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From: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
To: Jiri Kosina <jikos@kernel.org>, Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>,
Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>,
Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>,
David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>,
Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>,
Casey Schaufler <casey.schaufler@intel.com>,
Asit Mallick <asit.k.mallick@intel.com>,
Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>,
Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com>,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org
Subject: [Patch v3 06/13] mm: Pass task instead of task->mm as argument to set_dumpable
Date: Wed, 17 Oct 2018 10:59:34 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <c793fcd092063a68f1de7ce982df2ebb347a3542.1539798901.git.tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <cover.1539798901.git.tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
In-Reply-To: <cover.1539798901.git.tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
Change the argument to set_dumpable from task->mm to task. This allows us
to later add hooks to modify a task's property according to whether it is
a non-dumpable task. Non dumpable tasks demand a higher level of security.
Changes the dumpable value from in to unsigned int as negative number is
not allowed.
Signed-off-by: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
---
fs/exec.c | 14 ++++++++------
include/linux/sched/coredump.h | 2 +-
kernel/cred.c | 2 +-
kernel/sys.c | 2 +-
4 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
diff --git a/fs/exec.c b/fs/exec.c
index 1ebf6e5..e204830 100644
--- a/fs/exec.c
+++ b/fs/exec.c
@@ -1362,9 +1362,9 @@ void setup_new_exec(struct linux_binprm * bprm)
if (bprm->interp_flags & BINPRM_FLAGS_ENFORCE_NONDUMP ||
!(uid_eq(current_euid(), current_uid()) &&
gid_eq(current_egid(), current_gid())))
- set_dumpable(current->mm, suid_dumpable);
+ set_dumpable(current, (unsigned int) suid_dumpable);
else
- set_dumpable(current->mm, SUID_DUMP_USER);
+ set_dumpable(current, SUID_DUMP_USER);
arch_setup_new_exec();
perf_event_exec();
@@ -1943,17 +1943,19 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(set_binfmt);
/*
* set_dumpable stores three-value SUID_DUMP_* into mm->flags.
*/
-void set_dumpable(struct mm_struct *mm, int value)
+void set_dumpable(struct task_struct *tsk, unsigned int value)
{
unsigned long old, new;
- if (WARN_ON((unsigned)value > SUID_DUMP_ROOT))
+ if (WARN_ON(value > SUID_DUMP_ROOT))
+ return;
+ if (WARN_ON(!tsk->mm))
return;
do {
- old = READ_ONCE(mm->flags);
+ old = READ_ONCE(tsk->mm->flags);
new = (old & ~MMF_DUMPABLE_MASK) | value;
- } while (cmpxchg(&mm->flags, old, new) != old);
+ } while (cmpxchg(&tsk->mm->flags, old, new) != old);
}
SYSCALL_DEFINE3(execve,
diff --git a/include/linux/sched/coredump.h b/include/linux/sched/coredump.h
index ec912d0..c02b1ab 100644
--- a/include/linux/sched/coredump.h
+++ b/include/linux/sched/coredump.h
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@
#define MMF_DUMPABLE_BITS 2
#define MMF_DUMPABLE_MASK ((1 << MMF_DUMPABLE_BITS) - 1)
-extern void set_dumpable(struct mm_struct *mm, int value);
+extern void set_dumpable(struct task_struct *tsk, unsigned int value);
/*
* This returns the actual value of the suid_dumpable flag. For things
* that are using this for checking for privilege transitions, it must
diff --git a/kernel/cred.c b/kernel/cred.c
index ecf0365..18ef774 100644
--- a/kernel/cred.c
+++ b/kernel/cred.c
@@ -446,7 +446,7 @@ int commit_creds(struct cred *new)
!gid_eq(old->fsgid, new->fsgid) ||
!cred_cap_issubset(old, new)) {
if (task->mm)
- set_dumpable(task->mm, suid_dumpable);
+ set_dumpable(task, (unsigned int) suid_dumpable);
task->pdeath_signal = 0;
smp_wmb();
}
diff --git a/kernel/sys.c b/kernel/sys.c
index cf5c675..d0892cd 100644
--- a/kernel/sys.c
+++ b/kernel/sys.c
@@ -2292,7 +2292,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(prctl, int, option, unsigned long, arg2, unsigned long, arg3,
error = -EINVAL;
break;
}
- set_dumpable(me->mm, arg2);
+ set_dumpable(me, (unsigned int) arg2);
break;
case PR_SET_UNALIGN:
--
2.9.4
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2018-10-17 18:33 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 47+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2018-10-17 17:59 [Patch v3 00/13] Provide process property based options to enable Spectre v2 userspace-userspace protection Tim Chen
2018-10-17 17:59 ` [Patch v3 01/13] x86/speculation: Clean up spectre_v2_parse_cmdline Tim Chen
2018-10-18 12:43 ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-10-17 17:59 ` [Patch v3 02/13] x86/speculation: Remove unnecessary ret variable in cpu_show_common Tim Chen
2018-10-18 12:46 ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-10-17 17:59 ` [Patch v3 03/13] x86/speculation: Add static key for Enhanced IBRS Tim Chen
2018-10-18 12:50 ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-10-26 16:58 ` Waiman Long
2018-10-26 18:15 ` Tim Chen
2018-10-28 9:32 ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-10-17 17:59 ` [Patch v3 04/13] x86/speculation: Disable STIBP when enhanced IBRS is in use Tim Chen
2018-10-18 12:58 ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-10-26 17:00 ` Waiman Long
2018-10-26 18:18 ` Tim Chen
2018-10-26 18:29 ` Tim Chen
2018-10-17 17:59 ` [Patch v3 05/13] x86/smt: Create cpu_smt_enabled static key for SMT specific code Tim Chen
2018-10-18 13:03 ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-10-19 7:51 ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-10-17 17:59 ` Tim Chen [this message]
2018-10-18 13:22 ` [Patch v3 06/13] mm: Pass task instead of task->mm as argument to set_dumpable Thomas Gleixner
2018-10-19 20:02 ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-10-17 17:59 ` [Patch v3 07/13] x86/process Add arch_set_dumpable Tim Chen
2018-10-18 13:28 ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-10-18 18:46 ` Tim Chen
2018-10-19 19:12 ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-10-19 20:16 ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-10-22 23:55 ` Tim Chen
2018-10-17 17:59 ` [Patch v3 08/13] x86/speculation: Rename SSBD update functions Tim Chen
2018-10-18 13:37 ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-10-17 17:59 ` [Patch v3 09/13] x86/speculation: Reorganize SPEC_CTRL MSR update Tim Chen
2018-10-18 13:47 ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-10-26 17:21 ` Waiman Long
2018-10-26 18:25 ` Tim Chen
2018-10-17 17:59 ` [Patch v3 10/13] x86/speculation: Add per thread STIBP flag Tim Chen
2018-10-18 13:53 ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-10-17 17:59 ` [Patch v3 11/13] x86/speculation: Add Spectre v2 lite app to app protection mode Tim Chen
2018-10-18 15:12 ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-10-17 17:59 ` [Patch v3 12/13] x86/speculation: Protect non-dumpable processes against Spectre v2 attack Tim Chen
2018-10-18 15:17 ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-10-26 17:46 ` Waiman Long
2018-10-26 18:10 ` Tim Chen
2018-10-17 17:59 ` [Patch v3 13/13] x86/speculation: Create PRCTL interface to restrict indirect branch speculation Tim Chen
2018-10-17 19:12 ` Randy Dunlap
2018-10-18 15:31 ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-10-19 7:57 ` [Patch v3 00/13] Provide process property based options to enable Spectre v2 userspace-userspace protection Peter Zijlstra
2018-10-19 16:43 ` Tim Chen
2018-10-19 18:38 ` Peter Zijlstra
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