MSR_SPEC_CTRL */
+	if (static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL_SSBD))
 		host |= ssbd_tif_to_spec_ctrl(current_thread_info()->flags);
 
 	if (host != guest_spec_ctrl)
@@ -175,8 +175,8 @@ void x86_spec_ctrl_restore_host(u64 gues
 	if (!static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_MSR_SPEC_CTRL))
 		return;
 
-	/* Intel controls SSB in MSR_SPEC_CTRL */
-	if (static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL))
+	/* SSBD controlled in MSR_SPEC_CTRL */
+	if (static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL_SSBD))
 		host |= ssbd_tif_to_spec_ctrl(current_thread_info()->flags);
 
 	if (host != guest_spec_ctrl)
@@ -188,7 +188,7 @@ static void x86_amd_ssb_disable(void)
 {
 	u64 msrval = x86_amd_ls_cfg_base | x86_amd_ls_cfg_ssbd_mask;
 
-	if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_AMD_SSBD))
+	if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_LS_CFG_SSBD))
 		wrmsrl(MSR_AMD64_LS_CFG, msrval);
 }
 
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
@@ -735,6 +735,9 @@ static void init_speculation_control(str
 	if (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_INTEL_STIBP))
 		set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_STIBP);
 
+	if (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL_SSBD))
+		set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_SSBD);
+
 	if (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_AMD_IBRS)) {
 		set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_IBRS);
 		set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_MSR_SPEC_CTRL);
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c
@@ -156,6 +156,7 @@ static void early_init_intel(struct cpui
 		setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_MSR_SPEC_CTRL);
 		setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_INTEL_STIBP);
 		setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_SSBD);
+		setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL_SSBD);
 	}
 
 	/*
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/process.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/process.c
@@ -207,7 +207,7 @@ static __always_inline void __speculativ
 {
 	u64 msr;
 
-	if (static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_AMD_SSBD)) {
+	if (static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_LS_CFG_SSBD)) {
 		msr = x86_amd_ls_cfg_base | ssbd_tif_to_amd_ls_cfg(tifn);
 		wrmsrl(MSR_AMD64_LS_CFG, msr);
 	} else {

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 92+ messages in thread

* [PATCH 4.9 75/87] x86/cpu/AMD: Fix erratum 1076 (CPB bit)
  2018-05-21 21:10 [PATCH 4.9 00/87] 4.9.102-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (73 preceding siblings ...)
  2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.9 74/87] x86/cpufeatures: Disentangle SSBD enumeration Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2018-05-21 21:11 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
  2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.9 76/87] x86/cpufeatures: Add FEATURE_ZEN Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (15 subsequent siblings)
  90 siblings, 0 replies; 92+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2018-05-21 21:11 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-kernel
  Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Borislav Petkov, Linus Torvalds,
	Peter Zijlstra, Sherry Hurwitz, Thomas Gleixner, Ingo Molnar,
	David Woodhouse

4.9-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>

commit f7f3dc00f61261cdc9ccd8b886f21bc4dffd6fd9 upstream

CPUID Fn8000_0007_EDX[CPB] is wrongly 0 on models up to B1. But they do
support CPB (AMD's Core Performance Boosting cpufreq CPU feature), so fix that.

Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Sherry Hurwitz <sherry.hurwitz@amd.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170907170821.16021-1-bp@alien8.de
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c |   11 +++++++++++
 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+)

--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c
@@ -749,6 +749,16 @@ static void init_amd_bd(struct cpuinfo_x
 	}
 }
 
+static void init_amd_zn(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
+{
+	/*
+	 * Fix erratum 1076: CPB feature bit not being set in CPUID. It affects
+	 * all up to and including B1.
+	 */
+	if (c->x86_model <= 1 && c->x86_stepping <= 1)
+		set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_CPB);
+}
+
 static void init_amd(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
 {
 	u32 dummy;
@@ -779,6 +789,7 @@ static void init_amd(struct cpuinfo_x86
 	case 0x10: init_amd_gh(c); break;
 	case 0x12: init_amd_ln(c); break;
 	case 0x15: init_amd_bd(c); break;
+	case 0x17: init_amd_zn(c); break;
 	}
 
 	/* Enable workaround for FXSAVE leak */

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 92+ messages in thread

* [PATCH 4.9 76/87] x86/cpufeatures: Add FEATURE_ZEN
  2018-05-21 21:10 [PATCH 4.9 00/87] 4.9.102-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (74 preceding siblings ...)
  2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.9 75/87] x86/cpu/AMD: Fix erratum 1076 (CPB bit) Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2018-05-21 21:11 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
  2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.9 77/87] x86/speculation: Handle HT correctly on AMD Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (14 subsequent siblings)
  90 siblings, 0 replies; 92+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2018-05-21 21:11 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-kernel
  Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Thomas Gleixner, Borislav Petkov,
	Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk, David Woodhouse

4.9-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>

commit d1035d971829dcf80e8686ccde26f94b0a069472 upstream

Add a ZEN feature bit so family-dependent static_cpu_has() optimizations
can be built for ZEN.

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h |    2 ++
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c          |    1 +
 2 files changed, 3 insertions(+)

--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
@@ -212,6 +212,8 @@
 #define X86_FEATURE_IBRS	( 7*32+25) /* Indirect Branch Restricted Speculation */
 #define X86_FEATURE_IBPB	( 7*32+26) /* Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier */
 #define X86_FEATURE_STIBP	( 7*32+27) /* Single Thread Indirect Branch Predictors */
+#define X86_FEATURE_ZEN		( 7*32+28) /* "" CPU is AMD family 0x17 (Zen) */
+
 
 /* Virtualization flags: Linux defined, word 8 */
 #define X86_FEATURE_TPR_SHADOW  ( 8*32+ 0) /* Intel TPR Shadow */
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c
@@ -751,6 +751,7 @@ static void init_amd_bd(struct cpuinfo_x
 
 static void init_amd_zn(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
 {
+	set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_ZEN);
 	/*
 	 * Fix erratum 1076: CPB feature bit not being set in CPUID. It affects
 	 * all up to and including B1.

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 92+ messages in thread

* [PATCH 4.9 77/87] x86/speculation: Handle HT correctly on AMD
  2018-05-21 21:10 [PATCH 4.9 00/87] 4.9.102-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (75 preceding siblings ...)
  2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.9 76/87] x86/cpufeatures: Add FEATURE_ZEN Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2018-05-21 21:11 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
  2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.9 78/87] x86/bugs, KVM: Extend speculation control for VIRT_SPEC_CTRL Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (13 subsequent siblings)
  90 siblings, 0 replies; 92+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2018-05-21 21:11 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-kernel
  Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Thomas Gleixner, Borislav Petkov,
	Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk, David Woodhouse

4.9-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>

commit 1f50ddb4f4189243c05926b842dc1a0332195f31 upstream

The AMD64_LS_CFG MSR is a per core MSR on Family 17H CPUs. That means when
hyperthreading is enabled the SSBD bit toggle needs to take both cores into
account. Otherwise the following situation can happen:

CPU0		CPU1

disable SSB
		disable SSB
		enable  SSB <- Enables it for the Core, i.e. for CPU0 as well

So after the SSB enable on CPU1 the task on CPU0 runs with SSB enabled
again.

On Intel the SSBD control is per core as well, but the synchronization
logic is implemented behind the per thread SPEC_CTRL MSR. It works like
this:

  CORE_SPEC_CTRL = THREAD0_SPEC_CTRL | THREAD1_SPEC_CTRL

i.e. if one of the threads enables a mitigation then this affects both and
the mitigation is only disabled in the core when both threads disabled it.

Add the necessary synchronization logic for AMD family 17H. Unfortunately
that requires a spinlock to serialize the access to the MSR, but the locks
are only shared between siblings.

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 arch/x86/include/asm/spec-ctrl.h |    6 +
 arch/x86/kernel/process.c        |  125 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
 arch/x86/kernel/smpboot.c        |    5 +
 3 files changed, 130 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)

--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/spec-ctrl.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/spec-ctrl.h
@@ -33,6 +33,12 @@ static inline u64 ssbd_tif_to_amd_ls_cfg
 	return (tifn & _TIF_SSBD) ? x86_amd_ls_cfg_ssbd_mask : 0ULL;
 }
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_SMP
+extern void speculative_store_bypass_ht_init(void);
+#else
+static inline void speculative_store_bypass_ht_init(void) { }
+#endif
+
 extern void speculative_store_bypass_update(void);
 
 #endif
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/process.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/process.c
@@ -203,22 +203,135 @@ static inline void switch_to_bitmap(stru
 	}
 }
 
-static __always_inline void __speculative_store_bypass_update(unsigned long tifn)
+#ifdef CONFIG_SMP
+
+struct ssb_state {
+	struct ssb_state	*shared_state;
+	raw_spinlock_t		lock;
+	unsigned int		disable_state;
+	unsigned long		local_state;
+};
+
+#define LSTATE_SSB	0
+
+static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct ssb_state, ssb_state);
+
+void speculative_store_bypass_ht_init(void)
+{
+	struct ssb_state *st = this_cpu_ptr(&ssb_state);
+	unsigned int this_cpu = smp_processor_id();
+	unsigned int cpu;
+
+	st->local_state = 0;
+
+	/*
+	 * Shared state setup happens once on the first bringup
+	 * of the CPU. It's not destroyed on CPU hotunplug.
+	 */
+	if (st->shared_state)
+		return;
+
+	raw_spin_lock_init(&st->lock);
+
+	/*
+	 * Go over HT siblings and check whether one of them has set up the
+	 * shared state pointer already.
+	 */
+	for_each_cpu(cpu, topology_sibling_cpumask(this_cpu)) {
+		if (cpu == this_cpu)
+			continue;
+
+		if (!per_cpu(ssb_state, cpu).shared_state)
+			continue;
+
+		/* Link it to the state of the sibling: */
+		st->shared_state = per_cpu(ssb_state, cpu).shared_state;
+		return;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * First HT sibling to come up on the core.  Link shared state of
+	 * the first HT sibling to itself. The siblings on the same core
+	 * which come up later will see the shared state pointer and link
+	 * themself to the state of this CPU.
+	 */
+	st->shared_state = st;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Logic is: First HT sibling enables SSBD for both siblings in the core
+ * and last sibling to disable it, disables it for the whole core. This how
+ * MSR_SPEC_CTRL works in "hardware":
+ *
+ *  CORE_SPEC_CTRL = THREAD0_SPEC_CTRL | THREAD1_SPEC_CTRL
+ */
+static __always_inline void amd_set_core_ssb_state(unsigned long tifn)
 {
-	u64 msr;
+	struct ssb_state *st = this_cpu_ptr(&ssb_state);
+	u64 msr = x86_amd_ls_cfg_base;
 
-	if (static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_LS_CFG_SSBD)) {
-		msr = x86_amd_ls_cfg_base | ssbd_tif_to_amd_ls_cfg(tifn);
+	if (!static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_ZEN)) {
+		msr |= ssbd_tif_to_amd_ls_cfg(tifn);
 		wrmsrl(MSR_AMD64_LS_CFG, msr);
+		return;
+	}
+
+	if (tifn & _TIF_SSBD) {
+		/*
+		 * Since this can race with prctl(), block reentry on the
+		 * same CPU.
+		 */
+		if (__test_and_set_bit(LSTATE_SSB, &st->local_state))
+			return;
+
+		msr |= x86_amd_ls_cfg_ssbd_mask;
+
+		raw_spin_lock(&st->shared_state->lock);
+		/* First sibling enables SSBD: */
+		if (!st->shared_state->disable_state)
+			wrmsrl(MSR_AMD64_LS_CFG, msr);
+		st->shared_state->disable_state++;
+		raw_spin_unlock(&st->shared_state->lock);
 	} else {
-		msr = x86_spec_ctrl_base | ssbd_tif_to_spec_ctrl(tifn);
-		wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, msr);
+		if (!__test_and_clear_bit(LSTATE_SSB, &st->local_state))
+			return;
+
+		raw_spin_lock(&st->shared_state->lock);
+		st->shared_state->disable_state--;
+		if (!st->shared_state->disable_state)
+			wrmsrl(MSR_AMD64_LS_CFG, msr);
+		raw_spin_unlock(&st->shared_state->lock);
 	}
 }
+#else
+static __always_inline void amd_set_core_ssb_state(unsigned long tifn)
+{
+	u64 msr = x86_amd_ls_cfg_base | ssbd_tif_to_amd_ls_cfg(tifn);
+
+	wrmsrl(MSR_AMD64_LS_CFG, msr);
+}
+#endif
+
+static __always_inline void intel_set_ssb_state(unsigned long tifn)
+{
+	u64 msr = x86_spec_ctrl_base | ssbd_tif_to_spec_ctrl(tifn);
+
+	wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, msr);
+}
+
+static __always_inline void __speculative_store_bypass_update(unsigned long tifn)
+{
+	if (static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_LS_CFG_SSBD))
+		amd_set_core_ssb_state(tifn);
+	else
+		intel_set_ssb_state(tifn);
+}
 
 void speculative_store_bypass_update(void)
 {
+	preempt_disable();
 	__speculative_store_bypass_update(current_thread_info()->flags);
+	preempt_enable();
 }
 
 void __switch_to_xtra(struct task_struct *prev_p, struct task_struct *next_p,
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/smpboot.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/smpboot.c
@@ -75,6 +75,7 @@
 #include <asm/i8259.h>
 #include <asm/realmode.h>
 #include <asm/misc.h>
+#include <asm/spec-ctrl.h>
 
 /* Number of siblings per CPU package */
 int smp_num_siblings = 1;
@@ -229,6 +230,8 @@ static void notrace start_secondary(void
 	 */
 	check_tsc_sync_target();
 
+	speculative_store_bypass_ht_init();
+
 	/*
 	 * Lock vector_lock and initialize the vectors on this cpu
 	 * before setting the cpu online. We must set it online with
@@ -1325,6 +1328,8 @@ void __init native_smp_prepare_cpus(unsi
 	set_mtrr_aps_delayed_init();
 
 	smp_quirk_init_udelay();
+
+	speculative_store_bypass_ht_init();
 }
 
 void arch_enable_nonboot_cpus_begin(void)

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 92+ messages in thread

* [PATCH 4.9 78/87] x86/bugs, KVM: Extend speculation control for VIRT_SPEC_CTRL
  2018-05-21 21:10 [PATCH 4.9 00/87] 4.9.102-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (76 preceding siblings ...)
  2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.9 77/87] x86/speculation: Handle HT correctly on AMD Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2018-05-21 21:11 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
  2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.9 79/87] x86/speculation: Add virtualized speculative store bypass disable support Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (12 subsequent siblings)
  90 siblings, 0 replies; 92+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2018-05-21 21:11 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-kernel
  Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Thomas Gleixner, Borislav Petkov,
	Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk, David Woodhouse

4.9-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>

commit ccbcd2674472a978b48c91c1fbfb66c0ff959f24 upstream

AMD is proposing a VIRT_SPEC_CTRL MSR to handle the Speculative Store
Bypass Disable via MSR_AMD64_LS_CFG so that guests do not have to care
about the bit position of the SSBD bit and thus facilitate migration.
Also, the sibling coordination on Family 17H CPUs can only be done on
the host.

Extend x86_spec_ctrl_set_guest() and x86_spec_ctrl_restore_host() with an
extra argument for the VIRT_SPEC_CTRL MSR.

Hand in 0 from VMX and in SVM add a new virt_spec_ctrl member to the CPU
data structure which is going to be used in later patches for the actual
implementation.

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 arch/x86/include/asm/spec-ctrl.h |    9 ++++++---
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c       |   20 ++++++++++++++++++--
 arch/x86/kvm/svm.c               |   11 +++++++++--
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c               |    5 +++--
 4 files changed, 36 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)

--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/spec-ctrl.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/spec-ctrl.h
@@ -10,10 +10,13 @@
  * the guest has, while on VMEXIT we restore the host view. This
  * would be easier if SPEC_CTRL were architecturally maskable or
  * shadowable for guests but this is not (currently) the case.
- * Takes the guest view of SPEC_CTRL MSR as a parameter.
+ * Takes the guest view of SPEC_CTRL MSR as a parameter and also
+ * the guest's version of VIRT_SPEC_CTRL, if emulated.
  */
-extern void x86_spec_ctrl_set_guest(u64);
-extern void x86_spec_ctrl_restore_host(u64);
+extern void x86_spec_ctrl_set_guest(u64 guest_spec_ctrl,
+				    u64 guest_virt_spec_ctrl);
+extern void x86_spec_ctrl_restore_host(u64 guest_spec_ctrl,
+				       u64 guest_virt_spec_ctrl);
 
 /* AMD specific Speculative Store Bypass MSR data */
 extern u64 x86_amd_ls_cfg_base;
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -150,7 +150,15 @@ u64 x86_spec_ctrl_get_default(void)
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(x86_spec_ctrl_get_default);
 
-void x86_spec_ctrl_set_guest(u64 guest_spec_ctrl)
+/**
+ * x86_spec_ctrl_set_guest - Set speculation control registers for the guest
+ * @guest_spec_ctrl:		The guest content of MSR_SPEC_CTRL
+ * @guest_virt_spec_ctrl:	The guest controlled bits of MSR_VIRT_SPEC_CTRL
+ *				(may get translated to MSR_AMD64_LS_CFG bits)
+ *
+ * Avoids writing to the MSR if the content/bits are the same
+ */
+void x86_spec_ctrl_set_guest(u64 guest_spec_ctrl, u64 guest_virt_spec_ctrl)
 {
 	u64 host = x86_spec_ctrl_base;
 
@@ -167,7 +175,15 @@ void x86_spec_ctrl_set_guest(u64 guest_s
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(x86_spec_ctrl_set_guest);
 
-void x86_spec_ctrl_restore_host(u64 guest_spec_ctrl)
+/**
+ * x86_spec_ctrl_restore_host - Restore host speculation control registers
+ * @guest_spec_ctrl:		The guest content of MSR_SPEC_CTRL
+ * @guest_virt_spec_ctrl:	The guest controlled bits of MSR_VIRT_SPEC_CTRL
+ *				(may get translated to MSR_AMD64_LS_CFG bits)
+ *
+ * Avoids writing to the MSR if the content/bits are the same
+ */
+void x86_spec_ctrl_restore_host(u64 guest_spec_ctrl, u64 guest_virt_spec_ctrl)
 {
 	u64 host = x86_spec_ctrl_base;
 
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c
@@ -185,6 +185,12 @@ struct vcpu_svm {
 	} host;
 
 	u64 spec_ctrl;
+	/*
+	 * Contains guest-controlled bits of VIRT_SPEC_CTRL, which will be
+	 * translated into the appropriate L2_CFG bits on the host to
+	 * perform speculative control.
+	 */
+	u64 virt_spec_ctrl;
 
 	u32 *msrpm;
 
@@ -1561,6 +1567,7 @@ static void svm_vcpu_reset(struct kvm_vc
 	u32 eax = 1;
 
 	svm->spec_ctrl = 0;
+	svm->virt_spec_ctrl = 0;
 
 	if (!init_event) {
 		svm->vcpu.arch.apic_base = APIC_DEFAULT_PHYS_BASE |
@@ -4917,7 +4924,7 @@ static void svm_vcpu_run(struct kvm_vcpu
 	 * is no need to worry about the conditional branch over the wrmsr
 	 * being speculatively taken.
 	 */
-	x86_spec_ctrl_set_guest(svm->spec_ctrl);
+	x86_spec_ctrl_set_guest(svm->spec_ctrl, svm->virt_spec_ctrl);
 
 	asm volatile (
 		"push %%" _ASM_BP "; \n\t"
@@ -5041,7 +5048,7 @@ static void svm_vcpu_run(struct kvm_vcpu
 	if (unlikely(!msr_write_intercepted(vcpu, MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL)))
 		svm->spec_ctrl = native_read_msr(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL);
 
-	x86_spec_ctrl_restore_host(svm->spec_ctrl);
+	x86_spec_ctrl_restore_host(svm->spec_ctrl, svm->virt_spec_ctrl);
 
 	reload_tss(vcpu);
 
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c
@@ -8916,9 +8916,10 @@ static void __noclone vmx_vcpu_run(struc
 	 * is no need to worry about the conditional branch over the wrmsr
 	 * being speculatively taken.
 	 */
-	x86_spec_ctrl_set_guest(vmx->spec_ctrl);
+	x86_spec_ctrl_set_guest(vmx->spec_ctrl, 0);
 
 	vmx->__launched = vmx->loaded_vmcs->launched;
+
 	asm(
 		/* Store host registers */
 		"push %%" _ASM_DX "; push %%" _ASM_BP ";"
@@ -9054,7 +9055,7 @@ static void __noclone vmx_vcpu_run(struc
 	if (unlikely(!msr_write_intercepted(vcpu, MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL)))
 		vmx->spec_ctrl = native_read_msr(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL);
 
-	x86_spec_ctrl_restore_host(vmx->spec_ctrl);
+	x86_spec_ctrl_restore_host(vmx->spec_ctrl, 0);
 
 	/* Eliminate branch target predictions from guest mode */
 	vmexit_fill_RSB();

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 92+ messages in thread

* [PATCH 4.9 79/87] x86/speculation: Add virtualized speculative store bypass disable support
  2018-05-21 21:10 [PATCH 4.9 00/87] 4.9.102-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (77 preceding siblings ...)
  2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.9 78/87] x86/bugs, KVM: Extend speculation control for VIRT_SPEC_CTRL Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2018-05-21 21:11 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
  2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.9 80/87] x86/speculation: Rework speculative_store_bypass_update() Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (11 subsequent siblings)
  90 siblings, 0 replies; 92+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2018-05-21 21:11 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-kernel
  Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Tom Lendacky, Thomas Gleixner,
	Borislav Petkov, David Woodhouse

4.9-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>

commit 11fb0683493b2da112cd64c9dada221b52463bf7 upstream

Some AMD processors only support a non-architectural means of enabling
speculative store bypass disable (SSBD).  To allow a simplified view of
this to a guest, an architectural definition has been created through a new
CPUID bit, 0x80000008_EBX[25], and a new MSR, 0xc001011f.  With this, a
hypervisor can virtualize the existence of this definition and provide an
architectural method for using SSBD to a guest.

Add the new CPUID feature, the new MSR and update the existing SSBD
support to use this MSR when present.

Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h |    1 +
 arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h   |    2 ++
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c         |    4 +++-
 arch/x86/kernel/process.c          |   13 ++++++++++++-
 4 files changed, 18 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
@@ -274,6 +274,7 @@
 #define X86_FEATURE_AMD_IBPB	(13*32+12) /* Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier */
 #define X86_FEATURE_AMD_IBRS	(13*32+14) /* Indirect Branch Restricted Speculation */
 #define X86_FEATURE_AMD_STIBP	(13*32+15) /* Single Thread Indirect Branch Predictors */
+#define X86_FEATURE_VIRT_SSBD	(13*32+25) /* Virtualized Speculative Store Bypass Disable */
 
 /* Thermal and Power Management Leaf, CPUID level 0x00000006 (eax), word 14 */
 #define X86_FEATURE_DTHERM	(14*32+ 0) /* Digital Thermal Sensor */
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
@@ -323,6 +323,8 @@
 #define MSR_AMD64_IBSOPDATA4		0xc001103d
 #define MSR_AMD64_IBS_REG_COUNT_MAX	8 /* includes MSR_AMD64_IBSBRTARGET */
 
+#define MSR_AMD64_VIRT_SPEC_CTRL	0xc001011f
+
 /* Fam 17h MSRs */
 #define MSR_F17H_IRPERF			0xc00000e9
 
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -204,7 +204,9 @@ static void x86_amd_ssb_disable(void)
 {
 	u64 msrval = x86_amd_ls_cfg_base | x86_amd_ls_cfg_ssbd_mask;
 
-	if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_LS_CFG_SSBD))
+	if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_VIRT_SSBD))
+		wrmsrl(MSR_AMD64_VIRT_SPEC_CTRL, SPEC_CTRL_SSBD);
+	else if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_LS_CFG_SSBD))
 		wrmsrl(MSR_AMD64_LS_CFG, msrval);
 }
 
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/process.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/process.c
@@ -312,6 +312,15 @@ static __always_inline void amd_set_core
 }
 #endif
 
+static __always_inline void amd_set_ssb_virt_state(unsigned long tifn)
+{
+	/*
+	 * SSBD has the same definition in SPEC_CTRL and VIRT_SPEC_CTRL,
+	 * so ssbd_tif_to_spec_ctrl() just works.
+	 */
+	wrmsrl(MSR_AMD64_VIRT_SPEC_CTRL, ssbd_tif_to_spec_ctrl(tifn));
+}
+
 static __always_inline void intel_set_ssb_state(unsigned long tifn)
 {
 	u64 msr = x86_spec_ctrl_base | ssbd_tif_to_spec_ctrl(tifn);
@@ -321,7 +330,9 @@ static __always_inline void intel_set_ss
 
 static __always_inline void __speculative_store_bypass_update(unsigned long tifn)
 {
-	if (static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_LS_CFG_SSBD))
+	if (static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_VIRT_SSBD))
+		amd_set_ssb_virt_state(tifn);
+	else if (static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_LS_CFG_SSBD))
 		amd_set_core_ssb_state(tifn);
 	else
 		intel_set_ssb_state(tifn);

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 92+ messages in thread

* [PATCH 4.9 80/87] x86/speculation: Rework speculative_store_bypass_update()
  2018-05-21 21:10 [PATCH 4.9 00/87] 4.9.102-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (78 preceding siblings ...)
  2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.9 79/87] x86/speculation: Add virtualized speculative store bypass disable support Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2018-05-21 21:11 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
  2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.9 81/87] x86/bugs: Unify x86_spec_ctrl_{set_guest,restore_host} Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (10 subsequent siblings)
  90 siblings, 0 replies; 92+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2018-05-21 21:11 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-kernel
  Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Thomas Gleixner, Borislav Petkov,
	Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk, David Woodhouse

4.9-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>

commit 0270be3e34efb05a88bc4c422572ece038ef3608 upstream

The upcoming support for the virtual SPEC_CTRL MSR on AMD needs to reuse
speculative_store_bypass_update() to avoid code duplication. Add an
argument for supplying a thread info (TIF) value and create a wrapper
speculative_store_bypass_update_current() which is used at the existing
call site.

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 arch/x86/include/asm/spec-ctrl.h |    7 ++++++-
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c       |    2 +-
 arch/x86/kernel/process.c        |    4 ++--
 3 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/spec-ctrl.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/spec-ctrl.h
@@ -42,6 +42,11 @@ extern void speculative_store_bypass_ht_
 static inline void speculative_store_bypass_ht_init(void) { }
 #endif
 
-extern void speculative_store_bypass_update(void);
+extern void speculative_store_bypass_update(unsigned long tif);
+
+static inline void speculative_store_bypass_update_current(void)
+{
+	speculative_store_bypass_update(current_thread_info()->flags);
+}
 
 #endif
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -597,7 +597,7 @@ static int ssb_prctl_set(struct task_str
 	 * mitigation until it is next scheduled.
 	 */
 	if (task == current && update)
-		speculative_store_bypass_update();
+		speculative_store_bypass_update_current();
 
 	return 0;
 }
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/process.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/process.c
@@ -338,10 +338,10 @@ static __always_inline void __speculativ
 		intel_set_ssb_state(tifn);
 }
 
-void speculative_store_bypass_update(void)
+void speculative_store_bypass_update(unsigned long tif)
 {
 	preempt_disable();
-	__speculative_store_bypass_update(current_thread_info()->flags);
+	__speculative_store_bypass_update(tif);
 	preempt_enable();
 }
 

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 92+ messages in thread

* [PATCH 4.9 81/87] x86/bugs: Unify x86_spec_ctrl_{set_guest,restore_host}
  2018-05-21 21:10 [PATCH 4.9 00/87] 4.9.102-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (79 preceding siblings ...)
  2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.9 80/87] x86/speculation: Rework speculative_store_bypass_update() Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2018-05-21 21:11 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
  2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.9 82/87] x86/bugs: Expose x86_spec_ctrl_base directly Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (9 subsequent siblings)
  90 siblings, 0 replies; 92+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2018-05-21 21:11 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-kernel
  Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Borislav Petkov, Thomas Gleixner,
	Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk, David Woodhouse

4.9-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>

commit cc69b34989210f067b2c51d5539b5f96ebcc3a01 upstream

Function bodies are very similar and are going to grow more almost
identical code. Add a bool arg to determine whether SPEC_CTRL is being set
for the guest or restored to the host.

No functional changes.

Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 arch/x86/include/asm/spec-ctrl.h |   33 ++++++++++++++++++---
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c       |   60 +++++++++------------------------------
 2 files changed, 44 insertions(+), 49 deletions(-)

--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/spec-ctrl.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/spec-ctrl.h
@@ -13,10 +13,35 @@
  * Takes the guest view of SPEC_CTRL MSR as a parameter and also
  * the guest's version of VIRT_SPEC_CTRL, if emulated.
  */
-extern void x86_spec_ctrl_set_guest(u64 guest_spec_ctrl,
-				    u64 guest_virt_spec_ctrl);
-extern void x86_spec_ctrl_restore_host(u64 guest_spec_ctrl,
-				       u64 guest_virt_spec_ctrl);
+extern void x86_virt_spec_ctrl(u64 guest_spec_ctrl, u64 guest_virt_spec_ctrl, bool guest);
+
+/**
+ * x86_spec_ctrl_set_guest - Set speculation control registers for the guest
+ * @guest_spec_ctrl:		The guest content of MSR_SPEC_CTRL
+ * @guest_virt_spec_ctrl:	The guest controlled bits of MSR_VIRT_SPEC_CTRL
+ *				(may get translated to MSR_AMD64_LS_CFG bits)
+ *
+ * Avoids writing to the MSR if the content/bits are the same
+ */
+static inline
+void x86_spec_ctrl_set_guest(u64 guest_spec_ctrl, u64 guest_virt_spec_ctrl)
+{
+	x86_virt_spec_ctrl(guest_spec_ctrl, guest_virt_spec_ctrl, true);
+}
+
+/**
+ * x86_spec_ctrl_restore_host - Restore host speculation control registers
+ * @guest_spec_ctrl:		The guest content of MSR_SPEC_CTRL
+ * @guest_virt_spec_ctrl:	The guest controlled bits of MSR_VIRT_SPEC_CTRL
+ *				(may get translated to MSR_AMD64_LS_CFG bits)
+ *
+ * Avoids writing to the MSR if the content/bits are the same
+ */
+static inline
+void x86_spec_ctrl_restore_host(u64 guest_spec_ctrl, u64 guest_virt_spec_ctrl)
+{
+	x86_virt_spec_ctrl(guest_spec_ctrl, guest_virt_spec_ctrl, false);
+}
 
 /* AMD specific Speculative Store Bypass MSR data */
 extern u64 x86_amd_ls_cfg_base;
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -150,55 +150,25 @@ u64 x86_spec_ctrl_get_default(void)
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(x86_spec_ctrl_get_default);
 
-/**
- * x86_spec_ctrl_set_guest - Set speculation control registers for the guest
- * @guest_spec_ctrl:		The guest content of MSR_SPEC_CTRL
- * @guest_virt_spec_ctrl:	The guest controlled bits of MSR_VIRT_SPEC_CTRL
- *				(may get translated to MSR_AMD64_LS_CFG bits)
- *
- * Avoids writing to the MSR if the content/bits are the same
- */
-void x86_spec_ctrl_set_guest(u64 guest_spec_ctrl, u64 guest_virt_spec_ctrl)
+void
+x86_virt_spec_ctrl(u64 guest_spec_ctrl, u64 guest_virt_spec_ctrl, bool setguest)
 {
-	u64 host = x86_spec_ctrl_base;
+	struct thread_info *ti = current_thread_info();
+	u64 msr, host = x86_spec_ctrl_base;
 
 	/* Is MSR_SPEC_CTRL implemented ? */
-	if (!static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_MSR_SPEC_CTRL))
-		return;
-
-	/* SSBD controlled in MSR_SPEC_CTRL */
-	if (static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL_SSBD))
-		host |= ssbd_tif_to_spec_ctrl(current_thread_info()->flags);
-
-	if (host != guest_spec_ctrl)
-		wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, guest_spec_ctrl);
-}
-EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(x86_spec_ctrl_set_guest);
-
-/**
- * x86_spec_ctrl_restore_host - Restore host speculation control registers
- * @guest_spec_ctrl:		The guest content of MSR_SPEC_CTRL
- * @guest_virt_spec_ctrl:	The guest controlled bits of MSR_VIRT_SPEC_CTRL
- *				(may get translated to MSR_AMD64_LS_CFG bits)
- *
- * Avoids writing to the MSR if the content/bits are the same
- */
-void x86_spec_ctrl_restore_host(u64 guest_spec_ctrl, u64 guest_virt_spec_ctrl)
-{
-	u64 host = x86_spec_ctrl_base;
-
-	/* Is MSR_SPEC_CTRL implemented ? */
-	if (!static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_MSR_SPEC_CTRL))
-		return;
-
-	/* SSBD controlled in MSR_SPEC_CTRL */
-	if (static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL_SSBD))
-		host |= ssbd_tif_to_spec_ctrl(current_thread_info()->flags);
-
-	if (host != guest_spec_ctrl)
-		wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, host);
+	if (static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_MSR_SPEC_CTRL)) {
+		/* SSBD controlled in MSR_SPEC_CTRL */
+		if (static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL_SSBD))
+			host |= ssbd_tif_to_spec_ctrl(ti->flags);
+
+		if (host != guest_spec_ctrl) {
+			msr = setguest ? guest_spec_ctrl : host;
+			wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, msr);
+		}
+	}
 }
-EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(x86_spec_ctrl_restore_host);
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(x86_virt_spec_ctrl);
 
 static void x86_amd_ssb_disable(void)
 {

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 92+ messages in thread

* [PATCH 4.9 82/87] x86/bugs: Expose x86_spec_ctrl_base directly
  2018-05-21 21:10 [PATCH 4.9 00/87] 4.9.102-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (80 preceding siblings ...)
  2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.9 81/87] x86/bugs: Unify x86_spec_ctrl_{set_guest,restore_host} Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2018-05-21 21:11 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
  2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.9 83/87] x86/bugs: Remove x86_spec_ctrl_set() Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (8 subsequent siblings)
  90 siblings, 0 replies; 92+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2018-05-21 21:11 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-kernel
  Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Thomas Gleixner, Borislav Petkov,
	Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk, David Woodhouse

4.9-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>

commit fa8ac4988249c38476f6ad678a4848a736373403 upstream

x86_spec_ctrl_base is the system wide default value for the SPEC_CTRL MSR.
x86_spec_ctrl_get_default() returns x86_spec_ctrl_base and was intended to
prevent modification to that variable. Though the variable is read only
after init and globaly visible already.

Remove the function and export the variable instead.

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h |   16 +++++-----------
 arch/x86/include/asm/spec-ctrl.h     |    3 ---
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c           |   11 +----------
 3 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 24 deletions(-)

--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
@@ -217,16 +217,7 @@ enum spectre_v2_mitigation {
 	SPECTRE_V2_IBRS,
 };
 
-/*
- * The Intel specification for the SPEC_CTRL MSR requires that we
- * preserve any already set reserved bits at boot time (e.g. for
- * future additions that this kernel is not currently aware of).
- * We then set any additional mitigation bits that we want
- * ourselves and always use this as the base for SPEC_CTRL.
- * We also use this when handling guest entry/exit as below.
- */
 extern void x86_spec_ctrl_set(u64);
-extern u64 x86_spec_ctrl_get_default(void);
 
 /* The Speculative Store Bypass disable variants */
 enum ssb_mitigation {
@@ -278,6 +269,9 @@ static inline void indirect_branch_predi
 	alternative_msr_write(MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD, val, X86_FEATURE_USE_IBPB);
 }
 
+/* The Intel SPEC CTRL MSR base value cache */
+extern u64 x86_spec_ctrl_base;
+
 /*
  * With retpoline, we must use IBRS to restrict branch prediction
  * before calling into firmware.
@@ -286,7 +280,7 @@ static inline void indirect_branch_predi
  */
 #define firmware_restrict_branch_speculation_start()			\
 do {									\
-	u64 val = x86_spec_ctrl_get_default() | SPEC_CTRL_IBRS;		\
+	u64 val = x86_spec_ctrl_base | SPEC_CTRL_IBRS;			\
 									\
 	preempt_disable();						\
 	alternative_msr_write(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, val,			\
@@ -295,7 +289,7 @@ do {									\
 
 #define firmware_restrict_branch_speculation_end()			\
 do {									\
-	u64 val = x86_spec_ctrl_get_default();				\
+	u64 val = x86_spec_ctrl_base;					\
 									\
 	alternative_msr_write(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, val,			\
 			      X86_FEATURE_USE_IBRS_FW);			\
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/spec-ctrl.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/spec-ctrl.h
@@ -47,9 +47,6 @@ void x86_spec_ctrl_restore_host(u64 gues
 extern u64 x86_amd_ls_cfg_base;
 extern u64 x86_amd_ls_cfg_ssbd_mask;
 
-/* The Intel SPEC CTRL MSR base value cache */
-extern u64 x86_spec_ctrl_base;
-
 static inline u64 ssbd_tif_to_spec_ctrl(u64 tifn)
 {
 	BUILD_BUG_ON(TIF_SSBD < SPEC_CTRL_SSBD_SHIFT);
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -35,6 +35,7 @@ static void __init ssb_select_mitigation
  * writes to SPEC_CTRL contain whatever reserved bits have been set.
  */
 u64 __ro_after_init x86_spec_ctrl_base;
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(x86_spec_ctrl_base);
 
 /*
  * The vendor and possibly platform specific bits which can be modified in
@@ -140,16 +141,6 @@ void x86_spec_ctrl_set(u64 val)
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(x86_spec_ctrl_set);
 
-u64 x86_spec_ctrl_get_default(void)
-{
-	u64 msrval = x86_spec_ctrl_base;
-
-	if (static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL))
-		msrval |= ssbd_tif_to_spec_ctrl(current_thread_info()->flags);
-	return msrval;
-}
-EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(x86_spec_ctrl_get_default);
-
 void
 x86_virt_spec_ctrl(u64 guest_spec_ctrl, u64 guest_virt_spec_ctrl, bool setguest)
 {

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 92+ messages in thread

* [PATCH 4.9 83/87] x86/bugs: Remove x86_spec_ctrl_set()
  2018-05-21 21:10 [PATCH 4.9 00/87] 4.9.102-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (81 preceding siblings ...)
  2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.9 82/87] x86/bugs: Expose x86_spec_ctrl_base directly Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2018-05-21 21:11 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
  2018-05-21 21:12 ` [PATCH 4.9 84/87] x86/bugs: Rework spec_ctrl base and mask logic Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (7 subsequent siblings)
  90 siblings, 0 replies; 92+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2018-05-21 21:11 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-kernel
  Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Thomas Gleixner, Borislav Petkov,
	Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk, David Woodhouse

4.9-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>

commit 4b59bdb569453a60b752b274ca61f009e37f4dae upstream

x86_spec_ctrl_set() is only used in bugs.c and the extra mask checks there
provide no real value as both call sites can just write x86_spec_ctrl_base
to MSR_SPEC_CTRL. x86_spec_ctrl_base is valid and does not need any extra
masking or checking.

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h |    2 --
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c           |   13 ++-----------
 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)

--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
@@ -217,8 +217,6 @@ enum spectre_v2_mitigation {
 	SPECTRE_V2_IBRS,
 };
 
-extern void x86_spec_ctrl_set(u64);
-
 /* The Speculative Store Bypass disable variants */
 enum ssb_mitigation {
 	SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_NONE,
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -132,15 +132,6 @@ static const char *spectre_v2_strings[]
 static enum spectre_v2_mitigation spectre_v2_enabled __ro_after_init =
 	SPECTRE_V2_NONE;
 
-void x86_spec_ctrl_set(u64 val)
-{
-	if (val & x86_spec_ctrl_mask)
-		WARN_ONCE(1, "SPEC_CTRL MSR value 0x%16llx is unknown.\n", val);
-	else
-		wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, x86_spec_ctrl_base | val);
-}
-EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(x86_spec_ctrl_set);
-
 void
 x86_virt_spec_ctrl(u64 guest_spec_ctrl, u64 guest_virt_spec_ctrl, bool setguest)
 {
@@ -502,7 +493,7 @@ static enum ssb_mitigation __init __ssb_
 		case X86_VENDOR_INTEL:
 			x86_spec_ctrl_base |= SPEC_CTRL_SSBD;
 			x86_spec_ctrl_mask &= ~SPEC_CTRL_SSBD;
-			x86_spec_ctrl_set(SPEC_CTRL_SSBD);
+			wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, x86_spec_ctrl_base);
 			break;
 		case X86_VENDOR_AMD:
 			x86_amd_ssb_disable();
@@ -614,7 +605,7 @@ int arch_prctl_spec_ctrl_get(struct task
 void x86_spec_ctrl_setup_ap(void)
 {
 	if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_MSR_SPEC_CTRL))
-		x86_spec_ctrl_set(x86_spec_ctrl_base & ~x86_spec_ctrl_mask);
+		wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, x86_spec_ctrl_base);
 
 	if (ssb_mode == SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_DISABLE)
 		x86_amd_ssb_disable();

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 92+ messages in thread

* [PATCH 4.9 84/87] x86/bugs: Rework spec_ctrl base and mask logic
  2018-05-21 21:10 [PATCH 4.9 00/87] 4.9.102-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (82 preceding siblings ...)
  2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.9 83/87] x86/bugs: Remove x86_spec_ctrl_set() Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2018-05-21 21:12 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
  2018-05-21 21:12 ` [PATCH 4.9 85/87] x86/speculation, KVM: Implement support for VIRT_SPEC_CTRL/LS_CFG Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (6 subsequent siblings)
  90 siblings, 0 replies; 92+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2018-05-21 21:12 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-kernel
  Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Thomas Gleixner, Borislav Petkov,
	David Woodhouse

4.9-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>

commit be6fcb5478e95bb1c91f489121238deb3abca46a upstream

x86_spec_ctrL_mask is intended to mask out bits from a MSR_SPEC_CTRL value
which are not to be modified. However the implementation is not really used
and the bitmask was inverted to make a check easier, which was removed in
"x86/bugs: Remove x86_spec_ctrl_set()"

Aside of that it is missing the STIBP bit if it is supported by the
platform, so if the mask would be used in x86_virt_spec_ctrl() then it
would prevent a guest from setting STIBP.

Add the STIBP bit if supported and use the mask in x86_virt_spec_ctrl() to
sanitize the value which is supplied by the guest.

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c |   26 +++++++++++++++++++-------
 1 file changed, 19 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)

--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -41,7 +41,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(x86_spec_ctrl_base);
  * The vendor and possibly platform specific bits which can be modified in
  * x86_spec_ctrl_base.
  */
-static u64 __ro_after_init x86_spec_ctrl_mask = ~SPEC_CTRL_IBRS;
+static u64 __ro_after_init x86_spec_ctrl_mask = SPEC_CTRL_IBRS;
 
 /*
  * AMD specific MSR info for Speculative Store Bypass control.
@@ -67,6 +67,10 @@ void __init check_bugs(void)
 	if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_MSR_SPEC_CTRL))
 		rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, x86_spec_ctrl_base);
 
+	/* Allow STIBP in MSR_SPEC_CTRL if supported */
+	if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_STIBP))
+		x86_spec_ctrl_mask |= SPEC_CTRL_STIBP;
+
 	/* Select the proper spectre mitigation before patching alternatives */
 	spectre_v2_select_mitigation();
 
@@ -135,18 +139,26 @@ static enum spectre_v2_mitigation spectr
 void
 x86_virt_spec_ctrl(u64 guest_spec_ctrl, u64 guest_virt_spec_ctrl, bool setguest)
 {
+	u64 msrval, guestval, hostval = x86_spec_ctrl_base;
 	struct thread_info *ti = current_thread_info();
-	u64 msr, host = x86_spec_ctrl_base;
 
 	/* Is MSR_SPEC_CTRL implemented ? */
 	if (static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_MSR_SPEC_CTRL)) {
+		/*
+		 * Restrict guest_spec_ctrl to supported values. Clear the
+		 * modifiable bits in the host base value and or the
+		 * modifiable bits from the guest value.
+		 */
+		guestval = hostval & ~x86_spec_ctrl_mask;
+		guestval |= guest_spec_ctrl & x86_spec_ctrl_mask;
+
 		/* SSBD controlled in MSR_SPEC_CTRL */
 		if (static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL_SSBD))
-			host |= ssbd_tif_to_spec_ctrl(ti->flags);
+			hostval |= ssbd_tif_to_spec_ctrl(ti->flags);
 
-		if (host != guest_spec_ctrl) {
-			msr = setguest ? guest_spec_ctrl : host;
-			wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, msr);
+		if (hostval != guestval) {
+			msrval = setguest ? guestval : hostval;
+			wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, msrval);
 		}
 	}
 }
@@ -492,7 +504,7 @@ static enum ssb_mitigation __init __ssb_
 		switch (boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor) {
 		case X86_VENDOR_INTEL:
 			x86_spec_ctrl_base |= SPEC_CTRL_SSBD;
-			x86_spec_ctrl_mask &= ~SPEC_CTRL_SSBD;
+			x86_spec_ctrl_mask |= SPEC_CTRL_SSBD;
 			wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, x86_spec_ctrl_base);
 			break;
 		case X86_VENDOR_AMD:

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 92+ messages in thread

* [PATCH 4.9 85/87] x86/speculation, KVM: Implement support for VIRT_SPEC_CTRL/LS_CFG
  2018-05-21 21:10 [PATCH 4.9 00/87] 4.9.102-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (83 preceding siblings ...)
  2018-05-21 21:12 ` [PATCH 4.9 84/87] x86/bugs: Rework spec_ctrl base and mask logic Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2018-05-21 21:12 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
  2018-05-21 21:12 ` [PATCH 4.9 86/87] KVM: SVM: Implement VIRT_SPEC_CTRL support for SSBD Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (5 subsequent siblings)
  90 siblings, 0 replies; 92+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2018-05-21 21:12 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-kernel; +Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Thomas Gleixner, David Woodhouse

4.9-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>

commit 47c61b3955cf712cadfc25635bf9bc174af030ea upstream

Add the necessary logic for supporting the emulated VIRT_SPEC_CTRL MSR to
x86_virt_spec_ctrl().  If either X86_FEATURE_LS_CFG_SSBD or
X86_FEATURE_VIRT_SPEC_CTRL is set then use the new guest_virt_spec_ctrl
argument to check whether the state must be modified on the host. The
update reuses speculative_store_bypass_update() so the ZEN-specific sibling
coordination can be reused.

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 arch/x86/include/asm/spec-ctrl.h |    6 ++++++
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c       |   30 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 2 files changed, 36 insertions(+)

--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/spec-ctrl.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/spec-ctrl.h
@@ -53,6 +53,12 @@ static inline u64 ssbd_tif_to_spec_ctrl(
 	return (tifn & _TIF_SSBD) >> (TIF_SSBD - SPEC_CTRL_SSBD_SHIFT);
 }
 
+static inline unsigned long ssbd_spec_ctrl_to_tif(u64 spec_ctrl)
+{
+	BUILD_BUG_ON(TIF_SSBD < SPEC_CTRL_SSBD_SHIFT);
+	return (spec_ctrl & SPEC_CTRL_SSBD) << (TIF_SSBD - SPEC_CTRL_SSBD_SHIFT);
+}
+
 static inline u64 ssbd_tif_to_amd_ls_cfg(u64 tifn)
 {
 	return (tifn & _TIF_SSBD) ? x86_amd_ls_cfg_ssbd_mask : 0ULL;
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -161,6 +161,36 @@ x86_virt_spec_ctrl(u64 guest_spec_ctrl,
 			wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, msrval);
 		}
 	}
+
+	/*
+	 * If SSBD is not handled in MSR_SPEC_CTRL on AMD, update
+	 * MSR_AMD64_L2_CFG or MSR_VIRT_SPEC_CTRL if supported.
+	 */
+	if (!static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_LS_CFG_SSBD) &&
+	    !static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_VIRT_SSBD))
+		return;
+
+	/*
+	 * If the host has SSBD mitigation enabled, force it in the host's
+	 * virtual MSR value. If its not permanently enabled, evaluate
+	 * current's TIF_SSBD thread flag.
+	 */
+	if (static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_DISABLE))
+		hostval = SPEC_CTRL_SSBD;
+	else
+		hostval = ssbd_tif_to_spec_ctrl(ti->flags);
+
+	/* Sanitize the guest value */
+	guestval = guest_virt_spec_ctrl & SPEC_CTRL_SSBD;
+
+	if (hostval != guestval) {
+		unsigned long tif;
+
+		tif = setguest ? ssbd_spec_ctrl_to_tif(guestval) :
+				 ssbd_spec_ctrl_to_tif(hostval);
+
+		speculative_store_bypass_update(tif);
+	}
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(x86_virt_spec_ctrl);
 

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 92+ messages in thread

* [PATCH 4.9 86/87] KVM: SVM: Implement VIRT_SPEC_CTRL support for SSBD
  2018-05-21 21:10 [PATCH 4.9 00/87] 4.9.102-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (84 preceding siblings ...)
  2018-05-21 21:12 ` [PATCH 4.9 85/87] x86/speculation, KVM: Implement support for VIRT_SPEC_CTRL/LS_CFG Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2018-05-21 21:12 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
  2018-05-21 21:12 ` [PATCH 4.9 87/87] x86/bugs: Rename SSBD_NO to SSB_NO Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (4 subsequent siblings)
  90 siblings, 0 replies; 92+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2018-05-21 21:12 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-kernel
  Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Tom Lendacky, Thomas Gleixner,
	David Woodhouse

4.9-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>

commit bc226f07dcd3c9ef0b7f6236fe356ea4a9cb4769 upstream

Expose the new virtualized architectural mechanism, VIRT_SSBD, for using
speculative store bypass disable (SSBD) under SVM.  This will allow guests
to use SSBD on hardware that uses non-architectural mechanisms for enabling
SSBD.

[ tglx: Folded the migration fixup from Paolo Bonzini ]

Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h |    2 +-
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c    |    3 ++-
 arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c            |   11 +++++++++--
 arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.h            |    9 +++++++++
 arch/x86/kvm/svm.c              |   21 +++++++++++++++++++--
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c              |   18 +++++++++++++++---
 arch/x86/kvm/x86.c              |   13 ++++---------
 7 files changed, 59 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-)

--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
@@ -864,7 +864,7 @@ struct kvm_x86_ops {
 	int (*hardware_setup)(void);               /* __init */
 	void (*hardware_unsetup)(void);            /* __exit */
 	bool (*cpu_has_accelerated_tpr)(void);
-	bool (*cpu_has_high_real_mode_segbase)(void);
+	bool (*has_emulated_msr)(int index);
 	void (*cpuid_update)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
 
 	int (*vm_init)(struct kvm *kvm);
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
@@ -735,7 +735,8 @@ static void init_speculation_control(str
 	if (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_INTEL_STIBP))
 		set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_STIBP);
 
-	if (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL_SSBD))
+	if (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL_SSBD) ||
+	    cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_VIRT_SSBD))
 		set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_SSBD);
 
 	if (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_AMD_IBRS)) {
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c
@@ -357,7 +357,7 @@ static inline int __do_cpuid_ent(struct
 
 	/* cpuid 0x80000008.ebx */
 	const u32 kvm_cpuid_8000_0008_ebx_x86_features =
-		F(AMD_IBPB) | F(AMD_IBRS);
+		F(AMD_IBPB) | F(AMD_IBRS) | F(VIRT_SSBD);
 
 	/* cpuid 0xC0000001.edx */
 	const u32 kvm_cpuid_C000_0001_edx_x86_features =
@@ -618,13 +618,20 @@ static inline int __do_cpuid_ent(struct
 			g_phys_as = phys_as;
 		entry->eax = g_phys_as | (virt_as << 8);
 		entry->edx = 0;
-		/* IBRS and IBPB aren't necessarily present in hardware cpuid */
+		/*
+		 * IBRS, IBPB and VIRT_SSBD aren't necessarily present in
+		 * hardware cpuid
+		 */
 		if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_AMD_IBPB))
 			entry->ebx |= F(AMD_IBPB);
 		if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_AMD_IBRS))
 			entry->ebx |= F(AMD_IBRS);
+		if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_VIRT_SSBD))
+			entry->ebx |= F(VIRT_SSBD);
 		entry->ebx &= kvm_cpuid_8000_0008_ebx_x86_features;
 		cpuid_mask(&entry->ebx, CPUID_8000_0008_EBX);
+		if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_LS_CFG_SSBD))
+			entry->ebx |= F(VIRT_SSBD);
 		break;
 	}
 	case 0x80000019:
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.h
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.h
@@ -190,6 +190,15 @@ static inline bool guest_cpuid_has_arch_
 	return best && (best->edx & bit(X86_FEATURE_ARCH_CAPABILITIES));
 }
 
+static inline bool guest_cpuid_has_virt_ssbd(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *best;
+
+	best = kvm_find_cpuid_entry(vcpu, 0x80000008, 0);
+	return best && (best->ebx & bit(X86_FEATURE_VIRT_SSBD));
+}
+
+
 
 /*
  * NRIPS is provided through cpuidfn 0x8000000a.edx bit 3
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c
@@ -3557,6 +3557,13 @@ static int svm_get_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *
 
 		msr_info->data = svm->spec_ctrl;
 		break;
+	case MSR_AMD64_VIRT_SPEC_CTRL:
+		if (!msr_info->host_initiated &&
+		    !guest_cpuid_has_virt_ssbd(vcpu))
+			return 1;
+
+		msr_info->data = svm->virt_spec_ctrl;
+		break;
 	case MSR_IA32_UCODE_REV:
 		msr_info->data = 0x01000065;
 		break;
@@ -3691,6 +3698,16 @@ static int svm_set_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *
 			break;
 		set_msr_interception(svm->msrpm, MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD, 0, 1);
 		break;
+	case MSR_AMD64_VIRT_SPEC_CTRL:
+		if (!msr->host_initiated &&
+		    !guest_cpuid_has_virt_ssbd(vcpu))
+			return 1;
+
+		if (data & ~SPEC_CTRL_SSBD)
+			return 1;
+
+		svm->virt_spec_ctrl = data;
+		break;
 	case MSR_STAR:
 		svm->vmcb->save.star = data;
 		break;
@@ -5150,7 +5167,7 @@ static bool svm_cpu_has_accelerated_tpr(
 	return false;
 }
 
-static bool svm_has_high_real_mode_segbase(void)
+static bool svm_has_emulated_msr(int index)
 {
 	return true;
 }
@@ -5467,7 +5484,7 @@ static struct kvm_x86_ops svm_x86_ops __
 	.hardware_enable = svm_hardware_enable,
 	.hardware_disable = svm_hardware_disable,
 	.cpu_has_accelerated_tpr = svm_cpu_has_accelerated_tpr,
-	.cpu_has_high_real_mode_segbase = svm_has_high_real_mode_segbase,
+	.has_emulated_msr = svm_has_emulated_msr,
 
 	.vcpu_create = svm_create_vcpu,
 	.vcpu_free = svm_free_vcpu,
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c
@@ -8691,9 +8691,21 @@ static void vmx_handle_external_intr(str
 	}
 }
 
-static bool vmx_has_high_real_mode_segbase(void)
+static bool vmx_has_emulated_msr(int index)
 {
-	return enable_unrestricted_guest || emulate_invalid_guest_state;
+	switch (index) {
+	case MSR_IA32_SMBASE:
+		/*
+		 * We cannot do SMM unless we can run the guest in big
+		 * real mode.
+		 */
+		return enable_unrestricted_guest || emulate_invalid_guest_state;
+	case MSR_AMD64_VIRT_SPEC_CTRL:
+		/* This is AMD only.  */
+		return false;
+	default:
+		return true;
+	}
 }
 
 static bool vmx_mpx_supported(void)
@@ -11346,7 +11358,7 @@ static struct kvm_x86_ops vmx_x86_ops __
 	.hardware_enable = hardware_enable,
 	.hardware_disable = hardware_disable,
 	.cpu_has_accelerated_tpr = report_flexpriority,
-	.cpu_has_high_real_mode_segbase = vmx_has_high_real_mode_segbase,
+	.has_emulated_msr = vmx_has_emulated_msr,
 
 	.vcpu_create = vmx_create_vcpu,
 	.vcpu_free = vmx_free_vcpu,
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
@@ -1002,6 +1002,7 @@ static u32 emulated_msrs[] = {
 	MSR_IA32_MCG_CTL,
 	MSR_IA32_MCG_EXT_CTL,
 	MSR_IA32_SMBASE,
+	MSR_AMD64_VIRT_SPEC_CTRL,
 };
 
 static unsigned num_emulated_msrs;
@@ -2664,7 +2665,7 @@ int kvm_vm_ioctl_check_extension(struct
 		 * fringe case that is not enabled except via specific settings
 		 * of the module parameters.
 		 */
-		r = kvm_x86_ops->cpu_has_high_real_mode_segbase();
+		r = kvm_x86_ops->has_emulated_msr(MSR_IA32_SMBASE);
 		break;
 	case KVM_CAP_COALESCED_MMIO:
 		r = KVM_COALESCED_MMIO_PAGE_OFFSET;
@@ -4226,14 +4227,8 @@ static void kvm_init_msr_list(void)
 	num_msrs_to_save = j;
 
 	for (i = j = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(emulated_msrs); i++) {
-		switch (emulated_msrs[i]) {
-		case MSR_IA32_SMBASE:
-			if (!kvm_x86_ops->cpu_has_high_real_mode_segbase())
-				continue;
-			break;
-		default:
-			break;
-		}
+		if (!kvm_x86_ops->has_emulated_msr(emulated_msrs[i]))
+			continue;
 
 		if (j < i)
 			emulated_msrs[j] = emulated_msrs[i];

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 92+ messages in thread

* [PATCH 4.9 87/87] x86/bugs: Rename SSBD_NO to SSB_NO
  2018-05-21 21:10 [PATCH 4.9 00/87] 4.9.102-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (85 preceding siblings ...)
  2018-05-21 21:12 ` [PATCH 4.9 86/87] KVM: SVM: Implement VIRT_SPEC_CTRL support for SSBD Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2018-05-21 21:12 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
  2018-05-22  4:46 ` [PATCH 4.9 00/87] 4.9.102-stable review kernelci.org bot
                   ` (3 subsequent siblings)
  90 siblings, 0 replies; 92+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2018-05-21 21:12 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-kernel
  Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk,
	Thomas Gleixner, David Woodhouse

4.9-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>

commit 240da953fcc6a9008c92fae5b1f727ee5ed167ab upstream

The "336996 Speculative Execution Side Channel Mitigations" from
May defines this as SSB_NO, hence lets sync-up.

Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h |    2 +-
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c     |    2 +-
 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
@@ -63,7 +63,7 @@
 #define MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES	0x0000010a
 #define ARCH_CAP_RDCL_NO		(1 << 0)   /* Not susceptible to Meltdown */
 #define ARCH_CAP_IBRS_ALL		(1 << 1)   /* Enhanced IBRS support */
-#define ARCH_CAP_SSBD_NO		(1 << 4)   /*
+#define ARCH_CAP_SSB_NO			(1 << 4)   /*
 						    * Not susceptible to Speculative Store Bypass
 						    * attack, so no Speculative Store Bypass
 						    * control required.
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
@@ -926,7 +926,7 @@ static void __init cpu_set_bug_bits(stru
 		rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES, ia32_cap);
 
 	if (!x86_match_cpu(cpu_no_spec_store_bypass) &&
-	   !(ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_SSBD_NO))
+	   !(ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_SSB_NO))
 		setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS);
 
 	if (x86_match_cpu(cpu_no_speculation))

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 92+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH 4.9 00/87] 4.9.102-stable review
  2018-05-21 21:10 [PATCH 4.9 00/87] 4.9.102-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (86 preceding siblings ...)
  2018-05-21 21:12 ` [PATCH 4.9 87/87] x86/bugs: Rename SSBD_NO to SSB_NO Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2018-05-22  4:46 ` kernelci.org bot
  2018-05-22 11:08 ` Naresh Kamboju
                   ` (2 subsequent siblings)
  90 siblings, 0 replies; 92+ messages in thread
From: kernelci.org bot @ 2018-05-22  4:46 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Greg Kroah-Hartman, linux-kernel
  Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, torvalds, akpm, linux, shuah, patches,
	ben.hutchings, lkft-triage, stable

stable-rc/linux-4.9.y boot: 108 boots: 0 failed, 103 passed with 5 offline (v4.9.101-88-gc41014362085)

Full Boot Summary: https://kernelci.org/boot/all/job/stable-rc/branch/linux-4.9.y/kernel/v4.9.101-88-gc41014362085/
Full Build Summary: https://kernelci.org/build/stable-rc/branch/linux-4.9.y/kernel/v4.9.101-88-gc41014362085/

Tree: stable-rc
Branch: linux-4.9.y
Git Describe: v4.9.101-88-gc41014362085
Git Commit: c410143620854fe106977e99aec1b73e1bd0a3f5
Git URL: http://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git
Tested: 53 unique boards, 22 SoC families, 18 builds out of 183

Offline Platforms:

arm:

    tegra_defconfig:
        tegra30-beaver: 1 offline lab

    multi_v7_defconfig:
        armada-xp-openblocks-ax3-4: 1 offline lab
        tegra30-beaver: 1 offline lab
        zynq-zc702: 1 offline lab

    mvebu_v7_defconfig:
        armada-xp-openblocks-ax3-4: 1 offline lab

---
For more info write to <info@kernelci.org>

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 92+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH 4.9 00/87] 4.9.102-stable review
  2018-05-21 21:10 [PATCH 4.9 00/87] 4.9.102-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (87 preceding siblings ...)
  2018-05-22  4:46 ` [PATCH 4.9 00/87] 4.9.102-stable review kernelci.org bot
@ 2018-05-22 11:08 ` Naresh Kamboju
  2018-05-22 13:28 ` Guenter Roeck
  2018-05-22 20:41 ` Shuah Khan
  90 siblings, 0 replies; 92+ messages in thread
From: Naresh Kamboju @ 2018-05-22 11:08 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Greg Kroah-Hartman
  Cc: open list, Linus Torvalds, Andrew Morton, Guenter Roeck,
	Shuah Khan, patches, Ben Hutchings, lkft-triage, linux- stable

On 22 May 2018 at 02:40, Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
> This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 4.9.102 release.
> There are 87 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response
> to this one.  If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please
> let me know.
>
> Responses should be made by Tue May 22 21:03:57 UTC 2018.
> Anything received after that time might be too late.
>
> The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:
>         https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v4.x/stable-review/patch-4.9.102-rc1.gz
> or in the git tree and branch at:
>         git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git linux-4.9.y
> and the diffstat can be found below.
>
> thanks,
>
> greg k-h


Results from Linaro’s test farm.
No regressions on arm64, arm and x86_64.

NOTE:
kselftest rtnetlink.sh test case failed on all device.
Which is not a regression which used to SKIP pass and now run and fail.
Bug reported to investigate,
https://bugs.linaro.org/show_bug.cgi?id=3834

Summary
------------------------------------------------------------------------

kernel: 4.9.102-rc1
git repo: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git
git branch: linux-4.9.y
git commit: c410143620854fe106977e99aec1b73e1bd0a3f5
git describe: v4.9.101-88-gc41014362085
Test details: https://qa-reports.linaro.org/lkft/linux-stable-rc-4.9-oe/build/v4.9.101-88-gc41014362085

No regressions (compared to build v4.9.101-35-g336a062e8ff5)
------------------------------------------------------------------------

Boards, architectures and test suites:
-------------------------------------
dragonboard-410c
* boot - pass: 21,
* kselftest - pass: 35, fail: 1, skip: 32
* libhugetlbfs - pass: 90, skip: 1
* ltp-cap_bounds-tests - pass: 2,
* ltp-containers-tests - pass: 64, skip: 17
* ltp-fcntl-locktests-tests - pass: 4,
* ltp-filecaps-tests - pass: 2,
* ltp-fs-tests - pass: 57, skip: 6
* ltp-fs_bind-tests - pass: 2,
* ltp-fs_perms_simple-tests - pass: 19,
* ltp-fsx-tests - pass: 2,
* ltp-hugetlb-tests - pass: 21, skip: 1
* ltp-io-tests - pass: 3,
* ltp-ipc-tests - pass: 9,
* ltp-math-tests - pass: 11,
* ltp-nptl-tests - pass: 2,
* ltp-pty-tests - pass: 4,
* ltp-sched-tests - pass: 14,
* ltp-securebits-tests - pass: 4,
* ltp-syscalls-tests - pass: 1015, skip: 135
* ltp-timers-tests - pass: 13,

hi6220-hikey - arm64
* boot - pass: 20,
* kselftest - pass: 34, fail: 1, skip: 29
* libhugetlbfs - pass: 90, skip: 1
* ltp-cap_bounds-tests - pass: 2,
* ltp-containers-tests - pass: 64, skip: 17
* ltp-fcntl-locktests-tests - pass: 2,
* ltp-filecaps-tests - pass: 2,
* ltp-fs-tests - pass: 57, skip: 6
* ltp-fs_bind-tests - pass: 2,
* ltp-fs_perms_simple-tests - pass: 19,
* ltp-fsx-tests - pass: 2,
* ltp-hugetlb-tests - pass: 21, skip: 1
* ltp-io-tests - pass: 3,
* ltp-ipc-tests - pass: 9,
* ltp-math-tests - pass: 11,
* ltp-nptl-tests - pass: 2,
* ltp-pty-tests - pass: 4,
* ltp-sched-tests - pass: 10, skip: 4
* ltp-securebits-tests - pass: 4,
* ltp-syscalls-tests - pass: 1014, skip: 136
* ltp-timers-tests - pass: 13,

juno-r2 - arm64
* boot - pass: 22,
* kselftest - pass: 35, fail: 1, skip: 28
* libhugetlbfs - pass: 90, skip: 1
* ltp-cap_bounds-tests - pass: 2,
* ltp-containers-tests - pass: 64, skip: 17
* ltp-fcntl-locktests-tests - pass: 2,
* ltp-filecaps-tests - pass: 2,
* ltp-fs-tests - pass: 114, skip: 12
* ltp-fs_bind-tests - pass: 2,
* ltp-fs_perms_simple-tests - pass: 19,
* ltp-fsx-tests - pass: 2,
* ltp-hugetlb-tests - pass: 22,
* ltp-io-tests - pass: 3,
* ltp-ipc-tests - pass: 9,
* ltp-math-tests - pass: 11,
* ltp-nptl-tests - pass: 2,
* ltp-pty-tests - pass: 4,
* ltp-sched-tests - pass: 10, skip: 4
* ltp-securebits-tests - pass: 4,
* ltp-syscalls-tests - pass: 1015, skip: 135
* ltp-timers-tests - pass: 13,

qemu_arm
* boot - pass: 20,
* kselftest - pass: 35, fail: 1, skip: 32
* libhugetlbfs - pass: 1,
* ltp-cap_bounds-tests - pass: 2,
* ltp-containers-tests - pass: 63, skip: 18
* ltp-fcntl-locktests-tests - pass: 2,
* ltp-filecaps-tests - pass: 2,
* ltp-fs-tests - pass: 58, skip: 5
* ltp-fs_bind-tests - pass: 2,
* ltp-fs_perms_simple-tests - pass: 19,
* ltp-fsx-tests - pass: 2,
* ltp-hugetlb-tests - pass: 21, skip: 1
* ltp-io-tests - pass: 3,
* ltp-ipc-tests - pass: 9,
* ltp-math-tests - pass: 11,
* ltp-nptl-tests - pass: 2,
* ltp-pty-tests - pass: 4,
* ltp-sched-tests - pass: 7, skip: 7
* ltp-securebits-tests - pass: 4,
* ltp-syscalls-tests - pass: 1056, fail: 2, skip: 92
* ltp-timers-tests - pass: 13,

qemu_arm64
* boot - pass: 20,
* kselftest - pass: 36, fail: 1, skip: 33
* libhugetlbfs - pass: 90, skip: 1
* ltp-cap_bounds-tests - pass: 2,
* ltp-containers-tests - pass: 64, skip: 17
* ltp-fcntl-locktests-tests - pass: 2,
* ltp-filecaps-tests - pass: 2,
* ltp-fs-tests - pass: 57, skip: 6
* ltp-fs_bind-tests - pass: 2,
* ltp-fs_perms_simple-tests - pass: 19,
* ltp-fsx-tests - pass: 2,
* ltp-hugetlb-tests - pass: 22,
* ltp-io-tests - pass: 3,
* ltp-ipc-tests - pass: 9,
* ltp-math-tests - pass: 11,
* ltp-nptl-tests - pass: 2,
* ltp-pty-tests - pass: 4,
* ltp-sched-tests - pass: 8, skip: 6
* ltp-securebits-tests - pass: 4,
* ltp-syscalls-tests - pass: 991, fail: 2, skip: 157
* ltp-timers-tests - pass: 13,

qemu_x86_64
* boot - pass: 20,
* kselftest - pass: 48, fail: 1, skip: 33
* libhugetlbfs - pass: 90, skip: 1
* ltp-cap_bounds-tests - pass: 2,
* ltp-containers-tests - pass: 64, skip: 17
* ltp-fcntl-locktests-tests - pass: 2,
* ltp-filecaps-tests - pass: 2,
* ltp-fs-tests - pass: 57, skip: 6
* ltp-fs_bind-tests - pass: 2,
* ltp-fs_perms_simple-tests - pass: 19,
* ltp-fsx-tests - pass: 2,
* ltp-hugetlb-tests - pass: 22,
* ltp-io-tests - pass: 3,
* ltp-ipc-tests - pass: 9,
* ltp-math-tests - pass: 11,
* ltp-nptl-tests - pass: 2,
* ltp-pty-tests - pass: 4,
* ltp-sched-tests - pass: 13, skip: 1
* ltp-securebits-tests - pass: 4,
* ltp-syscalls-tests - pass: 998, skip: 152
* ltp-timers-tests - pass: 13,

x15 - arm
* boot - pass: 20,
* kselftest - pass: 34, fail: 1, skip: 29
* libhugetlbfs - pass: 87, skip: 1
* ltp-cap_bounds-tests - pass: 2,
* ltp-containers-tests - pass: 63, skip: 18
* ltp-fcntl-locktests-tests - pass: 2,
* ltp-filecaps-tests - pass: 2,
* ltp-fs-tests - pass: 58, skip: 5
* ltp-fs_bind-tests - pass: 2,
* ltp-fs_perms_simple-tests - pass: 19,
* ltp-fsx-tests - pass: 2,
* ltp-hugetlb-tests - pass: 20, skip: 2
* ltp-io-tests - pass: 3,
* ltp-ipc-tests - pass: 9,
* ltp-math-tests - pass: 11,
* ltp-nptl-tests - pass: 2,
* ltp-pty-tests - pass: 4,
* ltp-sched-tests - pass: 13, skip: 1
* ltp-securebits-tests - pass: 4,
* ltp-syscalls-tests - pass: 1075, skip: 75
* ltp-timers-tests - pass: 13,

x86_64
* boot - pass: 22,
* kselftest - pass: 51, fail: 1, skip: 30
* kselftest-vsyscall-mode-native - pass: 50, fail: 2, skip: 30
* kselftest-vsyscall-mode-none - pass: 51, fail: 1, skip: 30
* libhugetlbfs - pass: 90, skip: 1
* ltp-cap_bounds-tests - pass: 2,
* ltp-containers-tests - pass: 64, skip: 17
* ltp-fcntl-locktests-tests - pass: 2,
* ltp-filecaps-tests - pass: 2,
* ltp-fs-tests - pass: 58, skip: 5
* ltp-fs_bind-tests - pass: 2,
* ltp-fs_perms_simple-tests - pass: 19,
* ltp-fsx-tests - pass: 2,
* ltp-hugetlb-tests - pass: 22,
* ltp-io-tests - pass: 3,
* ltp-ipc-tests - pass: 9,
* ltp-math-tests - pass: 11,
* ltp-nptl-tests - pass: 2,
* ltp-pty-tests - pass: 4,
* ltp-sched-tests - pass: 9, skip: 5
* ltp-securebits-tests - pass: 4,
* ltp-syscalls-tests - pass: 1034, skip: 116
* ltp-timers-tests - pass: 13,

-- 
Linaro QA (BETA)
https://qa-reports.linaro.org

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 92+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH 4.9 00/87] 4.9.102-stable review
  2018-05-21 21:10 [PATCH 4.9 00/87] 4.9.102-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (88 preceding siblings ...)
  2018-05-22 11:08 ` Naresh Kamboju
@ 2018-05-22 13:28 ` Guenter Roeck
  2018-05-22 20:41 ` Shuah Khan
  90 siblings, 0 replies; 92+ messages in thread
From: Guenter Roeck @ 2018-05-22 13:28 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Greg Kroah-Hartman, linux-kernel
  Cc: torvalds, akpm, shuah, patches, ben.hutchings, lkft-triage, stable

On 05/21/2018 02:10 PM, Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote:
> This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 4.9.102 release.
> There are 87 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response
> to this one.  If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please
> let me know.
> 
> Responses should be made by Tue May 22 21:03:57 UTC 2018.
> Anything received after that time might be too late.
> 

Build results:
	total: 146 pass: 146 fail: 0
Qemu test results:
	total: 137 pass: 137 fail: 0

Details are available at http://kerneltests.org/builders/.

Guenter

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 92+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH 4.9 00/87] 4.9.102-stable review
  2018-05-21 21:10 [PATCH 4.9 00/87] 4.9.102-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (89 preceding siblings ...)
  2018-05-22 13:28 ` Guenter Roeck
@ 2018-05-22 20:41 ` Shuah Khan
  90 siblings, 0 replies; 92+ messages in thread
From: Shuah Khan @ 2018-05-22 20:41 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Greg Kroah-Hartman, linux-kernel
  Cc: torvalds, akpm, linux, patches, ben.hutchings, lkft-triage,
	stable, Shuah Khan

On 05/21/2018 03:10 PM, Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote:
> This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 4.9.102 release.
> There are 87 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response
> to this one.  If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please
> let me know.
> 
> Responses should be made by Tue May 22 21:03:57 UTC 2018.
> Anything received after that time might be too late.
> 
> The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:
> 	https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v4.x/stable-review/patch-4.9.102-rc1.gz
> or in the git tree and branch at:
> 	git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git linux-4.9.y
> and the diffstat can be found below.
> 
> thanks,
> 
> greg k-h
> 

Compiled and booted on my test system. No dmesg regressions.

thanks,
-- Shuah

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 92+ messages in thread

end of thread, other threads:[~2018-05-22 20:41 UTC | newest]

Thread overview: 92+ messages (download: mbox.gz / follow: Atom feed)
-- links below jump to the message on this page --
2018-05-21 21:10 [PATCH 4.9 00/87] 4.9.102-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:10 ` [PATCH 4.9 01/87] usbip: usbip_host: refine probe and disconnect debug msgs to be useful Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:10 ` [PATCH 4.9 02/87] usbip: usbip_host: delete device from busid_table after rebind Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:10 ` [PATCH 4.9 03/87] usbip: usbip_host: run rebind from exit when module is removed Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:10 ` [PATCH 4.9 04/87] usbip: usbip_host: fix NULL-ptr deref and use-after-free errors Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:10 ` [PATCH 4.9 05/87] usbip: usbip_host: fix bad unlock balance during stub_probe() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:10 ` [PATCH 4.9 06/87] ALSA: usb: mixer: volume quirk for CM102-A+/102S+ Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:10 ` [PATCH 4.9 07/87] ALSA: hda: Add Lenovo C50 All in one to the power_save blacklist Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:10 ` [PATCH 4.9 08/87] ALSA: control: fix a redundant-copy issue Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:10 ` [PATCH 4.9 09/87] spi: pxa2xx: Allow 64-bit DMA Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:10 ` [PATCH 4.9 10/87] spi: bcm-qspi: Avoid setting MSPI_CDRAM_PCS for spi-nor master Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:10 ` [PATCH 4.9 11/87] spi: bcm-qspi: Always read and set BSPI_MAST_N_BOOT_CTRL Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:10 ` [PATCH 4.9 12/87] KVM: arm/arm64: VGIC/ITS: protect kvm_read_guest() calls with SRCU lock Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:10 ` [PATCH 4.9 13/87] powerpc: Dont preempt_disable() in show_cpuinfo() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:10 ` [PATCH 4.9 14/87] signals: avoid unnecessary taking of sighand->siglock Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:10 ` [PATCH 4.9 15/87] tracing/x86/xen: Remove zero data size trace events trace_xen_mmu_flush_tlb{_all} Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:10 ` [PATCH 4.9 16/87] netfilter: nf_tables: cant fail after linking rule into active rule list Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:10 ` [PATCH 4.9 17/87] i2c: designware: fix poll-after-enable regression Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:10 ` [PATCH 4.9 18/87] powerpc/powernv: Fix NVRAM sleep in invalid context when crashing Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:10 ` [PATCH 4.9 19/87] mm: dont allow deferred pages with NEED_PER_CPU_KM Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:10 ` [PATCH 4.9 20/87] s390/qdio: fix access to uninitialized qdio_q fields Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:10 ` [PATCH 4.9 21/87] s390/cpum_sf: ensure sample frequency of perf event attributes is non-zero Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:10 ` [PATCH 4.9 22/87] s390/qdio: dont release memory in qdio_setup_irq() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:10 ` [PATCH 4.9 23/87] s390: remove indirect branch from do_softirq_own_stack Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.9 24/87] x86/pkeys: Override pkey when moving away from PROT_EXEC Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.9 25/87] x86/pkeys: Do not special case protection key 0 Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.9 26/87] efi: Avoid potential crashes, fix the struct efi_pci_io_protocol_32 definition for mixed mode Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.9 27/87] ARM: 8771/1: kprobes: Prohibit kprobes on do_undefinstr Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.9 28/87] tick/broadcast: Use for_each_cpu() specially on UP kernels Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.9 29/87] ARM: 8769/1: kprobes: Fix to use get_kprobe_ctlblk after irq-disabed Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.9 30/87] ARM: 8770/1: kprobes: Prohibit probing on optimized_callback Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.9 31/87] ARM: 8772/1: kprobes: Prohibit kprobes on get_user functions Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.9 32/87] Btrfs: fix xattr loss after power failure Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.9 33/87] btrfs: fix crash when trying to resume balance without the resume flag Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.9 34/87] x86/amd: dont set X86_BUG_SYSRET_SS_ATTRS when running under Xen Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.9 35/87] btrfs: fix reading stale metadata blocks after degraded raid1 mounts Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.9 36/87] x86/nospec: Simplify alternative_msr_write() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.9 37/87] x86/bugs: Concentrate bug detection into a separate function Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.9 38/87] x86/bugs: Concentrate bug reporting " Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.9 39/87] x86/bugs: Read SPEC_CTRL MSR during boot and re-use reserved bits Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.9 40/87] x86/bugs, KVM: Support the combination of guest and host IBRS Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.9 41/87] x86/bugs: Expose /sys/../spec_store_bypass Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.9 42/87] x86/cpufeatures: Add X86_FEATURE_RDS Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.9 43/87] x86/bugs: Provide boot parameters for the spec_store_bypass_disable mitigation Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.9 44/87] x86/bugs/intel: Set proper CPU features and setup RDS Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.9 45/87] x86/bugs: Whitelist allowed SPEC_CTRL MSR values Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.9 46/87] x86/bugs/AMD: Add support to disable RDS on Fam[15,16,17]h if requested Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.9 47/87] x86/KVM/VMX: Expose SPEC_CTRL Bit(2) to the guest Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.9 48/87] x86/speculation: Create spec-ctrl.h to avoid include hell Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.9 49/87] prctl: Add speculation control prctls Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.9 50/87] x86/process: Optimize TIF checks in __switch_to_xtra() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.9 51/87] x86/process: Correct and optimize TIF_BLOCKSTEP switch Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.9 52/87] x86/process: Optimize TIF_NOTSC switch Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.9 53/87] x86/process: Allow runtime control of Speculative Store Bypass Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.9 54/87] x86/speculation: Add prctl for Speculative Store Bypass mitigation Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.9 55/87] nospec: Allow getting/setting on non-current task Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.9 56/87] proc: Provide details on speculation flaw mitigations Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.9 57/87] seccomp: Enable " Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.9 58/87] x86/bugs: Make boot modes __ro_after_init Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.9 59/87] prctl: Add force disable speculation Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.9 60/87] seccomp: Use PR_SPEC_FORCE_DISABLE Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.9 61/87] seccomp: Add filter flag to opt-out of SSB mitigation Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.9 62/87] seccomp: Move speculation migitation control to arch code Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.9 63/87] x86/speculation: Make "seccomp" the default mode for Speculative Store Bypass Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.9 64/87] x86/bugs: Rename _RDS to _SSBD Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.9 65/87] proc: Use underscores for SSBD in status Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.9 66/87] Documentation/spec_ctrl: Do some minor cleanups Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.9 67/87] x86/bugs: Fix __ssb_select_mitigation() return type Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.9 68/87] x86/bugs: Make cpu_show_common() static Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.9 69/87] x86/bugs: Fix the parameters alignment and missing void Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.9 70/87] x86/cpu: Make alternative_msr_write work for 32-bit code Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.9 71/87] KVM: SVM: Move spec control call after restore of GS Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.9 72/87] x86/speculation: Use synthetic bits for IBRS/IBPB/STIBP Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.9 73/87] x86/cpufeatures: Disentangle MSR_SPEC_CTRL enumeration from IBRS Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.9 74/87] x86/cpufeatures: Disentangle SSBD enumeration Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.9 75/87] x86/cpu/AMD: Fix erratum 1076 (CPB bit) Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.9 76/87] x86/cpufeatures: Add FEATURE_ZEN Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.9 77/87] x86/speculation: Handle HT correctly on AMD Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.9 78/87] x86/bugs, KVM: Extend speculation control for VIRT_SPEC_CTRL Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.9 79/87] x86/speculation: Add virtualized speculative store bypass disable support Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.9 80/87] x86/speculation: Rework speculative_store_bypass_update() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.9 81/87] x86/bugs: Unify x86_spec_ctrl_{set_guest,restore_host} Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.9 82/87] x86/bugs: Expose x86_spec_ctrl_base directly Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:11 ` [PATCH 4.9 83/87] x86/bugs: Remove x86_spec_ctrl_set() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:12 ` [PATCH 4.9 84/87] x86/bugs: Rework spec_ctrl base and mask logic Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:12 ` [PATCH 4.9 85/87] x86/speculation, KVM: Implement support for VIRT_SPEC_CTRL/LS_CFG Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:12 ` [PATCH 4.9 86/87] KVM: SVM: Implement VIRT_SPEC_CTRL support for SSBD Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-21 21:12 ` [PATCH 4.9 87/87] x86/bugs: Rename SSBD_NO to SSB_NO Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-05-22  4:46 ` [PATCH 4.9 00/87] 4.9.102-stable review kernelci.org bot
2018-05-22 11:08 ` Naresh Kamboju
2018-05-22 13:28 ` Guenter Roeck
2018-05-22 20:41 ` Shuah Khan

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