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From: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
To: Eric Snowberg <eric.snowberg@oracle.com>,
	Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>,
	David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: keyrings@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-integrity <linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org>,
	David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>,
	Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>,
	"David S . Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>,
	James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>,
	"Serge E . Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>,
	keescook@chromium.org, gregkh@linuxfoundation.org,
	torvalds@linux-foundation.org, scott.branden@broadcom.com,
	weiyongjun1@huawei.com, nayna@linux.ibm.com, ebiggers@google.com,
	ardb@kernel.org,
	Lakshmi Ramasubramanian <nramas@linux.microsoft.com>,
	lszubowi@redhat.com, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
	James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com>,
	pjones@redhat.com,
	"konrad.wilk@oracle.com" <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>,
	Patrick Uiterwijk <patrick@puiterwijk.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v4 00/12] Enroll kernel keys thru MOK
Date: Thu, 19 Aug 2021 13:32:34 -0400	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <e7e251000432cf7c475e19c56b0f438b92fec16e.camel@linux.ibm.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <91B1FE51-C6FC-4ADF-B05A-B1E59E20132E@oracle.com>

On Thu, 2021-08-19 at 09:23 -0600, Eric Snowberg wrote:
> > On Aug 19, 2021, at 7:10 AM, Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> wrote:
> > 
> > On Thu, 2021-08-19 at 14:38 +0300, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
> >> On Wed, 2021-08-18 at 20:20 -0400, Eric Snowberg wrote:
> >>> Downstream Linux distros try to have a single signed kernel for each
> >>> architecture.  Each end-user may use this kernel in entirely different
> >>> ways.  Some downstream kernels have chosen to always trust platform keys
> >>> within the Linux trust boundary for kernel module signing.  These
> >>> kernels have no way of using digital signature base IMA appraisal.
> >>> 
> >>> This series introduces a new Linux kernel keyring containing the Machine
> >>> Owner Keys (MOK) called .mok. It also adds a new MOK variable to shim.
> >> 
> >> I would name it as ".machine" because it is more "re-usable" name, e.g.
> >> could be used for similar things as MOK. ".mok" is a bad name because
> >> it binds directly to a single piece of user space software.
> > 
> > Nayna previously said,
> >   "I believe the underlying source from where CA keys are loaded might vary 
> >   based on the architecture (".mok" is UEFI specific.). The key part is 
> >   that this new keyring should contain only CA keys which can be later 
> >   used to vouch for user keys loaded onto IMA or secondary keyring at 
> >   runtime. It would be good to have a "ca" in the name, like .xxxx-ca, 
> >   where xxxx can be machine, owner, or system. I prefer .system-ca."
> > 
> > The CA keys on the MOK db is simply the first root of trust being
> > defined, but other roots of trust are sure to follow.  For this reason,
> > I agree naming the new keyring "mok" should be avoided.
> 
> As I said previously, I’m open to renaming, I just would like to have an 
> agreement on the new name before changing everything.  The current proposed 
> names I have heard are “.machine" and ".system-ca".  Is there a preference 
> the maintainers feel is appropriate?  If so, please let me know and I’ll 
> rename it. Thanks.
> 

Jarkko, I think the emphasis should not be on "machine" from Machine
Owner Key (MOK), but on "owner".  Whereas Nayna is focusing more on the
"_ca" aspect of the name.   Perhaps consider naming it
"system_owner_ca" or something along those lines.

thanks,

Mimi



  reply	other threads:[~2021-08-19 17:33 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 33+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2021-08-19  0:20 Eric Snowberg
2021-08-19  0:20 ` [PATCH v4 01/12] integrity: Introduce a Linux keyring for the Machine Owner Key (MOK) Eric Snowberg
2021-08-19  0:20 ` [PATCH v4 02/12] integrity: Do not allow mok keyring updates following init Eric Snowberg
2021-08-19  0:21 ` [PATCH v4 03/12] KEYS: CA link restriction Eric Snowberg
2021-08-19  0:21 ` [PATCH v4 04/12] integrity: restrict INTEGRITY_KEYRING_MOK to restrict_link_by_ca Eric Snowberg
2021-08-19  0:21 ` [PATCH v4 05/12] integrity: add new keyring handler for mok keys Eric Snowberg
2021-08-19  0:21 ` [PATCH v4 06/12] KEYS: add a reference to mok keyring Eric Snowberg
2021-08-19  0:21 ` [PATCH v4 07/12] KEYS: Introduce link restriction to include builtin, secondary and mok keys Eric Snowberg
2021-08-19  0:21 ` [PATCH v4 08/12] KEYS: integrity: change link restriction to trust the mok keyring Eric Snowberg
2021-08-19  0:21 ` [PATCH v4 09/12] KEYS: link secondary_trusted_keys to mok trusted keys Eric Snowberg
2021-08-19  0:21 ` [PATCH v4 10/12] integrity: store reference to mok keyring Eric Snowberg
2021-08-19  0:21 ` [PATCH v4 11/12] integrity: Trust MOK keys if MokListTrustedRT found Eric Snowberg
2021-08-19  0:21 ` [PATCH v4 12/12] integrity: Only use mok keyring when uefi_check_trust_mok_keys is true Eric Snowberg
2021-08-19 11:38 ` [PATCH v4 00/12] Enroll kernel keys thru MOK Jarkko Sakkinen
2021-08-19 13:10   ` Mimi Zohar
2021-08-19 15:23     ` Eric Snowberg
2021-08-19 17:32       ` Mimi Zohar [this message]
2021-08-23 17:51         ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2021-08-23 20:48           ` Nayna
2021-08-24 14:34             ` Mimi Zohar
2021-08-25 22:21               ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2021-08-25 22:27                 ` James Bottomley
2021-08-27 20:44                   ` Nayna
2021-08-30 17:39                     ` Eric Snowberg
2021-09-01  0:52                       ` Nayna
2021-09-01  1:51                         ` Eric Snowberg
2021-09-02 10:18                           ` Mimi Zohar
2021-09-01  4:34                     ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2021-09-01  4:36                       ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2021-09-01  4:46                         ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2021-08-23 17:37       ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2021-08-23 17:35     ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2021-08-23 17:48       ` Eric Snowberg

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