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From: "tip-bot for Chang S. Bae" <tipbot@zytor.com>
To: linux-tip-commits@vger.kernel.org
Cc: ravi.v.shankar@intel.com, hpa@zytor.com, luto@kernel.org,
	dave.hansen@linux.intel.com, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	mingo@kernel.org, tglx@linutronix.de, chang.seok.bae@intel.com,
	ak@linux.intel.com
Subject: [tip:x86/cpu] x86/entry/64: Handle FSGSBASE enabled paranoid entry/exit
Date: Sat, 22 Jun 2019 03:11:11 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <tip-708078f65721b46d82d9934a3f0b36a2b8ad0656@git.kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1557309753-24073-13-git-send-email-chang.seok.bae@intel.com>

Commit-ID:  708078f65721b46d82d9934a3f0b36a2b8ad0656
Gitweb:     https://git.kernel.org/tip/708078f65721b46d82d9934a3f0b36a2b8ad0656
Author:     Chang S. Bae <chang.seok.bae@intel.com>
AuthorDate: Wed, 8 May 2019 03:02:27 -0700
Committer:  Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
CommitDate: Sat, 22 Jun 2019 11:38:54 +0200

x86/entry/64: Handle FSGSBASE enabled paranoid entry/exit

Without FSGSBASE, user space cannot change GSBASE other than through a
PRCTL. The kernel enforces that the user space GSBASE value is postive as
negative values are used for detecting the kernel space GSBASE value in the
paranoid entry code.

If FSGSBASE is enabled, user space can set arbitrary GSBASE values without
kernel intervention, including negative ones, which breaks the paranoid
entry assumptions.

To avoid this, paranoid entry needs to unconditionally save the current
GSBASE value independent of the interrupted context, retrieve and write the
kernel GSBASE and unconditionally restore the saved value on exit. The
restore happens either in paranoid_exit or in the special exit path of the
NMI low level code.

All other entry code pathes which use unconditional SWAPGS are not affected
as they do not depend on the actual content.

[ tglx: Massaged changelogs and comments ]

Suggested-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Suggested-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Suggested-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Chang S. Bae <chang.seok.bae@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Ravi Shankar <ravi.v.shankar@intel.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1557309753-24073-13-git-send-email-chang.seok.bae@intel.com

---
 arch/x86/entry/calling.h  |  6 ++++
 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S | 80 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------
 2 files changed, 75 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/calling.h b/arch/x86/entry/calling.h
index 9a524360ae2e..d3fbe2dc03ea 100644
--- a/arch/x86/entry/calling.h
+++ b/arch/x86/entry/calling.h
@@ -338,6 +338,12 @@ For 32-bit we have the following conventions - kernel is built with
 #endif
 .endm
 
+.macro SAVE_AND_SET_GSBASE scratch_reg:req save_reg:req
+	rdgsbase \save_reg
+	GET_PERCPU_BASE \scratch_reg
+	wrgsbase \scratch_reg
+.endm
+
 #endif /* CONFIG_X86_64 */
 
 .macro STACKLEAK_ERASE
diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S b/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S
index aaa846f8850a..7f9f5119d6b1 100644
--- a/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S
+++ b/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S
@@ -38,6 +38,7 @@
 #include <asm/export.h>
 #include <asm/frame.h>
 #include <asm/nospec-branch.h>
+#include <asm/fsgsbase.h>
 #include <linux/err.h>
 
 #include "calling.h"
@@ -947,7 +948,6 @@ ENTRY(\sym)
 	addq	$\ist_offset, CPU_TSS_IST(\shift_ist)
 	.endif
 
-	/* these procedures expect "no swapgs" flag in ebx */
 	.if \paranoid
 	jmp	paranoid_exit
 	.else
@@ -1164,9 +1164,14 @@ idtentry machine_check		do_mce			has_error_code=0	paranoid=1
 #endif
 
 /*
- * Save all registers in pt_regs, and switch gs if needed.
- * Use slow, but surefire "are we in kernel?" check.
- * Return: ebx=0: need swapgs on exit, ebx=1: otherwise
+ * Save all registers in pt_regs. Return GSBASE related information
+ * in EBX depending on the availability of the FSGSBASE instructions:
+ *
+ * FSGSBASE	R/EBX
+ *     N        0 -> SWAPGS on exit
+ *              1 -> no SWAPGS on exit
+ *
+ *     Y        GSBASE value at entry, must be restored in paranoid_exit
  */
 ENTRY(paranoid_entry)
 	UNWIND_HINT_FUNC
@@ -1174,7 +1179,6 @@ ENTRY(paranoid_entry)
 	PUSH_AND_CLEAR_REGS save_ret=1
 	ENCODE_FRAME_POINTER 8
 
-1:
 	/*
 	 * Always stash CR3 in %r14.  This value will be restored,
 	 * verbatim, at exit.  Needed if paranoid_entry interrupted
@@ -1192,6 +1196,25 @@ ENTRY(paranoid_entry)
 	 */
 	SAVE_AND_SWITCH_TO_KERNEL_CR3 scratch_reg=%rax save_reg=%r14
 
+        /*
+	 * Handling GSBASE depends on the availability of FSGSBASE.
+	 *
+	 * Without FSGSBASE the kernel enforces that negative GSBASE
+	 * values indicate kernel GSBASE. With FSGSBASE no assumptions
+	 * can be made about the GSBASE value when entering from user
+	 * space.
+	*/
+	ALTERNATIVE "jmp .Lparanoid_entry_checkgs", "", X86_FEATURE_FSGSBASE
+
+	/*
+	 * Read the current GSBASE and store it in in %rbx unconditionally,
+	 * retrieve and set the current CPUs kernel GSBASE. The stored value
+	 * has to be restored in paranoid_exit unconditionally.
+	 */
+	SAVE_AND_SET_GSBASE scratch_reg=%rax save_reg=%rbx
+	ret
+
+.Lparanoid_entry_checkgs:
 	/* EBX = 1 -> kernel GSBASE active, no restore required */
 	movl	$1, %ebx
 	/*
@@ -1218,16 +1241,32 @@ END(paranoid_entry)
  *
  * We may be returning to very strange contexts (e.g. very early
  * in syscall entry), so checking for preemption here would
- * be complicated.  Fortunately, we there's no good reason
- * to try to handle preemption here.
+ * be complicated.  Fortunately, there's no good reason to try
+ * to handle preemption here.
  *
- * On entry, ebx is "no swapgs" flag (1: don't need swapgs, 0: need it)
+ * R/EBX contains the GSBASE related information depending on the
+ * availability of the FSGSBASE instructions:
+ *
+ * FSGSBASE	R/EBX
+ *     N        0 -> SWAPGS on exit
+ *              1 -> no SWAPGS on exit
+ *
+ *     Y        User space GSBASE, must be restored unconditionally
  */
 ENTRY(paranoid_exit)
 	UNWIND_HINT_REGS
 	DISABLE_INTERRUPTS(CLBR_ANY)
 	TRACE_IRQS_OFF_DEBUG
-	/* If EBX is 0, SWAPGS is required */
+
+	/* Handle GS depending on FSGSBASE availability */
+	ALTERNATIVE "jmp .Lparanoid_exit_checkgs", "nop",X86_FEATURE_FSGSBASE
+
+	/* With FSGSBASE enabled, unconditionally restore GSBASE */
+	wrgsbase	%rbx
+	jmp	.Lparanoid_exit_no_swapgs;
+
+.Lparanoid_exit_checkgs:
+	/* On non-FSGSBASE systems, conditionally do SWAPGS */
 	testl	%ebx, %ebx
 	jnz	.Lparanoid_exit_no_swapgs
 	TRACE_IRQS_IRETQ
@@ -1235,12 +1274,14 @@ ENTRY(paranoid_exit)
 	RESTORE_CR3	scratch_reg=%rbx save_reg=%r14
 	SWAPGS_UNSAFE_STACK
 	jmp	.Lparanoid_exit_restore
+
 .Lparanoid_exit_no_swapgs:
 	TRACE_IRQS_IRETQ_DEBUG
 	/* Always restore stashed CR3 value (see paranoid_entry) */
 	RESTORE_CR3	scratch_reg=%rbx save_reg=%r14
+
 .Lparanoid_exit_restore:
-	jmp restore_regs_and_return_to_kernel
+	jmp	restore_regs_and_return_to_kernel
 END(paranoid_exit)
 
 /*
@@ -1651,10 +1692,27 @@ end_repeat_nmi:
 	/* Always restore stashed CR3 value (see paranoid_entry) */
 	RESTORE_CR3 scratch_reg=%r15 save_reg=%r14
 
-	testl	%ebx, %ebx			/* swapgs needed? */
+	/*
+	 * The above invocation of paranoid_entry stored the GSBASE
+	 * related information in R/EBX depending on the availability
+	 * of FSGSBASE.
+	 *
+	 * If FSGSBASE is enabled, restore the saved GSBASE value
+	 * unconditionally, otherwise take the conditional SWAPGS path.
+	 */
+	ALTERNATIVE "jmp nmi_no_fsgsbase", "", X86_FEATURE_FSGSBASE
+
+	wrgsbase	%rbx
+	jmp	nmi_restore
+
+nmi_no_fsgsbase:
+	/* EBX == 0 -> invoke SWAPGS */
+	testl	%ebx, %ebx
 	jnz	nmi_restore
+
 nmi_swapgs:
 	SWAPGS_UNSAFE_STACK
+
 nmi_restore:
 	POP_REGS
 

  reply	other threads:[~2019-06-22 10:11 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 63+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2019-05-08 10:02 [PATCH v7 00/18] x86: Enable FSGSBASE instructions Chang S. Bae
2019-05-08 10:02 ` [PATCH v7 01/18] x86/fsgsbase/64: Fix ARCH_SET_FS/GS behaviors for a remote task Chang S. Bae
     [not found]   ` <74F4F506-2913-4013-9D81-A0C69FA8CDF1@intel.com>
     [not found]     ` <6420E1A5-B5AD-4028-AA91-AA4D5445AC83@intel.com>
2019-06-16 15:44       ` Bae, Chang Seok
2019-06-16 16:32         ` Thomas Gleixner
2019-06-22 10:04         ` [tip:x86/cpu] x86/ptrace: Prevent ptrace from clearing the FS/GS selector tip-bot for Chang S. Bae
2020-06-18 13:50         ` [tip: x86/fsgsbase] " tip-bot2 for Chang S. Bae
2019-05-08 10:02 ` [PATCH v7 02/18] selftests/x86/fsgsbase: Test ptracer-induced GSBASE write Chang S. Bae
2019-06-22 10:04   ` [tip:x86/cpu] " tip-bot for Chang S. Bae
2019-05-08 10:02 ` [PATCH v7 03/18] x86/fsgsbase/64: Add 'unsafe_fsgsbase' to enable CR4.FSGSBASE Chang S. Bae
2019-06-22 10:05   ` [tip:x86/cpu] x86/cpu: " tip-bot for Andy Lutomirski
2020-06-18 13:50   ` [tip: x86/fsgsbase] " tip-bot2 for Andy Lutomirski
2019-05-08 10:02 ` [PATCH v7 04/18] kbuild: Raise the minimum required binutils version to 2.21 Chang S. Bae
2019-06-22 10:06   ` [tip:x86/cpu] " tip-bot for Chang S. Bae
2019-05-08 10:02 ` [PATCH v7 05/18] x86/fsgsbase/64: Add intrinsics for FSGSBASE instructions Chang S. Bae
2019-06-22 10:06   ` [tip:x86/cpu] " tip-bot for Andi Kleen
2020-06-18 13:50   ` [tip: x86/fsgsbase] " tip-bot2 for Andi Kleen
2019-05-08 10:02 ` [PATCH v7 06/18] x86/fsgsbase/64: Enable FSGSBASE instructions in the helper functions Chang S. Bae
2019-06-22 10:07   ` [tip:x86/cpu] x86/fsgsbase/64: Enable FSGSBASE instructions in " tip-bot for Chang S. Bae
2020-06-18 13:50   ` [tip: x86/fsgsbase] " tip-bot2 for Chang S. Bae
2019-05-08 10:02 ` [PATCH v7 07/18] x86/fsgsbase/64: Preserve FS/GS state in __switch_to() if FSGSBASE is on Chang S. Bae
2019-06-21 15:22   ` Thomas Gleixner
2019-06-22 10:08   ` [tip:x86/cpu] x86/process/64: Use FSBSBASE in switch_to() if available tip-bot for Andy Lutomirski
2020-06-18 13:50   ` [tip: x86/fsgsbase] " tip-bot2 for Andy Lutomirski
2019-05-08 10:02 ` [PATCH v7 08/18] x86/fsgsbase/64: When copying a thread, use the FSGSBASE instructions Chang S. Bae
2019-06-22 10:09   ` [tip:x86/cpu] x86/process/64: Use FSGSBASE instructions on thread copy and ptrace tip-bot for Chang S. Bae
2020-06-18 13:50   ` [tip: x86/fsgsbase] " tip-bot2 for Chang S. Bae
2019-05-08 10:02 ` [PATCH v7 09/18] x86/entry/64: Add the READ_MSR_GSBASE macro Chang S. Bae
2019-05-08 10:02 ` [PATCH v7 10/18] x86/entry/64: Switch CR3 before SWAPGS on the paranoid entry Chang S. Bae
2019-06-22 10:09   ` [tip:x86/cpu] x86/entry/64: Switch CR3 before SWAPGS in " tip-bot for Chang S. Bae
2020-06-18 13:50   ` [tip: x86/fsgsbase] " tip-bot2 for Chang S. Bae
2019-05-08 10:02 ` [PATCH v7 11/18] x86/fsgsbase/64: Introduce the FIND_PERCPU_BASE macro Chang S. Bae
2019-06-22 10:10   ` [tip:x86/cpu] x86/entry/64: " tip-bot for Chang S. Bae
2020-06-18 13:50   ` [tip: x86/fsgsbase] " tip-bot2 for Chang S. Bae
2019-05-08 10:02 ` [PATCH v7 12/18] x86/fsgsbase/64: GSBASE handling with FSGSBASE in the paranoid path Chang S. Bae
2019-06-22 10:11   ` tip-bot for Chang S. Bae [this message]
2019-06-29  7:21   ` Bae, Chang Seok
2019-06-29  7:37     ` Thomas Gleixner
2020-06-18 13:50   ` [tip: x86/fsgsbase] x86/entry/64: Handle FSGSBASE enabled paranoid entry/exit tip-bot2 for Chang S. Bae
2019-05-08 10:02 ` [PATCH v7 13/18] x86/fsgsbase/64: Document GSBASE handling in the paranoid path Chang S. Bae
2019-06-22 10:11   ` [tip:x86/cpu] x86/entry/64: " tip-bot for Chang S. Bae
2019-05-08 10:02 ` [PATCH v7 14/18] selftests/x86/fsgsbase: Test WRGSBASE Chang S. Bae
2019-06-22 10:12   ` [tip:x86/cpu] selftests/x86/fsgsbase: Test RD/WRGSBASE tip-bot for Andy Lutomirski
2019-05-08 10:02 ` [PATCH v7 15/18] selftests/x86/fsgsbase: Test ptracer-induced GSBASE write with FSGSBASE Chang S. Bae
2019-06-22 10:13   ` [tip:x86/cpu] " tip-bot for Chang S. Bae
2019-05-08 10:02 ` [PATCH v7 16/18] x86/fsgsbase/64: Enable FSGSBASE by default and add a chicken bit Chang S. Bae
2019-06-22 10:14   ` [tip:x86/cpu] x86/cpu: Enable FSGSBASE on 64bit " tip-bot for Andy Lutomirski
2020-06-18 13:50   ` [tip: x86/fsgsbase] " tip-bot2 for Andy Lutomirski
2019-05-08 10:02 ` [PATCH v7 17/18] x86/elf: Enumerate kernel FSGSBASE capability in AT_HWCAP2 Chang S. Bae
2019-06-22 10:14   ` [tip:x86/cpu] " tip-bot for Andi Kleen
2020-06-18 13:50   ` [tip: x86/fsgsbase] " tip-bot2 for Andi Kleen
2019-05-08 10:02 ` [PATCH v7 18/18] x86/fsgsbase/64: Add documentation for FSGSBASE Chang S. Bae
2019-06-14  6:54   ` Thomas Gleixner
2019-06-14 20:07     ` Bae, Chang Seok
     [not found]       ` <89BE934A-A392-4CED-83E5-CA4FADDAE6DF@intel.com>
2019-06-16  8:39         ` Thomas Gleixner
2019-06-16 12:34           ` Thomas Gleixner
2019-06-16 15:34             ` Bae, Chang Seok
2019-06-16 16:05               ` Thomas Gleixner
2019-06-16 20:48                 ` Bae, Chang Seok
2019-06-16 22:00                   ` Thomas Gleixner
     [not found]                     ` <8E2E84B6-BCCC-424D-A1A7-604828B389FB@intel.com>
2019-06-17  5:18                       ` Thomas Gleixner
2019-06-16 15:54     ` Randy Dunlap
2019-06-16 16:07       ` Thomas Gleixner
2019-06-22 10:15     ` [tip:x86/cpu] Documentation/x86/64: Add documentation for GS/FS addressing mode tip-bot for Thomas Gleixner

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