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* [RESEND] crypto: public_key: fix overflow during implicit conversion
@ 2021-08-19 12:37 zhenwei pi
2021-08-19 12:54 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
0 siblings, 1 reply; 2+ messages in thread
From: zhenwei pi @ 2021-08-19 12:37 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: jarkko
Cc: dhowells, herbert, davem, keyrings, linux-crypto, linux-kernel,
zhenwei pi
Hit kernel warning like this, it can be reproduced by verifying 256
bytes datafile by keyctl command, run script:
RAWDATA=rawdata
SIGDATA=sigdata
modprobe pkcs8_key_parser
rm -rf *.der *.pem *.pfx
rm -rf $RAWDATA
dd if=/dev/random of=$RAWDATA bs=256 count=1
openssl req -nodes -x509 -newkey rsa:4096 -keyout key.pem -out cert.pem \
-subj "/C=CN/ST=GD/L=SZ/O=vihoo/OU=dev/CN=xx.com/emailAddress=yy@xx.com"
KEY_ID=`openssl pkcs8 -in key.pem -topk8 -nocrypt -outform DER | keyctl \
padd asymmetric 123 @s`
keyctl pkey_sign $KEY_ID 0 $RAWDATA enc=pkcs1 hash=sha1 > $SIGDATA
keyctl pkey_verify $KEY_ID 0 $RAWDATA $SIGDATA enc=pkcs1 hash=sha1
Then the kernel reports:
WARNING: CPU: 5 PID: 344556 at crypto/rsa-pkcs1pad.c:540
pkcs1pad_verify+0x160/0x190
...
Call Trace:
public_key_verify_signature+0x282/0x380
? software_key_query+0x12d/0x180
? keyctl_pkey_params_get+0xd6/0x130
asymmetric_key_verify_signature+0x66/0x80
keyctl_pkey_verify+0xa5/0x100
do_syscall_64+0x35/0xb0
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
The reason of this issue, in function 'asymmetric_key_verify_signature':
'.digest_size(u8) = params->in_len(u32)' leads overflow of an u8 value,
so use u32 instead of u8 for digest_size field. And reorder struct
public_key_signature, it saves 8 bytes on a 64-bit machine.
Thanks to Jarkko Sakkinen for suggestions.
Signed-off-by: zhenwei pi <pizhenwei@bytedance.com>
---
include/crypto/public_key.h | 4 ++--
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/crypto/public_key.h b/include/crypto/public_key.h
index 47accec68cb0..f603325c0c30 100644
--- a/include/crypto/public_key.h
+++ b/include/crypto/public_key.h
@@ -38,9 +38,9 @@ extern void public_key_free(struct public_key *key);
struct public_key_signature {
struct asymmetric_key_id *auth_ids[2];
u8 *s; /* Signature */
- u32 s_size; /* Number of bytes in signature */
u8 *digest;
- u8 digest_size; /* Number of bytes in digest */
+ u32 s_size; /* Number of bytes in signature */
+ u32 digest_size; /* Number of bytes in digest */
const char *pkey_algo;
const char *hash_algo;
const char *encoding;
--
2.25.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 2+ messages in thread
* Re: [RESEND] crypto: public_key: fix overflow during implicit conversion
2021-08-19 12:37 [RESEND] crypto: public_key: fix overflow during implicit conversion zhenwei pi
@ 2021-08-19 12:54 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
0 siblings, 0 replies; 2+ messages in thread
From: Jarkko Sakkinen @ 2021-08-19 12:54 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: zhenwei pi; +Cc: dhowells, herbert, davem, keyrings, linux-crypto, linux-kernel
On Thu, 2021-08-19 at 20:37 +0800, zhenwei pi wrote:
> Hit kernel warning like this, it can be reproduced by verifying 256
> bytes datafile by keyctl command, run script:
> RAWDATA=rawdata
> SIGDATA=sigdata
>
> modprobe pkcs8_key_parser
>
> rm -rf *.der *.pem *.pfx
> rm -rf $RAWDATA
> dd if=/dev/random of=$RAWDATA bs=256 count=1
>
> openssl req -nodes -x509 -newkey rsa:4096 -keyout key.pem -out cert.pem \
> -subj "/C=CN/ST=GD/L=SZ/O=vihoo/OU=dev/CN=xx.com/emailAddress=yy@xx.com"
>
> KEY_ID=`openssl pkcs8 -in key.pem -topk8 -nocrypt -outform DER | keyctl \
> padd asymmetric 123 @s`
>
> keyctl pkey_sign $KEY_ID 0 $RAWDATA enc=pkcs1 hash=sha1 > $SIGDATA
> keyctl pkey_verify $KEY_ID 0 $RAWDATA $SIGDATA enc=pkcs1 hash=sha1
>
> Then the kernel reports:
> WARNING: CPU: 5 PID: 344556 at crypto/rsa-pkcs1pad.c:540
> pkcs1pad_verify+0x160/0x190
> ...
> Call Trace:
> public_key_verify_signature+0x282/0x380
> ? software_key_query+0x12d/0x180
> ? keyctl_pkey_params_get+0xd6/0x130
> asymmetric_key_verify_signature+0x66/0x80
> keyctl_pkey_verify+0xa5/0x100
> do_syscall_64+0x35/0xb0
> entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
>
> The reason of this issue, in function 'asymmetric_key_verify_signature':
> '.digest_size(u8) = params->in_len(u32)' leads overflow of an u8 value,
> so use u32 instead of u8 for digest_size field. And reorder struct
> public_key_signature, it saves 8 bytes on a 64-bit machine.
>
> Thanks to Jarkko Sakkinen for suggestions.
I appreciate this but since it is not relevant for the commit message,
I have to rip it off :-)
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
/Jarkko
> Signed-off-by: zhenwei pi <pizhenwei@bytedance.com>
> ---
> include/crypto/public_key.h | 4 ++--
> 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/include/crypto/public_key.h b/include/crypto/public_key.h
> index 47accec68cb0..f603325c0c30 100644
> --- a/include/crypto/public_key.h
> +++ b/include/crypto/public_key.h
> @@ -38,9 +38,9 @@ extern void public_key_free(struct public_key *key);
> struct public_key_signature {
> struct asymmetric_key_id *auth_ids[2];
> u8 *s; /* Signature */
> - u32 s_size; /* Number of bytes in signature */
> u8 *digest;
> - u8 digest_size; /* Number of bytes in digest */
> + u32 s_size; /* Number of bytes in signature */
> + u32 digest_size; /* Number of bytes in digest */
> const char *pkey_algo;
> const char *hash_algo;
> const char *encoding;
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 2+ messages in thread
end of thread, other threads:[~2021-08-19 12:54 UTC | newest]
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2021-08-19 12:37 [RESEND] crypto: public_key: fix overflow during implicit conversion zhenwei pi
2021-08-19 12:54 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
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