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From: ebiederm@xmission.com (Eric W. Biederman)
To: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com>,
	"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
	Miklos Szeredi <miklos@szeredi.hu>,
	akpm@linux-foundation.org, viro@ftp.linux.org.uk,
	linuxram@us.ibm.com, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, containers@lists.osdl.org,
	linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [patch] unprivileged mounts update
Date: Wed, 25 Apr 2007 12:41:41 -0600	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <m1647ks3dm.fsf@ebiederm.dsl.xmission.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20070425175609.GB20165@vino.hallyn.com> (Serge E. Hallyn's message of "Wed, 25 Apr 2007 12:56:09 -0500")

"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com> writes:

> Quoting Eric W. Biederman (ebiederm@xmission.com):
>> 
>> Are there other permission checks that mount is doing that we
>> care about.
>
> Not mount itself, but in looking up /share/fa/root/home/fa,
> user fa doesn't have the rights to read /share, and by setting
> fsuid to fa and dropping CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH the mount action fails.

Got it. 

I'm not certain this is actually a problem it may be a feature.
But it does fly in the face of the general principle of just
getting out of roots way so things can get done.

I think we can solve your basic problem by simply doing like:
chdir(/share); mount(.);  To simply avoid the permission problem.

The practical question is how much do we care.

> But the solution you outlined in your previous post would work around
> this perfectly.

If we are not using usual permissions which user do we use current->uid?
Or do we pass that user someplace?

>> > If it were really the equivalent then I could keep my capabilities :)
>> > after changing it.
>> 
>> We drop all capabilities after we change the euid.
>
> Not if we've done prctl(PR_SET_KEEPCAPS, 1)

Ah cap_clear doesn't do the obvious thing.

Eric

  reply	other threads:[~2007-04-25 18:44 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 24+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2007-04-25  7:45 Miklos Szeredi
2007-04-25 15:18 ` Miklos Szeredi
2007-04-25 16:55   ` H. Peter Anvin
2007-04-25 17:20     ` Serge E. Hallyn
2007-04-25 17:46       ` Eric W. Biederman
2007-04-25 17:56         ` Serge E. Hallyn
2007-04-25 18:41           ` Eric W. Biederman [this message]
2007-04-25 18:52             ` Serge E. Hallyn
2007-04-25 19:33               ` Miklos Szeredi
2007-04-26 14:57                 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2007-04-26 15:23                   ` Miklos Szeredi
2007-04-26 16:19                     ` Serge E. Hallyn
2007-04-26 16:29                       ` Miklos Szeredi
2007-04-26 19:42                         ` Serge E. Hallyn
2007-04-26 19:56                           ` Miklos Szeredi
2007-04-27  2:10                             ` Serge E. Hallyn
2007-04-25 17:21   ` Eric W. Biederman
2007-04-25 17:30     ` Serge E. Hallyn
2007-04-26 19:10     ` Jan Engelhardt
2007-04-26 20:27       ` Miklos Szeredi
2007-04-27  4:10         ` Eric W. Biederman
2007-04-27  7:01         ` Jan Engelhardt
2007-04-25 19:33   ` Andrew Morton
2007-04-25 19:45     ` Miklos Szeredi

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